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Abstract 
Corporate Governance and Accountability in Uganda - A Stakeholder Perspective 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the extent to which stakeholders in Uganda perceive the 
country's present governance framework to be effective in providing confidence 
about the corporate sector. The study is based upon semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaire surveys with different groups of stakeholders in Uganda. The issues that 
are examined include the legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks, the political 
framework, the cultural framework, the ethical framework and the economic 
framework underpinning governance in the nation's corporate sector. The research 
adopts an accountability perspective to investigate the various issues that emerge; the 
results suggest that urgent action is needed in order to facilitate the implementation of 
a sound corporate governance system that provides for a meaningful degree of 
accountability. 
xiii 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
The notion of good corporate governance (and departures therefrom) features 
prominently in the world's professional and academic literature, largely as a result of 
various financial scandals and failures all over the world. The growing number of 
cataclysmic events occurring over the past ten years or so has led to heightened 
concern about the de-facto standards of Corporate Governance which exist across the 
world. The financial crisis that swept the world in the summer of 1998 proved 
particularly significant in this regard; the Russian Government defaulted on several 
major loans, after which the crisis spread to Central and South America before 
moving to Asia, and leading to widespread fear that the Western financial system 
would collapse (Monks and Minow, 2001). In addition to these macro level 
catastrophes, a number of spectacular failures in individual companies have also 
focussed attention on the lack of robust structures. Although most of this attention has 
been devoted to recent cases in the world's richest nations (e. g. Enron, Worldcom and 
Parmalat), 1 developing countries have not been immune from such difficulties. For 
example, Uganda has had several recent large-scale corporate failures; three 
indigenous banks (The Co-operative Bank, Greenland Bank and Trans Africa Bank) 
collapsed in 1999 while a fourth (Trust Bank), a subsidiary of a Kenyan financial 
institution, was closed in the same year. Prior to these cases there had been a series of 
' Patsuris (2002) provides the following list of companies that have been involved in high profile 
corporate governance scandals: Adelphia Communications (April 2002); AOL Time Warner (July 
2002); Arthur Andersen (Nov. 2001); Bristol-Myers (July 2002); CMS Energy (May 2002); Duke 
Energy (July 2002); Dynergy (May 2002); El Paso (May 2002); Enron (October 2001); Global 
Crossing (February 2002); Halliburton (May 2002); Homestore. com (January 2002); K-Mart (January 
2002); Merck (July 2002); Mirant (July 2002); Nicor Energy LLC (July 2002); Peregrine Systems 
(May 2002); Qwest Communications International (February 2002); Reliant Energy (May 2002); Tyco 
(May 2002); WorldCorn (March 2002); and Xerox (June 2000). 
2 
corporate governance scandals involving the AIB in Ireland, and BCCI, Polly Peck as 
well as the Maxwell Communications Group in the UK, events which led to a 
reappraisal of the notion of good governance in the countries concerned. As a result of 
all these scandals Govemments and private sector organisations around the world 
have made various efforts to promote good govemance in both the private and the 
public sector; this interest in improved governance has led to the emergence of 
numerous governance guidelines and codes (Laing and Weir, 1999). 
Apart from corporate scandals, there has also been a demand for corporate governance 
guidelines among international investors; this has led to the tendency for convergence C: )-- 
in the guidelines towards acceptable international norms. For example, traditional 
corporate governance practices in Japan, Germany and France were questioned; in 
these markets, the Government's role was relatively pronounced, debt financing was 
preferred to equity, stock market capitalisations were low, systems of cross-holding 
made ownership illiquid, a few giant shareholders predominated, takeovers were rare, 
and disclosure was poor (Monks and Minow, 2001). 
The World Bank, through the International Finance Corporation, set out to promote 
corporate govemance throughout the world; it has sponsored and endorsed efforts to 
this end. Among the main results of these endeavours were the Principles of 
Corporate Govemance issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 1999 (later revised in 2004). These, together with the 
Commonwealth Principles (1999)2 and the King Report I (1994)3 were used as a basis 
2 cc Commonwealth Principles" refers to the Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth 
that were issued by the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance in 1999. 
3 
for drafting the Manual on Corporate Governance - Incorporating Reconunended 
Guidelines for Uganda (2001 ). 4 A copy of these guidelines is attached in Appendix 
1.1. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) of Uganda later published The Capital 
Markets Corporate Governance Guidelines in 2003 (see Appendix 1.2). The CMA 
guidelines were more specific than those published by the ICGU. Also, whereas the 
ICGU guidelines were meant to apply to all companies, the CMA guidelines -ývere 
designed specifically for companies listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange. 
The researcher picked up interest in the topic of corporate governance following the 
events that led to the collapse of Enron in 2001. When a company collapses or is 
involved in accounting and other corporate governance related scandals, various 
stakeholders are affected. For example, many or all employees lose their jobs as well 
as their pensions; shareholders lose practically all of their investments. Debt providers 
may not be able to recover the money lent to these companies; the Government loses 
the tax revenue that it would have received, both from the companies concerned and 
from other beneficiaries of the companies' operations. The community loses a source 
of employment when a company collapses and disposable income drops. Investor 
confidence is affected and the reputation of some professional entities may be 
affected. 5 These and other concerns influenced the researcher to examine the 
perceptions of stakeholders about corporate governance and accountability in Uganda, 
3 "King Report I" refers to the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (King Committee on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa), published by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa in 
1994. The code was later revised in 2002. 
4 In a document posted on its website on 19ffi April 2005, the Pan-African Consultative Forum 
(Corporate Governance) stated that an Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) was 
established in Uganda to lead governance reform in that country; this decision was taken following a 
three-day regional workshop on corporate governance convened by the Commonwealth Association for 
Corporate Governance (CACG) in association with the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Parastatal 
Monitoring Unit in June 1998. 
5 E. g. Arthur Andersen, which was one of the biggest five accounting firms in the world, had to wind 
up as a result of being tainted by its involvement in the Enron scandal. 
4 
the researcher's own country; Uganda is a developing nation where confidence in the 
corporate sector's governance standards is, on the face of it, crucial if domestic and 
international investment is to grow, and the nation's economy to expand. 
1.2 Background Information about Uganda 
This section provides some background information about the political, legal, 
regulatory, economic, ethical, social and cultural environment in Uganda to provide 
the context for the empirical studies carried out in Uganda and discussed later in the 
thesis. 
Figure 1.1 Map of Uganda 
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NOTE: This map, taken from Lonely Planet website, shows Uganda and its surrounding countries. 
Uganda is a land-locked country located in the Eastern part of Africa. The nation is 
surrounded by Kenya to the east, Tanzania to the south, Sudan to the north, the 
5 
Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Rwanda to the southwest (see figure 
1.1). 
According to official records, Uganda began interacting with people from Europe in 
March 1860 following the visit of Giovani Miani, an Italian working for the Egyptian 
authorities. Uganda became a British Protectorate in 1894 and eventually gained its 
independence on 9th October 1962 (Ugandan Goverment, 2004). 
1.2.1 Political Environment 
Uganda has had a turbulent political history since gaining its independence from 
colonial rule in 1962. At the time of independence, Uganda had a federal system of 
government; however, in 1966 Milton Obote, the then Prime Minister, forcefully 
n I.. abolished all kingdoms and created the Republic of Uganda. Idi Amin eventually 
overthrew Obote in a military coup on 25 th January 1971 and ruled Uganda until he 
himself was overthrown in April 1979. 
After the overthrow of Amin there were successive short lived govermnents led by 
Professor Yusuf Lule (for two months), Godfrey Binaisa (eleven months) and Paul 
Muwanga (four months). Obote was returned to power in 1980 following elections 
and was sworn in as President for the second time on I I'hDecember 1980. Obote was 
subsequently overthrown for the second time on the 27th July 1985 and Tito Okello 
was sworn in as President only to be forcefully removed from office on the 26h 
January 1986 by a group led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Museveni was sworn in as 
6 
President of Uganda on 29"' January 1986 and retains power to this day (Uganda 
Govenunent, 2004). 
The Ugandan Constitution of 1995 provides for a total of 305 members of parliament 
composed of 214 Constituency Representatives, 56 District Women Representatives, 
10 Uganda People's Defence Forces Representatives, 5 Representatives of the Youth, 
5 Representatives of Persons with Disabilities, 5 Representatives of Workers and 10 
Ex-officio Members (Parliament of Uganda website, 2004). The functions of the 
Parliament of Uganda are specified as follows: 
i. passing laws for the good governance of Uganda; 
providing, by giving legislative sanctions, taxation and acquisition of 
loans, the means of carrying out the work of GoverDment; 
scrutinising Government policy and administration through the following: 
" pre-legislative scrutiny of bills referred to the parliamentary 
conu-nittees by Parliament; 
" scrutiny of the various objects of expenditure and the sums to be spent 
on each; 
" assurance regarding transparency and accountability in the application 
of public funds; 
" addressing to a member of Government questions for reply on the floor 
of the House; and 
monitoring the implementation of Government programmes and 
proj ects; 
iv. debating matters of topical interest, usually those highlighted in the 
President's State of The Nation address; 
V. vetting the appointment of persons nominated by the President under the 
Constitution or any other enactment. (Uganda Parliament website, 2004). 
The minimum qualifications for a person to become a member of parliament are 
A- 
Level or its equivalent. 
7 
1.2.2 The Legal System 
As stated in Section 1.2.1 above, one of the functions of parliament is to pass laws for 
the good governance of Uganda. At the forefront of the legal system in Uganda is the 
Judiciary, whose official website states: 
The judiciary is a distinct and independent arm of Government entrusted 
with judicial authority, and mandated to administer and deliver justice to 
the people of Uganda. It plays a fundamental role in the promotion of law 
and order, human rights, social justice, morality and good governance. 
The same website indicates the following regarding its mission: 
The mission of the Judiciary is to provide administration and timely delivery 
of justice to all people of Uganda. To achieve the above, the following main 
objectives are pursued as under: 
0 Establish and facilitate an effective machinery capable of 
functioning as an adjudicating service; 
0 Hear, consider and judge cases and dispose of them quickly and 
fairly in accordance with the law; 
0 Interpret and apply the Constitution and other laws of Uganda; and 
0 Introduce modalities for out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism 
to reduce the burden of cases on the courts. 
Article 128 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) states the following regarding the 
independence of the courts: 
The courts are not subject to the control or direction of any person or 
authority. No person can interfere with the courts in the exercise of their 
functions. All organs of the State are required to give the courts the 
assistance necessary to make them efficient. 
The Judiciary in Uganda is divided into: (i) the Supreme Court; (ii) the Court of 
Appeal; (iii) the High Court; (iv) the Commercial Court; and (v) the Magistrates 
Courts. 
The Supreme Court was established by Article 130 of the Constitution of Uganda 
(1995) and is composed of the Chief Justice and at least six other Justices. The 
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decisions of the Supreme Court are final and form precedents to be followed by all 
lower courts. The Court of Appeal came into being following the promulgation of the 
Constitution of Uganda (1995), and the enactment of the Judicature Statute (1996) and 
6 is between the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Court of Appeal consists of 
the Deputy Chief Justice and at least seven other Justices. The only cases that can be 
brought directly to the Court of Appeal without passing through the High Court are 
cases involving the interpretation of the Constitution, where the Court of Appeal sits 
as a Constitutional Court. 
The High Court of Uganda was established by Article 138 of the Constitution and can 
try any case of any value or crime of any magnitude in Uganda. It hears appeals from 
Magistrates Courts in addition to hearing cases brought to it directly. The High Court 
is headed by the Honourable Principal Judge who is in charge of the administration of 
the court and has general supervisory powers over Magistrates' Courts. The High 
Court conducts most of its business at its headquarters but also has circuits in seven 
other locations spread all over the country. The High Court has four divisions, namely 
the Civil Division, the Commercial Division, the Family Division and the Criminal 
Division. The Commercial Court is, therefore, a division of the High Court and 
specialises in areas of a commercial nature. 
The Magistrate's Courts are the lowest courts and their decisions are subject to review 
by the High Court. The official website of the Ugandan Judiciary states: 
There are three levels of Magistrates Courts: Chief Magistrates, 
Magistrates Grade 1 and Magistrates Grade IL These courts handle the 
bulk of cases in Uganda. Presently the country is divided into 26 Chief 
Magistrates' areas administered by Chief Magistrates who have general 
The Court of Appeal is also a Constitutional Court. 
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powers of supervision over all magisterial courts within the area of jurisdiction. 
The cases that these Magistrates' Courts can hear are limited according to ý,, alue and 
type of crime. Crimes and cases above a certain value can only be tried by the High 
Court and the Superior Courts if there is an appeal against the decisions of the High 
Court 
.7 
In addition to the above courts of judicature, there are also Judicial Commissions of 
Inquiry which operate under the Commission of Inquiries Act and are free to adopt 
their own modus operandi. Other institutions involved in the administration of justice 
include local council courts and land tribunals; however, these do not fall under the 
judiciary. 
1.2.3 The Regulatory and Supervisory Environment 
Corporations and statutory bodies are regulated and supervised by different types of 
bodies. Private companies are regulated by the Registrar General's office (Companies 
Act of Uganda, 1964). However, there are other gove=ent agencies such as the 
Uganda Revenue Authority, the National Environment Management Authority and 
the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda that have an interest in the 
running of corporations and have regulatory and supervisory powers in their 
respective areas of concern. State-owned enterprises are regulated by the respective 
Ministries under which they operate as specified in the respective Statutes and Acts 
' "As far as civil claims are concerned the jurisdiction of the Chief Magistrates and Magistrates Grade I 
is limited to cases whose subject matter does not exceed the monetary value of shs. 5,000,000 (approx. 
f 1,600) and shs. 2,000,000 (approx. f 640) respectively. The present law limits the civil jurisdiction of 
Magistrates Grade 11 to minor claims whose value does not exceed shs. 5,000 (approx. f 1.60)" (See 
official website of the Judicature of Uganda). 
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that set the entities up. These Statutes or Acts are passed by Parliament and may be 
revised from time to time. The Registrar General has regulatory powers for all 
corporations, whether private or public unless specifically excluded from his 
jurisdiction. Other institutions that are involved in monitoring private and state-owned 
enterprises include the office of the Auditor General, the Inspector General of 
Government and the Ministry of Ethics and Integrity. 
1.2.4 The Economic Environment 
The Applied Language Solutions (2006) states the following on its website regarding 
the economy of Uganda: 
Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular 
rainfall, and sizable mineral deposits of copper and cobalt. Agriculture is 
the most important sector of the economy, employing over 80% of the 
work force. Coffee accounts for the bulk of export revenues. Since 1986, 
the government - with the support of foreign countries and international 
agencies - has acted to rehabilitate and stabilize the economy by 
undertaking currency refonn, raising producer prices on export crops, 
increasing prices of petroleum products, and improving civil service 
wages. The policy changes are especially aimed at dampening inflation 
and boosting production and export earnings. 
Uganda would arguably be far more developed than it is had it not been for the chronic 
political instability and erratic economic management that it has been experiencing 
since 1971 when Idi Amin overthrew the elected govermnent and started a period of 
economic turmoil in Uganda. This economic and political instability has left Uganda 
among the poorest and least-developed countries in Africa, notwithstanding its wealth 
in natural resources. However, there have been some improvements in the economy 
with inflation falling from 240% in 1987 and 42% in June 1992 to 8.9% in 2006, whilst 
9 While reference has been to the Wikipedia here, the researcher acknowledges the 
fact that anyone can 
post anything on the Wikipedia website. However, it is believed that the particular 
information that is 
cited here is accurate. 
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Uganda's real GDP for 2006 is estimated at 4.5% (Oketch, 2006). The Wikipedia 
(2004)9 gave the following estimates with respect to Uganda's economy for the year 
2002: investment as a percentage of GDP was estimated at 20.9%; private sector 
investment at 14.9% of GDP; and gross national savings as a percentage of GDP at 
5.5%. 
The Uganda Investment Authority was set up by an Act of Parliament in 1991 to 
encourage and facilitate investment in Uganda; its stated mission is: 
To market Uganda's investment opportunities and to ensure that Uganda 
becomes the best investment destination through provision of quick and 
quality facilitation services to all prospective investors to the country. 10 
In addition to the Uganda Investment Authority, Uganda has: the Capital Markets 
Authority which is responsible for regulating capital markets in Uganda; the Uganda 
Securities Exchange responsible for regulating the companies listed on the Ugandan 
Stock Exchange; " and the Uganda Manufacturers Association whose objective is to 
promote, protect and coordinate the industrialists in Uganda. 12 Most of the Ugandan 
businesses are either sole-proprietorships, or family owned, whilst others are privately 
owned with the number of shareholders not exceeding 50 members. 13 Only 5 Ugandan 
companies have the potential for dispersed ownership as a result of being listed on the 
Uganda Securities Exchange. 
In 1993, the Ugandan Government decided to privatise most of the nation's state run 
corporations (Ddumba-Ssentamu and Mugume, 2001). The stated objective for doing 
10 Official website of the Uganda Investment Authority. 
" At the time of writing this thesis (March, 2006), there are only 8 companies listed on the Uganda 
Securities Exchange; out of these, 5 are incorporated in Uganda, whilst 3 are registered in Kenya and 
cross-listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange. 
12 See official website of the Uganda Manufacturers Association. 
13 Section 30 of the Uganda Companies Act (1965) limits the number of shareholders of private 
companies to a maximum of 50. 
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so was: ccto improve the quality, coverage and economic efficiency of commercial and 
utility services, through privatisation, private participation in infrastructure, and an 
improved regulatory framework". 14 To-date, 117 out of the 3 82 formerly state-owned 
companies have been privatised and only 36 are yet to be divested. 15 Five of the 
privatised companies had their shares listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange, while 
the remaining firms were bought by local and foreign investors without being listed. 
Recently, there has been a move to revive the East African Community which was 
terminated during the time of Idi Amin in the mid 1970s. The Treaty establishing the 
East African Community (1999) set the following as its objectives: 
Promotion of sustainable growth and equitable development of partner 
states including rational utilisation of the region's natural resources and 
protection of the environment; 
Strengthening and consolidating the long standing political, economic, 
social, cultural and traditional ties by partner states and associations 
between the people of the region in promoting a people-centred mutual 
development; 
Enhancing and strengthening participation of the private sector and civil 
society; 
Mainstrearning of gender in all its programmes and enhancement of the 
role of women in development; 
Promotion of good governance including adherence to the principles of 
democratic rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal 
opportunities and gender equality; and 
Promotion of peace and stability within the region, and good 
neighbourliness among the partner states. 
As can be noted in the above objectives, the promotion of good governance, including 
accountability and transParency, was one of the stated objectives of the East African 
Community. It was hoped that countries in the Community would agree on ways of 
14 See official website of the Uganda Government Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture Program. 
15 However, the Uganda Government retained partial ownership of some of the privatized companies, 
such as the New Vision Printing and Publishing Company Ltd. 
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improving the governance of their indigenous companies in their countries so as to 
promote accountability and transparency. 
Further to the above objectives, on the 28ýh of August, 2004 the Heads of State of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania issued the following Joint Cornmuniquý dunng a 
Summit of the Heads of State held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 27 th to 29thAugust 2004: 
In pursuance of the provision of paragraph I of this Article, the Partner 
States undertake to establish among themselves and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common Market, 
subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation in 
order to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, 
cultural, social, political, and other relations of the Partner States to the 
end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development 
and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of which shall 
be equitably shared. 
The above communique was based on Article 5(2) of the East African Community 
Treaty. This proclamation set the stage for a larger economic market for the three East 
African Countries with the possibility of other countries in the region joining the East 
African Federation. 
1.2.5 Cultural, Ethical and Social Environment 
Uganda is made up of four main ethnic groups, namely the Bantu, Nilotics, Hamitics 
and NiloHarnitics (Uganda Govenunent, 2004). The Ugandan Constitution of 1995 
recognised 56 tribes in Uganda. However four more were recognised 
in 2004 thus 
bringing the total number of officially recognised tribes to 60.16 In the past, each tribe 
had a leader whose role was to unite the tribe and ensure that the 
interests of the tribe 
were adhered to by all members constituting that tribe. Deviation 
from community 
16 See Uganda Goverment White Paper on The Report of the Constitutional Review 
(2004). The 
newly recognised tribes include Gimara, 
Reli, Shana and Barundi. The other 56 are stated in the 
Constitution of Uganda (1995). 
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interests could be punished by banishment from the tribe. Each tribe had several clans 
which were in turn made up of families. There was a recognised leader at each of 
these levels whose function was similar to that of the tribal leader but at a lower level. 
Some tribes in Uganda, such as the Karimojong in the North East and the Sabiny in 
the East, still exhibit strict adherence to these systems and values. Some regions of the 
country such as Buganda, Busoga, Tooro, Budama and Teso have cultural leaders 
whose roles are mainly cultural and ceremonial rather than administrative in the sense 
of wielding political authority. Irrespective of the administrative or cultural system in 
place, there is still strong allegiance to the tribe, clan and family and individuals are 
often influenced to act in the best interest of those groups. This may lead to conflicts 
between acting in the best interests of the company or institution where one works, or 
fulfilling the tribal, clan or family expectations. Some officials may end up in 
unethical practices in order to raise money to satisfy these expectations. 
In December 2003, Uganda joined the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
during a three-day conference that took place in Merida, Mexico. The Convention 
aimed at: (i) promoting and strengthening measures to prevent and combat corruption 
more efficiently and effectively; (ii) facilitating and supporting international 
cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption; 
and (iii) promoting integrity, accountability and proper management of public 
resources (Karnya, 2004). 
The potential impact of ratification might necessarily be expected to be large in 
Uganda. For example, speaking during a workshop organised by the Uganda Media 
Women Association, the Executive Director of Uganda Debt Network, Mr. Zie 
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Gariyo, suggested that Uganda loses between Shs200 billion 17 and Shs350 billion a 
year through corruption; he explained that corruption generally takes the form of 
outright fraud and embezzlement, illegal payments, payment of ghost employees, 
false declaration of customs entries, poor contracting systems and fraudulent 
procurement (Walulya and Nalugo, 2004). The issue of corruption will be one of the 
factors examined in the empirical work reported in Chapters 6 and 7. 
1.2.6 Previous Studies on Corporate Governance in Uganda 
Although there has been some investigation of corporate governance practices in 
Uganda, to the researcher's knowledge this is the first major study that has been 
carried out on the subject, particularly in the private sector. The World Bank has 
sponsored research projects in the banking sector and on good governance in the 
public sector, but little work appears to have been undertaken regarding corporate 
governance in the Ugandan private sector. Researchers such as Caprio et al. (2005), 
Manibog (2003), Fick (2002), and Tangari and Mwenda (2001) have stressed that 
corporate governance is essential for attracting investment, improving commercial 
performance and contributing to economic development; factors such as bad or 
unclear corporate governance, corruption, inadequate legal and judicial systems and 
lack of democracy are seen as not being conducive to investment. The Africa 
Competitive Report of 2000/2001 re-iterated the same issues and stressed the need for 
the regulatory framework to be tightened to provide for improved corporate 
governance and mandate prompt corrective measures. 
17 "Shs" is an abbreviation for "Shillings", which is the Ugandan currency. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
The main aim of this research project is to examine the perceptions of stakeholders 
au about corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. Based upon this objective, 
the research will try to address the following questions: 
1. How is corporate governance understood in the Ugandan context? 
2. What do stakeholders perceive the current state of corporate governance and 
accountability in Uganda to be? 
3. What factors influence the practice of corporate governance in Uganda? 
4. Does Uganda have an adequate framework to support the practice of corporate 
governance? 
5. Are there any stakeholder suggestions on how corporate governance practices 
can be improved in Uganda? 
6. To what extent are Western norms of corporate governance applicable to a 
developing nation such as Uganda? 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
The research will confine itself to examining the perceptions of various categories of 
individuals who are understood either to have a prominent role in shaping the 
governance of companies or who are representatives of the key constituencies in 
Ugandan society. These will include: regulators, legislators, company employees, 
company executives, executive directors, non-executive directors, investors, owner- 
managers, lawyers/judiciary, accountants, academics and civil servants. Semi- 
structured interviews and questionnaire surveys, with questions based on the research 
questions, as well as international corporate governance principles and the extant 
academic literature on corporate governance, will be used as a basis for the research. 
Stakeholders will be asked for their views regarding these recommended principles 
and whether these principles are being applied in Ugandan companies. Other country 
specific factors which could affect the practice of corporate govemance will 
be 
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identified and integrated into the research. The main principles of corporate 
governance that will be used as sources for the questions are: (i) the OECD Principles 
(2004); GO the UK Combined Code (2003); (iii) the King Report 11 (2002); (iv) the 
Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (1999); and (v) the 
Ugandan Manual on Corporate Governance (2001). Other codes that will be referred 
to are: the Guidelines for Enhancing Good Economic and Corporate Governance in 
Africa (2002); the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2003); and the White Paper on 
Corporate Govemance in South Eastem Europe (2003). 
The study adds to the extant literature on corporate governance and accountability 
with respect to Uganda and other emerging or developing economies. The researcher 
was not able to locate any previous detailed study on corporate governance and 
accountability in Uganda. This study, therefore, will contribute to the academic 
literature regarding governance in Uganda, and Africa more generally. It is also hoped 
that various stakeholders in Uganda will use the results of the study to further their 
knowledge on corporate governance and accountability; they may reflect on the 
findings and take positive steps to improve governance in Ugandan companies. In this 
respect, the concluding chapter of the thesis attempts to draw together some of the key 
issues highlighted by the study that might be of concern to Ugandan regulatory 
authorities. 
In the wake of the financial crises and other corporate scandals outlined in this 
chapter, the question of how companies are governed has come to prominence more 
than ever before; other factors such as political stability and the risk associated with 
decisions that may be made by particular Governments, legal protection of investors' 
18 
rights, the effectiveness of regulatory and other enforcement agencies, as well as 
ethical issues that include corruption and bribery, have become major considerations 
in investment decisions. Clearly the relative importance of certain of these factors is 
likely to differ between developed and developing countries; one of the key aims of 
this thesis is to examine the appropriateness of Western codes and norms to 
governance in developing nations such as Uganda. The assumption made in this study 
is that potential investors generally follow their perceptions in making investment 
decisions and will put their money where they perceive good corporate governance 
practices to exist. It is also assumed that increased investment will contribute to the 
economic and social development of the citizens of a particular country; corporate 
governance and accountability are taken to be important for a country's development. 
These factors led the researcher to examine the perceptions of stakeholders towards 
corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. 
The study examines the perceptions of stakeholders, and so the interpretive paradigm, 
as identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979), is adopted. The study will give a 
descriptive account of the perceptions of stakeholders and attempt to interpret them 
using the conceptual framework of accountability. A stakeholder approach was 
selected in light of the researcher's experience of growing up in Uganda where 
cultural and social values stress allegiance to societal values; acting in the interests of 
the tribe, clan and family to which one belongs is important. These values may be 
changing, as society evolves and Ugandans interact with the international community, 
but they are still at the heart of the ordinary person in African society. The researcher 
is aware that the shareholder view is very influential in the UK although, in practice, 
some companies in that country may consider the interests of a wider cross-section of 
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stakeholders in their decisions. The research will, therefore, try to establish --, N-hether 
the participants in the current study view corporate governance from a shareholder or 
- consistent with the traditional societal values of Africa -a stakeholder approach. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The study is organised into eight chapters. Following the current introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the extant literature in the general area of corporate 
governance, with specific emphasis on: the concept of corporate governance; the 
relevance of corporate governance; the board of directors and its committees; 
shareholders and other stakeholders; disclosure and transparency; and the framework 
of corporate govemance. 
Chapter 3 reviews the various efforts that have been made to outline and promote a 
robust set of corporate governance principles in Africa. These efforts include those of 
the Economic Commission for Africa, which published the Guidelines for Enhancing 
Good Economic and Corporate Governance in Africa in 2002; the King Report 11 
(2002) of South Africa; and the Ugandan Manual on Corporate Governance (2001). 
Other relevant literature is used to develop the material in Chapter 2 in order to 
establish whether these issues are likely to be of major interest in an African context. 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology and methods which will be applied to the study. 
The chapter presents the various assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology that form the basis for the empirical research. As this 
chapter indicates, the study adopts Burrell and Morgan's (1979) interpretive 
paradigm. However, the paradigm borders on functionalism at various points and the 
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research uses both semi-structured interviews and questionnaire survey as its methods 
for collecting empirical data. 
Chapter 5 continues setting out the research design of the thesis by presenting the 
theoretical framework that is used to interpret the findings. The theoretical framework 
adopted by the study is accountability. Stewart's (1984) ladder of accountability was 
selected as being appropriate for the study, in particular the notions of managerial 
accountability and commercial accountability set out in the model. 
Chapter 6 describes the findings emerging from interviews held with sixteen 
individuals occupying various industrial, regulatory, political and judicial positions in 
Uganda during the month of September 2004. The chapter summarises the views of 
the par-ticipants and tries to interpret these perceptions in the light of internationally- 
accepted principles of corporate governance and accountability. 
Chapter 7 continues with the presentation of empirical results and covers the findings 
of a questionnaire survey that was administered in Uganda during the months of April 
to June 2005. In addition to providing a description of the views of stakeholders, the 
chapter presents the results of the detailed statistical analysis that was conducted on 
the data. In particular, the average responses across the sample as a whole and 
between various sub-groups of respondents are investigated. 
Chapter 8 discusses and synthesises results from both the interviews and the 
questionnaire survey, as well as examining the applicability of Stewart's ladder of 
accountability in the type of corporations prevalent in Uganda, while Chapter 9 
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presents some conclusions and recommendations based upon the empirical evidence, 
and highlights some limitations of the study and suggests areas for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
A series of cataclysmic events led to heightened concern about Corporate Governance 
across the world. According to Monks and Minow (2001), the financial crisis that 
swept the world in the summer of 1998 proved particularly significant in this regard. 
The Russian Government defaulted on loans leading to fragility in the global financial 
system. The crisis then spread to Central and South America before moving to Asia, 
leading to widespread fears that the Western fmancial system would collapse. Dunne 
(2003) points out that this potential collapse of the global financial system forced 
regulators to reassess the applicability of the various governance structures in 
existence within corporate entities. Dunne cites failings in high profile companies like 
Enron and Worldcom in the USA, AIB in Ireland, and BCCI, Polly Peck and Maxwell 
Communications Group in the UK as a further impetus for scrutinising governance of 
firms. Laing and Weir (1999)18 state that this interest in improved governance has led 
to the emergence of numerous guidelines and codes. 
The aim of this chapter is to review the published literature on corporate governance 
and identify possible target research priorities. Section 2.2 describes the concept of 
corporate governance; Section 2.3 examines the relevance of corporate governance; 
Section 2.4 deals with the board of directors, while Section 2.5 discusses board 
committees; Section 2.6 looks at shareholders and Section 2.7 examines issues of 
18 Cited by Dunne (2003). 
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disclosure and transparency; the chapter ends with discussion of the framework of 
corporate governance in Section 2.8. 
2.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 The Shareholder versus Stakeholder View 
One of the key debates in the modem corporate governance literature relates to the 
question of whether the effectiveness of a firm's governance arrangements has 
implications which go beyond those of its shareholders (Keasey et al., 1997). This 
issue has led to the development of the conflicting standpoints normally termed the 
shareholder and the stakeholder views. 19 For example, Letza et al. (2004) state that: 
For many commentators corporate governance is about building effective 
mechanisms, either in order to satisfy current social expectations or to 
satisfy the narrower expectations of shareholders (p. 242). 
The position taken regarding this debate is usually viewed as depending on the 
perspectives and biases of the individual as to what comprises a corporation, and its 
appropriate position in society (Monks and Minow, 2001). This debate also highlights 
the extent to which public policy intervention is appropriate (Keasey et al., 1997). 
Mallin (2004a) illustrates how important the distinction between the shareholder and 
stakeholder view is when she states that: 
An aspect of particular importance is whether the company itself operates 
within a shareholder framework, focusing primarily on the maintenance or 
enhancement of shareholder value as its main objective, or whether it 
takes a broader stakeholder approach emphasising the interests of diverse 
19 For example, the Anglo-Saxon system (which is shared by the UK and US) emphasises shareholder 
value and a board composed of executives and non-executive directors elected by shareholders. The 
German model, on the other hand, gives a legal right to certain stakeholder groups, such as employees, 
to be represented on the supervisory board alongside the directors. 
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groups such as employees, providers of credit, suppliers, customers and 
the local community (p. 9). 
Mallin argues that this distinction is important because shareholders and stakeholders 
may favour different corporate governance structures and monitoring mechanisms; 
she points out, however, that: "In reality the involvement of shareholders and 
stakeholders will depend on national laws and customs and also the individual 
company's approach" (p. 49). 
The shareholder view starts from an assumption that management is only accountable 
to shareholders and that management's decisions are limited to the interests of the 
owners. This view perceives a corporation as a legal instrument for shareholders to 
maximise their wealth (Letza et al., 2004). Management is not required to take into 
account the effects of their corporate decisions on the interests of other parties 
(Keasey et al., 1997). Shareholders' rights are normally enshrined in law (Mallin, 
2004a), while the theory underpinning management actions is based upon the 
separation of ownership and control as stated by Berle and Means (1932). Agency 
theory arose from analyses of this separation, and focuses on the issues where one 
party (the principal) delegates work to another party (the agent); in the case of a 
corporation, the shareholders are the principal and the directors are the agent (Mallin, 
2004a). Mallin argues that, as a consequence of this focus on shareholders, the 
maintenance or enhancement of shareholder value becomes paramount. Keasey et al. 
(1997) suggest that the separation of ownership and control may allow a firmýs 
behaviour to diverge from the profit-maximising, cost-minimising "ideal". In this 
context, Mallin points out that, agents may misuse their power 
for pecuniary or other 
advantage, or might fail to take appropriate risks in pursuance of the principalsý 
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interests. She also notes the problem of information asymmetry whereby the agents 
have access to more information than the principals. Mallin argues that the 
shareholders have a vested interest in trying to ensure that resources are used to 
maximum effect, which, in turn, should be to the benefit of society as a whole . 
20 The 
costs resulting from managers misusing their position, as well as the expense 
associated with monitoring and disciplining them to try to prevent abuse, have been 
termed "agency costs" (Blair and McLaury, 1995). 
The shareholder view assumes that markets - particularly markets for capital, 
managerial labour, and corporate control - provide the most effective restraints on 
managerial discretion, and that the residual voting rights of shareholders should 
ultimately commit corporate resources to value-maximi sing ends on behalf of the 
shareholders (Letza et al., 2004; Keasey et al., 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and 
Manne, 1965). Related to this notion is the abuse of executive power model which 
addresses the problem of executive managers who may abuse the power they have by 
pursuing their own interests to the detriment of the corporation (Letza et al., 2004; 
Keasey et al., 1997; Hutton, 1995; Kay and Silberston, 1995). The principal-agent or 
finance model would try to ensure that these executives behaviour is aligned to the 
interests of the shareholders (Keasey et al., 1997). 
Stakeholder theory extends the scope of the corporate governance notion beyond the 
relationship between management and shareholders, to include other relevant parties 
that have an interest in the operations of corporations. The theory is premised on the 
20 The Hampel Report (1998) took the view that whilst managements should develop appropriate 
relationships with their various stakeholder groups, they should 
have primary regard for the overall 
objectives of their companies - which is to preserve and enhance shareholder value over 
time. The 
report limited the accountability of the 
directors, as a board, to shareholders. Hermes, one of the largest 
institutional investors in the UK, took a similar approach in the Hermes Principles (2002). 
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concept of a company being a legal or artificial person that operates in a community, 
and on the view that "there should be some explicit recognition of the well belng of 
other groups having a long-term association with the firm - and therefore an interest, 
or stake, in its long-term success" (Keasey et al., 1997, P. 9). 2 1 Based upon this 
assumption, etza et al. (2004) present the following description of corporate 
govemance from a stakeholder perspective: 
In general, corporate governance is about the understanding and 
institutional arrangements for relationships among various economic 
actors and corporate participants who may have direct or indirect interests 
in a corporation, such as shareholders, directors/managers, employees, 
creditors, suppliers, customers, local communities, govenu-nent, and the 
public (p. 242). 
This understanding of corporate governance assumes that stakeholders participate in 
corporate decision-making, long-term contracts and trust relationships and highlights 
the role of business ethics in relating to stakeholders (Letza et al., 2004). To this end, 
the Code of Corporate Govemance developed for South Eastem Europe (2003) states 
that protecting stakeholder rights and developing value-enhancing relations with 
stakeholders is now widely accepted as being linked to performance, thus conforming 
to the pursuance of shareholders' benefits. However, one of the fundamental problems 
of corporate governance is how companies can be held accountable to a wider cross- 
section of stakeholders. Highlighting this problem, Mclaren (2004) notes: 
Many [businesses] talk of a wider range of stakeholders in their 
businesses, but few actively seek to make their businesses accountable to 
their employees, customers, local communities and other stakeholders ... 
stakeholders currently have little influence over the corporations that 
affect their lives (p. 192). 
21 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) makes a strong case when it states 
that the success of a company in the long-term depends not only upon having a sound strategy, a 
competent management, valuable assets and a promising market, but also hinges upon a company 
maintaining a sound relationship with the various constituencies on which it depends: customers, 
shareholders, lenders, employees, suppliers, the community in which it operates, Government and local 
authorities (EBRD, 1997). 
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The King Report 1 (1994) advocates an integrated approach to sound govemance in 
the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, having regard to the fundamental 
principles of good financial, social, ethical and environmental practice. The King 
Report 11 (2002) affirms this same principle and argues that a "licence to operate" is 
no longer just a matter for the company and the regulator, but includes the permission 
of the regulator, industry and market standards, industry reputation, the investigative 
media, attitudes of customers, suppliers, consumers, employees, investors and 
communities (local, national and international), ethical pressure groups, public 
confidence and political opinion (par. 5.2). 
22 The Commonwealth Code (1999) argues 
that while the board is accountable to the owners of the corporation (shareholders) for 
achieving corporate objectives, its conduct in regard to factors, such as business ethics 
and the environment, may have an impact on legitimate societal interests 
(stakeholders) and thereby influence the reputation and long-term interests of the 
business. The inclusive approach recognises that stakeholders need to be considered 
when developing the strategy of a company irrespective of whether the relationship 
between the company and these stakeholders is contractual or non-contractual (King 
Report 11,2002, par. 5.3 ). 23 McLaren (2003) suggested that stakeholder groups could 
collaborate with institutional investors who would, in turn, engage with companies 
through "voice" to have stakeholder concerns addressed; these investors were in a 
position to exercise power and influence over corporations (unlike the stakeholder 
groups who had no direct control over the companies concerned). 
22 The Commonwealth Code (1999) also stresses that corporate governance requires that the board 
must govern the corporation with integrity and enterprise in a manner that entrenches the licence it has 
to operate and that this licence embraces the corporation's interaction with its shareholders and other 
stakeholders, such as the communities in which it operates, bankers and other suppliers of finance and 
credit, customers, the media, public opinion makers and pressure groups. 
23 In some countries, such as Germany and Japan, corporate goals seem to be defined more widely than 
shareholders' profits (Charkham, 1994 and Schneider-Lenne, 1992). For example, German companies 
are under a social obligation to employees and the local community; the company is seen as an 
enduring social organisation in both Germany and Japan (Keasey et al., 1997). 
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Mallin (2004a) suggests that agency relationships are not limited to those existing 
between directors and shareholders, and that a stakeholder view tries to maximise 
shareholder value whilst at the same time taking into account the interests of the wider 
stakeholder group. Letza et al. (2004) also note that shareholder interest is not 
independent of stakeholder interest and vice-versa. Customers, for example, are 
becoming more aware of social, environmental and ethical aspects of corporate 
behaviour and try to ensure that the company supplying them is acting in a socially 
responsible manner; examples of this include fair trade, organic products, the 
prohibition of child labour and the upholding of minimum human rights. On a related 
note, Monks and Minow (2001) note that: 
Corporations do not just determine what goods and services are available 
in the marketplace, but, more than any other institution, corporations 
determine the quality of the air we breathe and the water we drink and 
even where we live (p. 11). 
Monks and Minow suggest that corporations provide jobs that pay wages, produce 
goods and services which meet the needs of society, and improve employees' self 
esteem. Monks and Minow also argue that society expects companies to offer a safe 
workplace and environment where the interests of employees, shareholders, 
customers, suppliers, creditors and neighbours are designed for the long-term benefit 
of all stakeholder groups. 
The governance of corporations therefore affects various parties and not just the 
shareholders. Monks and Minow (2001) note that the relationship between 
corporations and stakeholders is governed by laws imposed by the legislature and by 
private law established in agreements between the corporation and its employees, 
customers, suppliers, investors and community; corporations also operate under the 
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laws of the marketplace. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) 
require companies to recognise the rights of stakeholders as established by law, and 
encourage an active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating 
wealth, jobs and sustainability in financially sound enterprises. 24 
Careful examination of the relevant literature as a whole suggests that the 
"Shareholder versus Stakeholder" debate substantively revolves around establishing a 
point on a continuum at which a company operates. The distinction does not seem to 
be one that can be arrived at by dichotomous analysis involving grouping companies 
into two separate and distinct categories with no commonalities. This distinction (i. e. 
whether corporate govemance is motivated by the shareholder or stakeholder 
approach) may reveal that all companies take into account both shareholder and 
stakeholder interests, but to varying degrees. 
2.2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance 
Monks and Minow (2001) state that definitions of what constitutes a corporation 
reflect the perspectives (and biases) of those providing the definitions. Similarly, it 
can be argued that definitions of corporate governance may reflect the perspectives of 
the person defining the term; for example, Keasey et al. (1997) note that the term 
96 corporate governance" has not been used in a consistent manner by different 
researchers: 
In its narrowest sense, the term may describe the formal system of 
accountability of senior management to the shareholders. At its most 
expansive the term is stretched to include the entire network of formal and 
24 Mallin (2004a) argues that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are intertwined since 
companies operate within a wider society. 
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informal relations involving the corporate sector and their consequences for society in general. For the purposes of this volume we defte corporate 
governance to include "the structures, process, cultures and systems that 
engender the successful operation of the organisations" (p. 2). 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) defines corporate governance as the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled. However, this report seems to limit 
accountability to the board reporting to shareholders on their stewardship, subject to 
laws and regulations in place. The UK Hampel Report (1998) extends the notion of 
corporate governance to taking into account the interests of constituencies 
(stakeholders) with a relevant interest in a company's business. 
The preamble to the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance (as revised in 2004) 
states that: 
Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring perfon-nance are determined. 
The King II Report (2002, p. 6) endorses the following description of corporate 
governance given by Cadbury (1999): 
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals ... 
the aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society. 
Monks and Minow (2001) define corporate governance as: 
... the relationship among various participants 
in determining the direction 
and performance of corporations (p. 1). 
An examination of the above definitions seems to suggest that not all of them limit N, 
corporate governance to the narrow formal accountability of senior management to 
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shareholders. Instead, some of the definitions extend corporate governance to formal 
and informal relationships with other stakeholders which, presumably, companies 
would need to identify as being relevant. What seems to influence a company's 
predominant disposition towards the shareholder or stakeholder approach may be the 
laws of the country in which a company operates and the specific culture and 
circumstances of a particular company; this issue is one of the key questions 
addressed in this thesis. The empirical research conducted for the present study adopts 
the definition used by the OECD Principles (2004). This is because the researcher is 
of the view that the system by which companies are directed and controlled can 
include the whole framework of corporate governance rather than just the strict 
relationship between shareholders, the board and management. The basis for this view 
is the stakeholder approach that is adopted for the current study where companies are 
perceived to be responsible to stakeholders that extend beyond shareholders. This 
stakeholder view has a bearing on corporate social responsibility which is examined 
in Section 2.2.3. 
2.2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility 
In 1932, US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis argued that, "The privilege of 
engaging in such commerce in corporate form is one which the state may confer or 
may withhold as it sees fit.,, 
25 Brandeis stressed that states should make sure that the 
privilege of the corporate structure was conferred only in those cases where it was 
consistent with public policy and welfare. These views provide a basis for considering 
the corporation as a citizen of the state in which it operates; it is a legal person 
25 Quoted by Monks and Minow (2001, p. 7). 
33 
operating in a community, having its own rights, privileges and responsibilities. Like 
any other citizen, the corporation is expected to act in a socially responsible manner 
that complies with the norms of the society in which it operates. Academic studies 
such as Gray et al. (1996), have been at the forefront of promoting social 
responsibility in corporations. In particular, Zappala (2003) notes that corporate 
citizenship includes integrating social, ethical, environmental, economic and political 
values in the core decision-making processes of business. The World Economic 
Forum has also been trying to champion the case for corporate social responsibility. 
The World Economic Forum (2002) noted that: 
Corporate social responsibility makes good business sense, but companies 
must balance the goal of good citizenship placed upon them by society 
with the traditional aim of profitability required by shareholders. 26 
In a joint statement from a task force of World Economic Forum CEOs, the World 
Economic Forum (2003) identified the following as being key issues in corporate 
citizenship: (i) good corporate governance and ethics - including compliance with the 
law, existing regulations and international standards, efforts to prevent bribery and 
corruption and other ethical issues; (ii) responsibility for people; 27 (iii) responsibility 
for environmental impacts; and (iv) a broader contribution to development (social and 
economic) in host countries and communities. The Economic Forum (2004) further 
argues that corporate citizenship should portray what a company stands for in terms of 
the principles and values that it holds and should not just be a matter of profitability. 
Corporate social responsibility should reflect the company's corrunitment to 
contribute to society's welfare in order to reflect its good citizenship. The article 
26 Extract from a statement issued at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum held in New 
York on 4 February 2002: "Group of CEOs Calls for Leadership on Global Corporate Citizenship". 
27 For example, product and employee safety programmes; human and labour rights which may include 
equal opportunities, non-discrimination, prevention of child labour, freedom of association and fair 
wages. 
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suggests that each board should be able to define, explain and ultimately measure the 
ethical, social and envirom-nental risks and opportunities that their company and 
industry sector faces, including intangibles, and their impact on its reputation. 28 
Ward (2003) examines the legal aspects of corporate citizenship and argues that law 
and litigation are an important part of corporate social responsibility. She cites cases 
at the international level where companies that have been associated with abusive 
regimes - and those whose operations have harmed people in some way - have been 
taken to court. There has also been litigation against companies that have violated 
labour rights in the supply chain and those that have acted as cartels in order to fix the 
prices of their products and services. 
The Global Stakeholder Report (2005 )29 discusses whether corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reports should be made mandatory and claims that the level of 
support for mandatory reporting is decreasing. 30 The report finds that the stakeholder 
group most in favour of the mandatory approach is the financial services sector, while 
company employees are the strongest opponents. However, the Global Stakeholder 
Report points out that some users of the CSR publications view them as no more than 
tools which companies use for public relations purposes; there is sometimes no 
objective way of verifying the information contained in those documents. Companies 
28 In its Joint Action Plan for Business and Governments (2003), the Commonwealth Business Council 
noted that key to implementing the concept of corporate citizenship was the realisation that: "the 
values, attitudes and systems of good corporate citizenship should be embedded in the way that all 
employees, from top management to front line operatives, work from day to day" (p. 7) 
29 Accounting for Good: the Global Stakeholder Report 2005: The Second World-wide Survey on 
Stakeholder Attitudes to CSR Reporting. 
30 The report does not give reasons why the support for mandatory CSR report is decreasing. However, 
Business Week Online edition of 29/06/2005 published an article- "Corporate Citizenship on the Rise" 
- asserting that corporate citizenship was on the rise. This article argues that corporate citizenship 
is 
now a fundamental piece of any successful company's business plan and affects the company's bottom 
line, share price, and long-term viability. 
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are also noted as being selective in what they include in the reports. The motives for 
companies publishing CSR reports may include: (i) improving the company's 
reputation and brand image in terms of commitment to employees' and society's 
welfare; (ii) improving the company's bottom line; (iii) showing that the company 
complies with existing legislation and regulations; and (iv) creating goodwill with 
host Governments and the local community. Concerned parties may use the 
inforination contained in the reports (for what it is worth) to scrutinise the activities of 
companies and hold them answerable for their policies and activities. 
2.3 Relevance of Corporate Governance 
There are a number of reasons why the topic of corporate governance has grown in 
importance in recent years. First, it is seen as a response to the corporate scandals that 
occurred in the early 1990s, as explained in Section 2.1. Second, interest in corporate 
governance has grown as a result of the well-documented financial crises that spread 
throughout the emerging markets in the late 1990s. Third, a general concern for 
proper corporate governance mechanisms sprang up in the developed world. 31 
Concern for corporate governance has been further heightened by large-scale 
corporate failures in developed markets as noted by Patsuris (2002). Zea (2003) 
highlights that accounting scandals continue to rock the business world in the US 
despite the tough Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
" Monks and Minow (2001) note that corporate governance practices in Japan, Germany and France 
were questioned by international investors. In these markets, the Government's role is relatively 
pronounced, debt financing is preferred to equity, stock market capitalisations are low, systems of 
cross-holding make ownership illiquid, a few giant shareholders dominate, takeovers are rare, and 
disclosure is poor (Monks and Minow, 2001). 
36 
Institutional Shareholders have also played a major role in promoting corporate 
governance in the UK and the US. Doyle (1994) notes that today's shareholders are 
predominantly institutional investors rather than active owners and that their voice 
cannot go unheard; similarly, Monks and Minow (2001) argue that some institutional 
shareholders have become more active in exercising their share ownership rights since 
the late 1980s. Monks and Minow also note that shareholder activism initially started 
as a reaction to the abuses of the takeover era and focused on the key issues of board 
performance, the compensation of senior executives, board composition, and the 
independence (and competence) of audit committees. 
In the UK, concern for corporate governance has given rise to various documents that 
address pertinent issues associated with better management of companies. A selection 
of some of these documents is presented in Appendix 2.1. 
From the preceding discussion, it appears that the relevance of corporate governance 
lies mainly in protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
According to the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), the 
overriding objective of a corporation should be to optimise, over time, the return to its 
shareholders. To achieve this objective, the corporation should endeavour to ensure 
the long-term viability of its business and to manage effectively its relationships with 
stakeholders (Monks and Minow, 2001). The King Report 11 (2002) recognised the 
importance of corporate governance for investment when it stated that: 
If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance 
practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with 
the level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts 
for 
lax accounting and reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere. 
All 
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enterprises in that country - regardless of how steadfast a3 ? articular 
company's practices may be - suffer the consequences (par. 16) . 
The Manual on Corporate Governance for Uganda (2001) notes that corporate 
governance is an essential tool for prosperity and economic growth and suggests: 
Past macroeconomic difficulties have been exacerbated by weak or inadequate corporate governance, stemming from weak legal and 
regulatory systems, inconsistent auditing standards, poor banking 
practices, unregulated capital markets, inefficient board of directors and ignoring of the rights of minority shareholders. Corporate governance is 
important because it promotes good leadership within the corporate sector 
(par. 2). 
Monks and Minow (2001) note that the need of global corporations for capital (and 
the ability of shareholders to invest with ease worldwide) has led to a remarkably 
effective dialogue conceming govemance reform. This move has made corporate 
governance relevant worldwide since, if a country wants to attract local and foreign 
investment, then it has to be concerned about the way companies in that country are 
managed and the security of the investment. 33 Realising this fact, the Principles of 
Corporate Govemance in Kenya (2000) identify the following reasons underpinning 
the need for a sound corporate governance system: (i) attracting both local and foreign 
capital and assuring investors that their investment will be secure and efficiently 
managed in a transparent and accountable manner; (ii) creating competitive and 
efficient companies and business enterprises; (iii) enhancing the accountability and 
performance of those entrusted with managing corporations; and (iv) promoting 
efficient and effective use of limited resources. One of the institutions entrusted with 
the responsibility of ensuring the implementation of corporate governance practices is 
the board or directors which is examined in Section 2.4. 
3' The King Report 11 (2002) reproduces this statement, originally made by Arthur Levitt, the former 
Chairperson of the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
33 It remains to be seen whether such dialogue is actually taking place and whether it is leading to 
improved governance in companies worldwide. 
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2.4 The Board of Directors 
2.4.1 Types of Boards 
Mallin (2004a) explains that boards can have either a unitary or a two-tier system. A 
unitary board involves a company having only one single board comprising of both 
executive and non-executive directors. 34 In the two-tier system (or "dual") board 
system, a company typically has an executive management board and a supervisory 
board that often includes employee representativeS. 35 In this part of the chapter, the 
codes of corporate govemance for the UK and South Eastem Europe (SEE, 2003) will 
be used as examples of the unitary board system while the codes of the Netherlands 
(Dutch Code, 2003) will be used to illustrate the dual board system because they seem 
to be representative of each type of system. 
2.4.2 The Role of the Board 
The Dutch Code (2003) specifies that: "The management board and the supervisory 
board are responsible for the corporate structure of the company and compliance with 
the code" (Section 1), while the UK Combined Code (2003) states that: "Every 
company should be headed by an effective board, which is collectively responsible for 
the success of the company" (Section Al). 
34 Examples of countries that have this type of system include the UK, US, Uganda and the majority of 
EU member states. 
35 Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark have the two-tier system of 
boards. 
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In the Dutch dual board system, the supervisory board oversees the direction of the 
business whilst the management board is responsible for the running of the business 
(Mallin, 2004a). In the unitary board structure, the prime responsibility of the board of 
directors is to determine the broad strategy of the company and to ensure its 
implementation (Hampel Report, 1998). Thus the roles of the two boards in the Dutch 
dual structure are both incorporated into one board for a unitary structure such as in 
the UK model. 
The UK's Combined Code (2003) presents the following duties of the board: (i) to 
provide entrepreneurial leadership for the company within the framework of prudent 
and effective controls, thus enabling risk to be assessed and managed; (ii) to ensure 
that the necessary financial and human resources are acquired for the company to 
meet its objectives; (iii) to take decisions objectively in the interests of the company; 
(iv) to meet sufficiently regularly for the directors to discharge their duties effectively, 
and to have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved for the board's decision 
and to specify those matters that have been delegated to management; and (v) to 
review management performance, set the company's targets, values and standards, 
and ensure that the company's obligations to its shareholders and others are 
understood and met. 36 In relation to the unitary board, the White Paper on Corporate 
Governance in South Eastern Europe (SEE, 2003) states that: 
The key functions of the board are to ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the appointment and effective monitoring of management and 
the accountability to shareholders (par. 241). 
36 A further function of the unitary board is to act as a link between managers and investors (Mallin, 
2004a). 
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The SEE principles explain that ensuring the strategic guidance of the company 
provides the company with a sense of vision and direction and determines the long- as 
well as the short-term goals of the company. The company's strategy then has to be 
elaborated on and agreed with management. The role of monitoring management 
implies that the board will hire and fire senior management, including the CEO, 
monitor and manage conflicts of interest, and put in place any relevant procedures 
(SEE, 2003). Under the SEE recommendations, the board should be responsible for 
reporting relevant matters to the shareholders and for ensuring that the company has 
complied with the law; to fulfil this reporting responsibility, the board should ensure 
the integrity and effectiveness of the accounting and financial reporting system. 
For countries with a two-tier system of boards, such as the Netherlands and Germany, 
the role of the management board is to: manage the company; be responsible for 
achieving the company's aims, strategy, policy and results; ensure compliance with all 
relevant legislation and regulations; and manage the risks associated with the 
company s activities (Dutch Code, 2003). These responsibilities are similar to the 
responsibilities of the Executive Board in the unitary board system. The supervisory 
board, under this two-tier system, supervises the management board; this role 
encapsulates: (i) monitoring the achievement of the company's objectives; (ii) 
reviewing corporate strategy and the risks inherent in the company's business 
activities; (iii) monitoring the structure and operation of the internal risk management 
and control systems; (iv) approving the financial reporting process; and (v) ensuring 
compliance with any legislation and regulations. Similar functions would also 
be 
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carried out by the unitary board in relation to the Executive Board. 37 Other roles for 
the board include : 38 
taking responsibility for preparing the accounts and reporting the business as a going concern, with supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary. 
presenting a balanced and understandable assessment of the company's 
position and prospects in interim and other price-sensitive public reports (and 
reports to regulators) as well as information required to be presented by 
statutory instruments; 
being responsible for the quality and completeness of publicly-disclosed financial reports; 
maintaining a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders' investment and the company's assets; 
establishing formal and transparent arrangements for maintaining an 
appropriate relationship with the company's auditors; 
defining the mission/vision of the company; 
approving business plans and budgets and monitoring major capital 
expenditures and corporate takeover; 
" monitoring and supervising the company's compliance with relevant 
legislation, articles of association, in-house regulations and policies; 
" maintaining a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders' 
investment and the company's assets, and conducting a review of the 
effectiveness of the group's internal controls; 
" assessing whether the executives are sufficiently qualified to fulfil the 
demands of their positions; 
setting standards of conduct covering codes of ethics or statements of 
business practice which should be communicated to all employees and 
published both internally and externally (Cadbury, 1992); and 
complying with the duty of confidentiality whereby members are not allowed 
to disclose company information that is confidential and/or trade secret. 39 
37 Based upon the functions relating to the unitary board and those of the supervisory board, it would 
seem that there are some similarities between the unitary and the dual board system, and that the 
distinction between the two is largely a legal one since the unitary board supervises the executive board 
just as the supervisory board oversees the management board to ensure that the company's aims, 
strategies, policies and results are achieved as planned for, all relevant legislation and regulations are 
complied with and the company's risk is managed effectively. 
38 These points are taken from the following codes or principles of corporate governance: 
1. The Cadbury Report (1992); 
2. The Combined Code (2003); 
3. The Dutch Code (2003); 
4. The Hampel Report (1998); 
5. Korea Code (1999); 
6. Turkey Code (2003). 
39 Some of the board's functions may be delegated to board committees such as the audit, 
remuneration, nomination, and risk committees whilst others may be delegated to an executive 
(management) committee or board (Hampel, 1998; Mallin, 2004a). The role and composition of these 
committees is examined in more detail later. 
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In all systems, boards should abide by the company's articles of incorporation and by- 
laws and should do nothing that is outside the authority of the company, as laid down 
in its articles of incorporation. In addition to any legal requirements, companies 
should also clarify in their by-laws the board's main functions and responsibilities 
(SEE, 2003). The SEE stresses that: "[t]he actual functioning and effective role of the 
boards depends, to a large extent, on the qualities of their individual members as well 
as on the respective CEOs" (par. 239). 
2.4.3 Board Composition 
The UK Combined Code (2003) states that: 
The board should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should be 
of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate 
for the requirements of the business and that changes to the board's 
composition can be managed without undue disruption (par. A. 3). 
The same code recommends that there should be a strong presence on the board of 
both executive and non-executive directors and that undue reliance should not be 
placed on particular individuals. This point was stressed by the Combined Code 
(2003) when it stated that no one individual should dominate the board's decision- 
taking. The Code recommends that: 
Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the 
board to be independent. A smaller company should have at least two 
independent non-executive directors (par. A. 3.2). 40 
The Hampel Report (1998) had earlier proposed that non-executive directors should 
be appointed based upon their experience, qualifications, technical and market 
40 The Combined Code (2003) defines a smaller company as being one below FTSE 350 throughout the 
year immediately prior to the reporting year and the Cadbury Report (1992) stressed that independent 
board members should not receive any emoluments from the company other than their directors' fees 
and benefits accruing from their shareholdings. 
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knowledge and, possibly, their political contacts .41 Both the Dutch Code and the UK 
Combined Code require at least one member of the unitary or supervisory board to be 
a financial expert, with the relevant knowledge and experience of financial 
administration and accounting for listed companies or other large legal entities. 42 
In some countries that have a two-tier system of boards, such as Germany, 
employees may have representatives on the supervisory board as well as the 
management board, but the extent of this involvement varies from country to 
country (Mallin, 2004a). 
Investigation of views regarding board composition (and the other board-related 
issues discussed in the preceding and following sections) forms a key part of 
research documented later in the thesis. It should however be noted that, in their 
study of 86 UK companies, Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) found no evidence that 
board composition had a significant impact on company performance. Board 
44potential" was found to have more impact on performance than the proportions 
of independent non-executive directors and executive directors. 
2.4.4 Appointment to the Board 
In the UK, the Combined Code (2003) states that appointments to the board should be 
made on merit, using objective criteria and that care should be taken to ensure that 
appointees have enough time available to devote to the job, particularly in the case of 'r- 
41 The Dutch Code (2003) also added the ability to assess the broad outline of overall company policy 
and possession of the specific expertise required for the fulfilment of duties being among the required 
qualities of membership to a company's board. 
42 The Combined Code also recommends that board members should be refreshed periodically and that 
the succession of board members should be planned. 
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chairmanships. This concern for directors to have sufficient time extends to both non- 
executive and executive directors. The Dutch Code (2003) recommends the following: 
The number of supervisory boards of Dutch listed companies of which an individual may be a member shall be limited to such an extent that the 
proper performance of his duties is assured; the maximum number is five, for which purpose the chain-nanship of a supervisory board counts double. (par. 111.3.4). 43 
The UK Combined Code states that: 
There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board (Section A. 4). 
In the unitary board system, shareholders elect board members whilst in the dual 
board system, shareholders appoint the members of the supervisory board (other than 
the employee members) and the supervisory board appoints the members of the 
management board (Mallin, 2004a). 44 
The Combined Code recommends that succession for board members and senior 
management has to be planned in the context of maintaining an appropriate balance 
of skills and experience within the company and on the board. Similarly, the 
Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (CACG Guidelines, 
1999) argue that: 
The board should ensure that through a managed and effective process, 
board appointments are made that provide a mix of proficient directors, 
each of whom is able to add value and to bring independent judgement to 
bear on the decision-making process (p. 8). 
In the UK, directors of listed companies are required by the Combined Code to 
submit themselves for election by the shareholders at the first Annual General 
43 The Combined Code recommends that executive directors should not take on more than one non- 
executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company. 
44 Although the appointment of directors to represent outside interests is arguably incompatible with 
board cohesion, the Dutch Code (2003) envisages that, in exceptional cases, it may be appropriate for a 
major creditor or shareholder to nominate a director. 
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Meeting (AGM) after their appointment, and to re-election thereafter at intervals of 
45 no more than three years. The Hampel Committee Report (1998) had made a similar 
recommendation regarding re-election, subj ect to continued satisfactory 
performance. 46 The Dutch Code (2003) affirmed that a supervisory board member 
should be elected only after careful consideration of the particulars of the candidate in 
question . 
47 The Combined Code also recommends that non-executive directors should 
be appointed for specified terms subject to re-election and to Companies Acts 
provisions relating to the removal of a director. 48 The need for orientation and 
training for both new and continuing directors has been recommended by several 
codes, such as the Combined Code (2003) and is discussed in Section 2.4.5. 
2.4.5 Orientation and Training of Directors 
The Combined Code (2003) states that: 
The chairman should ensure that new directors receive a full, formal and 
tailored induction on joining the board (A. 5.1). 
The SEE Report (2003) expressed a similar view when it stated that newly appointed 
board members should receive induction into the company's business, operations and 
markets. The Cadbury Committee report noted that this was particularly desirable for 
45 The Combined Code (2003) specifies that "The names of directors submitted for election should be 
accompanied by sufficient biographical details and any other relevant information to enable 
shareholders to take an informed decision on their election" (par. A. 7.1). 
46 In addition, the Hampel Committee Report (1998) recommended that all names submitted for 
election or re-election as directors should be accompanied by biographical details indicating their 
relevant qualifications and experience, to enable shareholders to take an informed decision about 
whether to support any directors' re-election. 
47 If a non-executive director in a UK firm resigns, that director is entitled to inform the shareholders 
about whether the resignation resulted from a policy disagreement or a personality clash; such a 
disclosure may be in the interests of all shareholders (Hampel, 1998). 
48 The Combined Code notes that: "Any term beyond six years (e. g. two three-year terms) for a non- 
executive director should be subject to particularly rigorous review, and should take into account the 
need for progressive refreshing of the board" (par. 7.2) and that serving more than nine years could be 
relevant to the determination of a non-executive director's independence. 
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directors3 whether executive or non-executive, with no previous board experience. 
However, the Cadbury Committee Report pointed out that after the induction , it was 
up to individual directors to keep abreast of their legislative and broader 
responsibilities. The Combined Code also suggests that all directors should regularly 
update and refresh their skills and knowledge and that major shareholders should be 
given the opportunity to meet new non-executive directors . 
49 The company should 
provide the necessary resources for developing and updating the knowledge and 
capabilities of all its directors. 
The SEE (2003) identified three different aspects of training, namely: (i) the role of 
board members; (ii) the personal development of directors; and (iii) the technical 
skills necessary for the task. Among the matters to be covered by the training are 
practical guidance on the meaning of directors' fiduciary duties; how directors should 
perform their main ftmctions; the capacity of the board members to work together; 
essential personal qualities like integrity, scepticism and the courage to question 
executive management; and specific technical and substantive training to complete 
and bring board members up-to-date in the various areas of expertise necessary for 
the adequate performance of their functions. The SEE (2003) recommended that in 
order to provide companies with expertise, centres to train board members (such as 
Directors' Institutes) could be set up, developed and reinforced at the country level. 
These centres could give board members the opportunity to exchange their 
experiences, create networks, contribute to the development of a new board culture 
and develop a database of qualified board members that would facilitate the future 
recruitment process for companies. 
49 The Code argues that updating skill and knowledge, together with familiarity with the company, 
would enable board members to fulfil their role both on the board and board committees. 
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2.4.6 Independence of Board Members 
The Dutch Code (2003) recommended that supervisory board members should be 
'I'k able to act critically and independently of one another, of the management board and 
of any particular interest groups. This recommendation also applied to the unitary 
board structure, and to all board members, whether executive or non-executive. For 
example, The Hampel Report (1998) stated the following: 
Executive directors share with their non-executive colleagues overall 
responsibility for the leadership and control of the company. As well as 
speaking for the business area or function for which he is directly 
responsible, an executive director should exercise individual judgement on 
every issue coming before the board, in the overall interests of the 
company. In particular, an executive director other than the chief 
executive officer needs to be able to express views to the board which are 
different from those of the chief executive officer and be confident that, 
provided that this is done in a considered way, the individual will not 
suffer. (par. 3.6) 
Despite the above observations, the precise meaning of "board independence" 
remains problematic (Brennan and McDermott, 2004) and the practical aspects of 
how members can be truly "independent" remains open to debate. Based upon their 
study of over 250 Dutch companies, Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004) point to 
what they terrn the "independence paradox" caused by the information asymmetry 
between company management and non-executive board members. The non- 
executive members are dependent on company executives in obtaining adequate 
information about companies and yet the non-executive directors are expected to be 
independent and to supervise these executives. The question remains whether the 
non-executive directors can be truly independent under those circumstances and 
whether the independent judgement they bring to bear is based on independent and 
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objective information. Evidently, not everyone agrees that boards should include a 
balance of executive and non-executive members. Based upon a study of 98 publicly 
traded Swedish companies, Randoy and Jenssen (2004) concluded that board 
independence was more relevant for companies operating in less competitive 
industries than in highly competitive industries and that the latter companies should 
have fewer outside board members as compared to less competitive companies. The 
companies surveyed argued that highly competitive companies were already being 
monitored by a competitive product market and that board independence reduces firm 
performance in such industries. Presumably this was because of the fast response 
speed required in such competitive environments and also because outside directors 
are less informed and less competent to make good decisions in highly competitive 
markets. Randoy and Jenssen (2004) noted that CEOs of firms in less competitive 
product markets tended to become risk-averse without necessarily maximising 
shareholder wealth, unless monitored by a strong independent board. 
2.4.7 Non-Executive Directors 
The Cadbury Report (1992) stressed the importance of non-executive directors, as far 
as independence is concerned, with the following words: 
Non-executive directors should bring an independent judgement to bear on 
issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments, 
and standards of conduct. We recommend that the calibre and number of 
non-executive directors on a board should be such that their views will 
carry significant weight in the board's decisions (par. 4.11). 
The Cadbury Report also argued that non-executive directors might lose something of 
their independent edge if they remained on a board too long. However, the SEE 
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Report (2003) argued that "being independent is more a question of individual 
character and personal attitude, which cannot be prescribed by law" (par. 254). 50 
The Combined Code (2003) recommended that the board should appoint one of the 
independent non-executive directors to be a senior independent director and that 
shareholders should have access to this individual where they have concerns that 
contact through the normal channels of chairman, chief executive or finance director 
have failed to resolve an issue or for which such contact is inappropnate. 51 
The Combined Code (2003) highlighted seven factors that would prevent a person 
from being considered to be an independent non-executive director; these included a 
person who: 
(a) has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
(b) has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with 
the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior 
employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; 
(c) has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from 
a director's fee, participates in the company's share option or a performance- 
related pay scheme, or is a member of the company's pension scheme; 
(d) has close family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
(e) holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
(f) represents a significant shareholder; or 
(g) has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first 
election. 
The Dutch Code (2003,111.2.2) provided a similar list, but added the following: 
50 According to the SEE Report (2003), the spirit of independence requires the capacity to exercise 
objective judgement on corporate affairs and not to be subordinate to any particular interest, especially 
that of management, controlling shareholders or political influence. 
51 The Cadbury Report (1992) identifies the senior non-executive director as the person to whom other 
directors could address their concerns if the role of chairman and chief executive are combined. 
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(h) a person who holds at least ten per cent of the shares in the company 
(including the shares held by natural persons or legal entities which cooperate 
with him under an express or tacit, oral or written agreement); 
(i) a person who is a member of the management board or supervisory board - or 
is a representative in some other way - of a legal entity which holds at least 
ten percent of the shares in the company, unless such entity is a member of the 
same group as the company; 
)a person who has temporarily managed the company during the previous 
twelve months where management board members have been absent or unable 
to discharge their duties. 
A major factor that affects the ability of directors, especially the non-executive ones, 
to exercise their role from an informed point of view is access to adequate, relevant 
and timely information. The supply of information to board members is, therefore, 
discussed in Section 2.4.8. 
2.4.8 Supply of Information to Board Members 
The Combined Code (2003) stresses the importance of information and professional 
development when it notes the following: 
The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a 
form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. All 
directors should receive induction on joining the board and should 
regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge. (par. A. 5). 
The Hampel Report (1998) had stressed this earlier when it stated that the 
effectiveness of a board was dependent to a substantial extent on the form, timing and 
quality of the information that it received and that management had an obligation to 
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ensure an appropriate supply of information. 52 The SEE Report (2003) stresses that 
boards should have access to all information required to evaluate and decide on 
matters related to the company ahead of their meeting. 53 Management and the 
executive board members should provide supervisory board members with relevant 
and accurate information in an orderly and timely manner. The SEE Report continues 
to recommend that the chairman and the CEO should regularly assess and determine 
which information is necessary or relevant for non-executive board members to 
perform their task more efficiently and that there should be a constant dialogue 
between the executive and non-executive members regarding any information 
provided to the board. 
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The SEE Report recommends further that companies should establish procedures that 
allow board members to have direct access to employees at all levels as an 
independent check on the information reported to the board by senior management, 
and to obtain information from external auditors that they consider necessary in order 
to be able to fully carry out their supervising duties. 55 
The Combined Code notes that there should be provision for board members to seek 
professional advice when they need it: 
52 The chairman has a particular responsibility to ensure that all directors are properly briefed on issues 
arising from board meetings (Cadbury 1992). 
53 The SEE Report (2003) states that: "All board members should have explicit and broad power to 
access information that is necessary to the performance of their functions" (par. 265). 
54 However, the SEE Report (2003) advises that non-executive members should be proactive in 
acquiring any information that they judge is necessary for the effective control of the company and its 
management; they should look for complementary information or clarification of any issues when they 
deem it necessary. 
55 The Combined Code (2003) makes it the responsibility of the chairman to ensure that all the directors 
receive accurate, timely and clear information but also encourages directors to seek clarification or 
amplification where necessary. The Combined Code also recommends that a company secretary's 
responsibilities include ensuring good information flows within the board and its committees and 
between senior management and non-executive directors. 
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The board should ensure that directors, especially non-executive directors , have access to independent professional advice at the company's expense where they judge it necessary to discharge their responsibilities as directors. Committees should be provided with sufficient resources to 
undertake their duties. (Combined, 2003, A. 5.2) 
The Dutch Code (2003,111.1.9) takes a similar stance: 
If the supervisory board considers it necessary, it may obtain information from officers and external advisers of the company. The company shall 
provide the necessary means for this purpose. The supervisory board may 
require that certain officers and external advisers attend its meetings. 
This requirement for the board to be able to obtain information and external advice 
goes to show the importance placed on board members taking decisions from an 
informed position. 
2.4.9 Directors' Liabilities 
The SEE Report (2003) recommends that the collective (as well as personal) liabilities 
of board members should be clearly defined in company law, company by-laws, board 
procedures or other relevant regulatory acts and that sanctions should be dissuasive 
and effectively and consistently enforced in order to deter wrongdoing. 56 The SEE 
Report takes the view that the same legal duties and liabilities should be applied to 
executive and non-executive board members as this will encourage non-executive 
members to inform themselves and act diligently, although it recognises that different 
degrees of liability could be established by a court if the board is sued. The SEE 
Report argues that sanctions should be punitive enough for board members to take 
their responsibilities seriously, but suggests that this should be balanced so as not to 
56 The Turkey Code (2003) explicitly states that "Members of the board will be jointly liable should 
they intentionally or unintentionally fail to properly perform their duties assigned to them bý, 
legislation, the articles of association and the general assembly" (p. 5 1). 
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unduly deter able candidates. Improvements in the training of board members and 
clarity about their duties that are laid down by laws and regulations would help in 
raising awareness of directors' liabilities. 
2.4.10 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
The Combined Code (2003) recommends a clear division of responsibilities at the 
head of the company between the running of the board and the executive 
responsibility for running of the company's business, with no one individual having 
"unfettered" powers of decision. The Combined Code expressed its opposition to the 
combining of the roles of chief executive and chairman when it stated: 
The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same 
individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief 
executive should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the 
board. (par. A. 2.1). 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) makes the same recommendation and argued that 
separation of the two roles would help to avoid concentration of power in one person. 
The Report recommends that in the event that the chairman was also the chief 
executive, it is essential that there should be a strong and independent element on the 
board. 57 
The Hampel Report states that "The chief executive officer's task is to run the 
business and to implement the policies and strategies adopted by the board" (Hampel, 
3.16). The chief executive would therefore be at the forefront of implementing the 
decisions of the board. 
57 The Harnpel Report (1998) requires boards to explain and justify their reasons where the two roles 
are combined. 
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2.4.11 Constructive Use of the AGM 
The Turkey Code (2003) recommends that meetings of the board be planned and 
conducted in an effective and efficient manner. The Combined Code (2003) outlines 
the following recommendations regarding the annual general meeting (AGM): 
the AGM should be used by the board to communicate with investors and 
to encourage their participation; 
the company should ensure that votes cast are properly received and 
recorded; this includes all proxy votes; 
a separate resolution should be proposed on each substantially separate issue; 
(iv) the chairmen of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees should 
be available to answer questions at the AGM and all directors should 
attend; and 
(v) the notice of the AGM and related papers should be sent to shareholders at 
least 20 working days before the meeting. 
2.4.12 Evaluation of Directors and Committees 
The Combined Code (2003, A. 6) specifies that: 
The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its 
own performance and that of its committees and individual directors. 
Such an evaluation is aimed at helping to establish the extent to which each 
director and board committee member contributes and is committed to their role; the 
chairman is expected to act on the results of the evaluation as appropriate. The non- 
executive directors, led by the senior independent director, should be responsible for 
evaluating the chainnan, taking into account the views of executive directors 
(Combined Code, 2003). 
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Mallin (2004a) suggests the following approaches for evaluating the board as a whole: 
(i) a structured questionnaire to evaluate how the board is perfonning in key areas 
such as achieving key goals that have been set; and (ii) informal discussion between 
the chairman of the board and the directors that cover a wide range of strategic and 
operational issues. According to Mallin, the evaluation of directors provides each 
individual with the opportunity to discuss key issues with the chairman on a one-to- 
one basis. Mallin points out that these evaluations contribute to the establishment of 
the performance criteria that help to achieve corporate objectives and to align the 
performance of directors with the interests of shareholders. 58 
2.5 Board Committees 
Various countries have recommended the setting up of committees by boards to 
permit the delegation of certain functions to those committees; the most commonly 
found board committees are the audit, remuneration and nomination committees 
(Combined Code, 2003; The King Report 11,2002; Mallin, 2004a and Gregory, 
59 2002). Countries that require board committees include Australia, Belgium, France, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Uganda, the UK and the US. Board committees are 
seen as assisting the board and its directors to discharge their duties and 
responsibilities; however, the board retains its overall responsibility for those 
functions and it is the board as a whole that remains responsible for the issues covered 
by the committees (Mallin, 2004a and the King Report, 2002). The Combined 
Code 
(2003) recommends the following composition of board committees: 
58 The Combined Code (2003) requires boards to disclose in the annual report the way in which the 
Ferformance evaluations have been carried out. 
1 9 The Recommended Guidelines for Corporate Governance in Uganda (2001) state that the 
nomination, remuneration, audit and governance committees are among the most relevant committees 
that boards should have (par. 2.7). 
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audit committee: at least three members (two members for smaller 
companies) who should all be independent non-executive directors; at least 
one member should have recent and relevant financial experience; (ii) remuneration committee: at least three (two in the case of smaller 
companies) who should all be independent non-executive directors; 
(iii) Nomination committee: a majority of members of the nomination committee 
should be independent non-executive directors; the chain-nan or an 
independent non-executive director should chair the committee. 
The OECD Principles (revised 2004) sound a cautious note when they state: 
While the use of committees may improve the work of the board, they 
may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board 
and of individual members. In order to evaluate the merits of board 
committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and 
clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is 
particularly important in the increasing number of jurisdictions where 
boards are establishing independent audit committees with powers to 
oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases 
independently (Section VI, par. E. 2). 
The King Report II recommends that there should be a formal procedure for 
delegating certain functions of the board that describes the extent of such delegation 
and thereby enables the board to properly discharge its duties and responsibilities and 
to effectively fulfil its decision-taking process. 60 
2.6 Shareholders 
The notion of diff-use stock ownership originated with Adam Smith's warning in the 
Wealth of Nations about "negligence and profusion" that resulted when those who 
managed enterprises were "rather of other people's money than their own. , 
61 Berle 
and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) have subsequently focused on the 
conflict between diff-use shareholders and professional managers. 
60 The terms of reference, life span, role and function have to be formally determined; there should also 
be transparency and full disclosure from the committees to the board, except where the committee has 
been mandated otherwise by the board. The King Report 11 also requires committees to be subject to 
regular evaluation by the board to ascertain their performance and effectiveness. 
61 Cited by Holderness (2003, p. 5 1) 
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This section of the chapter discusses the nature (and implications) of ownership- 
structures in the (largely developed) countries that most of the corporate governance 
literature has so far focused on. In the next chapter, the issues are contextualised in an 
African setting to which Uganda belongs. 
2.6.1 Ownership Structure 
Berle and Means (1932) suggested that ownership of a corporation can be in different 
forms. The first form is where an individual incorporates a business as a nominal 
vehicle for conducting that individual's own investment, activities and transactions, 
the individual still controls the business and there is no separation of ownership and 
control. The second fonn is where there are several owners of a business3 with 
management owning the majority of the voting stock while the remainder is widely 
diffused; control and part ownership is effectively in the hands of management. The 
third form is where ownership is so widely scattered that working control can be 
maintained with only a minority interest; the shareholder(s) with the largest minority 
interest exercises effective control over the company. The fourth form suggested by 
Berle and Means is where the ownership is so dispersed that not even a substantial 
minority interest exists. In this latter case no identifiable shareholder has sufficient 
ownership to exercise any form of control; directors can, therefore, exercise control 
over the company using the proxy machinery 62 leading to complete separation 
between ownership and control since the investors exercise virtually no control over 
" Management appoints the proxy committee which casts votes on behalf of shareholders and has 
control over that committee. 
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the wealth they contribute to the enterprise. This leads to a situation where, as Berle 
and Means (19 3 2) note: 
The property owner who invests in a modem corporation so far surrenders 
his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the 
position of independent owner for one in which he may become merely 
recipient of the wages of capital (p. 3). 
Berle and Means expressed the view that the separation of ownership from control 
produced a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager could 
diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of 
power disappeared. Consequently, the position of ownership changed from that of an 
active to that of a passive agent since the investor had no actual control over the 
enterprise and its physical properties. Berle and Means (1932) argued that: 
Since direction over the activities of a corporation is exercised through the 
board of directors, we may say for practical purposes that control lies in 
the hands of the individual or group who have the actual power to select 
the board of directors, (or its majority), either by mobilizing the legal right 
to choose them - "controlling" a majority of the votes directly or through 
some legal device - or by exerting pressure which influences their choice 
(p. 69). 
Berle and Means conclude that control may arise from: almost complete 
ownership; majority control; a legal device without majority ownership; minority 
control; and management control. Whilst the first three of these result from the 
right to vote, the last two are factual rather than legal. 
In line with dispersed ownership, a study commissioned by the Federation of 
European Securities Exchanges (FESE) identified the following categories of owners 
of listed companies in its report entitled Share Ownership Structure in Europe (FESE, 
2002): (i) non-resident investors; (ii) the public sector; (iii) individual and household 
investors; and (iv) domestic collective investments (mutual funds, pension funds and 
insurance companies). According to the report, non-resident investors have become 
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the driving force in European markets, while the public sector's participation in listed 
companies varies from zero in countries like the UK and Spain to 30% in the new 
stock markets of Eastern Europe such as Poland and Slovenia. Ownership by 
individual and household investors varies from 25-30% in Spain and Italy to 3-8% in 
Finland, Portugal and France. Domestic collective investments account for 47% of the 
total market capitalisation in the UK. The report postulates that institutional investors 
seem to be increasingly diversifying their portfolios towards non-domestic markets 
and securities. Table 2.1 presents the findings of the research commissioned by the 
Federation of European Securities Exchange (FESE, 2002) regarding ownership 
structures in individual countries throughout Europe. Other investors make up for the 
remaining difference of 0.6%. 
Table 2.1 Share Ownership Structure in Europe 
Country Foreign 
Investors 
Public 
Sector 
Individual 
Households 
Private Non- 
Financial 
Enterprises 
Private 
Financial 
Enterprises 
Denimark-2000 26 7 16 19 26 
France - 2000 36 6 8 21 29 
Germany-2000 20 6 16 40 18 
Greece - 2001 22 0 34 25 19 
Finland -2000 74 8 7 9 2 
Italy - 2000) 15 15 25 25 20 
Norway-2000 34 25 8 17 16 
Poland - 2001 39 30 20 - 9 
Portugal -1999 25 12 4 27 13 
Slovenia-2000 4.7 24.5 23.1 21.2 26.5 
Spain - 2000 36 0 30 20 14 
Sweden-2000 40 9 13 10 28 
UK - 2000 32 0 16 3 47 
Average 31.1 11.0 16.9 19.8 20.6 
Note: The above Table was compiled from information contained in the FESE (2002) Report. 
Highlighting the impact of ownership structure on corporate governance, Burton et al. 
(2004) note: 
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Many small, family-run, businesses do not need to take heed of these 
corporate governance requirements, especially where the business has no 
outside investors or major stakeholders. However, once a company seeks a 
stock market listing and offers its shares to the public through an IPO, 
detailed corporate governance requirements .... are likely to come into force for the first time (p. 35 4). 
In the case of Uganda, there are only seven countries listed on the Uganda Securities 
Exchange and only five of these are incorporated in Uganda; the other two are cross- 
listed but registered in Kenya. The vast majority of Ugandan companies are either 
family-run or sole-proprietorships and so this raises questions about how much 
corporate governance is valued in them. 
Mallin (2004b) points out that as the share ownership has concentrated in institutional 
investors, the ultimate beneficiaries, who are the real owners of the shares, have lost 
influence on the companies in which they invest, since it is the institutional investors, 
not the beneficial owners, who vote. 
In addition to the separation of ownership and control, there are several other respects 
in which share ownership in the modem corporation differs from the traditional 
notions of ownership; these stem largely from the fact that there are so many owners 
that it makes little sense to consider any one of them an "owner" from the aspect of an 
individual with an economic interest in being informed about and involved in 
corporate affairs (Monks and Minow, 2001). 
In 1960, Harvard law professor Abram Chayes wrote that "Ownership fragmented 
into shares was ownership diluted. It no longer corresponded to effective control over 
company operations. " Chayes found that. there were no "institutional arrangements" 
that could "make it possible for many scattered individuals to concert their suff-rages 
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on issues sufficiently defined to warrant meaningful conclusions about an expression 
of their Wilp5.63 Chayes' finding may no longer be applicable in light of increased 
shareholder activism (especially institutional shareholders). 
2.6.2 Rights of Shareholders 
The rights of shareholders are an important consideration in corporate governance. 
Adam Smith (1937)64 believed that the protection of an individual in his quiet 
enjoyment of property was one of the few legitimate activities of civil Government. 
Various codes and principles of corporate governance have presented these rights in 
their documents. For example, the OECD Principles (2004) suggest the following 
rights of shareholders: 
1. the right to: (i) secure methods of ownership registration; (ii) convey or 
transfer shares; (iii) obtain relevant and material information on the 
corporation on a timely and regular basis; (iv) participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings; (v) elect and remove members of the board; and (vi) 
share in the profits of the corporation; 
2. the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: (i) amendments to the 
statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the 
company; (ii) the authorisation of additional shares; and (iii) extraordinary 
transactions., including the transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in 
effect result in the sale of the company; 
3. the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general shareholder 
meetings and to be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, that 
govern shareholder meetings; shareholders should be able to vote in person or 
in absentia, and equal effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or 
in absentia; 
4. disclosure by the company of capital structures and arrangements that enable 
certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their 
equity ownership; 
5. facilitation of the exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including 
institutional investors; 
63 Abram Chayes, in his Dec. 1960 introduction to John P. Davis, Corporations (originally published 
1897, republished Capricon Press, New York, 1961), pp. xvii-xviii. 
64 Cited by Monks and Minow (200 1), p. 8 1. 
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6. the right to consult with each other on issues concerning 
shareholder rights, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse; and 7. equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority 
shareholders and the opportunity for shareholders to obtain 
violation of their rights. 
Berle and Means (1932)65 add the following points: 
their basic 
and foreign 
redress for 
1. the right to use the property: for example, cashing dividend cheques, using 
stock to secure a loan or to give some, or all of it, as a gift; 
2. the right to bring a suit for damages if the corporation's directors or managers 
fail to meet their obligations; and 
3. certain residual rights following the company's liquidation (or its filing for 
reorganisation under bankruptcy laws), once creditors and other claimants are 
paid off. 
2.6.3 Responsibilities of Shareholders 
Monks and Minow (2001) argue that ownership is a combination of rights and 
responsibilities with respect to a specific property. Adam Smith (1937)66 believed 
that,, by pursuing their own interests, shareholders frequently promoted the 
responsibilities of society more effectively than if they had set out with this expressed 
purpose. Monks and Minow take the view that although fractionalisation of ownership 
characteristics has possibly served to enrich owners by decreasing their 
accountability, bad governance practices create an obligation for fiduciary 
shareholders to pull together the fractions of ownership and restore value for their 
beneficiaries. 67 
65 cited by Monks and Minow (200 1), pp. 92-93. 
66 cited by Monks and Minow (1937), p. 82. 
67 Similarly, Hutton (1995) argues that pension funds and insurance companies are shareholders and 
that it is their "moral duty" to ensure that companies are governed in the interests of shareholders. In 
1991, the Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC) issued a document entitled "The Responsibilities 
of Institutional Investors in the UK", in which it was advocated that institutions should make positive 
use of their voting rights (Mallin, 1996). 
63 
According to Graham and Dodd (1934), shareholders have a right and responsibility 
to focus their attention on matters where "the interest of the officers and the 
stockholders may be in conflict, " including executive compensation. Moreover. 
Monks and Minow (2001) argue that shareholders must be vigilant about preserving 
the full integrity - and value - of their stock ownership rights. 
The UK Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury 
Committee, 1992) viewed institutional investors as having a special responsibility in 
influencing the standards of corporate governance in the companies in which they 
invested and called on them to play a more active part in securing better corporate 
governance, to take a positive interest in the composition of boards, to make positive 
use of their voting rights to change company decisions, and to disclose their policies 
on the use of voting rights. 
The main areas of contention between institutional investors and their investee 
companies tend to be the following: (i) the requirement for a majority of independent 
directors on the board and on key committees; (ii) the separation of the roles of 
Chairman, CEO and lead directors; (iii) the compensation of executives and board 
members; (iv) takeover defence strategies; and (v) confidential voting (Mallin, 
1996). 68 
Short and Keasey (1997) note that while institutional investors as a collective own the 
majority of the equity in UK companies, on an individual basis their shareholdings are 
I 
68 Mallin (1996) points out that, in the UK, the voting services offered by institutional investors' 
representative groups have an important role to play in highlighting contentious issues and in helping 
the institutions to reach a consensus on resolutions, as well as, on occasion, acting as a "voice" for the 
institutions that they represent. 
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mostly in the region of 2-3 percent of a company's issued shares. In comparison to the 
size of the company and the size of the institution's total portfolio, this shareholding is 
small and may not warrant the expense that has to be incurred in actively monitoring 
management. An individual institution can only have a significant influence when the 
potential to influence other institutions or shareholders is taken into account. The 
sheer size of financial institutions gives them a voice, via their impact upon the media, 
which can be used to influence general perceptions of corporate behaviour. The 
potential for such a public voice also often translates into private influence and into 
the seeming willingness of corporations to run special sessions for institutional 
shareholders. Action taken by institutional investors may act as a deterrent to other 
companies' boards and may signal to the corporate community in general that 
intervention by institutions remains a credible threat. This influence has to be 
balanced with the effect of negative publicity upon share prices. 
Edward V. Regan (1992), the former New York State Comptroller, 69 expressed 
concern that shareholders, directors and the public only reacted after the economic 
damage had been done; he stressed the need for a pro-active institutional investors' 
role in monitoring the performance of firms. 
2.7 Disclosure and Transparency 
This section examines some of the aspects of disclosure and transparency that 
have 
been stressed in the literature and codes or principles of corporate governance; the 
discussion again focuses on the key issues examined in the empirical chapters of the 
69 Cited by Monks and Minow (200 1), p. 152. 
65 
thesis. With respect to disclosure and transparency, the Blue Ribbons Committee 
(1998) argued that the oversight function of committees, such as the audit committee, 
should ensure that appropriate accounting policies, internal controls and (independent 
and objective) outside auditors were in place to deter fraud, anticipate financial risks 
and promote accurate, high quality and timely disclosure of fmancial and other 
information to the board, public markets and shareholders. 
From a shareholder perspective, the main concern for disclosure and transparency 
arises from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932) which 
leads to an agency relationship (Mallin, 2004a). Mallin argues that infonnation 
asymmetry arises because the beneficial owners of companies are not actively 
involved in the day to day management of the company, and because management 
and shareholders have access to different levels of information. Recognition of this 
fact, together with the possibility that management can misuse their power and make 
decisions that diverge from the interests of the beneficial owners (Keasey et al, 1997) 
makes it necessary for management to make adequate disclosures and act in a 
transparent manner so as to enable the owners to monitor management's perfon-nance. 
The Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (CACG Guidelines, 
1999) suggests that this monitoring can help in holding management accountable for 
achieving the company's objectives. 
From a stakeholder point of view, firms have a relationship with other relevant parties 
that have an interest in the operation of corporations. As such, companies are expected 
to recognise the well-being of other groups having a long-term association with the 
firm (Keasey et al., 1997). The EBRD (1997) observes that a company's success 
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hinges upon its maintaining a sound relationship with the various constituencies on 
which it depends and pursuing policies that enhance shareholders' benefits. The King 
Report 11 (2002) stresses the value of a firm's reputation in attracting capital and 
enhancing business performance, while Monks and Minow (200 1) and Gray et al. 
(1996) note that a firm's position towards corporate social responsibility plays a role 
in the way that it is perceived by stakeholders. Disclosure and transparency is stressed 
by various codes, such as the Combined Code, as one of the ways of enhancing 
relations between companies and shareholders. 70 
Various codes of corporate governance, such as the OECD Principles (revised, 2004), 
Combined Code (2003), the Directors Remuneration Regulations (2002), the Hampel 
Committee Report (1998) and the Cadbury Committee Report (1992) suggest that the 
following information should be Part of a company's disclosure set: 
(a) financial and operating results; 
(b) corporate objectives; 
(c) major share ownership and voting rights; 
(d) remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives; 
(e) information about board members, including their qualifications, the 
selection process, other company directorships and whether they are 
regarded as independent by the board; 
(f) related party transactions; 
(g) foreseeable risk factors; 
(h) governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate 
governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented; 
(i) material interest in any transaction or matter directly affecting the 
corporation; 
the impact of an organisation's activities on society and the envirom-nent; 
(k) membership of board committees; and 
(1) - in the event of a resignation by a non-executive 
director - information 
about whether the resignation resulted from a policy disagreement or a 
personality clash. 
70 Disclosure and transparency may also be driven by the need to conform to laws, regulations, 
by-laws 
and private laws established by the legislature, the company, or mutual agreement 
(Monks and Minow, 
2001). 
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The UK Hampel Committee Report (1998) also required companies to disclose cases 
where the roles of chairman and chief executive were combined by explaining and 
justifying the reasons for combining the two roles. The Combined Code (2003) sought 
to enhance transparency in companies by recommending that the chairpersons of the 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees should be available to answer 
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questions during the AGM. 
2.8 The Framework of Corporate Governance 
Section I of the revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004) 
stresses the importance of an effective corporate governance framework in the 
following words: 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate 
the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
Letza et al. (2004) argue that: 
[A] pluralist approach ... suggests that corporate governance is not 
only conditioned to the economic logic such as economic rationality and 
efficiency, but also shaped and influenced by politics, ideologies, 
philosophies, legal systems, social conventions, cultures, modes of 
thought, methodologies, etc. (p. 258). 
Vintiadis (2004) also notes that conflict of interest, regulatory inefficiency, unsound 
ethics and greed are among the causes of recent major corporate failures. Some of the 
areas that will be considered as forming part of the framework of corporate 
governance are the political, legal, regulatory and accounting frameworks together 
with the economic, cultural, social and ethical factors that may have an impact on 
71 The Combined Code also recommended that all directors should attend such meetings. 
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corporate governance in a country. Each of them is examined in detail in the empirical 
analysis reported later in the thesis. 
2.8.1 Political Framework 
In line with the need for an appropriate framework for corporate governance, the 
Guidelines for Enhancing Good Economic and Corporate Governance in Africa (ECA 
Guidelines, 2002) state: 
Good economic governance exists in those economies where the institutions of Government have the capacity to manage resources 
efficiently; formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and 
regulations; can be monitored and be held accountable; in which there is 
respect for the rules and norms of economic interaction; and in which 
economic activity is unimpeded by corruption and other activities 
inconsistent with the public trust. The key elements contributing to an 
environment of good economic governance are transparency, 
accountability, an enabling environment for private sector development 
and growth, and institutional development and effectiveness. (Section 2.1, 
par. 4). 
The above quotation points to the necessity of having a political envirom-nent which is 
conducive to the promotion of corporate governance in a particular country. 72 
Government is entrusted with an overall responsibility for the proper management of 
resources in a country through policies, regulations and institutions that monitor and 
enforce compliance with good stewardship. Businesses operate in accordance with 
laws, rules, regulations and policies that are put in place as a result of political 
decisions by Government. Measures such as fiscal and monetary policies and laws 
governing commercial interactions, and their enforcement thereof, should, arguably, 
provide a stable framework within which a business operates. Company officials will 
72 The OECD Principles note that Governments have an important responsibility for shaping an 
effective regulatory framework that provides for sufficient flexibility to allow markets to function 
effectively and to respond to expectations of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
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respond to this framework by either following the laws and regulations faithfully and 
using them to promote good governance in their companies, or by trying to 
circumvent those laws and regulations (if they do not consider them appropriate under 
the prevailing circumstances). Such action may lead to poor corporate governance 
practices in companies. 
The empirical focus of this thesis is on perceptions of governance practices in 
Uganda. The ECA Guidelines note that the majority of African countries lack the 
capacity to meet the mandate of eradicating poverty and improving economic growth 
due to deficiencies in their economic governance structures. In particular, the 
guidelines state that the deficiencies include: 
[T]he lack of an appropriate institutional framework to guide economic 
policy-making and execution; a weak civil society unable to hold 
Government accountable for its actions; a similarly weak or uninterested 
parliament; and the lack of consultative mechanisms for engaging the 
private commercial interests for input into sectoral planning or other 
national economic decision-making process. (Section 2.1, par. 5). 
Also, if Goverm-nent officials are perceived to be corrupt in their conduct, then their 
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oversight function of Government and the business sector may be compromised . 
The political framework in passing appropriate laws, setting up regulatory and 
supervisory agencies, monitoring the implementation of those laws, regulations and 
policies, and being an example of good governance cannot be overstressed in the 
promotion of corporate governance in a country. Parliament's oversight 
function is 
seen as being instrumental in the process of good governance and accountability 
73 Neal (2003) examines the oversight function of parliament in her article: "Ensuring Accountability 
in 
Public Expenditure" published by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (19 March). 
Neal 
argues that Parliament has the responsibility of both passing bills that reflect good policies and 
monitoring their implementation to ensure that they are administered 
in accordance with the legislative 
intent. 
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(Neal, 2003 ). 74 The type of political leadership in a country may also affect the ability 
of companies in that country to attract foreign investment and to trade with foreign 
countries. Trade sanctions have been imposed at various times on countries whose 
political leadership was thought not to be acceptable by the international community. 
Examples include South Africa (at the time of apartheid) '75 Libya (Albright, 2000)76 
and Iraq (Elliot and Hufbauer, 2006). 77 These sanctions curtailed investment flows 
into those countries and the ability of each nation's firms to trade effectively with 
other countries. The focus of the present study, Uganda, provides a clear example of 
the problems that can be caused by sudden dismantling of established political 
structures, particularly in a developing country; when Idi Amin overthrew the elected 
Government in 1971, he set into motion certain policies that destroyed the economy 
of an otherwise flourishing country and also heralded an era of moral degeneration, 
which in turn resulted in extensive corruption (and other unethical business activities, 
such as smuggling) due to shortages of commodities (Mulumba, 2006). Such issues 
and the potential for a robust system of corporate governance to tackle them, is one of 
the central questions examined in the present study. 
2.8.2 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The OECD Principles (2004) recommend that the corporate governance framework 
should be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of 
74 Neal also argues that: "the framework for effective parliamentary scrutiny must take into account two 
important issues: first, the establishment of specific oversight mechanisms to effectively hold the 
executive to account for their activities, and secondly the need for a bipartisan approach in Parliament 
when overseeing executive activities" (p. 3). 75 U. S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 1086. 
76 Trade sanctions were imposed against Libya in 1986 after Libya was blamed for the bombing of a 
Berlin disco that killed two U. S. servicemen and a Turkish woman, and wounded 229, including 79 
Americans. 
77 Sanctions were imposed against Iraq on 2 August 1990 after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. See also: 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (2003). 
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responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
This view implies that whoever is responsible for setting up principles or codes of 
corporate governance should make sure that there is no conflict between the proposed 
principles and the existing law of the country. In the event of a possible conflict, then 
appropriate legislation would need to be enacted if thought appropriate for the 
country. There could also be cases where no conflict exists with existing laws, but 
rather the absence of a law needed to support a specific aspect of corporate 
governance that is important. Again, the requirement for appropriate legislation would 
need to be investigated in such a situation. 78 Arun and Turner (2004) point to the need 
for appropriate laws that would protect investors, increase financial disclosure, 
impose fiduciary duties on directors and company executives and also reduce political 
interference in the management of companies. 
There has been a debate as to whether codes of corporate governance should be 
legislated or left to the private sector to be formulated voluntarily as part of a self- 
regulating system. Dewing and Russell (2000) cite the example of the traditional 
British preference for self-regulation which is reflected in the UK Company law, 
where statutory provisions are supplemented by the activities of professional or other 
bodies. The authors quote Goulding (1999) who points out that to supplement the 
statutory frameworks, a series of "extra-legal codes" has been developed which 
includes Listing Rules (the "Yellow Book") administered by the LSE, 79 and the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers administered by the Panel on Takeovers and 
78 The King Report 11 (2002) identified 27 recommendations requiring statutory amendment and other 
actions. 
79AIthough responsibility for the listing rules has now passed to the UK Listing Authority. 
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Mergers. 80 However, Dewing and Russell (2000) and Power (1997) question the 
effectiveness of self-regulation in actually regulating companies since companies do 
not have to comply with codes, but only to disclose non-compliance; according to 
these authors, there seems to be no adequate monitoring of disclosure of non- 
compliance. Dewing and Russell take the view that there is a case for the 
establishment of a more formal and permanent framework for setting, monitoring, and 
ensuring compliance with corporate governance standards in order to enhance 
accountability. US authorities took this line when they passed into law the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of 2002, while the UK published The Directors' Remuneration Report 
Regulations 2002 as a Statutory Instrument (2002 No. 1986) which is legally 
81 82 binding; Ugandan firms are governed by The Companies Act (1964). Dewing and 
Russell (2004) were of the view that regulation was justified in cases where the 
market failed to produce behaviour or results that were in the public interest and gave 
examples of social regulation involving environment, industrial relations, racial 
equality and safety (among others). Stressing the importance of the regulatory 
framework, Ade-Ajayi (2004) observed that levels of governance could be weakened 
depending on the regulatory and oversight environment of the host country. Ade- 
Ajayl argued that corporate governance would be enhanced in countries where the 
legal and regulatory framework was strong and effective. 
80 Cheffins (1997) argues that the advantages of self-regulation within a statutory framework using 
extra-legal codes are that it has: "greater speed of response and flexibility in the face of changing 
circumstances; the ability to focus on the application of the spirit rather than the letter of the 
regulations; and the increased ability to draw on practitioner expertise which is made at a reduced cost" 
(pp. 378). 
8' in terms of certain disclosure items and the requirement for a (non-binding) shareholder vote on the 
remuneration report. 
82 The Act is based upon the British Companies Act of 1948 and was considered by the research 
participants to be outmoded and in urgent need of revision. The Recommended Guidelines 
for 
Corporate Governance in Uganda (2001) are voluntary and not legally binding. These are contained in 
the Manual on Corporate Governance published by the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda. 
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Selznich (1985) defined "regulation" as "sustained and focused control exercised by a 
public agency over activities that are valued by a community" (p. 363 ). 83 Dewing and 
Russell (2004) refer to Baggott's (1987) three main classifications of regulatory 
systems, namely: (i) by degree of formality; (ii) by legal status; and (iii) by extent to 
which "outsiders" are involved. Dewing and Russell (2004) note that regulation may 
vary from voluntary systems of self-regulation, to more formal systems of self- 
regulation involving greater participation by outsiders, or it may be in the form of 
direct public regulation based on statute. Whittington (1993 )84 explained that self- or 
private-regulation was typically carried out by professional bodies, whilst broadly 
based self- or private -regulation involved a greater interdependence from the 
members of the group being regulated and included representation of broader 
interests; public regulation was backed by formal authority of law. Regardless of 
whether a country takes the legislative or self-regulatory route, the implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement of the codes will be important. A related question is the 
extent to which regulatory agencies' roles are clearly defined and distinct, and their 
resources adequate to facilitate their work. Also of importance is the extent to which 
companies comply with laws and regulations relating to corporate governance. In 
their study of Irish companies, Brennan and McDermott (2004) established that a 
significant number of Irish companies did not comply with some of the requirements 
of the UK Combined Code. Based upon this study, Brennan and McDermott 
concluded that: 
The lack of compliance by some companies with some of the provisions of 
the Combined Code highlights the limitations of using non-mandatory 
codes. It is likely that problem companies, most in need of following best 
practice, are least likely to adopt non-mandatory provisions (p. 334). 
83 Cited by Dewing and Russell (2004, p. 108). 
84 Cited by Dewing and Russell (2004). 
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Thus, the legal and regulatory framework in Uganda will be one of the issues 
investigated in this thesis. 
2.8.3 Accounting Framework 
The OECD Principles (2004) highlight the importance of the accounting framework in 
promoting disclosure and transparency, stating that: 
Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high 
quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure 
(Section V, B). 
This statement suggests that accounting information plays a major role in the effective 
corporate governance of a firm as it enables relevant parties to monitor the 
performance of an organisation and use that information to hold management 
accountable for the stewardship of resources. Annual audits conducted by 
independent, competent and qualified auditors are recommended by the OECD 
Principles to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders about the financial position and performance of the company in all 
material respects (Section V, Q. In line with this thinking, the Combined Code (2003) 
requires UK boards to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company's position and prospects, stating that: 
The board's responsibility to present a balanced and understandable 
assessment extends to interim and other price-sensitive public reports and 
reports to regulators as well as to information required to be presented by 
statutory requirements. (Section C. 1). 
The importance of audit committees in ensuring the integrity of financial reports has 
already been examined in Section 2.5 of this chapter. The Cadbury Committee Report 
(1992) stressed the importance of the internal auditors - in addition to the external 
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auditors - requiring them to establish internal audit functions and undertake regular 
monitoring of key controls and procedures. The Cadbury Committee Report also 
highlighted the necessity of having a financial reporting system whereby financial 
transactions were accounted for in a consistent manner: 
A basic weakness in the current system of financial reporting is the 
possibility of different accounting treatments being applied to essentially 
the same facts, with the consequence that different results or financial 
positions could be reported, each apparently complying with the 
overriding requirement to show a true and fair view. ... there are advantages to investors, analysts, other accounts users and ultimately to 
the company itself in financial reporting rules which limit the scope for 
uncertainty and manipulation (par. 4.47). 
This view suggests that sound accounting principles, applied similarly by all firms, 
should enable users to make a fair assessment of the performance of companies and 
guide the decisions of those users, either in making investment decisions, holding 
management accountable or for other uses, such as tax assessment and valuation of 
shares. 
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The corollary questions seem to relate to who sets the accounting principles and who 
ensures that the principles are applied uniformly across companies. Such issues are 
where a robust accounting framework can play a major role in ensuring the integrity 
of the information that is prepared by companies and disseminated to users. The body 
that is responsible for the setting of a nation's accounting standards would need to 
consider the adequacy of the standards in portraying a true and fair view of the 
85 However, not everyone thinks that annual financial reports are adequate tools for discharging 
accountability. For example, Steccolini (2004, p. 33 1) notes the following: 
Those who underline the weaknesses of the annual report as a disclosure tool point out 
that there is little demand for the information it provides (Jones and Pendlebury, 1996), 
that the number of users is likely to be small (Jones, 1992), that the annual report may not 
contain all the relevant information that users seek, that the information may be presented 
in too complex a format and the reports may not be directly available and accessible to 
potential users (for example, Jones et al., 1985). 
Although the above statement was made in the context of public accountability, some of its elements 
are likely to apply to private sector accountability. Chapter 5 discusses the notion of accountability - 
and its relevance to modem corporate governance practices - in detail. 
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transactions of companies and in ensuring that these standards are applied unifonnly 
across companies and as intended by the standard setters. The quality of the standards 
(and the enforcement of implementation) is likely to have an impact on the confidence 
of the users of the accounting information produced by firms that are applying those 
standards. 
2.8.4 The Economic Framework 
The OECD Principles (2004) recognise the importance of the economic framework 
when they state: 
Corporate govemance is only part of the larger economic context in which 
firms operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the 
degree of competition in product and factor markets (p. 12). 
Coffee (2005) associates corporate scandals with the state of the economy and 
ownership structure; he argues as follows: 
Conventional wisdom explains a sudden concentration of corporate 
financial scandals as the consequence of a stock-market bubble. When the 
bubble bursts, scandals follow, and, eventually, new regulation. 
Historically, this has been true at least since the South Seas Bubble, and 
this hypothesis works reasonably well to explain the turn-of-the- 
millennium experience in the USA and Europe. World-wide, a stock- 
market bubble did burst in 2000, and in percentage terms the decline was 
greater in many European countries than in the United States. (pp. 198- 
199). 
Coffee notes that the most recent economic downturn was associated with pervasive 
accounting scandals, fraud and financial irregularities that included earnings 
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manipulation. 86 One of the reasons given by the author for earnings manipulation is 
pressure from stock markets to support share prices. 87 
The economic framework, therefore, seems to be an important factor in corporate 
governance as it is likely to influence participants to act in certain ways. Pressures 
can come from the expectations of stock market analysts or as a result of economic 
policies put in place by Government that impact negatively on the performance of 
finns and affect their competitiveness. Other factors such as the level of taxes, 
inflation and poverty in a country, or the individual circumstances of company 
officials might also influence the conduct of directors in managing their company and 
incline them to act in one way or the other. 
2.8.5 Cultural and Social Factors 
Willmott (1996) argues that human beings participate in particular social worlds and 
that universal processes of accountability are influenced by historically and culturally 
distinctive backgrounds. The OECD Principles (2004) recognise the fact it is not 
possible to formulate corporate governance principles that would apply to all 
countries at all times. Moreover, the OECD acknowledges that their principles will 
need to be adapted by different countries according to the varying legal, economic and 
cultural circumstances therein. This necessary divergence can be evidenced by the 
routes that different countries have taken in the type of codes adopted. Several 
countriesý including the UK, have stressed the shareholder view and adopted 
86 Examples of these are given in footnote 19. 
87 However, in cases like Enron, there was apparent fraud intended to benefit certain individuals who 
were occupying senior positions in the company. See Monks and Minow (200 1). 
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voluntary regulation (the Combined Code, 2003), whilst others such as the US have 
opted for the legal approach to corporate governance rule enforcement (SOX, 2002). 
Much of mainland Europe and Japan have instead opted for the stakeholder approach 
which extends beyond the interests of shareholders based upon the traditions 
prevailing in each nation. Despite this realisation that different countries may have 
different approaches to corporate governance, there seems to be a growing trend 
towards a commonly-accepted set of corporate governance principles as a result of 
on-going globalisation in capital and product markets. Hertig (2005) supports this 
view, stating that: 
Continental European reluctance to follow the UK and US lead started to 
soften owing to EU firms increasingly tapping US capital markets, and 
practically disappeared once it became clear that corporate scandals were 
not confined to North America. For their part, firms listed in industrialised 
Asian countries or in developing and transition countries are increasingly 
forced to show compliance with some kind of corporate governance 
principles if they want to avoid the costs associated with scoring badly on 
global corporate governance tables. (p. 273) 
Such convergence in governance principles is likely to present new challenges, such 
as examining the cultural and social values of different countries and examining how 
these values can be aligned to those of the international investment community. 
2.8.6 Ethical Framework 
According to Monks and Minow (2001), some scholars have developed what they call 
an "ethical contract. " This contract assumes that any executive's legitimacy can only 
be sustained by the interaction of a company's "relationships" with other 
stakeholders. The authors argue that the extemal legitimacy of executives and 
employees must be sustained and controlled by the personal ethic of the individuals 
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involved as well as by broader corporate and societal moral nonns. The personal ethic 
operates through conscience, while the corporate and societal ethics work through the 
internal and external systems of scrutiny, each of which is reinforced by mechanisms 
for enforcement (Cannon, 1992). In line with this thinking, Chryssides and Kaler 
(1996) note that business ethics has two aspects: (i) the specific situations in which 
ethical controversy arises; and (ii) the principles of behaviour by which it is 
appropriate to abide. Chryssides and Kaler state that business ethics can manifest 
themselves in areas such as advertising, accounting, employee relations and 
environmental issues, and that legislation alone is not sufficient to protect 
stakeholders; they argue as follows: 
Appearing to be ethical, it may be suggested, is simply good business: 
consumers are arguably, more likely to buy from a company which can be 
seen to be acting ethically. Graduates are more likely to be attracted to 
companies which treat their employees fairly and give customers a fair 
deal. Others may contend that concern for business ethics is a means of 
forestalling legislation; business people do not want external restrictions 
or new possibilities for prosecution and litigation. Those who are less 
disenchanted with human nature will welcome this interest in responsible 
business behaviour as evidence that there is a genuine concern within the 
business world that consumers get a fair deal, that environmental pollution 
is brought under control, that men and women work in acceptable working 
conditions, and so on. (p. 5) 
Chryssides and Kaler assume that one should act ethically "for no other reason than 
that it is wrong not to do so" (p. 6), although Webley (2003) finds evidence that 
companies that have adopted codes of ethical practice tend to perform better than the 
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others. The OECD Principles (2004) note that factors such as business ethics as well 
as corporate awareness of the environment and societal interests of the communities 
in which a company operates, can have an impact on reputation and long-term 
success. However, Keasey et A (1997) note that a system of accountability may need 
88 In a random sample of 17 codes published or revised between 2001 and 2003, Webley 
found that the 
most common words used in the preamble of those codes were: fairness, honesty, 
integrity, openness, 
respect, responsibility and trust. 
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to make trade-offs between ethical and wider efficiency issues, whilst Solomon and 
Solomon (2004) suggest that ethical behaviour is part of a company's corporate social 
responsibility. potts and Matuszewski (2004) are of the view that: 
Ethics and integrity are critical to the global marketplace. Countries must demonstrate trustworthiness in order to fully share in the benefits of international development and trade (p. 178). 
Potts and Matuszewski argue that "ethical" companies can recruit and retain the best 
workforces and foster positive, long-term relationships with vendors, customers, 
investors and stockholders. Potts and Matuszewski also note that "ethical" companies 
can develop sufficient collateral and respect to reduce activist and media pressures 
and protect corporate reputation. Supporting the importance of moral values in 
corporations, Dawson (2004) notes that confidence in corporations and capital 
markets can only be built based on the actions, values and beliefs of those in the 
boardrooms of the corporations themselves. 
The above literature suggests that the ethical framework within which a company 
operates is an important aspect of its corporate governance. The framework in this 
context consists of, values held by the society within which a company operates; the 
legal framework; a company's internal values and practices; and the values held by 
the individuals who work in the company. Whether companies should be concerned 
I"k about ethics because it makes business sense, or because it is good for the company's 
reputation or just because that is what they should do, is open to discussion. It is clear, 
however, from the literature that a company might reasonably expect to be affected by 
the ethical ftamework within which it operates and should take a position with regard 
to ethical issues as part of its corporate governance. A fuller discussion of ethical 
matters and their inter-relationships with corporate governance, accountability and the 
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stakeholder notion is explored in Chapter 5, and forms an important part of the 
interview and survey-based research reported later in this thesis. 
2.8.7 Privatisation 
Whilst much industrial activity across the globe takes place via a constantly changing 
mix of private and state-owned enterprises, a number of countries began large-scale 
privatisation programmes in the 1980s and 1990s and many of these are on-going. 
Wright et al. (1997) note that extensive privatisation has been undertaken across many 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), while a similar process occurred a 
decade earlier in the UK. More recently, many privatisation programmes have begun 
in developing nations and continue today, particularly in Africa. The stated objectives 
of privatisation throughout the world usually include reducing subsidies to the entities 
concerned, thus improving national finances and enhancing efficiency and 
transparency as a result of the pursuit of the profitability required by private owners 
and market forces (Dean and Andreyeva, 2001). Dyck (2001), however, cautions that 
unless developing countries embrace a meaningftil corporate governance perspective, 
privatisation is unlikely to provide the benefits of improved performance with 
accountability. Dyck argues that transfer of title alone does not ensure improved 
resource allocation and that adopting a corporate governance perspective will lead to 
more effective privatisations with fewer problems. This same view is expressed by 
Dean and Andreyeva (200 1) who state that: 
[P]rivatisation per se does not achieve efficiency benefits. To ensure the 
transformation of incentives, a change in managerial behaviour, and 
finally better company performance, privatisation must create an effective 
mechanism of corporate governance (p. 63). 
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In addition to corporate governance mechanisms, there has also been concern about 
the process of privatisation in Uganda. There have been claims that the process lacks 
transparency and that, in some cases, it has been marred by corruption and lack of 
accountability for the proceeds from the sale of formerly state-owned enterprises. 89 
Such claims highlight the importance of accountability at all levels of governance and 
illustrate that good intentions alone are not sufficient to achieve the desired objectives 
of any action. Proper mechanisms need to be considered in implementing a policy that 
is perceived to be beneficial to the intended group of stakeholders. As the study 
carried out in Russia by Judge and Naoumova (2004) illustrates, Uganda is not alone 
in encountering problems in its privatisation process. Judge and Naoumova 
established that the Russian privatisation process lacked transparency and fair play as 
govemment bureaucrats grabbed all the private property distributed by the state. 
Judge and Naournova argue that Russia's troubled history, as well as its centralised 
culture, legal framework and prevailing corruption affected the privatisation process. 
Corporate govemance practices in companies acquired in such a manner remain 
questionable following privatisation. Russia's experience highlights the impact of the 
political, cultural, social and ethical factors under which companies operate and the 
need to plan any privatisation process carefully, taking into account mechanisms that 
are likely to improve the governance of those companies following privatisation. 
2.9 Con usion 
This chapter has reviewed some of the extant literature on corporate governance and 
related issues such as accountability and regulation with the aim of identifying 
89 Tangiri and Mwenda (2001) allege that "Uganda's privatisation in the 1990's was marred by 
malpractices and manipulation involving regime politicians and well-connected individuals" (p. 117). 
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potential research priorities. Section 2.2 examined the concept of corporate 
governance and discussed: the shareholder versus stakeholder view; the definition of 
corporate governance; and corporate social responsibility. Section 2.3 outlined the 
relevance of corporate governance, while Section 2.4 discussed boards of directors, 
reviewing types of board structure; the role of the board; board composition; 
appointment to the board; resignation of directors; orientation and training of 
directors; independence of board members; non-executive directors; supply of 
information to board members; directors' liabilities; chairman and chief executive 
officer; constructive use of the AGM; and evaluation of directors and committees. 
Section 2.5 described the board committees recommended by various codes of 
corporate governance before Section 2.6 examined ownership structure, in particular 
the rights and responsibilities of shareholders and their relevance to corporate 
governance structures. Section 2.7 of the chapter outlined various issues relating to 
disclosure and transparency while Section 2.8 reviewed various frameworks that 
underpin any robust corporate governance system, in particular, the: political; legal 
and regulatory; accounting; economic; cultural and social; ethical; and the impact of 
privatisation programmes in modem corporate governance regimes. 
The literature suggests that corporate governance can help firms to generate and 
maximise value for intended beneficiaries by improving accountability, transparency 
and efficiency, and by treating all relevant parties fairly and justly. Clearly, 
identifying the "intended beneficiaries" of a corporation's actions will depend upon 
the firm's predominant disposition towards the shareholder and stakeholder 
viewpoints. However, adherence to the laws and regulations of countries where a 
company operates are likely to necessitate all fin-ns to take into account certain rights 
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of stakeholders, other than just shareholders, as specified by those laws and 
regulations and by the by-laws and articles of association of the companies 
themselves. 
Most of this chapter has been based on Western thinking; the next chapter discusses 
the potential relevance of Western corporate governance principles to developing 
countries such as those in Africa. The empirical research will be carried out in Uganda 
where many of the issues raised in this chapter will be applied and stakeholders will 
be asked for their views as to the applicability of these ideas in the Ugandan context, 
with its particular circumstances. 
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Chapter 3 
Corporate Governance in Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the financial crisis that swept the world in 1997/98, the World Bank and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)90 joined 
forces to create a formal programme (the Global Corporate Goverriance Forum) which 
would assist in the development of corporate governance standards worldwide. In 
1999, the OECD published its Principles (revised in 2004) which were intended to act 
as guidelines for individual countries when drafting their own standards of good 
governance. The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) endorsed the 
OECD Principles but also came up with its own Statement on Global Corporate 
Governance Principles (ICGN, 1999) in which it was affirmed that: 
[A]Iong with traditional financial criteria, the governance profile of a 
corporation is now an essential factor that investors take into consideration 
when deciding how to allocate their investment capital (p. 1). 
In his speech, delivered at the International Conference on Building the Institutions 
for a Modem Market Economy (held in China in 2002), Wolfensohn (2002)91 outlined 
his belief that corporate govemance was a part of a much broader framework of 
development that was an essential element in terms of job creation, distribution of 
resources, spreading of wealth, and integration into the international community. 
Wolfensohn stated that for corporate governance to work, legal reform was necessary 
90 OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
91 Mr. Wolfensohn is the President of the World Bank. 
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in developing and emerging markets; he argued that compliance by private parties 
with corporate governance rules depended in part on a country's legal culture and 
respect for the rule of law, reinforced by a belief that the rules were enforceable. 
Wolfensohn identified that some of the problems faced by judicial systems included: 
the quality of judges; weak enforcement of judgments; Government interference: and 
corruption. 
The OECD principles (as revised in 2004) contained the following headings: 
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
11. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
VI. The ResPonsibilities of the Board. 
The OECD stated that its principles: 
[A]re intended to assist OECD and non-OECD Governments in their 
efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory 
framework for corporate governance in their countries, and to provide 
guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and 
other parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate 
governance. 92 
Corporate governance is treated by the OECD Principles as being a key element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. 
The OECD Principles argue that the presence of an effective corporate governance 
system (at both individual company and macro-economic levels) helps to provide the 
92 This is an extract from the first paragraph of the Preamble to the OECD Principles (2004). 
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degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market 
economy, leading to a lower cost of capital, a more efficient use of resources and, 
thereby, encouraging economic growth. 
3.2 Concept of Corporate Governance 
The tendency in Africa for corporate governance to be analysed from a stakeholder 
perspective can be seen from the definitions and/or contents of the various codes and 
other literature pertaining to corporate governance in Africa. The introduction to the 
King Committee on Corporate Governance (King Report 11,2002) refers to corporate 
governance as being: 
[C]oncerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals 
and between individual and communal goals ... the aim 
is to align as 
nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society. 
93 
The Principles for Corporate Governance in Kenya (Kenya, 1999) define corporate 
govemance as: 
[T]he manner in which the power of a corporation is exercised in the 
stewardship of the corporation's total portfolio of assets and resources, 
with the objective of maintaining and increasing shareholder value and 
satisfaction of other stakeholders in the context of its corporate mission 
(para. 1.1.2). 
The need for stakeholder rights to be recognised and protected is stressed in the 
document. The Recommended Guidelines for Corporate Governance in Uganda that 
was published by the ICGU in 2001 appeared to endorse the stakeholder perspective 
when it stated: 
Directors should recognize that companies do not act independently of the 
societies in which they operate, and that the continued and ultimate 
93 The King Report quoted Sir Adrian Cadbury's statement in Corporate Governance Overview, 
1999 
World Bank Report. 
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success of a company depends on the support and goodwill of different 
resource providers, including investors, employees, creditors, suppliers, 
bankers, etc., whose interests must therefore be specifically addressed 
(section 2.5). 
The same ICGU principles also recommended that boards should identify a 
company's internal and external stakeholders and agree a policy or policies regarding 
how the company should relate to them and address their interests. 
According to Kempe (2003 )94, "good governance entails the existence of efficient and 
accountable institutions - political, judicial, administrative, economic, corporate - and 
entrenched rules that promote development, protect human rights, respect the rule of 
law, and ensure that people are free to participate in, and be heard on, decisions that 
affect their lives" (pp. 2-3). The Guidelines for Enhancing Good Economic and 
Corporate Governance in Africa, which were developed by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA, 2002), define corporate governance as: 
[T]he mechanisms through which corporations (whether private, publicly- 
traded, or state-owned) and their management are governed. It involves a 
set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders, and its other stakeholders, and also provides the structure 
through which the objectives and the monitoring of performance are 
determined" (para. 14). 
The Pan African Consultative Forum on Corporate Governance held at the Eskom 
Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa (16'h - 18'h July 2001) described 
corporate governance as follows: 
Corporate Governance deals with the issues of who directs the company - 
and for whose benefit. Who has the real control of and who has a voice in 
direction of the company: the shareholders, the management, the board of 
directors, or other stakeholders, such as the employees, creditors and the 
wider community? The key elements of good corporate governance are 
94 Kempe R. H. is the Director, Development Management Division, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA). He presented a paper entitled "The UNECA and Good Governance 
in Africa" at the Havard International Development Conference 2003 
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accountability, transparency, responsibility, and fairness to all 
stakeholders. 
3.3 Relevance of Corporate Governance in Africa 
Combes and Wong (2004) caution against the mentality of thinking about corporate 
governance in terms of one-size-fits-all; they argue that corporate governance codes 
will shift over time and vary across countries. Voluntary codes, that require 
companies to comply or explain, are likely to work in countries where the media and 
activist shareholders monitor corporate behaviour, but in some emerging markets, 
where corporate governance awareness is low and public scrutiny weak, legislation 
might be favoured over voluntary codes. Combes and Wong point out, however, that 
there seems to be a powerful force driving the convergence of codes as companies list 
their shares in different countries and rating agencies around the world use similar 
criteria to evaluate governance practices. Industry bodies seem to want common 
standards in the countries and companies where their members invest. The Asahi 
Weekly (2004)95 gives an example of a number of companies in Japan that are opting 
toý fine-tune the traditional Japanese-style system rather than adopt the U. S. model in 
which management is overseen by three board committees that have a majority of 
members drawn from outside directors. In the Foreword to the Guidelines for 
Enhancing Good Economic and Corporate Governance in Africa (ECA, 2002), the 
Executive Secretary of ECA stated the following: 
Good economic and good corporate governance matter to Africa because, 
among other things, they contribute to macroeconomic stability; they 
enhance a Government's ability to implement development and poverty 
reduction policies with scarce resources; they enable public management 
ftmctions to be executed in an accountable manner; they contribute to the 
95 "Corporate governance goes custom-made" in The Asahi Weekly published by The Asahi Shimbun, 
19 June, 2004. htip: //www. asahi. com/en.! zlish/business/TKY200406190169. html. 
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creation of a credible policy environment in which domestic and 
international investors can have confidence and trade can be advanced; 
they lead to the strengthening of absorptive capacity to attract and 
mobilise development assistance flows; they enable the demonstration of 
transparent and participatory economic policy-making and execution as 
well as an open flow of information available to all stakeholders; they 
signal a Government's adherence to standards of institutional functioning 
free of corruption or other such rent-seeking behaviour; they represent a 
source of competitive advantage; they attract private domestic and foreign 
investment; and they broaden and deepen local capital markets. 
It has also been postulated that good governance is synonymous with the achievement 
of better economic growth rates, particularly when institutions that support markets 
are established (ECA, 2002). This view was supported by Hossain (2004)96 who 
wrote the following in the Financial Express: 
Globally, corporate governance has succeeded in attracting a good deal of 
public interest because of its importance for the economic health of 
businesses and corporations and the welfare of society, in general. 
Corporate governance is also perceived as a prerequisite for attracting and improving 
foreign investment. Mr Kitili Mbathi, the Vice President of the Uganda Presidential 
Investors Round Table (PIRT) concurred with this view when he stated: 
... the 
bottlenecks which hinder foreign investment do not need funding; 
most of it is to do with good sound governance and economic 
management. 97 
Delegates at the Pan-African Consultative Forum (PACF, 200 1) agreed that 
improvements in corporate governance should benefit all types and sizes of 
enterprises in Africa - not just the few large publicly-listed companies, 
but also: 
unlisted private companies; family firms; state-owned enterprises; small and medium- 
sized enterprises (SMEs); and local subsidiaries of multinational companies. 
The Pan 
African Consultative Forum (PACF, 2001) recognised the fact that good corporate 
96 bM2: //www. financialexpress-bd. com/print. asp? newsid= 12823 
97 Quoted by Nakawesi, D. in The Monitor Online (25/03/2005). 
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governance improved the financial performance of companies and the operation of 
capital markets by making firms safer for investors, thereby decreasing the cost of 
capital and increasing investment. Delegates at the Consultative Forum affirmed that 
good corporate governance was also a prerequisite for corporate responsibility and 
thus to overall sustainable development. 98 Delegates also spoke of the inseparability 
of corporate governance, public governance and the economic policy environment, 
and the consequent need for policy review and modification to the legal framework. 
The PACF (2001) was of the view that throughout the developing world, but 
especially in most of Africa, it was necessary to focus not so much on the role of 
capital markets in improving corporate governance, but rather to look at the banking 
sector, development finance institutions and private equity investment. Similarly, in 
the context of international investment, corporate governance should be improved to 
attract not just international portfolio capital, but also foreign direct investment. In 
addition, domestic savings need to be mobilised for investment in national companies. 
3.4 Corporate Governance Issues in Africa 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)99 is based on a three- 
pronged strategy - creating the preconditions for development; addressing priority 
issues; and mobilizing resources. The preconditions for development are the 
promotion of peace, democracy, human rights and sound economic management. 
100 
Mobilising resources involves creating the conditions that promote private sector 
"Which includes financial, environmental and social sustainability. 
99 NEPAD is an organisation that was initiated by the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) to develop 
an integrated socio-economic framework for Africa. Its activities 
include reviewing political and 
corporate governance in the member countries of the OAU. 
100 Sound economic management includes good corporate governance practices. 
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investment, thereby reducing capital flight and bringing in foreign investors (The LRS 
Report, 2002). However, the PACF (2001) recognised that country-specific 
circumstances will lead to differing priorities and stages of development in corporate 
govemance practices. 
3.5 Corporate Governance Framework 
The OECD Principles (2004) identify the following as being among the factors that 
constitute the framework of corporate governance: (i) macroeconomic policies; (ii) 
the degree of competition in product and factor markets; (iii) legislation; (iv) 
regulation such as listing requirements; (v) the institutional environment, including 
regulatory bodies; and (vi) the societal interests of communities in which companies 
operate. The OECD Principles recognise that a country's specific circumstances, 
history and tradition will affect the corporate governance framework. According to 
the OECD Principles, 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate 
the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities (OECD Principles, 2004, Section 1). 
The OECD Principles also stress the importance of taking into account the 
interactions and complementarity between different elements of the corporate 
governance framework and its overall ability to promote ethical, responsible and 
transparent corporate governance practices. If new laws and regulations are needed, 
they should be designed in a way that makes them possible to implement and enforce 
in an efficient and even-handed manner. Corporate governance requirements and 
practices are typically influenced by an array of legal domains, such as: (i) company 
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law; (ii) securities regulation; (iii) accounting and auditing standards; (iv) insolvency 
law; (v) contract law; (vi) labour law; (vii) tax law and (viii) banking laws (OECD 
Principles, 2004; Wolfensohn, 2002). Effective enforcement of laws and regulations 
requires that the allocation of responsibilities for supervision, implementation and 
enforcement among different authorities is clearly defined so that the competencies of 
complementary bodies and agencies are respected and used most effectively (OECD 
Principles, 2004). It is also important to ensure that regulatory responsibilities are 
vested with bodies that are subject to judicial review and can pursue their functions 
without conflicts of interest (OECD Principles, 2004). 
In 2003, the OECD issued a report entitled Experiences ftom the Regional Corporate 
Governance Roundtables in which the following was stated: 
The experiences of economic transition and all too frequent financial 
crises in developing and emerging market economies have confirmed that 
a weak institutional framework for corporate governance is incompatible 
with sustainable financial market development. 
UNECA (2002) is of the view that the majority of African countries lack the capacity 
to meet their mandate of delivering the economic growth and stability due to 
deficiencies in their economic governance structures. 
Those deficiencies include the lack of an appropriate institutional 
framework to guide economic policy-making and execution; a weak civil 
society unable to hold Government accountable for its actions; a similarly 
weak or uninterested parliament; and the lack of consultative mechanisms 
for engaging the private commercial interests for inputs into sectoral 
planning or other national economic decision-making process (ECA, 2002, 
para. 5). 
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3.5.1 Political Framework 
ECA (2002) argues that good political governance is a prerequisite for good economic 
and corporate governance. Good corporate governance includes predictable, open and 
enlightened policy-making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; a strong 
civil society participating in public affairs; adherence to the rule of law; respect for 
basic human rights and freedoms, judicial independence; and consistent traditions and 
predictable institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a given country. 
Public institutions help determine limits on the arbitrary exercise of power by 
politicians and bureaucrats. 
ECA (2002) is of the view that the ability of the state to provide the requisite 
institutional framework to support good governance outcomes is fundamental to the 
interaction between political governance and economic and corporate governance. 
ECA points out that one of the major concerns in Africa is bad political governance 
and the subversion of basic human rights and freedoms resulting in the erosion of the 
capacity of a number of states to sustain economic growth and address poverty. ECA 
believes that corporate governance in Africa can be greatly helpe y improvements 
in an overall framework that promotes transparency and accountability and that has 
adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
In its Anti-Corruption Handbooklol, Transparency International mentions oversight of 
Government and other authorities as being one of the important functions of a modem 
parliament. Parliamentary oversight entails the monitoring of executive activities 
for 
101 http: //www. transparency. org/ach/oversight-bodies/supreme-audit/discussion. htm1 31/10/2005 
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efficiency, probity and fidelity. 102 However, according to ECA (2002), there has been 
a steady decline in the ability of most legislative assemblies to act as a counterbalance 
to executive power and to hold the executive branch of Government accountable. 
Moreover, parliaments do not seem to have an impact on the affairs of the state, on 
making of laws, or the unmaking of Governments. In Africa, the executive branch 
might dominate Parliaments as a result of controlling resources, making cabinet 
appointments and diplomatic positions, and also due to the ineptness of the opposition 
members of some of the parliaments. Loyalties to political parties may also outweigh 
concerns for the legislature as an institution and some parliaments might just act as 
"rubber stamps" to the decisions of the executive. In line with this, there have been 
various allegations in the Ugandan media that the executive arm of Government 
sometimes uses monetary incentives and promises of lucrative jobs to get MPs to vote 
for Government's position. 103 There have also been allegations that some MPs are 
bribed in order to vote for Government positions on various matters that are brought 
before Parliament. Corruption is perceived by some members of the press as being 
102 The official website of the Parliament of Uganda mentions the following as being among the 
functions of the Parliament of Uganda: 
(i) to pass laws for the good governance of Uganda; 
(ii) to provide, by giving legislative sanctions to taxation and acquisition of loans, the means of 
carrying out the work of Government; 
(iii) to scrutinise Government policy and administration through the following: 
pre-legislative scrutiny of bills referred to the Parliamentary committees by parliament; 
scrutinising of the various objects of expenditure and the sums to be spent on each; 
assuring transparency and accountability in the application of public funds; 
addressing to a member of Government questions for reply on the floor of the House; and 
monitoring the implementation of Government programmes and projects. 
(iv) to debate matters of topical interest usually highlighted in the President's State of The Nation 
address; 
(v) to vet the appointment of persons nominated by the President under the Constitution or any other 
enactment. 
http: //www. narliament. go. up, /index functions. htm. 27/10/2004. 
103 In Uganda, for example, there have been various allegations in the media regarding Members of 
Parliament being influenced to vote for Government positions by being given money or promises of 
appointments to certain positions. See Appendix 3.1 for a list of some of the articles 
that have been 
written in the Ugandan Newspapers on this subject. 
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institutionalised in Uganda. 104 The alleged taking of bribes by MPs provoked a 
statement from the bishops of four main Christian Churches in Uganda in which the 
bishops warned MPs against being compromised in their decision-making processes. 
Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala appealed to the MPs to abide by the oaths of their office 
and cautioned them as follows: 
As leaders of the country charged with the obligation of making laws and 
overseeing the implementation of Government policies, we appeal to you 
to be true to your oaths of office especially at this time when you are 
dealing with issues of constitutional amendment. ... Your political 
organisations are important, but Uganda is more important. I therefore 
urge you to discharge your duties honourably and with a clear conscience 
so that you can leave behind a robust and unimpeachable legacy. " (The 
Monitor Online, 20/11/2004). 
Politicians who take "bribes" from Government in order to support Government's 
position might also be compromised in setting and monitoring the enforcement of 
laws affecting corporate governance in both private and public sector corporations. In 
some African countries, such as Uganda, several cabinet ministers are board members 
of both private and public sector corporations -a situation that can create potential 
conflicts of interest for these officials as they exercise their monitoring and 
supervisory functions. ECA argues that boosting parliamentary oversight in Africa 
requires the building of political will to combat corruption, ensure accountability and 
provide parliament with tools such as committees with the power to scrutinise 
legislation, and collaborative relationships with civil society organisations, including 
the media, which should be entrenched in law. 
An examination of articles written in the Ugandan Newspapers indicates that 
stakeholders are concerned about Government enacting appropriate laws that are: 
104 See Appendix 3.2 for a selection of articles examining corruption in Uganda. 
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conducive to the promotion of good governance in both the public and private sector 
(such as labour laws to govern remuneration and respect for the rights of workers); 
facilitating regulatory and supervisory authorities to perform their functions 
efficiently and without undue interference in their work; taking firm steps to counter 
corruption and bribery in all sectors as such practices are perceived to have an impact 
on corporate governance in all firms - whether directly or indirectly; the legislature 
improving their image so that they can be perceived as champions of transparency and 
accountability; setting up fiscal and monetary policies that can contribute to the 
positive governance of companies; and promoting a general political environment 
where both foreign and local investors can have confidence in doing business in 
Uganda or with Ugandan firms. 
The integrity of prominent political figures is perceived as being crucial in 
encouraging all parties involved in the governance of businesses to be transparent and 
accountable to their respective stakeholders. Political interference and cronyism in the 
appointment of senior executives and board members in institutions where 
Government has a stake is seen as being counterproductive if the qualifications, 
competence, experience and personal qualities of the prospective appointees are not 
taken into account when judging whether these individuals have the required 
attributes to be able to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to them. There have also 
been concerns in the media about some senior Government officials protecting certain 
individuals against prosecution in instances where those individuals have been alleged 
to have acted inappropriately in their business transactions, just as it has been alleged 
that some Government officials have conflicts of interest in their dealings with 
commercial entities (see Appendix 3.2). 
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The management of the privatisation process in Uganda has also drawn a lot of 
attention from stakeholders with some claiming that the process has been poorly 
managed, lacks transparency and Government has not given adequate accountability 
for the proceeds from the disposal of privatised entities. The Ugandan Government 
gave the following as being among the benefits of privatisation: (i) reduction of 
subsidies; (ii) promotion of the private sector; (iii) efficiency improvements and (iv) 
increase in production capacity. 105 Appendix 3.4 presents a list of articles that 
examine some of the above issues. 
3.5.1.1 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an organ of NEPAD and is regarded 
in part as an attempt to inspire under-performing states to improve their governance. 
However, the recommendations resulting from a review of a country are not legally 
binding. A peer review under NEPAD focuses primarily on the state of a country's 
democracy, political process, economic development and corporate governance 
practices, based on criteria of governance norms and democratisation goals to which 
African leaders have committed themselves. At the time of acceding to the APRM 
protocol, each state must have a clearly defined time-bound Programme of Action for 
implementing NEPAD and the African Union's 106 declarations on democracy, 
political, economic and corporate governance, as endorsed by the inaugural summit of 
the AU in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. This Programme of Action must 
include periodic reviews (Mathoho, 2003). 
105 The above benefits were outlined by the Privatisation Unit in an article published in The New 
Vision, which is the official Government newspaper (22 nd April, 2004). 
106 The African Union is made up of all countries in Africa, including Uganda. 
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A possible problem regarding the implementation of the APRM relates to the extent to 
which African leaders are prepared to go to put pressure on their peers. Given the 
state of corruption that was observed in the ECA (2002) report, there may still be a 
great deal of work to be done by African Governments to develop a culture that will 
conform to the standards on political and economic cooperation and good governance 
that they have set for themselves. 
3.5.2 Legal Framework 
As regards the role of law in governance, the ECA report of 2002 states that: 
Good governance requires impartial and fair legal institutions. A judiciary 
independent from both Government intervention and influence by the 
parties in a dispute provides the best institutional support for the rule of 
law. The fair enforcement of the rule of law and order promote the 
development of markets, economic growth, and poverty reduction. In 
particular, economic growth generates greater demand for a consistent 
legal framework and reliable legal tools. (para. 56) 
In addition to outlining the general role of law, ECA (2002) also gives the following 
attributes required if a Judiciary is considered to be independent: ' 07 
1. It is impartial. Judicial decisions are not influenced by a judge's personal 
interest in the outcome of the case at hand. 
2. Judicial decisions, once rendered, are respected. Either the parties to the case 
must comply voluntarily with the decision, or those with the power to coerce 
compliance must be willing to use such power if compliance is not 
forthcoming. 
3. The judiciary is ftee ftom interference. Parties to a case, or others with an 
interest in its outcome, cannot influence the judge's decision. This protection 
from interference also allows for the prevention of judicial corruption and 
coercion. 
107 See paragaph 52, UNECA (2002). 
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According to ECA, national Governments pose perhaps the most serious threat to 
judicial independence in Africa. The power of African judiciaries resides primarily in 
the degree to which political elites and members of the public consider impartial 
resolution of disputes important to the conduct of their lives. In those countries with 
bad governance, "impartiality" will not be operative since control takes precedence, 
e. g. the tendency for Governments to ignore judicial decisions that do not favour them 
(para. 54). 108 Judicial independence, 109 in turn, brings a number of benefits to a 
society or a state, for example: the vesting of legal rights that are enforceable and 
protected; greater attention to the rule of law and more transparent enforcement of 
contracts. (ECA, 2002, para. 55). 110 
The official web page of the Uganda judiciary states the following: 
The judiciary is a distinct and independent arm of Government entrusted 
with judicial authority, and mandated to administer and deliver justice to 
the people in Uganda. It plays a fundamental role in the promotion of law 
and order, human rights, social justice, morality and good governance. 111 
Despite the stated objectives of the judiciary, there have been a lot of concerns 
regarding the adequacy of the judiciary in Uganda to handle cases related to the 
governance of companies in a fair and expeditious manner due to the limited number 
of judicial officers and allegations of compromise within the judiciary. Various efforts 
have been made to increase the number of judges and magistrates and to clean up the 
108 Other documented attempts by Governments to influence judicial decisions in Africa have included 
bribery, harassment, control over the assignment of cases to individual judges, promotions, transfers, 
dismissals, and the removal of cases from the jurisdiction of the courts and their placement in parallel 
tribunals that do not safeguard due process (UNECA, 2002, para. 54). 
109 which includes the impetus to demonstrate judicial integrity on the part of members of the judiciary 
110 An example of possible political interference in the independence of the judiciary is Uganda where 
the President has threatened to sack any judge who gives a ruling that would involve the eviction of a 
squatter on the property of a registered owner. Such a threat may have an impact on the rights of 
private ownership of property. There have also been allegations that some high profile businessmen are 
under the protection of certain political figures who protect them against prosecution when those 
individuals violate the law. 
111 htip: //www. judicature. c,, o. ug. 
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alleged corruption within the judiciary. Other concerns include the independence and 
competence of the judiciary, laws and regulations that are perceived as being 
inadequate or outmoded and needing revision and antiquated technology (especially 
information systems). Appendix 3.3 gives a list of some of the articles that have been 
written about the judiciary in Ugandan newspapers. 
3.5.3 Ethical and Social Framework 
The ethical values held by society, and most especially by the participants in the 
governance of companies are likely to influence the way those participants exercise 
their duties. According to the ECA report (2002), corruption is one of the most 
fundamental problems in most of Africa, primarily because of the lack of financial 
resources, personnel and top political support to allow enforcement of the law. ECA 
suggests that the economic, social, and political costs of corruption are formidable and 
that corruption, ultimately, is a symptom of weak institutions and poor policies. 
Moreover, addressing corruption effectively means addressing the underlying 
economic, political and institutional causes. Prevention of corruption needs the 
involvement of civil society, the media, the private sector, and parliaments; however, 
the most important of all conditions to control corruption is, ECA suggests, a strongly 
motivated political leadership supported by other persons of appropriate insight and 
integrity. Good governance (econornic, corporate, and political) allows for the 
functioning of, and respect for, institutions, laws, conventions and practices that 
would effectively discourage corruption and punish those intent on perpetrating it. 
ECA (2002) suggests that political will refers to "the demonstrated credible intent of 
political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder 
103 
groups, etc. ) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level" 
(para. 50). Without such intent, the pronouncements of Governments, in particular, 
are simply regarded as ritualistic. 
3.5.4 Regulatory Framework 
Among the most essential foundations of good economic and corporate governance is 
the regulatory framework. Separating the Government's policyrnaking and regulatory 
roles by establishing independent regulatory mechanisms and fostering the 
development of regulatory expertise helps to assure stability in the regulatory 
environment, thereby reducing the risk that regulation may be misused to achieve 
short-term political ends. The regulation of the financial system is a particularly 
important factor for capital markets, given the importance of the latter in building a 
viable and growing economy. (ECA, 2002). The role of the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks in promoting corporate governance will be examined in more 
detail in Chapters 6 and 7 which will present the empirical findings of the research 
conducted in Uganda. 
3.6 Observations 
Africa is realising that it needs to improve its governance in the political, economic 
and corporate sectors if it is to achieve sustainable development for its people. There 
is a growing awareness that African leaders have to tackle the underlying factors that 
have been hindering sustained development. These factors include a failure of 
political will, absence of an independent judicial system that is free from interference, 
a lack of properly functioning regulatory mechanisms that are capable of carrying out 
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necessary sanctions and a well-articulated division of responsibilities between the 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. Political will is also needed to 
tackle the problem of corruption which appears to be pandernic in AfTica. It is 
therefore imperative that, in their planning, African leaders consider the corporate 
governance framework which encompasses cultural, political, economic, legal, ethical 
and technological dimensions. The decision will then involve identifying a framework 
that may be applicable to individual countries. Ultimately, the adoption of corporate 
governance mechanisms will impact directly on the mission to achieve sustainable 
development, because attracting both domestic and foreign investment requires more 
confidence in the state of the ma or African economies than is currently the case. i 
The next chapter examines the research paradigm, methodology and methods that will 
be employed in gathering data for the present study. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Design: Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
Vogt (1993, p. 196) defmes research design as the "science (and art) of planning 
procedures for conducting studies so as to get the most valid findings. " The design 
provides a detailed plan which a researcher can then employ to guide and focus the 
research (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The research problem underpinning the present 
study and the availability of the sources of infonnation (including literature, original 
sources and research subjects) were discussed in Chapter 1. Chapters 4 and 5 outline 
and explain the research design and underlying theory; specifically, Chapter 4 
discusses the research methodology and methods, while Chapter 5 presents the 
theoretical framework within which the empirical work on corporate governance in 
Uganda is carried out and interpreted. 
4.2 Research Paradigms 
Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 47) state that paradigms "offer a framework comprising 
an accepted set of theories, methods and ways of defming data", while Bailey (1978, 
p. 18) describes a paradigm as "the mental window through which the researcher 
views the world. " Creswell (1998, p. 74) refers to paradigms as: 
[A] basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide- their (researchers) 
inquiries. These assumptions are related to the nature of reality (the 
ontology issue), the relationship of the researcher to that being researched 
(the epistemological issue), the role of values in a study (the axiological 
issue), and the process of research (the methodological issue). 
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In line with this viewpoint, Burrell and Morgan (1979) develop a set of paradigms 
based upon the assumptions made by a researcher about the nature of social science 
and the nature of society. The assumptions about the nature of social science include 
issues relating to: (i) ontology; (ii) epistemology; (iii) human nature; and (iv) 
methodology. Burrell and Morgan further assume that distinctions can be made in 
each of the above categories depending upon whether the social scientist is using a 
subjective or objective approach to study. Burrell and Morgan also argue that a 
researcher is influenced by his/her view about the nature of society; both of these 
categories of assumptions are discussed in detail below. 
4.2.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
Ontological assumptions involve the nature of reality or being. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) give the following as an illustration of the basic ontological question faced by 
social science researchers: 
... whether the " reality to be investigated is external to the individual - imposing itself on individual consciousness; whether "reality" is of an 
"objective" nature, or the product of individual consciousness; whether 
44reality" is a given "out there" in the world, or the product of one's mind. 
(P. 1) 
Collis and Hussey (2003) argue that researchers must decide whether they consider 
the world to be objective and external to themselves, or socially constructed and only 
understood by examining the perceptions of human actors. 
Related to the ontological assumption is the epistemological assumption which deals 
with the grounds of knowledge, that is, how one might begin to understand the world 
and communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings. This assumption is: 
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... predicated upon a view of the nature of knowledge itself. whether, for 
example, it is possible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as being hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible 
form, or whether "knowledge" is of a softer, more subjective, spiritual or 
even transcendental kind, based on experience and insight of a unique and 
essentially personal nature. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, pp. 1-2). 
The stance taken towards knowledge will determine the relationship between the 
researcher and that which is being researched. 
The epistemological assumption made in this study is in line with Merleau-Ponty's 
(1908-1961) middle ground between subjectivism and objectivism which accepts the 
possibility of cognitive relations between subject and object, i. e. where the "seer" and 
the "seen"' condition one another, and the capacity for seeing depends upon the 
capacity for the object being seen. Schutz's (1899-1959) notions of reflexivity (the 
process of turning on oneself, looking at what has been going on and, thus, attaching 
meaning retrospectively to what has already been experienced) and indexicality (the 
process of organising and ordering experiences using expressions and activities which 
are shared even though they are not explicitly stated) are in effect adopted in this 
study when the perceptions of stakeholders are interpreted. 
Burrell and Morgan's third type of assumption relates to human nature, particularly 
the relationship between human beings and their environment. This is an assumption 
that is used in examining whether human beings respond in a mechanistic or even 
deterministic fashion to the situations encountered in their external world, or whether 
man, through his free will, is regarded as the creator of his environment. This 
examination envelopes the philosophical debate between the advocates of 
deten-ninism and voluntarism. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the assumptions 
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made by a researcher regarding ontology, epistemology and nature have direct 
implications on the methodology used in a particular study. The assumptions made 
and the methodology adopted in this study will be outlined in Section 4.3 of this 
chapter. 
4.2.2 The Subjective - Objective Dimension 
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) used the framework of assumptions regarding 
ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology to underpin the following 
outline of the subjective - objective dimension of research, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) explain that the nominalist position revolves around the 
assumption that the social world, external to individual cognition, is made up of 
nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality; 
there is no "real" structure to the world that these concepts are used to describe. 
The "names" used are regarded as artificial creations whose utility is based 
upon their convenience as tools for describing, making sense of and 
negotiating the external world. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 4). 
Table 4.1: The Subjective - Objective Dimension 
The subjectivist apýroach 
to social ki-ence 
Nominalism 
Anti-positivism 
Voluntarism 
Ideogaphic 
The objectivist approach 
to social science 
Realism 
Ontology 
4- Epistemology 
Human nature 
Methodology 
10 Positivism 
Determinism 
Nomothetic 
Note: This Table shows Burrell and Morgan's (1979) scheme for analysing assumptions about the 
nature of social science. 
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Burrell and Morgan go on to explain that realism postulates the social world, external 
to individual cognition, to be a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively 
immutable structures that exist irrespective of whether we label and perceive them. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) note that the term positivism can be used to describe 
epistemologies which seek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by 
searching for regularities and causal relationships between the constituents; these 
reflect traditional research approaches which dominate the natural sciences. Some 
positivists claim that hypothesised regularities can be verified by an adequate 
experimental research programme while others maintain that hypotheses can only be 
falsified and never demonstrated to be true. Burrell and Morgan argue that both 
"verificationists" and "falsificationists" accept that the growth of knowledge is 
essentially a cumulative process in which new insights are added to the existing stock 
of knowledge and false hypotheses eliminated. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), for the anti-positivist, the social world is 
essentially relativistic and can only be understood from the point of view of the 
individuals who are directly involved in the activities being studied. Anti-positivists 
maintain that one can only develop understanding by occupying the frame of 
reference of the participant in action. Social science is seen as being essentially a 
subjective rather than an objective enterprise and cannot, as a consequence, generate 
objective knowledge of any kind. Anti-positivism does not, therefore, search for laws 
or underlying regularities in the world of social affairs. 
III 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that man and his activities can either be regarded as 
being completely determined by the situation or "environment" in which he is located, 
or they can be regarded as being completely autonomous and free-willed. Burrell and 
Morgan postulate that social science theories: 
... must 
incline implicitly or explicitly to one or other of these points of 
view, or adopt an intermediate standpoint which allows for the influence 
of both situational and voluntary factors in accounting for the activities of 
human beings (p. 6). 
Burrell and Morgan's assumptions about the nature of social science are widely seen 
as relevant but not exhaustive. For example, Collis and Hussey (2003) add an 
axiological, value-based assumption; in this context, positivists are seen as believing 
that science and the process of research are value-free, and regard the phenomena 
under investigation as objects to be examined in a detached manner. 
Phenomeno lo gists take the view that researchers have values (whether explicit or not) 
and that these values help to determine what are recognised as facts and the 
interpretations which are drawn from them. 
4.2.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) used Dahrendorf s (195 9) "order-conflict" debate as the 
basis for their assumption that society can be studied via the notions of regulation and 
radical change. These concepts are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Dahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956) try to distinguish between approaches to 
sociology which concentrate upon explaining the nature of social order and 
equilibrium on the one hand, and those which are more concerned with problems of 
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change, conflict and coercion in social structures on the other. This distinction is 
referred to as the order-conflict debate. Table 4.2 presents a schema which Burrell and 
Morgan (1979, p. 13) use to portray Dahrenhorf s simplified model of the order- 
conflict debate. Burrell and Morgan argue that the distinction between integration and 
conflict is a continuum, where consensus could be a result of coercion rather than a 
result of integration arising from shared values (though not necessarily so) and could 
be treated as a system legitimising the power structure. 
Table 4.2 Two Theories of Society: "Order" and "Conflict" 
The "order" or "integrationist" The "conflict" or "coercion" 
view of society emphasises: view of society emphasises: 
Stability Change 
Integration Conflict 
Functional co-ordination Disintegration 
Consensus Coercion 
NOTE: This Table shows Burrell and Morgan's schema used to portray Dahrenhorf s simplified model 
of the order-conflict debate. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that the order-conflict debate be replaced by the 
notions of "regulation" and "radical change". Burrell and Morgan use the term 
46 sociology of regulation" to refer to theorists who are primarily concerned with 
providing explanations of society in terms that emphasise its underlying unity and 
cohesiveness, and about the need for regulation in human affairs so that society is 
maintained as an entity. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the "sociology of radical change" is 
concerned about finding explanations for radical change, deep-seated structural 
conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which its theorists see as 
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characterising modem society. Burrell and Morgan argue that the sociology of radical 
change is substantially concerned with people's emancipation from the structures that 
limit and stunt their potential for development, and with alternatives rather than with 
the acceptance of the status quo. 
Table 4.3 The Regulation - Radical Change Dimension 
The sociology of REGULATION The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE 
is concemed with: is concemed with: 
(a) The status quo (a) Radical change 
(b) Social order (b) Structural conflict 
(c) Consensus (c) Modes of domination 
(d) Social integration and cohesion (d) Contradiction 
(e) Solidarity (e) Emancipation 
(f) Need satisfaction (f) Deprivation 
(g) Actuality (g) Potentiality 
Note: This Table shows Burrell and Morgan's (1979) characteristics of "regulation" and "radical 
change". 
Table 4.3 presents the distinction that Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 18) made between 
the characteristics of "regulation" and those of "radical change". Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) argue that the two models are separate and distinct from each other (however 
close one's position might be to the middle ground) since they are based upon 
opposing assumptions. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), "the ideographic approach to social science 
is based upon the view that one can only understand the social world by obtaining 
first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation" (p. 6) and stresses getting 
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close to one's subject and letting one's subject unfold its nature and characteristics 
during the process of investigation. 
The ideographic approach emphasises the analysis of the subjective 
accounts which one generates by "getting inside" situations and involving 
oneself in the everyday flow of life - the detailed analysis of the insights 
revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries, biographies and 
journalistic records (p. 6). 
The nomothetic approach to social science emphasises the importance of basing 
research upon systematic protocol and technique, as in the natural sciences, which 
focus upon the process of testing hypotheses in accordance with the canons of 
scientific rigour. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that this approach is preoccupied 
with the construction of scientific tests and the use of quantitative techniques for the 
analysis of data; surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and standardised research 
instruments are mentioned by the authors as examples of the techniques associated 
with the nornothetic approach. 
4.2.4 Burrell and Morgan's Four Paradigms 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) present four paradigms, namely: the radical humanist; 
radical structuralist; interpretive; and functionalist. Burrell and Morgan base their 
classification on the assumption that the nature of science can be thought of in terms 
of the subjective - objective dimension, while the nature of society can be thought of 
in terms of a regulation - radical change dimension. Within the sociology of 
regulation, the subjective - objective debate has assumed the form of a debate 
between interpretive sociology and functionalism, while within the context of the 
sociology of radical change there has been a division between theorists subscribing to 
radical humanist and radical structuralist views of society. Burrell and Morgan (1979, 
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p. 22) used these dimensions to come up with four paradigms which, they claimed, 
define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis of social phenomena 
(Table 4.4). It may, however, be pointed out that the two axes are continua and, 
arguably, not absolutely but just relatively different. 
Table 4.4 Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
I: 
H 
() 
rID 
Radical humanist 
Interpretive 
Radical Structuralist 
Functionalist 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Note: This Table shows Burrell and Morgan's (1979) four paradigms 
C 
tTI 
(. 'J 
r1 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that these four paradigms are defined by meta- 
theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorising 
and modus operandi of social theorists, and that the paradigms are based upon 
different meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of science and of 
society. Burrell and Morgan take the position that the four paradigms are mutually 
exclusive and that one cannot operate in more than one paradigm at any given point in 
time, although one can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the functionalist paradigm is firmly rooted 
in the sociology of regulation and approaches its subject matter from an objectivist 
point of view, while the interpretive paradigm reflects the sociology of regulation and 
takes a subjectivist approach. The functionalist paradigm is concerned about 
providing explanations of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration. 
solidarity, need satisfaction and actuality. In contrast, the interpretive paradigm is 
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concerned about understanding the world as it is, based on the subjective experience 
of the participant, as well as the observer, and uses an approach which is nominalist, 
anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic. The radical humanist paradigm is 
concerned about developing a sociology of radical change from a subjectivist 
standpoint, while advocates of the radical structuralist paradigm do so from the 
objectivist one; however, both the radical humanist and radical structuralist are 
committed to a sociology of. 
... radical change, emancipation, and potentiality, an analysis which 
emphasises structural conflict, modes of domination, contradiction and 
deprivation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 34). 
The radical humanist paradigm views the social world from a perspective which tends 
to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic, while radical 
structuralism approaches reality from a standpoint which tends to be "realist", 
"positivist", "determinist" and "nomothetic". 
In a similar vein, Collis and Hussey (2003) present two main paradigms, namely, the 
positivistic paradigm and the phenomenological paradigm. The positivistic paradigm 
is quantitative, objectivist, scientific, experimentalist and traditionalist. The 
phenomenological paradigm is qualitative, subjectivist, humanistic and interpretive; 
according to Collis and Hussey, the phenomenological paradigm may also be referred 
to as the interpretivist paradigm. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify four strands of interpretive theory (Table 4.5), 
namely: (i) solipsism (the most extreme form of subjective idealism); (ii) 
phenomenology (both transcendental or "pure" phenomenology, and existential 
phenomenology); (iii) phenomenological sociology (ethnomethodology and 
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phenomenological symbolism); and (iv) hermeneutics. Burrell and Morgan base these 
distinctions upon the degree of subjectivity in terms of the four strands of the 
subjective - objective dimension. 
Table 4.5 Characteristics of the Four Paradigms 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
Conflict Radical Change Coercion Division Hostility 
Radical humanism Radical structuralism 
Anarchistic Contemporary Russian ý0 
0 Individualism Mediterranean social 
"Cý French Marxism theory 
Existentialism 
Critical Conflict theory 
Cd +-4 S theory dissensus 
Wz 0 M alintegration 14 C 
E* i ýý M 
P Integrative Social 
=- iý 
s theory system 
Phenomenology theory 
s Objectivism 
m Hermeneutics Interactionism 
and social 
Phenomenological action theory 
Sociology 
ý71 
Interpretive sociology Functionalist sociology 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Commitment Cohesion Solidarity Consensus 
Reciprocity Stability Persistence Need satisfaction 
Actuality Social order Status quo Co-ordination 
Social integration 
Note: This Table summarises the different strands within each paradigm as proposed by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979); Dahrendorf (1959) and Cohen (1968) 
Radical humanism Radical structuralism 
Anarchistic Contemporary Russian 
Individualism Mediterranean social 
French Marxism theory 
Existentialism 
Critical Conflict theory 
S theory * dissensus 
0 9 malintegration 
P Integrative Social 
s theory system 
I Phenomenology theory 
s Objectivism 
m Hermeneutics Interactionism 
and social 
Phenomenological action theory 
Sociology 
Interpretive sociology Functionalist sociology 
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Table 4.5 surnmarises the characteristics of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) four 
paradigms. The strands in the four paradigms are arranged from left to right according 
to the order in which they are closest to the subjective or objective dimension, with 
the one to the left being more subjective than the one to the right. 
Chua (1986), Willmott (1993) and Cohen (1968) criticised Burrell and Morgan's 
assertion that the four paradigms were mutually exclusive and that one could not 
operate in more than one paradigm at any given point in time; they argued that it was 
possible to operate across paradigms without fully inclining to one or the other and 
gave the example of the possibility for theories to involve elements of both order and 
conflict. It therefore follows that not every researcher is in agreement with Burrell and 
Morgan's exclusive stance on the paradigms. Arguably, Burrell and Morgan's 
classification schema may be considered to be simplified learning tools that do not 
capture the complexity of what is possible in research; the actual methodology 
adopted by a researcher may depend on the issues being examined and the relevant 
assumptions the researcher may wish to make to guide a particular study under 
specific circumstances. 
4.3 Research Methodology 
Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 55) describe research methodology as "the overall 
approach to the research process, from theoretical underpinning to the collection and 
analysis of data" and stress that the type of methodology a researcher selects should 
reflect the assumptions of the research paradigm. Collis and Hussey present a range of 
methodologies that vary depending upon whether the positivistic or the 
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phenomenological methodologies are used. Phenomenological methodologies would 
be similar to Burrell and Morgan's (1979) subjective dimension while the positivistic 
would relate to the objective type. The present study will be mainly concerned with 
the sociology of regulation and not radical change and so will adopt neither radical 
humanism nor radical structuralism. Although the sociology of regulation is consistent 
with use of both the interpretive and functionalist paradigms, this thesis mainly draws 
its methodology from the interpretive paradigm. The study will not assume complete 
objectivism in its approach since it deals with the perceptions of stakeholders towards 
corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. The next section discusses 
further the various aspects of the interpretive paradigm that will provide the basis of 
assumptions made in the research. 
4.3.1 The Interpretive Paradigm 
The research will use both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect and analyse 
data. However, the main thrust of the research is interpretive as both the qualitative 
and quantitative data will be interpreted in an effort to identify and understand the 
perceptions of stakeholders about corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the study adopts Merleau-Ponty's (1908-1961) middle 
r-- 
ground between subjectivism and objectivism. Consequently, this research assumes 
that corporate governance deals with real organisations and real people who exist 
independently from the mind of the participant, although the perceptions of those 
participants do not exist outside of their minds. The study is qualitative in nature and 
does not look for causal relationships between the constituent elements of the social 
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world, nor does it attempt to establish regularities by means Of an experimental 
research programme that can be independently verified' 12 or that can be used to 
predict future events; this approach supports anti-positivism which is characteristic of 
e interpretive paradigm. 
The study assumes that humans are not completely determined by the situation or 
"envirom-nent" but neither are they completely autonomous and free-willed. A middle 
ground, where the participant is influenced, but not determined, by the environment, 
will be adopted. This point will be especially relevant when dealing with codes or 
principles of corporate governance - which are an element of the sociology of 
regulation and may have elements of uniformity - while leaving room for adaptation 
depending upon the specific circumstances of the participants. Both voluntarism and 
determinism will, therefore, be relevant in the study in which a continuum between 
extreme voluntarism and determinism is assumed. 
This study adopts a stakeholder approach and seeks to establish the perceptions of 
stakeholders, as participants, towards corporate governance and accountability in 
Uganda. This approach has been selected by the researcher because the traditional 
cultures of the people in Uganda, and most of Africa, are stakeholder-based. There is 
a strong belief in the values of family, clan, and the tribe to which every member of 
that group of persons has to owe allegiance. Traditionally, family, clan and tribal 
values were strictly enforced by the leaders of those communities and everyone who 
belonged to the respective groups was expected to uphold and act in its interests or 
else face strict sanctions. The study therefore assumes that this communal approach to 
112 e. g. by repeating the same research process. 
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governance and accountability continues to exist in Uganda, while recognising that 
some of these values may have changed as a result of normal evolution (or interaction 
with other cultures). 
This study adopts the ideographic approach to social science, which is based on the 
view that one can only understand the social world by obtaining first hand knowledge 
of the subjects under investigation. In contrast, the nornothetic approach bases 
research upon systematic protocol and technique involving testing hypotheses in 
accordance with the processes of scientific rigour, similar to. those employed in the 
natural sciences. 
4.3.2 Strands of the Interpretive Paradigm 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the common characteristic of the interpretive 
paradigm is to attempt to understand and explain the social world from, primarily, the 
point of view of the actors directly involved. Burrell and Morgan further explain: 
The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the 
world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at 
the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of 
individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of 
the participant as opposed to the observer of action (p. 28). 
Burrell and Morgan assume that the interpretive paradigm tends to be nominalist, anti- 
positivist, voluntarist and ideographic in its approach to social science and that the 
world of human affairs is cohesive, ordered and integrated; they state that interpretive 
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sociology is concerned "with issues relating to the nature of the status quo, social 
order, consensus, social integration and cohesion, solidarity and actuality" 113 (p. 3 1). 
The interpretive paradigm is in line with Dilthey's (1833 - 1911) argument that the 
cultural sciences are essentially concerned with the internal processes of human minds 
that can only be fully understood in relation to the minds that create them and the 
inner experience which they reflect. 114 Weber (1864 - 1920)1 15 also argues that the 
key characteristic function of social science is to be "interpretive", that is, to 
understand the subjective meaning of social action. For Weber, the objective reality of 
the social world is not a central issue; it is the way in which it is interpreted by human 
actors that is important. 
4.3.3 The Strand of Interpretive Paradigm Adopted for this Study 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) present four strands within the interpretive paradigm, 
namely: solipsism; phenomenology; hermeneutics; and phenomenological sociology 
(see Table 4.5 and Appendix 4.1). Solipsism has not been adopted in this case because 
solipsists are extreme idealistic subjectivists who believe that the world is the creation 
of the mind and does not have any distinct independent existence. In contrast, the 
present study assumes that there is a real world outside the human mind and that the 
people whose perceptions are being sought are real, even if their perceptions may be 
subjective. A hermeneutical standpoint has not been adopted because it primarily 
relates to literary studies, whereas this thesis is conducted via interaction with 
"' The emphasis is in the original text of Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
114 Quoted by Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 229) 
115 idem. (p. 230) 
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individuals. Moreover, the study focuses on the perceptions of the participants, where 
it is assumed that these perceptions are influenced, but not determined, by the life 
experiences of those taking part. Phenomenological sociology is also ruled out 
because this study does not employ ethnomethodology or phenomenological symbolic 
interactionism, or the methods of collecting data that are associated with those 
methodologies. Ethnomethodology uses ethnography which involves describing and 
interpreting a cultural or social group or system (Creswell, 1998); in particular, the 
researcher examines the group's observable and learned patterns of behaviour, 
customs, and ways of life (Harris, 1968); as Cresswell (1998) notes: 
As a process, ethnography involves prolonged observation of the group, 
typically through participant observation in which the researcher is 
immersed in the day-to-day lives of the people or through one-on-one 
interviews with members of the group. The researcher studies the 
meanings of behaviour, language, and interactions of the culture-sharing 
group (p. 58). 
The main method of collecting ethnographical data is participant observation where 
the researcher becomes a full working member of the group being studied, with the 
aim of being able to interpret the social world in the way that the members of that 
particular group would do; the research normally takes place over a long period of 
time in a clearly defined location (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Phenomenological 
symbolic interactionism is extremely subjective and does not accept the existence of a 
real world to which the participant reacts; in contrast, the present study assumes a real 
world does exist upon which perceptions are based. 
This leaves phenomenology which, in turn, is divided between: (i) transcendental (or 
pure) phenomenology; and (ii) existential phenomenology. Husserl's (1859 - 1938) 
pure phenomenology (see Appendix 4.1) is extremely subjective but the present study 
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borders on functionalism as it deals with codes and principles of corporate 
governance. The study, therefore, does not adopt pure or transcendental 
phenomenology. Although principles and codes are generally established to serve a 
function in a group of individuals (or an organisation), the study does not concentrate 
on the functions themselves, but focuses instead on the perceptions of stakeholders 
towards the understanding and state of the principles; any factors that have an impact 
in the practice of those codes and principles are also explored. The study therefore 
adopts an existential phenomenological approach, whereby the researcher attempts to 
develop an understanding of the perceptions from the point of view of the 
stakeholders themselves. However, it is assumed that by interacting with the subjects 
of the research, the researcher may influence the perceptions and responses of those 
individuals. The research, therefore, adopts a two-way flow of perceptions and 
influences, which may manifest itself particularly in the gathering of information 
using semi-structured interviews; the phrasing of statements in the questionnaire (and 
the type of information sought) may also reflect the researcher's attitude which may, 
in turn,, influence the answers given by the respondents. A major assumption in this 
thesis is that the stakeholders are likely to be influenced by their historical and present 
experiences, and the values held by the society in which they live. It is, therefore, a 
study that tries to understand and explain the social world from the point of view of 
the actors directly involved in the social process - i. e. stakeholders in Ugandan 
companies. These experiences will be assumed to be the basis of reflexivity and 
indexicality which may influence respondents' perceptions of corporate governance 
and accountability in Uganda. 
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4.4 Research Methods 
Based upon the assumptions made in this study regarding ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology, the researcher has selected semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaire surveys as the principal methods of collecting empirical 
data for the study; the reasons for these choices are now set out and discussed. 
4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Interviews involving one-on-one in-depth discussions are conducted as one of the 
methods of gathering data. Interviews can take a structured, semi-structured, or 
unstructured (open-ended) form. In structured interviews "all respondents are asked 
exactly the same questions in the same order with the aid of a formal interview 
schedule" (Bryman, 2004, p. 544); the researcher compiles questions requiring specific 
responses selected from a limited set of phrases designed by the researcher without 
deviating from the directed process. Bryman argues that a semi-structured interview: 
... (refers) to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions 
that are in the general form of an interview guide but is able to vary the 
sequence of questions. The questions are frequently somewhat more 
general in their frame of reference from that typically found in a structured 
interview schedule. Also, the interviewer usually has some latitude to ask 
further questions in response to what are seen as significant replies (p. 
543). 
Bryman describes an unstructured interview as: 
... an interview 
in which the interviewer typically has a list of topics or 
issues, often called an interview guide, that are typically covered. The 
style of questioning is usually very informal. The phrasing and sequencing 
of questions will vary from interview to interview (p. 543). 
Semi-structured interviews are conducted in this thesis to permit the coverage of 
general themes that have been identified in the literature on corporate governance 
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frameworks, while allowing flexibility so that significant issues raised during the 
interviews can be pursued. This method of research was adopted to enable the 
stakeholders to give answers in specific areas suggested by the general literature as 
being important; this approach also gives the respondents a chance to discuss any 
related issues that they think are pertinent to the area of study. 
The research further assumes that the views expressed by stakeholders in the 
interviews will reflect their life experiences as well as their historical (and present) 
social situations and the values held by their society. To this end, a cross-section of 
regulators, business executives, shareholders, members of the judiciary, practitioners 
and parliamentarians were interviewed as indicated in Table 4.6. These particular 
interviewees were selected based upon their knowledge, experience and participation 
in the field of corporate governance. Others, such as academics, the judiciary, 
members of parliament and the Chairman of Transparency International (U), were 
included as stakeholders who might reasonably be expected to have an interest in 
corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. Another factor that influenced 
the selection of interviewees was their availability and willingness to participant in the 
research. Attempts were made to contact other individuals but they were either not 
available or not willing to be interviewed. For example, no institutional investor was 
interviewed because attempts to make appointments with institutional investors were 
not successful. There was also a practical aspect of cost and time constraints; only 
those stakeholders living within Kampala (the capital city of Uganda) were 
interviewed because it would have been too expensive for the researcher to travel to 
different locations outside of Kampala. The inter-views highlighted a number of 
important issues that required following up in the questionnaire survey to establish 
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whether the views expressed were shared by a wider cross-section of stakeholders, 
including employees and owner-managers; access to these groups for interviews had 
been attempted, but had not proved possible to arrange. 
Table 4.6 List of Interviewees 
INTERVIEWEES (Sept. 2004) No. 
President, Capital Markets Authority I 
Regulators 2 
CEO Institute of Corporate Govemance of Uganda I 
High Court Judges 2 
Company Secretary & Legal Counsel I 
Legislators 2 
Senior Civil Servant 
Chairperson, Transparency Intemational (U) 
Solicitor and Senior Partner 
Former Executive Director I 
Former Director, Central Bank of Uganda 
Managing Director of a company 
Partner, CPA Firm 
Total 16 
Note: This Table shows the list of stakeholders that were interviewed in this study. 
4.4.2 Questionnaire Survey 
Despite the fact that the research will be dealing with perceptions of stakeholders that 
are mainly qualitative, questionnaires (which are often analysed quantitatively) are 
also used, thus introducing a method of enquiry that is consistent with the nomothetic 
approach. The study will therefore have elements of the functionalist paradigm, in 
terms of the collection and subsequent analysis - using both parametric and non- 
parametric techniques - of the questionnaire ata. 
116 
Questionnaires can be structured or semi-structured. In a structured questionnaire, 
every respondent is presented with questions requiring specific responses, typically 
by 
116 Bryman (2004) describes questionnaires as: "A collection of questions administered to respondents. 
When used on its own, the term usually denotes a self-completion questionnaire" 
(p. 542). 
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ticking a box; the respondents are usually asked to select a response from a limited set 
of choices compiled by the designer of the questionnaire, and neither the researcher 
nor his/her subject are permitted to deviate from the given alternatives. A semi- 
structured questionnaire will often use general guiding questions to which the subject 
responds without being tied down to a selection of specific possible answers. The 
respondent may be given an option to raise further issues that he/she considers 
important but are not covered in the specific questions asked in the questionnaire; they 
may also be given the chance to elaborate on their answers. 
For the current study, questionnaires were administered to a wide sample of 
stakeholders as a method of triangulation to verify whether there was consistency 
between: (i) the general literature on corporate governance and accountability that was 
presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis; (ii) the views of stakeholders that were gathered 
during the interviews; and (iii) the responses to the questionnaire survey. The 
questionnaires employed a combination of structured and semi-structured questions so 
as to elicit personal views from the respondents according to their perceptions about 
the framework of corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. The 
questionnaire survey was selected for practical reasons in order to get views from a 
wider selection of stakeholders as the researcher could not have hoped to interview 
the sheer range and volume of stakeholders that responded to the questionnaire 
survey. The survey was deliberately done after the interviews to examine consistency 
with, and generalisability of, the findings from interviews as part of the triangulation 
method. 
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The study assumes that the responses of the stakeholders who took part in the survey 
are based upon their personal perceptions, influenced in turn by their lived 
experiences and values; these values are also assumed to be influenced by those of the 
wider society in which the stakeholders live. However, the study also assumes that the 
stakeholders' views are not wholly determined by the society or environment in which 
they live, but rather reflect the interaction between personal views and values and 
those of society. This reasoning implies that the study will reflect the views of those 
who respond to the survey; the generalisability of the research findings may, 
therefore, be hampered by use of this method. However, the analysis of the results 
indicates the extent to which the views of different categories of respondents are 
shared by other groups; this is assumed to be an indicator of how much the views 
expressed by the respondents are shared by the stakeholders in Uganda. Another 
potential limitation of a survey such as this relates to the phrasing of the statements to 
which the stakeholders are asked to respond. Self-administered surveys do not give a 
chance to the respondents to elicit clarification from the researcher (as interviews do) 
and so different respondents may interpret specific questions in ways more varied 
than is in interviews and give a range of answers based upon their understanding of 
the questions. The respondents in this study were given an opportunity to make 
comments at the end of the questionnaire survey and add whatever information or 
views that they thought relevant to the field of study. This provision was intended to 
enable them to express personal views that reflected their perceptions of certain other 
issues relating to corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. 
The categories that were targeted in the questionnaire survey included regulators, 
legislators, company executives and directors, the judiciary and other stakeholders as 
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indicated in Table 4.7. The specific individuals were selected based upon the positions 
they held and their availability and willingness to participate in the survey. 117 A major 
consideration was whether the individuals belonged to stakeholder groups that would 
be likely to have up-to-date knowledge of, and concern about, issues relating to the 
governance of Ugandan companies. To increase the response rate, the researcher hand 
delivered copies to the individuals selected for the survey. Where possible, 
appointments were made through telephone calls so that the purpose of the research 
could be explained to potential respondents and assurances of privacy for the 
individuals participating in the study given - unless those individuals decided to 
waive their privacy. The researcher agreed with the respondents a date on which the 
questionnaires would be collected. In the event of questionnaires not being ready at 
the agreed time, new dates were set for collection. It was hoped that this personal 
, approach to explaining, delivering and collecting questionnaires would improve the 
response rate. 
Table 4.7 List of the Questionnaire Survey Recipients 
IR EO SP0ND EN T No. 
Legislators 30 
Regulators 6 
_. 
Company Employees 50 
Civil Servants 50 
Academics 35 
Accountants 20 
Company Executives 64 
Owner-managers 5 
Individual Investors 40 
Institutional Investors 5 
Non-Executive Directors 7 
Executive Directors 50 
Judiciary/Legal 10 
Others 10 
Total 382 
Note: This Table shows the list of individuals to whom the questionnaires were distributed. 
117 For practical reasons, only those stakeholders in and around Kampala were selected. 
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The questionnaire survey was piloted on three individuals in the UK, two of whom 
were academics, with the third being a practitioner heading the corporate governance 
section of a global investment firm. It was not possible to pilot the survey in Uganda 
due to the distance involved. Copies of the questionnaire survey were sent to some 
individuals in Uganda but none responded. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the various assumptions that are made in the present study 
and identified the research methodology and methods adopted. The assumptions 
ni... about the nature of social science relate to ontology, espistemology, human nature and 
methodology as suggested by Burrell and Morgan (1979). The central ontological 
assumption made in the study involves recognition of the existence of reality outside 
the mind of individuals' perceptions. However, the perceptions of participants are 
assumed to be subjective, and influenced by the environment in which they live (for 
example, reflecting the values held by society). 
The epistemological assumption made in this study is in line with Merleau-Ponty's 
(1908-1961) middle ground between subjectivism and objectivism. Schutz's (1899- 
1959) notions of reflexivity and indexicality are in effect adopted in this study when 
the perceptions of stakeholders are interpreted. 
With respect to assumptions regarding human nature, the individual is assumed to 
have a free will and to be able to make decisions that are not totally determined by the 
environment. However, the study also assumes that the values held by the society in 
which one lives will have an impact on one's attitudes and activities, and that the 
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society may take sanctions against an individual or company that violates its values. 
Such sanctions may force compliance with the values held by society or the particular 
group of individuals with which one is associated or belongs to. The study, therefore 
assumes a middle ground between voluntarism and determinism. Based upon the 
foregoing assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology and human nature, the study 
adopts the interpretive paradigm as its main methodology, but also adopts elements of 
the functionalist approach. This choice of methodology is also influenced by 
assumptions about the nature of society, where the present study prioritises regulation 
over radical change. The study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods of 
collecting data by using both questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews. 
These methods were selected because of their convenience in the collection of data, 
considering the wide range of stakeholders targeted in the research. It would have 
been difficult to use case studies as these would have limited the availability of the 
spectrum of stakeholders, given the present situation in Uganda where there are only 
seven listed companies and the stock market does not seem to be fluid. Also, 
companies seem to be very sensitive about researchers publishing information about 
their companies as some claim that they have had experiences where these researchers 
have published information that was damaging to the reputation of these 
companies. 118 Ethnographic studies were also not possible for the same reasons. Other 
methods such as content analysis would not be suitable since there is hardly anything 
ni, aDOUt corporate governance in reports published by Ugandan companies. The media 
have published various articles regarding corruption and political interference but 
these mainly relate to Government institutions; not much is written about private 
companies, except for an occasional article about violation of the rights of employees. 
118 This concern may also be a reflection of the state of corporate governance in those companies. 
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The researcher was not able to identify any business magazines that could have been 
used for content analysis. Semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys 
enabled the researcher to reach a cross-section of stakeholders and provided useful 
information for the research. 
The next chapter examines the theoretical framework adopted for this study. The 
theoretical framework provides the context in which the results of both the semi- 
structured interviews and questionnaires are interpreted. 
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Chapter 5 
Theoretical Framework: Accountability 
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Chapter 5 
Theoretical Framework -Accountability 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 of this thesis outlined the methodological underpinning of this study. The 
interpretive paradigm, particularly the phenomenological approach, was selected 
because the research will be dealing with the perceptions of stakeholders regarding 
the notion and practice of corporate governance in Uganda. This chapter examines the 
theoretical framework that will be adopted. The lens that will be used in examining 
stakeholder perceptions towards corporate governance in Uganda is that of 
accountability. Since the dissertation will handle corporate governance in both public 
sector and private sector corporations, Stewart's Ladder of Accountability (Stewart, 
1984) was deemed specifically to be an appropriate theoretical framework. 
5.2 Definition of Accountability 
The term "accountability" can be understood from three perspectives. The first 
standpoint involves viewing the notion of accountability in its widest sense, with the 
term defined in ways such as "the capacity to give an account, explanation, or reason" 
(Munro, 1996, P. 3). 
The second (and narrowest) sense of accountability involves perception of the 
corporate form in terms of a principal-agency relationship, whereby the principal 
has 
a right to receive an account of the agents' stewardship of the entrusted resources. 
In 
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this context, the information will be used for the purpose of monitoring, evaluating 
and controlling the agents so that their actions are aligned to the interests of the 
principals. This narrow perspective is concentrated on the relationship bem-een a 
principal and an agent, such as a shareholder (principal) and management (agent), or a 
superior (principal) and a subordinate (agent) in a hierarchical structure (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Donaldson, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Byrd et al., 1998. 
Bushman and Smith, 2001; 2003; Vinten, 2001). The notion of management being 
accountable to the owners is based upon the agency concept which was proposed by 
Berle and Means (1932), where the separation of ownership and control necessitated 
the placing of limits on managerial discretion (Fama and Jensen, 1983) to safeguard 
the assets of the company. Accountability was also seen as helping to minimise the 
potential risks of fraud and to boost investor confidence (ICAEW, 1999; Abbott et al., 
2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; 2003; Burton et al., 2003). Gray et al. (1996) and 
Stanton (1997) point out that the requirement to report financial information to 
shareholders is one of the very few instances of explicit accountability established 
within the law itself 
The third meaning of accountability is much wider and based upon the stakeholder 
perspective whereby companies are not just accountable to shareholders, but also to 
other groups such as employees, debtors, creditors and others with direct contractual 
or transactional relations with the corporation. Stakeholders in this context include 
suppliers of goods and services as well as any members of the general public, who 
affect or are affected by the actions - or inactions - of the companies (Benston, 
1982a; 
1982b; Gamble and Kelly, 2001; Dunne, 2003; Tricker, 1984). These stakeholders are 
identified through the actual or potential harm and benefits that they experience (or 
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anticipate experiencing) as a result of a firm's actions or inactions; these impacts can 
be either internal or external (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Thus, management has 
the responsibility of identifying those with a legitimate demand for accountabilitý, ý 
(Gray et al., 1987; Gray et al., 1996; Moir, 2001). 
Within a stakeholder context, Munro (1996) argues that accountability is mainly 
concerned with issues of identity and alignment, while Keasey and Wright's (1993) 
definition is "a subset of governance [which] involves the monitoring, evaluation and 
control of organisational agents to ensure that they behave in the interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders" (p. 291). A company, as a member of the society 
in which it operates, is concerned with establishing its identity and defining itself 
within its (stakeholder-comprised) community; it therefore provides accounts which 
help to identify it within that community. The community can respond to the 
company's disclosures by either accepting and including it, or rejecting and excluding 
it, from the community. The standards that form the basis for inclusion or exclusion of 
the community are either expressed explicitly or taken for granted, based upon the 
lived experiences of existing members. The lived experiences of the community 
(reflected in the stakeholders' perceptions) are indexed and used for sanctioning other 
community members. Thus, companies wishing to be accepted into a community have 
to align themselves with these indexed experiences, which themselves form the basis 
of the community's values. 
Within a stakeholder framework, the notion of accountability implies that a company 
that is giving an account of itself would be interested in creating a favourable 
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impression with the community and demonstrating that it is aligned with the interests 
of that community (Munro, 1996). 
Stewart (1984) argues that for accountability to exist there must be a relationship of 
power between the point of account (the person or entity giving the account) and the 
point to which the account is given (the entity that is receiving the account). Stewart 
calls this relationship the "bond of accountability" which implies that the information 
is evaluated against some standard or expectation, and sanctions are then applied 
accordingly; accountability thereby presumes a responsibility and an answerability for 
actions undertaken by a subject (Dunshire, 197 1). Gray et al. (1996) stress these rights 
and responsibilities of the participants, whereby the subjects have an obligation to 
explain their actions to others who have the power to assess the perfon-nance of the 
subjects and allocate praise or censure (Jones, 1977). The answerable subjects are 
required to demonstrate the reasonableness of their actions to a community of others, 
thereby embedding an element of moral responsibility (Arrington and Francis, 1993). 
Tricker (1983) argues that these rights and responsibilities must be enforceable for an 
accountability relationship to exist; Ijiri (1975, p. ix) notes that the rights may stem 
from "a constitution, a law, a contract, an organisational rule, a custom or even an 
informal obligation". Rights may also be enshrined in quasi-legal documents such as 
codes of conduct, statements from authoritative bodies to whom the organisations 
subscribe, mission statements and other documents (Gray et al., 1996). There may 
also be other rights and responsibilities not stated in statute or other forms of 
agreement; these may be absolute or relative, and can only be achieved through 
debateý education and agreement (Gray et al., 1996). Although there can be multiple 
links of account as a response to multiple demands of accountability, there must be a 
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clear "bond of accountability" with specified rights and responsibilities (Stewart, 
1984; Jones, 1977). For example, Jackson (1982) argues that: 
In giving an account, its form and substance depend upon the values, beliefs 
and perceptions of the person giving the account (p. 221). 119 
In this context, Stewart (1984) states that: 
To be meaningful the account must also recognise the values, beliefs and 
perceptions of those to whom the account is given (p. 30). 
Gray (1994) explains that the concept of accountability reflects the notions of fairness 
and justice and is seen as essential in terms of the re-introduction of an ethical basis 
for accounting. 
The present study is based upon the stakeholder approach and will treat accountability 
as extending to all relevant stakeholders that affect, or are affected by, the activities of 
a company, whether a public sector or private sector organisation. This is because the 
researcher believes that a company operates within a community and the community 
in which it operates is interested in the activities of that company since the community 
normally permits a company to operate within its environment if the company is 
perceived to be in harmony with the community's interests. This view is coloured by 
the backgound of the researcher where communal interests are perceived as being 
paramount in the African society. The study will, therefore, also assume that the 
perceptions of stakeholders towards corporate governance in Uganda will be 
influenced by their values and beliefs. 
"9 Quoted by Stewart (1984, p-30). 
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5.3 Objectives of Accountability 
The objectives of accountability will depend upon whether it is private or public 
accountability. The objectives of private sector accountability include: (i) assuring the 
shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, local community and other 
stakeholders of an organisation that their interests are being served by the functioning 
of a free market system in conjunction with internal and external monitoring systems 
(Benston, 1982a; 1982b); (ii) acting as a control mechanism through the monitoring, 
evaluating and controlling of an organisation's agents, and measuring their 
performance by outcomes (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Munro, 1996); (iii) managing a 
company's risk (Cadbury, 1992; Turnbull Report, 1999; Treadway Commission, 
1994); (iv) influencing the organisations' behaviour as a result of their being held to 
account - what is accounted for can shape participants' views of what is 
important, 
what to do and what not to do (Burchell et al, 1980; Hopwood, 1983; Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 1993); and (v) reinforcing power relationships between the accountee 
(managers) and accountor (stakeholders) and attempting to communicate what should 
happen in the future (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
The objectives of public sector 120 accountability will depend upon whether the 
n 
accountability is commercial, managerial, or public in nature. Commercial 
accountability in public sector entities shares the same characteristics as private sector 
accountability. Managerial accountability incorporates most of the elements of 
commercial accountability, but may vary depending upon whether the accountability 
relates to a commercial entity (such as state-owned corporations which are 
designed 
120 In the context of this study, "public sector" refers to organisations that are run under government 
auspices, i. e. state-owned. 
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to run on a profit making basis) or a not-for-profit organisation. 121 Political, or public, 
accountability normally relates to the relationship between a Government and its 
electorate, and aims at ensuring that elected officials conduct their affairs in the 
interests of the electorate (or face being sanctioned by being voted out of office); it is, 
therefore, a control mechanism to some extent. Unlike commercial and managerial 
accountability, which are more clearly defined, public accountability is wider, 
relatively loose in nature and can extend to non-elected Government officials who 
may be sanctioned indirectly by the electorate holding a Government to account for 
those officials' actions (Stewart, 1984). 
5.4 Stewart's Ladder of Accountability 
Stewart (1984) suggested a ladder of accountability consisting of the following five 
steps: (i) accountability for probity and legality; (ii) process accountability; (iii) 
performance accountability; (iv) - programme accountability; and 
(v) policy 
accountability. Stewart constructed this ladder of accountability specifically to 
analyse public accountability, but suggested that it could also be used to examine 
managerial and commercial accountability. 
This framework has been constructed for the analysis of public 
accountability, but can be used for other forms of accountability, such as 
managerial accountability and commercial accountability (p. 18). 
It is on this basis that Stewart's ladder of accountability has been selected for the 
current study. Given the nature of the corporate form in Uganda, with a mixture of 
private, state and semi-state owned organisations in existence, the ladder will be used 
in this thesis to examine the perceptions of Ugandan stakeholders towards corporate 
"' For example, not-for-profit entities will typically have no shareholders. The emphasis in this study is 
on private and public and semi-state owned companies that are ostensibly operating to make a profit. 
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governance. This will be done by analysing and interpreting the research findings to 
see whether the practice of corporate governance in Uganda reflects the different 
forms of accountability suggested by Stewart in his ladder of accountability. 
Table 5.1 Stewart's Ladder of Accountability (1984) 
Policy Accountability 
Accountability 
I 
by judgement 
Progarnme 
Accountability 
Performance 
Accountability 
Process 
Accountability 
Accounting for Accountability 
Probity and Legality 
II 
by standards 
NOTE: This Table shows the 5 levels of Stewart's Ladder of Accountability as illustrated 
by Hannah 
(2003). At the bottom of the ladder is accountability by standards and at the top is accountability 
by 
judgement. 
5.4.1 Accountability for Probity and Legality 
Accountability for probity and legality is at the bottom of Stewart's ladder- This 
form 
involves the scrutinising of whether funds that have been provided to an organisation 
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have been used properly in an authorised manner and whether the law has been 
complied with. Financial information provided by statements of account, together 
with approved budgets and externally audited financial statements of account, can be 
used to examine probity. Probity also includes what Robinson (1971) refers to as 
"fiscal" accountability, i. e. whether funds have been expended as stated and whether 
items have been used for the projects for which they were entrusted. Legal documents 
that grant powers can also be examined and compared with what has transpired to 
verify whether the legality component has been satisfied. Stewart (1984) argues that 
the information and explanations provided by the officers of an organisation do not in 
themselves represent accountability, but provide a basis for judgement as to whether 
the officers have been accountable in fulfilling their probity and legality requirements. 
It is this scrutiny of the information - and holding the officers to account - that ensures 
accountability. Stewart notes that legislation may specify the fonn in which 
information is to be provided and published by the accounting officer, and the right of 
access by the stakeholders to that information. The financial information required for 
probity and legality can, therefore, be defined with precision. 
Considering what happened in business scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat 
and Maxwell, as well as the Ugandan scandals involving alleged insider lending and 
other dealings by officials of Greenland Bank, accounting for probity and legality 
is a 
pertinent issue in corporate governance. The providers of capital expect the officials 
working in companies to use companies' resources in an authorised manner and to 
comply with legal requirements such as submission of various returns required 
by law 
and adherence to health and safety standards, observance of workers rights which are 
enshrined in the law and ensure compliance with various environmental 
laws and 
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regulations as specified by the respective Governments and international bodies. 
Other laws and regulations may stem from financial markets and other regulatory 
agencies. Stakeholders have a major concern about the appropriate use of funds and 
other resources committed to the management of company officials and accountability 
for probity is an important aspect of the governance of any organisation, whether 
public or private sector. Accountability for legality and probity is in line with what 
Ijirl (1975) pointed out, namely that rights and responsibilities might stem from "a 
constitution, a law, a contract, an organisational rule, a custom or even an informal 
obligation" (p. ix). Gray et al. (1986) also noted that rights might be enshrined in 
quasi-legal documents such as codes of conduct, statements from authoritative bodies 
to whom the organisations subscribe, mission statements and other documents. Gray 
et al. also argued that there might be other rights and responsibilities not stated in 
statute or other forms of agreement and that these might be absolute or relative. 
Companies might, therefore, be required to account for legality and probity with 
respect to all these issues as part of their corporate governance. 
5.4.2 Process Accountability 
Robinson (1971) put forward the notion of process accountability to facilitate 
examinations of. (i) waste in the use of resources; (ii) the adequacy of procedures 
used to perform any work; and (iii) whether the work was carried out following 
specified processes. Stewart (1984) argues that the information requirements for 
process accountability can, if narrowly conceived, also be defined. The providers of 
capital are concerned about the way the resources of the organisation that they fund 
uses the resources at its disposal. Shareholders would not appreciate management 
wasting the resources of the company as this would have a direct impact on the 
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profitability of that company and, consequently, the value of the company. 
Procedures, such as internal control mechanisms, are an important aspect of the 
proper management of an organisation. Management and the Board also have a 
special duty to make sure that the strategic and operational plans laid down for a 
company are implemented according to plan. Process accountability is, therefore, 
important for both public and private sector commercial entities and is part of the 
corporate governance of such entities. 
5.4.3 Performance Accountability 
Performance accountability scrutinises the performance of an officer, or an 
organisation, to examine whether the expected goals and objectives have been 
achieved. Stewart (1984) points out that the stated goals may not always be fully 
known by the stakeholders, and this lack of information affects their ability to hold the 
relevant parties to account. 
Performance accountability plays an important role in corporate governance as one of 
the major responsibilities of the board is to make strategic plans for the company. 
These plans include goals and objectives which are then left to management to 
implement. The board is expected to monitor the achievement of these goals and part 
of the evaluation of management's performance is whether the goals and objectives 
set for the entity have been achieved as expected. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the 
remuneration of senior management may take into account the achievement of these 
goals and objectives and this serves as an incentive to align management's 
performance to the goals and objectives of the owners of the company which 
promotes accountability to the providers of capital and other relevant stakeholders. 
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However, other goals and objectives may be set, taking into account a wider cross- 
section of stakeholders such as employees, customers and the community at large. 
This may be in the form of improving the conditions under which the employees 
serve, or reducing the number of customer complaints and increasing customer 
satisfaction, or reducing pollution and participating in activities that may enhance the 
quality of life for the community where an organisation operates. Management may 
be held accountable for the achievement of these goals and their performance may be 
evaluated taking this into account. This accountability may be to the community 
through various regulatory agencies and elected representatives or to the owners of 
the company either through the board or at Annual General Meetings, or other fora. 
Stewart (1984) points out that some stakeholders may not be aware of the goals and 
objectives set for the company. This issue was discussed in Chapter 2 under 
information asymmetry between management and non-executive board members but 
also applies to other stakeholders such as owners, customers and the community. The 
fact that management possesses some information that may not be available to other 
stakeholders may limit the ability of those stakeholders to assess the performance of 
management in achieving the company's goals and objectives and to hold 
management accountable for their performance. This is where disclosure of relevant 
information may be required as part of management's accountability to stakeholders. 
5.4.4 Programme Accountability 
Programme accountability is similar in nature to performance accountability since it 
also examines whether the stated goals and objectives have been achieved. However, 
performance accountability can involve all the activities of an organisation, whereas 
147 
programme accountability examines specific programmes with concrete goals and 
objectives. Stewart (1984) intended programme accountability to deal with specific 
programmes in an organisation and to examine whether the goals and objectives set 
for those programmes had been achieved (Robinson, 1971). 
Programme accountability applies to all companies irrespective of whether they are in 
the public or private sector. Each company may set up special programmes whether to 
develop a specific product or service, or to develop a particular segment of the 
market, or to set up something to benefit employees or the community. Companies 
may come up with promotions of products or training of employees. All these may be 
in the form of specific programmes which may be aimed at improving the 
performance and profitability of the company, but may just be furthering the 
company's image as a good corporate citizen. The board may monitor management's 
performance and hold them accountable for the achievement of these specific 
programmes. In the context of the stakeholder approach, relevant stakeholders may 
also hold management and the board accountable for the policies and activities of the 
companies for which they are responsible. 
5.4.5 Policy Accountability 
A Government is accountable to its electorate for setting standards and policies, but 
there may be no predetermined standards. Stewart (1984) argues that Government is 
accountable for both the policies that it pursues and those that it fails to pursue. Policy 
accountability is carried out via the response to the varied demands of stakeholders as 
there are no pre-set bounds determined for it. These stakeholders may include not 
only the electorate but also any other parties, such as other foreign Govermnents and 
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international bodies, that may have an interest in what a particular Government does 
or does not do. 
Although Stewart discusses policy accountability in the context of Govemment, the 
concept may be extended to both public and private sector commercial entities since 
Stewart foresaw that the Ladder of Accountability could be applied to those sectors. 
Business entities have levels of management where policy is set, starting with the 
board and filtering through to the lower levels. Some of these policies may have an 
impact on the governance of companies and the relationship with stakeholders. 
Companies may have to account to stakeholders for the policies that they set and 
follow whether these policies are related to increasing the value of the investment 
made by shareholders or to dealing with issues of interest to other stakeholders. An 
example could be the impact of companies' activities on the environment or on 
employees. Some of these policies may enhance the performance of the company or 
derail the achievement of the company's goals and objectives. The board of any 
company would be involved in setting the overall Policies of the company and would 
be accountable to the owners of the company and other relevant stakeholders on the 
choice and implementation of policies. The board would, in turn, hold management 
accountable for the implementation of those policies and for setting sub-policies that 
are consistent with the overall policies set by the board. 
Monitoring and evaluating the policies set and implemented by companies may not 
always be easy for stakeholders who are not involved in the management of those 
companies as these stakeholders may not be aware of all the policies set by the 
companies. However, these policies would normally manifest themselves in the 
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activities of the companies and in the way the companies carry out those activities. 
Companies may also publish some of their policies in their annual reports or on their 
websites. This would be part of the disclosure of relevant information by companies. 
Policy accountability is, therefore, part and parcel of the governance of companies for 
which the board and management may be held accountable. 
5.5 The Adequacy of Stewart's Ladder of Accountability 
The tone of Stewart's (1984) ladder of accountability reflects the principal-agent 
model of corporate governance where the superior holds the subordinate answerable 
for his/her actions. In the case of a commercial entity, the provider of capital holds 
management accountable and management acts on behalf of the principal. 
Government is also held accountable to the electorate since, presumably, the citizens 
are the owners of the resources managed by Government. Arguably, Government 
could also be held accountable for the manner in which companies conduct their 
business since Government grants firms licences and provides a framework in which 
they operate. One area of accountability which is arguably neglected by Stewart's 
Ladder is that involving relationships between people working at the same level in an 
organisation or between those employed in different organisations where hierarchical 
accountability does not apply. In a hierarchical organisation, superiors can hold 
subordinates accountable, but there are also situations where subordinates such as 
employees can hold their superiors accountable for their actions and policies. 
Competing organisations can also demand accountability from each other, particularly 
when it comes to "fair play" and the infringement of rights and obligations. The local 
community can call both the private and the public sector firms to account for their 
activities when they affect the legal rights, and the quality of life of the enviromnent. 
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Although Stewart's Ladder of Accountability may have some shortcomings, it appears 
to be applicable to the study being conducted and will be applied in the study. A 
further review of Stewart's Ladder will be made at the end of the study to evaluate the 
extent of its suitability with respect to private sector businesses. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented a framework of accountability based upon Stewart's 
Ladder of Accountability. This ladder of accountability was originally designed to 
scrutinise public sector accountability, but is also applicable to the private sector. 
This particular research is adopting a stakeholder approach which will extend 
Stewart's ladder to accountability to stakeholders as defined in Chapter 2. The 
research will assume that companies have to account for the legality and 
appropriateness of their activities taking into account not only the effect of those 
activities on the interests of shareholders, but also the impact of the companies' 
activities on a wider public such as employees, customers, creditors, and the public. 
Some of the rights of these stakeholders are protected by law and the companies will 
be required to abide by these laws and regulations. Other rights may not be protected 
by law but the companies will still be expected to act in a socially responsible manner. 
The processes employed by companies are vital for achieving company objectives and 
will be part of the board's strategic planning and monitoring responsibilities. This will 
go together with setting, monitoring, and evaluating company goals and objectives 
and taking corrective actions when and as required. These are aspects of perfon-nance 
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accountability which are exercised by all companies. As ar ed before, companies, gu 
irrespective of whether they are public or private, might institute specific programmes 
and it is part of the board's responsibilities to oversee such programmes. It xas also 
pointed out that all companies set policies for which they might be held accountable. 
A ma or problem in implementing the various steps in Stewart's ladder of i 
accountability may be how to establish "bonds of accountability" between 
management or the board and the different stakeholders - if this is taken to be the pre- 
condition for true accountability. Berle and Means (1932) foresaw the problem 
encountered by fractured share ownership where individuals do not have a sufficient 
share of ownership to exert control over management. Berle and Means argued that 
this led to a situation where management exercised control and the owners just 
collected "rent" in the form of dividends from their investment without having any 
effective control over the companies in which they invested. Alternatively, majority 
shareholders could exercise control at the expense of the minority. Ugandans are 
minority shareholders with insignificant share ownerships in the companies listed on 
the Uganda Securities Exchange (only 5 of which are Ugandan companies); this in 
itself might affect their ability, as minority shareholders, to hold management 
accountable. The companies that are run as sole-proprietorships or are family-owned 
might not see the need for accountability as there is no separation of ownership from 
management. The other private companies whose shareholders do not exceed 50 
members (as specified by law) would need to be examined to establish whether there 
are dominant shareholders who are in a position to control the company or whether all 
shareholders can bring management to account through a true bond of accountability. 
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Despite these questions, Stewart's ladder of accountability will be used to analyse 
Ugandan stakeholders' perceptions about corporate governance and accountability in 
their country. Emphasis will be placed on accountability for legality and probity as 
these appear to be the most applicable steps of Stewart's ladder with respect to 
commercial enterprises. However, references will be made to the other aspects of 
Stewart's ladder where and when applicable. A ftu-ther appraisal of the applicability of 
the ladder to private sector companies will be made in Chapter 8 which provides a 
synthesis of the research findings. 
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Chapter 6 
Semi-Structured Interviews in Uganda 
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Chapter 6 
Semi-Structured Interviews in Uganda 
6.1 Introduction 
Semi-structured interviews with sixteen individuals occupying various industrial, 
regulatory and judicial positions in Uganda were carried out during the month of 
September 2004.122 The purpose of the interviews was to examine the extent to which 
stakeholders in Uganda perceived the country's present corporate governance 
framework as being effective in providing confidence and accountability regarding 
the corporate sector. Table 6.1 provides further details about the interviewees. 
Table 6.1 Timetable for Interviewees 
Interviewee 
Date of 
Interview Time 
President, Capital Markets Authority Sept. 20th 11.30 am 
Regulator I Sept. 6th 4.30 pm 
CEO Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda Sept. 4th 9.15 am 
Regulator 2 Sept. 8th 11.30 am 
High Court Judge 1 Sept. 7th 3.00 pm 
High Court Judge 2 Sept. 15th 3.00 pm 
Company Secretary & Legal Counsel Sept. 13th 11.00 am 
Legislator 1 Sept. 8th 10.00 am 
Legislator 2 Sept. 9th 1.00 pm 
Senior Civil Servant Sept. 16th 3.00 pm 
Chairperson, Transparency International (U) Sept. 14th 12. 
Solicitor and Senior Partner Sept. 20th 4.30 pm 
Former Executive Director Sept. 9th 11.00 am 
Former Director,, Central Bank of Uganda Sept. 16th 1.00 pm 
Managing Director of a company Sept. 20th 3.00 pm 
Partner, CPA Firm Sept. 15th 8.00 am 
Note: Table showing the individuals that were interviewed. All the interviewees were based in 
Kampala, Uganda. 
122 See Appendix 6.1 for the guiding questions used during the interviews. 
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In line with the discussions in the previous chapters, the issues that were examined in 
the interviews included the legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks in existence, 
the political, cultural, ethical framework and the economic frameworks. Each 
interview lasted for approximately one hour and was recorded with the permission of 
the interviewee; these tapes were later used in transcribing and writing up the results 
of the interviews which were analysed in the context of the accountability notions laid 
out in Chapter 5. The method used is in line with Creswell's (1998) recommendation 
that interviews could be used in collecting data under phenomenology; this data 
should then be used to describe and interpret a cultural and social group. 
The remainder of the chapter outlines the key points and arguments put forward by 
the interviewees. Section 6.2 describes views regarding the nature and meaning of the 
tenn "corporate governance", while Section 6.3 highlights opinions relevant to the 
framework of corporate governance in Uganda, set out earlier in the thesis. Section 
6.4 examines accountability while Section 6.5 analyses responses about the most 
pressing issues in corporate governance in Uganda and Section 6.6 presents the 
summary to this chapter. 
6.2. Concept of Corporate Governance 
Before examining the applicability and relevance of the accountability concept, the 
interviews began by seeking opinions regarding the meaning and nature of corporate 
govemance. 
156 
6.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
Each interviewee's definition of the term "corporate governance" was consistent with 
conventional stakeholder theory. For example, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) stated: 
The stakeholder approach was adopted by the ICGU over the shareholder 
view because it is broader and is not limited to shareholders although it 
includes shareholders. Some organisations, such as the ICGU and public 
sector bodies, do not have shareholders but there are parties that are 
interested in the way that these organisations are managed. These parties 
may include the members who subscribe to the organisations, the public in 
the case of the public sector enterprises, customers, employees, the banks 
and other providers of finance, and the community which may refuse to 
buy goods and services from the business and thus run it out of business. 
The President of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) of Uganda emphasised this 
point when he stated that "businesses cannot operate in isolation since they operate in 
an environment where there are other stakeholders; businesses need the cooperation of 
these stakeholders". The Registrar General, on the other hand, described corporate 
governance as "the basic mechanism by which companies and other corporate bodies 
are directed, controlled, managed and regulated. " This definition reflected Cadbury's 
(1992) definition which stressed a board's accountability to shareholders in line with 
the principal-agent view. 
The definitions suggested by these and other interviewees 123 emphasise the following 
aspects of corporate govemance (see Table 6.2): 124 
i) promoting probity, transparency and accountability in companies; 
ii) concern for stakeholders that extends beyond shareholders; 
"' Not reported here. 
124 These are presented in the order of number of times they were raised by the interviewees in Table 
6.2; the number of times is indicated between brackets. 
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iii) mechanisms or systems for directing, controlling, managing and regulating 
organisations; 
iv) creating wealth for shareholders and adding value to the corporation; 
V) acting in the interests of, and protecting, all shareholders - including 
minority shareholders; 
vi) setting and implementing targets and objectives; 
vii) corporate social responsibility; and 
viii) acting within the law of the country. 
Table 6.2 Summary of Issues Raised by Interviewees 
Interviewees Total Percentage 
who Number of of 
Mentioned Interviewees Interviewees 
Concern for stakeholders that extends 
beyond shareholders 16 16 100% 
Promoting probity, transparency and 
accountability in companies 16 16 100% 
Creating wealth for shareholders and adding 
value to the corporation 16 16 100% 
Mechanisms or systems for directing, 
controlling, managing and regulating 14 16 88% 
Setting and implementing targets and 
objectives 14 16 88% 
Acting in the interests of, and protecting, all 
shareholders - including minority 14 16 88% 
shareholders 
Corporate social responsibility 12 16 75% 
Acting within the law of the company 12 16 75% 
Note: This Table shows the number of interviewees who mentioned each aspect of corporate 
governance. 
It was notable that most of the interviewees highlighted the importance of a wide 
range of stakeholders extending beyond the firms' owners. It was, however, surprising 
that only 75% of the respondents mentioned corporate social responsibility as being 
an aspect of corporate governance. One might reasonably have expected more 
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interviewees to be concerned about corporate social responsibility since all of them 
supported the view that corporate governance should include concern for stakeholders 
that extended beyond shareholders. It is possible that the individuals who were 
interviewed were not conversant with the social issues relating to the operations of 
companies in Uganda. 
6.2.2 Guidelines developed by the Institute of Corporate 
Governance in Uganda 
Many of the interviewees had not seen or read the Corporate Governance Guidelines 
developed by the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) in 2001 (see 
Table 6.2 below). One half of the participants said that they had seen the guidelines, 
however, only 6 out of the 16 (or 37.5 per cent) claimed to have read them. 
Table 6.3 Awareness about the ICGU guidelines 
Interviewee 
Seen 
Principles 
Read 
Principles 
President, Capital Markets Authority Yes Yes 
Regulator I Yes No 
Regulator 2 Yes Yes 
CEO Institute of Corporate Govemance of Uganda Yes Yes 
High Court Judge I No No 
High Court Judge 2 No No 
Company Secretary & Legal Counsel Yes No 
Legislator I No No 
Legislator 2 No No 
Senior Civil Servant Yes Yes 
Chairman of Transparency Intemational (Uganda) Yes Yes 
Solicitor and Senior Partner Yes Yes 
Former Executive Director No No 
Fonner Director, Central Bank of Uganda No No 
Managing Director of a company No No 
Partner, CPA Firm No No 
Note: This Table shows the interviewees who had read or seen the Guidelines of Corporate Governance 
that were issued by the ICGU. 
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It was notable that among those who had not read the guidelines were legislators, 
directors of companies, accountants, a company secretary and even one of the 
regulators who was directly involved in regulating companies. These results highlight 
the need for the training of all the relevant parties involved in corporate governance in 
Uganda so that they can familiarise themselves with the requirements in relation to the 
firms that they manage or oversee. None of the interviewees mentioned the guidelines 
of corporate governance published by the Uganda Capital Markets Authority; this 
might be an indication that the interviewees were not aware of this document, which 
was designed only for firms publicly traded on the USE. 
6.2.3 The State of Corporate Governance in Uganda 
The CEO of the ICGU expressed concern that the structures needed to support 
implementation of the ICGU guidelines were not in place, and that the level of 
implementation of the guidelines was poor. This interviewee went on to point out that 
the ICGU was trying to have an impact on the situation by training senior 
management, conducting public awareness lectures, and adding value to organisations 
by sensitising (and helping) people to appreciate the fact that good corporate 
governance was inherently beneficial. In particular, this interviewee felt that the 
training and sensitisation seminars would have a multiplier effect arising from the 
dissemination of ideas by those who had been sensitised. The President of the ICGU 
suggested that the ICGU corporate governance guidelines should be used by 
companies to develop their own internal rules. A Senior Civil Servant was of the view 
that the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (ICPAU) should play a 
central role in promoting corporate governance. This interviewee also expressed the 
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hope that the ICGU would work with the Uganda Securities Exchange in promoting 
the principles of corporate governance; he was of the view that companies in Uganda 
should be compelled to either comply with the guidelines or explain and justify why 
they had not (as in countries such as the UK). 
According to the CEO of the ICGU, the Ministry of Finance in Uganda is helping to 
finance the training of directors in the public sector corporations. However, funds are 
limited and managers and board members from the private sector have not received 
much training with respect to corporate governance guidelines. This interviewee 
explained that various organisations were supportive of the efforts of the ICGU, 
including the Bank of Uganda, the Uganda Capital Markets Authority and the Uganda 
Securities Exchange. The ICGU is also working together with the Commonwealth and 
the African Project and Development Facility under the auspices of World Bank. 
The Chairman of Transparency International (Uganda) made the following 
observation which might need to be taken into consideration in order to make the 
sensitisation process more effective: 
Corporate governance guidelines should be simplified so that they can be 
understood by managers at lower levels. The ICGU has been organising 
conferences and seminars for the top people around Kampala and the 
membership of the ICGU is limited to people around Kampala. The ICGU 
is a club of people who head big companies and non-Governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or those who head ministries or who have influence 
in ministries and parastatal bodies. It should go down to lower levels 
because that is where the majority of people are. 
6.2.4 Relevance of Western Models of Corporate Governance 
Because Westem models of corporate govemance dominate the literature, the 
interviewees were asked for their views about the applicability of such norms to a 
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developing country such as Uganda. As Table 6.3 indicates, most were of the opinion 
that international corporate governance guidelines were of some relevance to Uganda, 
citing issues such as accountability, disclosure, integrity and transparency as being 
universal in application. However, some interviewees observed that international 
guidelines would require to be adapted to the Ugandan enviromnent, since it was felt 
that one model could not fit all situations completely. In this context, factors such as: 
the level of national economic development; corruption; sectarianism; poverty; lack of 
job security; unemployment and corporate ownership structure were all mentioned as 
being likely to affect the practice of corporate governance. 
One of the lawyers saw no reason why international guidelines should not apply in 
Uganda, since the Companies Act of Uganda was modelled on the British Companies 
Act of 1948 and it is this Act that is the basis of the governance of companies in 
Uganda. 125 The CEO of the ICGU argued that international principles of corporate 
governance could be used as a benchmark for a domestic framework, commenting 
that Uganda could think globally while acting locally. The CEO of the USE expressed 
this view by stating: 
It is critical that we look at all models available and get the best out of 
them because, eventually, with globalisation the whole issue of 
convergence of standards and guidelines becomes prominent. An example 
of this is the international financial reporting standards. 126 
Inspection of Table 6.3 reveals that the company directors did not think that Western 
Models of corporate governance were relevant to Uganda. The reasons given by this 
group for this opinion included: the difference in enviromnents, sizes and ownership 
125 The ICGU guidelines themselves were based on the OECD Principles (1999), the Commonwealth 
Principles (1999) and the King Report 1 (1999) of corporate governance. 
126 The Chairman of the Capital Markets Authority of Uganda explained that what might differ would 
be the degree to which corporate governance principles were applied in Uganda. 
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structure between Ugandan companies and companies in the Western World; the 
respective levels of development; problems affecting multinational corporations 
compared with those affecting local companies; and differences in the understanding 
of corporate governance arising from different cultures. 
Table 6.4 The Relevance of Western Models of Corporate Governance to Uganda 
Interviewee Yes No 
Legislator I Yes 
Legislator 2 Yes 
Regulator I Yes 
Regulator 2 Yes 
President, Capital Markets Authority Yes 
ICGU Yes 
High Court Judge 1 Yes 
High Court Judge 2 Yes 
Company Secretary Yes 
Senior Civil Servant No 
Lawyer Yes 
Former Director, Central Bank of Uganda No 
Managing Director of a company No 
Partner, CPA Firm Yes 
Former Executive Director No 
Other Senior Official Yes 
Note: This Table shows whether interviewees thought that Western Models of Corporate Governance 
were or were not relevant to Uganda. 
The Chairperson of Transparency International (TI) in Uganda was of the view that 
some aspects of conventional international guidelines might not work under the 
present circumstances in Uganda; he argued as follows: 
If you take the level where we are and the level where the Americans or 
British are, they are up there, they understand and they have been exposed 
to some of these things early and they are very ethical in whatever they do 
and they have no pressures from friends and relatives who may not be as 
endowed or as privileged as they are. In our setting we are forced by 
circumstances to do things which someone in America is not forced to do. 
And even the system of controls in those countries does not allow you to 
go off the rails and get away with it. But here someone goes off the rails 
and may be running an institution or Government and he does something 
and gets away with it. Though we should not have different standards for 
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Uganda and the rest of the world, I think we should start with something 
that we can enforce. 
The Chairperson of TI was referring to the possibility that some people in Uganda 
might become involved in certain malpractices (such as embezzlement, corruption and 
bribery) and that no action would be taken against them either because of political 
protection, or as a result of bribing whoever was responsible for taking action; such 
activities would not be condoned and would be much more likely to be followed up 
by the media and the judicial system in the Western World. The issue of corruption 
and bribery emerged strongly throughout the interviews and is returned to below. It 
should, however, be noted that corruption and other forms of malpractices are by no 
means the exclusive preserve of developing nations, as can be evidenced by recent 
events at Enron in the USA and Parmalat in Italy. The difference between the two sets 
of circumstances is, however, that concrete action can be taken against officials who 
are proved to be involved in such inappropriate acts in the West, whereas such 
outcomes are rare in developing countries such as Uganda. 
The responses given by the interviewees regarding the relevance of Western Models 
to developing countries such as Uganda were mixed, as can be seen in Table 6.4. 
These answers might be due to differences between general principles of corporate 
governance such as those published by the OECD and specific codes or acts such as 
those issued in the UK and the USA. The OECD Principles and the Principles for 
Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (1999) were specifically designed with 
widespread applicability in mind, with the understanding that they could be adapted to 
fit the specific circumstances of the different countries; in contrast the UK Combined 
Code (2003) and the SOX (2002) were specific to the nations concerned. Developing 
countries might have stipulations in their corporate governance guidelines that 
differ 
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from the requirements of the codes that are specific to the UK and the USA. 
Differences in ownership structure might affect the principles applicable in a 
particular country; for example, in the UK and the USA corporate ownership is 
relatively widely dispersed whereas in developing countries most firms are either 
family-owned or sole proprietorships, with no separation between ownership and 
management. Therefore, the general principles proposed by the OECD and the 
Commonwealth might be considered more applicable to the developing countries. 
Notwithstanding this point, developing countries could also benefit from some of the 
contents of the codes and acts of the Western Models and could adapt these contents 
to the specific circumstances of their respective countries. 
6.2.5 The Applicability of Corporate Governance Guidelines across 
classes of Ugandan Companies 
The interviewees were unanimous in their view that the basic principles of corporate 
governance should apply to all companies in Uganda, whether listed or unlisted; the 
only difference would be in the matter of details to be disclosed. 127 The interviewees 
argued that all companies had a responsibility towards various stakeholders (such as 
shareholders, customers, suppliers, Government, employees, the environment and the 
community in which the company operates), and took the view that poor management 
could potentially cause any company to collapse. For example, the CEO of the ICGU 
indicated that: 
The principles of corporate governance are applicable to all companies, 
whether listed or not, but can be customised to suit the particular type of 
entity that we are looking at. Listed companies will have to operate under 
very stringent standards. Unlisted companies would operate under less 
127 However, the problems affecting multinational companies were not perceived to be the same as 
those affecting small corporations in developing countries, even though the need for principles of good 
governance remained the same. 
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tight regulations. Better governance can enable some of the companies 
that are not listed to get the requirements for listing. 
In addition, a former Company Secretary of a listed firm argued that a common 
overall objective should exist, namely to maximise the wealth of the providers of 
capital (while taking into account the interests of other stakeholders), and he 
suggested further that good governance would help companies to attain such 
objectives. This interviewee also stated that "the only difference between listed and 
unlisted companies is in ownership, but the objectives are the same. " A Senior Civil 
Servant argued that sound governance: (i) would be good for the growth of a 
company; (ii) could minimise the risk of failure, and (iii) might promote social 
responsibility. 
While accepting the view that the principles of good governance should apply to all 
companies, one of the Senior Civil Servants pointed out that the cost aspect of 
implementing corporate governance guidelines could be a drawback for small 
businesses. One of the lawyers also argued that listed companies would require more 
control than unlisted ones, since in the former type of firm shareholders did not have a 
direct relationship with the directors, apart from appointing them in a general meeting, 
whereas in unlisted companies the shareholders were usually also the directors. 
The views of the respondents suggested that stakeholders in Uganda would generally 
want the principles of good governance to be applied to all companies. However, the 
extent of application would depend upon factors such as size and the ownership 
structure of the company. 
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6.2.6 Importance of Corporate Governance in Uganda 
The interviews also sought to explore views about the underlying importance attached 
to the notion of corporate governance. The good governance of Ugandan corporations 
was perceived as having a wide range of benefits, but was thought likely to be 
particularly important in terms of the following: (i) the economic and social 
development of the country; (ii) creating wealth for shareholders; (iii) managing 
resources in a transparent manner; (iv) promoting accountability; (v) managing risk; 
(vi) improving the performance of companies; (vii) attracting both local and foreign 
investment; and (viii) protecting the interests of all shareholders - including minority 
shareholders. The CEO of the ICGU expressed the belief that good governance 
allowed a company to examine its long-term sustainability and assess the extent to 
which value was being added to the company; he also pointed to its role in controlling 
management's handling of owners' resources, so that the entity was managed in line 
with the latters' objectives. This interviewee further described his hope that corporate 
governance improvements would address the issue of corruption, lead to better 
utilisation of scarce resources and enable people to have a better quality of life and 
standard of living. In a similar vein, a Member of Parliament of Uganda stressed the 
importance of good corporate governance thus: 
If any company is not properly managed and it collapses or gets a 
problem, the effect of the corruption or poor management goes beyond the 
managers and owners of the company and affects either the Government 
revenue in the form of lost taxes, or the employees and other members of 
the community who may lose a source of income. 
6.2.7 Stakeholder versus Agency Perspectives 
One of the striking findings arising from the interviews was that most of the 
individuals appeared to view corporate governance from a stakeholder perspective 
167 
rather than as a dimension of conventional principal/agent theory. For example, the 
President of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) of Uganda argued that: 
Businesses cannot operate in isolation since they operate in an 
environment where there are other stakeholders; businesses need the co- 
operation of these stakeholders in order to survive and operate profitably. 
In contrast, as listed in the previous chapter, the principal/agent theory of corporate 
governance places good governance in the context of the relationship between 
management (as agents) and shareholders (as principals), and tends to limit 
accountability of management and the board of directors to the company as a whole 
and shareholders as a collective (Keasey et al., 1997). 128 The principal/agent 
perspective is broadly in line with the approach adopted in the Cadbury Report (1992) 
in the UK, which defined corporate governance as ".. . the system 
by which 
companies are directed and controlled" (par 2.5) and specified the responsibilities of 
the board as including "... setting the company's strategic aims, providing the 
leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and 
reporting to shareholders on their stewardship" (par. 2.5), subject to laws, regulations 
and the shareholder body in general meeting. 
Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, extends the notion of corporate governance 
beyond the relationship between management and the shareholders to include other 
relevant parties that have an interest in the operations of corporations. 
The theory is 
premised on the concept of a company being a legal or artificial person that operates 
in a community, and on the view that "there should be some explicit recognition of 
128 This standpoint was implied in the "Caparo" Case in the UK where the 
House of Lords ruled that 
auditors owed a legal duty of care to the company and to the shareholders collectively, 
but not to the 
shareholders as individuals, nor to third parties 
(Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman and others [199011 
ER 568). 
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the well-being of other groups having a long-term association with the firm - and 
therefore an interest, or 'stake', in its long-term success" (Keasey et al., 1997, p. 9). 
In addition, The King II Report (2002) of South Africa adopted the stakeholder view 
when it embraced the following description of corporate governance given by 
Cadbury (1999): 
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals ... the aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society. 
It is worth noting, however, that the report rejected the notion of directors being 
accountable to all legitimate stakeholders: 
In governance terms, one is accountable at common law and by statute to 
the company if a director, and one is responsible to the stakeholders 
identified as relevant to the business of the company. The stakeholder 
concept of being accountable to all legitimate stakeholders must be 
rejected for the simple reason that to ask boards to be accountable to 
everyone would result in their being accountable to no one (par. 5.1). 
Whilst this form of words is similar to that in the UK's Hampel Report of 1998, in 
adopting a limited view of the groups to whom directors are answerable, the overall 
picture which emerged from the interviews was of pervasive support for the 
stakeholder view of corporate governance. 
6.2.8 Stakeholders 
Based upon their perceptions of accountability to a broader cross-section of 
stakeholders, as outlined in Section 6.3.1, the interviewees had well-formed views 
nil, about the groups that could be thought of as stakeholders 
in Uganda. For example3 
one of the legislators (D) stated the following: 
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Stakeholders include all the people who can get affected by the operations 
of a corporation. These include shareholders, Government, suppliers, 
contractors, employees, providers of finance and the community that may 
be concerned about environmental issues such as pollution. Stakeholders 
also include the ordinary citizens whom members of parliament and 
Government represent since the people want to know whether the 
members of parliament and Government officials are carrying out the 
responsibilities entrusted to them on behalf of the people. 
As the managing director of a company pointed out: 
Different stakeholders have different concerns about the activities of an 
organisation. The Government, for instance, will be concerned about 
collecting taxes and ensuring that the various laws of the country are 
complied with while the community will be mainly concerned with the 
organisation's impact on the environment. In contrast, providers of capital 
such as shareholders and donors will be concerned about the usage of the 
funds to achieve the set objectives. 
Specific examples of the various regulatory authorities mentioned by the interviewees 
as being potential stakeholders included the Registrar of Companies, the Uganda 
Revenue Authority (URA), the National Environmental Management Authority, the 
Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), the Uganda Capital Markets Authority (CMA), 
and the National Social Security Fund. 
6.2.9 Corporate Citizenship 
As noted earlier, in 1932, US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stressed that 
states should make sure that the privilege of the corporate structure was conferred 
only in those cases where it was consistent with public policy and welfare. Such a 
perspective provides a basis for viewing the corporation as a citizen of the state in 
which it operates, i. e. as a legal person operating in a community and having 
its own 
rights, privileges and responsibilities. Like any other citizen, the corporation is 
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expected to act in a particular manner that complies with the norms of the society in 
which it operates. 
In line with this standpoint, most of the interviewees appeared to adhere to the broad 
notion of corporate citizenship, arguing that corporations had to integrate into the 
economic and societal concerns of the community if they were to operate on a 
sustainable basis. 
6.3 The Framework of Corporate Governance in Uganda 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the issue of accountability is inextricably 
linked to the notion of corporate governance. Section I of the revised OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004) stresses the importance of an 
effective corporate governance framework in the following words: 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law; and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
In the light of this multi-faceted notion of corporate governance, the semi-structured 
interviews covered the legal, regulatory, political and accounting frameworks together 
with the economic, cultural, sociaL and ethical factors that might have an impact on 
corporate governance practices in Uganda. 
6.3.1 The Legal Framework 
The CEO of the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE) stressed that the interaction 
between the directors, managers and shareholders of a company must take place 
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according to the laws of the country concerned, and ensure that: no la,, N, s are violated: 
all shareholders (whether are minority or majority owners) are protected; and cater for 
issues of corporate social responsibility. In Uganda, the basic law governing the 
operation of all companies is The Companies Act, originally issued in 1948 and last 
revised in 1964.129 Various laws and statutes governing different types of statutory 
corporations also exist; the Act or Statute establishing each public sector corporation 
f lloW. 130 outlines the corporate governance guidelines that they are required to 0 Some 
of the interviewees pointed out that, although there were various laws in Uganda 
which addressed corporate governance, their implementation remained a major 
problem. It was also noted that some companies implemented selective sections of the 
Companies Act while some private corporations found a way of getting around the 
requirements of the law. The laws that govern corporate governance in Uganda were 
perceived as either not being adequate or as being outdated and needing revision; the 
Companies Act was singled out in this context. 131 
An area of concern for several of the interviewees was the protection of minority 
shareholders, especially in multinational companies. An example was given of one of 
129The Ugandan Companies Act is largely based upon the British Companies Act of 1948. 
130 Examples of such Acts and Statutes include: 
1. The Companies Act, 1964; 
2. The National Environment Statute, 1995; 
3. The Public Finance and Accountability Regulations, 2003; 
4. The Public Finance and Accountability Act, 2003; 
5. The Leadership Code Act, 2002; 
6. The Collective Investment Schemes Act, 2003; 
7. The Investment Code, 199 1; 
8. The Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Statute, 1993; 
9. The Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture (Amendment) Act, 2000; 
10. The Capital Markets Authority Statute, 1996; 
11. The Financial Institutions Act, 2004; 
12. The Accountants Statute, 1992; 
13. The Workers' Compensation Act, 2000; 
14. The Uganda Registration Services Bureau Act, 1998; 
15. The Uganda Securities Exchange Limited Rules, 2003. 
13 1A number of respondents claimed that, in some cases, there was no proper consultation process 
before the passing of the statutes and laws governing various corporations. 
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the multinational companies listed on the USE; the parent company of this subsidiary 
owned 90% of the shares while Ugandans owned only 10%. The concern related to 
how the interests of the Ugandan shareholders could realistically be protected since, 
out of the eight current board members, three were Executive Directors appointed by 
the parent company, two were representatives of the parent company, one was a 
former employee of the Ugandan subsidiary and the other two have been Board 
members since the Board was established. 
A Judge from the High Court of Uganda felt strongly about the need to protect 
employees and to pay living wages. This interviewee pointed out that, presently, there 
was no law covering the setting of minimum wages and that The Workers' 
Compensation Act (2000) was silent on this issue; employers were free to pay what 
they wanted and this had led to the exploitation of some employees who were paid 
just a "pittance". 
Some of the interviewees argued that, although the courts of law were an enforcement 
mechanism, the court system was overstretched as the number of judges was 
insufficient to handle all the pending cases expeditiously. Concern was also expressed 
that some members of the judiciary were being influenced by bribes when cases were 
brought before them. 132 
While it was felt that the Ugandan judiciary generally acted independently in 
adjudicating cases, some examples were cited where there had been interference in 
implementing the decisions of courts or the recommendations of judicial commissions 
132 However, to-date no concrete evidence has been brought to prove this allegation against judges. 
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of enquiry. Some of the interviewees stated that the recommendations made by the 
Commission of Enquiry that looked into the affairs of the Police Force in Uganda 
were generally implemented, whilst the ones concerning the purchase of the "junk 
helicopters" were not and those of the enquiry into the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA) were suppressed on technicalities. 133 The helicopters were purchased from a 
foreign country with the involvement of a local Ugandan company and raised ethical 
and legal questions relating to transparency, fairness, probity and respect for 
contractual obligations. Alleged corruption within the URA had a direct impact on 
companies as it affected accountability, transparency and proper disclosure by both 
the URA and the companies that colluded with the URA officials. This, in turn, had 
an impact on the community at large since the revenue lost through corruption could 
have been used to enhance the services provided by Goverranent to the people of 
Uganda. 
In terms of judicial independence, High Court Judge I stated that: 
Independence of the judiciary means that a judge can hear and decide a 
case without fear or favour to a third party and would have nothing behind 
his mind such as personal concerns in deciding the case. It means being 
free from interference or fear in deciding a case. 
Similarly, High Court Judge 2 described independence of the judiciary as: 
... the ability of the 
individual judge in adjudicating between parties to be 
able to look at the issues and make a decision based on the issues without 
fear or favour or pressure from any other party but purely based on the law 
and the evidence presented. 
The two judges did not, however, regard the failure to implement court decisions as a 
sign that the judiciary lacked independence. High Court Judge 1 argued that although 
there had been a few cases of interference, there was a general level of independence 
133 There has been some restructuring of the URA during 2005 in measures which are believed to be a 
result of donors applying pressure on the Ugandan Government to act on the Report of the Commission 
of Enquiry into the URA (The Sebutinde Report) (Nyanzi, 2006). 
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among the judiciary; in his view, non-implementation of the judgements would onl-. y, 
affect a small section of the work of the judiciary, mostly those that involved 
Govenu-nent. High Court Judge 2 argued as follows: 
Implementation of the decisions of courts of law is left to other parties and 
does not affect the independence of the judiciary, although the atmosphere 
within which the Judge is working may influence the Judge. However, by 
and large, the role of the court ends with the judgement. 
The general view of the two judges was that the judiciary was playing its part in 
protecting the rights of stakeholders by trying to adjudicate between various parties in 
cases involving alleged violation of contractual and other rights where the respective 
parties were protected by law. The judges felt that this process was instrumental in 
promoting corporate governance in Uganda and that the judgements made were based 
on the evidence presented to court and were free of interference by any external party. 
6.3.2 The Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
The OECD Principles state the following regarding the supervisory and regulatory 
framework: 
Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the 
authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and 
objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, transparent 
and fully explained (Section I, D). 
Some of the interviewees claimed that Ugandan regulatory authorities were not 
effective in enforcing governance regulations even though they had the authority to do 
so. 134 However, the Registrar General outlined several problems that impacted on the 
134 The regulatory and supervisory authorities in Uganda include: the Registrar General's Office, the 
Bank of Uganda (BoU), National Drug Authority (NDA), Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA), 
Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), National Environment Management Authority, Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA), Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), Capital Markets Authority, Uganda 
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enforcement of laws and regulations; shortages of resources including funds, 
personnel, transport and up-to-date technology were among the major problems that 
the Registrar's office was facing in its effort to follow up what was happening in 
companies and to demand compliance. Moreover, the office was still using obsolete 
information systems that relied on paper files which, considering the number of 
companies involved, made it difficult to keep track of developments. 135 Neither was 
the Registrar's office able to verify information supplied by existing and prospective 
companies due to the geographical spread of companies and the insufficiency of 
resources. Most of the companies did not keep proper financial and other required 
records; this inevitably affected the quality of data collected. 136 Corruption, and 
insufficient knowledge and/or training for those who were supposed to implement the 
regulations were other factors that affected implementation. 
The Registrar General Pointed out that the Registry had prosecuted some companies 
for non compliance but he argued that the process was too cumbersome. The 
companies were dispersed all over the country and this made it very expensive for the 
Registrar's office to follow up all companies in Uganda and prosecute them in their 
respective courts of law. One of the Managing Directors interviewed took the view 
that some regulatory agencies, such as the Central Bank of Uganda, simply reacted to 
situations and imposed the regulations of advanced countries on Ugandan companies 
Communications Commission (UCC) and the Institute of Public Certified Accountants of Uganda 
(ICPAU). 
135 It was hoped that a computerised record keeping system would be set up soon. 
136 Another factor mentioned in the interviews was the inadequacy of fmes designed to encourage 
compliance. Some other interviewees added ignorance of the laws and regulations, lack of political will 
to enforce compliance, political interference with the officers charged with enforcing the laws and 
regulations, corruption and insufficient training for those involved in implementing the rules and 
regulations as being some of the factors affecting enforcement of regulations and laws in Uganda. 
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without consultation and without tailoring these regulations to the Ugandan 
envirom-nent. 
On the whole, the respondents felt that there was a clear division of responsibilities 
between regulatory bodies, although more than one body appeared to want to regulate 
in certain areas; this situation often reflected the fact that different bodies were 
looking at a variety of consequences for the same event. 
6.3.3 Accounting Framework 
The OECD Principles (2004) highlight the importance of the accounting framework in 
promoting disclosure and transparency, stating that: 
Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high 
quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure 
(Section V, B). 
Annual audits conducted by independent, competent and qualified auditors are 
recommended by the OECD Principles in order to provide an external and objective 
assurance to the board and shareholders about the financial position and performance 
of the company in all material respects (Section V, Q. In terms of standard setting, a 
Company Secretary made the following observation: 
The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (ICPAU) Statute 
was enacted in 1992 to regulate the accounting profession and to guide 
Government in accounting related matters; consequently, the ICPAU had 
recommended the use of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). However, MRS are not yet mandatory in Uganda - except for 
listing purposes; some accountants follow the US accounting standards 
while others follow the UK standards, but the trend right now is towards 
use of the MRS. 
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Despite the stated objective of the ICPAU, the general view among the respondents 
was that the accounting framework in Uganda was weak. Some of the interviewees 
noted that part of the problem may relate to the fact that practising accountants in 
Uganda belong to different professional bodies that are supposed to regulate 
accounting practice; in addition, a number of these professional bodies are 
international and do not have sufficient mechanisms for liaising with their Ugandan 
members. The Chief Executive of the ICPAU stressed the problem of monitoring and 
regulating accounting practitioners in Uganda due to the limited resources at the 
disposal of the ICPAU and the number and geographical spread of those practitioners. 
It was clear from the interviews that the accounting framework needed urgent 
attention to ensure that financial statements in Uganda were prepared using common 
accounting principles, thereby allowing for meaningful evaluation and comparison of 
performance. In this context, mechanisms for effective supervision and censoring of 
members who do not adhere to accepted principles need to be developed and 
implemented. 
6.3.4 Political Framework 
The general consensus was that a nation's political environment affected the practice 
of corporate govemance in tangible and substantive ways. The interviewees argued 
that factors such as Government's fiscal and monetary policies (as well as security, 
stability and the political leadership in a nation) could all have a strong influence. A 
stable and conducive political climate was perceived as being a prerequisite for 
providing assurance to the business community and stimulating investment and good 
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governance practices. Some of the political factors that were mentioned as affecting 
the practice of corporate governance in Uganda were: 
political interference with the work of regulatory and supervisory bodies; 
(2) the protection of certain entities that have political connections when these 
entities do not comply with certain legal and regulatory requirements; 
(3) the existence of political appointees who do not have the required 
qualifications and experience, or who cannot be held to account because of 
protection from major political figures; and 
(4) the awarding of tenders to political supporters, and the denial of business to 
entities that are critical of Goverment. 
A Managing Director made the following noteworthy assertion regarding the ability 
of directors to exercise independent judgement: 
There are cases where we have "shadow directors". A person may be 
appointed as a director, but that person is answerable to another person 
who directs him in his duties. These directors act in the interest of the 
party who appoints them and not necessarily in the interests of the 
corporation. There are even cases of people being sent by some political 
authority to sit in meetings and hear what is going on and then report back 
to the authority; this limits the freedom of the board members to express 
their views freely and make independent decisions. 
Clearly such behaviour differs dramatically from what the (admittedly US and UK 
dominated) literature on corporate governance suggests as best practice. In a similar 
vein, one of the interviewees observed that politicians sometimes ignored the 
professional advice of independent official bodies and appointed their own cronies to 
boards of directors and senior management positions without following the official 
structures and policies in place at the time. 
The interviewees did not appear to have much confidence in the ability of the present 
Ugandan Parliament to enact laws appropriate for assisting in the practice of good 
governance. This belief reflected perceived corruption, lack of integrity, and vested 
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interests among some parliamentarians; there was also a feeling that some of its 
members were easily manipulated by the executive arm of Government and that 
several failed to understand the concepts underlying good corporate governance. 137 
There was concern that the above conduct of parliamentarians could compromise their 
ability to promote accountability in Government and in private companies. In this 
context, a former Director of the Central Bank observed that: 
If there is corruption within the Govenu-nent circles then the Government 
cannot enforce good governance in corporations. Most of the MPs are on 
Boards of statutory corporations and other corporations where 
Government has an interest. However, these MIs cannot enforce good 
governance in those corporations because some of them are perceived to 
be corrupt. 
The above views bring into question the competence of some of the directors to 
perform their duties and to be accountable to the relevant parties (rather than to their 
political patrons). One interviewee argued that political interference and appointments 
occurred everywhere in the world; however, in developed countries such people 
would be vetted and institutional investors could launch extensive media publicity 
highlighting any appointment that was thought not to be proper. 
There has been an attempt to curb corruption among senior Government officials and 
politicians through The Leadership Code Act (2002) whereby these officials are 
required to declare their income, assets and liabilities. 138 Another office that has been 
trying to enforce good governance is that of the Inspector General of Govemment 
137 It was argued by some of the interviewees that parliament would do a better job if it had a 
recognised and effective opposition. The Ugandan Constitution did not allow multi-party politics at the 
time the interviews were conducted; consequently, no formal opposition party was recognised by 
government. Multi-party politics was provided for with effect from the parliamentary elections 
conducted in February 2006. However, the members of the opposition are still a minority in parliament 
and are likely to be overruled by the members of parliament belonging to the ruling party. It remains to 
be seen whether there will be a change in the way Ugandans perceive their parliamentarians and 
whether the new members are any less prone to manipulation by the executive arm of government than 
were the former members.. 
138 Certain measures have also been specified to avoid conflicts of interest. 
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(IGG), which is supposed to enforce The Leadership Code. However, an MP 
expressed the following reservations about the effectiveness of the IGG in carrying 
out his/her duties: 
The IGG is supposed to be one of the arms of Government in enforcing 
good governance. However the IGG can make recommendations 
regarding specific officers that may be involved in malpractice or may not 
be performing up to expected standards, but does not have the power to 
enforce implementation of the recommendations. These recommendations 
may be ignored by the appointing authority. 139 
It was felt by some interviewees that for parliament to pass laws that were suitable for 
(and conducive to) promoting a strong corporate governance system, parliamentarians 
themselves must first understand what the notion of corporate governance implied; 
they should then make sure that all related laws that they passed reflected good 
governance principles. In this context, one of the interviewees recommended that MPs 
and other politicians should receive formal training in corporate governance. 
6.3.5 Cultural and Social factors 
The interviewees were of the view that both cultural and social factors impacted on 
the practice of corporate governance in Ugandan corporations. People's attitudes 
towards integrity, political interference, corruption and bribery, conflicts of interest 
and accountability were seen as being necessary for the enforcement of principles of 
good governance. The specific cultural and social factors mentioned by the 
interviewees included: (i) pressure from extended families and the clan for financial 
support (which might encourage corruption and bribery); (ii) respect for elders, allied 
139The Ministry of Ethics and Integrity is also trying to play a role in improving corporate governance 
in Uganda by monitoring Members of Parliament and Senior Government officials in matters relating 
to their ethical behaviour as laid out in The Leadership Code Act (2002) of Uganda. 
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to due deference to one's superiors and non-confrontation of those in authority; (Ili) 
the head of a family making decisions for family-owned businesses without expecting I 
to be questioned about his decisions; (iv) attitudes towards employment; (v) attitudes 
towards women (and the dominance of men); and (vi) tribalism. These issues were 
mentioned as having the potential to affect the demand for accountability. The 
practice of glorifying those who acquired wealth - irrespective of the means used to 
acquire it - was thought likely to encourage corruption and embezzlement of funds, 
while tribalism could lead to the employment of unqualified and incompetent 
personnel. 
In reference to pressure from extended families and clan members for financial and 
other support, a Solicitor and Senior Partner stated that: 
Culturally, when you are in a good position you must take care of 
everybody from your clan. So you may find yourself employing people 
not because they are qualified and competent but because they come from 
your area or from your family. Some of these employees may disobey 
their direct bosses because they know the chairman of the board or some 
other senior officer who brought them into the company. 
Some inter-viewees suggested that people who were thought to have political 
connections were feared and not criticised for fear of retribution; such individuals 
tended to become "sacred cows", untouchable in their organisations. This fear was 
extended to all those who got jobs through the auspices of prominent political figures. 
A Senior Official gave the following explanation as to why elders were not questioned 
in some Ugandan cultures: 
The elders were considered to be wise and very fair; they would only 
make a decision after looking at all sides and so they would not need 
questioning. Some of our cultures are very democratic. In Karamoja, for 
instance, all important decisions are determined by the council of elders. 
However, these days some people are appointed to positions of leadership 
on political grounds and do not have those qualities that the traditional 
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elders had. Not questioning them would have a negative impact on good 
governance. 
However, one of the High Court Judges felt that culture was not relevant to corporate 
governance and that good governance was a question of discipline and respecting the 
law. This Judge argued as follows: 
Many organisations have a practice manual that binds the staff. This is on 
top of the Statute governing the organisation. Cultural aspects are not 
embedded in these practice manuals. With due respect to our cultures, 
there is a time for everything. As Africans, not just as Ugandans, we need 
to respect the law whether it is contained in the Statute or in the practice 
manual. 
More generally, the view of most respondents was that negative cultural and social 
elements in Uganda should be changed so that good corporate governance and 
accountability could be enhanced in both private and public sector organisations. 
Measures were believed to be required to identify the cultural and social factors that 
affected individual organisations, each of which should come up with specific rules 
and procedures that could (taking into account its particular circumstances) improve 
the culture of corporate govemance in that particular company. 
6.3.6 Ethical Factors 
The interviewees appeared to see a link between moral codes and governance 
practices, with each of the following ethical factors perceived as having a negative 
impact on corporate governance practices in Uganda: (i) threats of a person being 
sacked for exposing an official who was doing something wrong; (ii) sexual 
harassment against staff, (iii) compromising behaviour of management in dealing with 
junior staff; (iv) political appointments that failed to take account of qualifications or 
competence regarding assigned duties; (v) recruitment of unqualified and incompetent 
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individuals on other grounds; (vi) corruption and bribery - particularly in the public 
sector; (vii) insufficient disclosure of accounting information; (viii) non-adherence to 
the codes of conduct governing various corporations; (ix) lack of qualities such as 
integity, punctuality, honesty and accountability; and (x) the tendency of some 
politicians to demand favours from the officers of public sector corporations -M 
particular, an officer who refused to grant the favours could find himself out of a job. 
Some of the interviewees argued that when an individual was appointed on the basis 
of personal connections with the employer (or on political grounds), nothing might be 
done about malpractice by that employee since there would be a big officer behind the 
person and the other company officials would be afraid of taking action against him or 
her. Other ethical factors that were mentioned included conflicts of interests and 
inadequate remuneration. A partner in an accounting firm narrated his specific 
experience of bribery in a Government office as follows: 
I went to the office to licence my car when it was approaching lunch time. 
I was supposed to pick up a bank pay-in-slip. The person at the counter 
told me that the people responsible for the pay-in-slips had gone but if I 
could buy her some lunch she would be able to get me the bank slip so that 
I could get my licence. This bothered me. Maybe if this lady was being 
remunerated properly there would be no need for her to ask for a bribe. 
However, some people are just selfish and are using their positions to 
enrich themselves. 
A High Court Judge noted the direct impact of endemic corruption on levels of 
accountability: 
Corruption is the biggest ethical factor facing us in Uganda. The feeling is 
that once you are appointed to work in a public corporation you have been 
given a plantation from which you can harvest. You cannot come out and 
complain that you do not have money since corruption will solve all your 
problems. This is connected to lack of accountability; a person involved in 
corruption will not want accountability since this would reveal the wrong 
things going on in the corporation. If a person such as an accountant 
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stands up against the General Manager because of corruption, that person 
will be sacked. 
A Senior Government Official referred to bribery as "moving things" because some 
officials might demand bribes before they could work on certain things or they might 
just slow down the process until they were given bribes. Some documents might even 
be hidden so as to frustrate the person who did not want to give a bribe. Some 
Goverm-nent officials might even demand bribes before they awarded contracts to 
private businesses. 
One of the High Court Judges was very outspoken against corruption in Uganda: 
Corruption should not be tolerated. There can be corruption anywhere but 
in a country like Uganda where we are underdeveloped or developing, the 
effects of corruption are far greater reaching than in a country that is 
developed. Every Shilling that you lose through corruption affects many 
more people because our GDP and per capita income is small and that one 
Shilling makes a whole lot of difference to someone's life if it is not there. 
We are largely an economy that depends a lot on donor funding. We can 
ill afford to tolerate corruption and yet you will be surprised to see how 
much we do tolerate corruption in our public and private institutions. 
The President of the CMA decried the moral decadence that had prevailed in Ugandan 
society since Amin's time. 
You may remember the period which they called "mafuta mingi"; that is 
getting anything for free. That spirit is still continuing in some people. 
There is also the problem of diluting religious values which has had an 
impact on the ethical values. We used to have a subject called Civics in 
schools but the subject was removed. Civics was about protection of the 
environment and about being a good citizen. We are trying to ensure that 
these good things that happened in the past can be introduced in the school 
curriculum again. We are trying to say that corporate governance is a key 
subject and that it should be introduced in the school syllabus starting 
from Primary School level because most of the people leave school at 
Primary School level. We think that people should know about ethical 
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values, transparency and good business management starting from that 
level. 140 
A senior partner in a law firm argued that tax evasion was not just a legal issue but 
also an ethical one since some business people allegedly bribed Government officials 
in order to dodge paying tax or in order to lower their tax bills. 
The views expressed by the interviewees indicated that they did not consider business 
to be divorced from ethics; they were of the view that people's attitudes towards 
moral values might affect their integrity, accountability and the practice of corporate 
govemance as a whole. These views suggest that the ethical and moral issues 
mentioned by the interviewees should be considered as Uganda attempts to improve 
the corporate govemance system. 
6.3.7 Economic Factors 
The interviewees were of the view that the macro-economic policies of a country 
could affect the way in which large organisations were managed. Economic factors 
such as the level of remuneration, poverty, and inflation were also seen as affecting 
accountability; for example, a Member of Parliament took the view that companies in 
financial distress might be tempted to manage their accounts (using unethical and 
illegal means) so as to give a misleading positive impression to shareholders, and 
thereby reduce the accountability of managers. However, the company secretary 
argued that fiscal policies such as tax regimes could also influence corporate 
140 Although the teaching of civics was suggested by only one interviewee, there has been extensive 
discussion regarding the need for improving the moral and ethical standards of the Ugandan 
population. The Ugandan Government has subsequently decided that Civics is now to be taught in all 
Primary Schools and Ethics in all Universities. It is hoped that this would strengthen the moral and 
ethical values of the Ugandan citizens. 
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governance; specifically, if tax rates were considered to be too high then, he argued, 
some business people might try and evade the taxes by either under-declaring their 
profits (or the value of the goods that they import), or by smuggling goods into the 
country. An MP argued that high inflation and poor exchange rates reduced the 
purchasing power of the local currency and reduced people's spending power; he 
further argued that this could have an impact on the management of companies as 
poverty could drive malpractices by those whose wealth had decreased. 
One of the interviewees claimed that some board members were primarily concerned 
about getting paid and, therefore, simply accepted what the company executives told 
them about - or decided for - the company; this behaviour was seen as being likely to 
affect the board's oversight function. Some interviewees asserted that poor wages 
often underpinned any corrupt tendencies, especially if employees thought that they 
could get away with it. Notwithstanding these arguments, one of the High Court 
Judges argued as follows: 
I have come to the conclusion that you do not have to be rich to be honest 
and not every poor person is a thief or is corrupt. It is just greed that 
makes people corrupt. Whatever the case is, corruption should not be 
tolerated at all as it can only lead to disadvantages. 
It was also pointed out that some Ugandan organisations that were struggling to 
survive under stiff competition might not be following good corporate governance 
practices. A senior Government official gave the example of a multi-national 
company that had resorted to means that were potentially unfair to a particular 
stakeholder group, namely their customers: 
Last week the Governor of the National Bureau of Standards visited some 
stores that sell food products. When he visited Company X, which 
is a 
multinational Supermarket, he found that the Supermarket was using 
expired materials to bake bread which they were selling to customers 
in 
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the store. One would not expect such a prestigious store to resort to such 
practices in order to make profits. 
The above views indicate the various ways in which the state of a domestic economy 
can affect the practice of corporate governance. In the light of this evidence, it appears 
reasonable to suggest that the Government should scrutinise its fiscal and monetary 
policies and the impact that these may have on the economy and, consequently, on the 
practice of corporate governance; otherwise, meaningful improvements in 
accountability are unlikely to be achieved. What is clear from the comments made by 
the interviewees is that a poor economy characterised by poverty, inadequate 
remuneration, high inflation, and high tax rates could be a breeding ground for poor 
corporate governance, because of a lack of accountability and the propensity for 
adopting unethical practices as a means of survival. 
6.3.8 Privatisation in Uganda 
In Uganda there has been a move to liberalise the economy, thereby giving way to 
private ownership of previously state-owned enterprises. 141 The CEO of the ICGU 
explained that one of the aims of privatisation in Uganda was to improve corporate 
governance in those public sector entities that were targeted for privatisation. Other 
interviewees supported the privatisation process, saying that they saw it as a good 
thing as it would help to improve accountability, the quality of products and services, 
and the quality of management. One of the High Court Judges stated the following: 
There was a general feeling that public enterprises belonged to nobody. So 
whoever was appointed to manage those corporations did not have that 
inner responsibility that they belonged to somebody; as long as the 
14 1 Examples of such divestitures include the Government owned newspaper - The New Vision - 
whose shares were floated by the Government on the USE in September 2004; the DFCU Bank ý, N, 
here 
Government sold its shares to the public in July 2004; British American Tobacco Uganda Ltd (BATU); 
Uganda Clays; the Bank of Baroda; Uganda Telecom; Post Bank; and Uganda Commercial Bank. 
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corporations survived and there was enough money to keep employees and 
to pay the big shots, nobody worried about accountability. The Government kept putting money into these corporations but the 
corporations did not yield the desired results. 
The Managing Director who took part in the interviews thought that privatisation 
would encourage professionalism in running the privatised companies and also hoped 
that competent and skilled managers would help to improve accountability and 
achieve best practice. 142 This comment was made in light of the perception amongst 
some stakeholders that the privatisation process itself was not transparent, and that 
some companies were being sold to people based on political and other considerations 
(including undeclared interests by some of the Government officials that were 
responsible for effecting the process); some of these people were not thought to be 
sufficiently qualified and competent to run the companies. 
There were also concerns that asset stripping had occurred in some of the privatised 
companies. For example, one interviewee claimed that some of the foreigners who 
bought state-owned enterprises used the titles to those assets to obtain loans from 
banks, after which they left the country. Some interviewees argued that several 
companies had been sold to non-Ugandan interests who did not have a credible track 
record in the industries concerned. An example was given of Westmont, which 
initially bought the Uganda Commercial Bank only for the purchase to be cancelled 
later when the Bank was collapsing as a result of internal lending and other 
malpractices. 
142 This interviewee's only caution was that state-owned companies should be sold to people who were 
capable of running them and adding value to them. 
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Other interviewees also commented on the problems associated with privatisation in 
Uganda. For example, the Chairman of Transparency International noted that: 
There has been a lot of wastage of resources after the privatisation of state 
owned entities. Some of the new owners do not respect labour laws or 
employees and do not act in the interests of the company. A number of 
these companies are run down. The Government was focusing on the 
market rather than on the corporate governance issues during the 
privatisation process; issues of corporate governance were left to the new 
private owners. 
Concern was also expressed about the lack of accountability for money received by 
Government from the privatisation process. This issue has led to speculation that the 
Government may have diverted the proceeds from the sale of the companies to 
unauthorised purposes to foster political or personal interests. 
The Chairman of the CMA argued, however, that privatisation had improved the 
management of the economy by removing political patronage and introducing 
efficient operating methods in the industries concerned. 
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Evidently, stakeholders have observed the privatisation process in Uganda with mixed 
feelings and a degree of cynicism. While there seems to be general support for the 
process, the concerns about transparency and accountability need to be addressed. 
Some interviewees also argued that, while foreign investment was welcome, first 
priority should be given to Ugandan bidders when the state disposed of its industrial 
assets, either by floating shares on the USE or by inviting bids from core Ugandan 
investors before engaging foreign investors. This change, it was argued, would 
promote a spirit of investment among Ugandans. 
143 The company secretary also cited the floating of Government's shares on the stock exchange as a 
means of improving transparency and accountability in the privatisation process. 
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6.4 Accountability 
6.4.1 Perception of Accountability 
Chapter 5 outlined the interrelatedness of the notions of- (i) corporate governance, (ii) 
stakeholder theory, and (iii) accountability. The discussions, therefore, explicitly 
probed the interviewees for their views about the latter in the context of the Ugandan 
corporate governance framework and the support for the stakeholder notion outlined 
in the previous section. The interviewees agreed that accountability to several 
stakeholders (i. e. not just shareholders) was an essential aspect of good governance, 
but they felt that very little accountability was evident in the current Ugandan 
environment, especially in public sector corporations. For example, a Company 
Secretary of a listed company made the following observation: 
In law, management is accountable to the company and to shareholders as 
a collective. However, if you look at society as a whole, depending upon 
the nature of the industry, the industry is such that it has an impact on the 
environment, or it extracts its resources from the environment. 
Government uses revenues collected from these companies in the form of 
taxes to provide services to the community. The community is also the 
market for the products of the company. The company survives because of 
the broader society and not just the shareholders. Management has, 
therefore, to be accountable to society on how they utilise the 
environment. 
The elements that featured most prominently in the definitions of accountability 
advanced by the interviewees included perceptions of accountability as: (i) companies 
providing information to enable stakeholders to make judgements about the 
performance of management in running the company; (ii) management being able to 
justify their actions and decisions in the pursuit of maximising shareholder value; (iii) 
ensuring that what was entrusted to a person was put to the rightful use for the benefit 
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of whomever it was intended and as authorised (i. e. probity and legality); (iv) 
demonstrating proper stewardship of resources; (v) adhering to agreed budgets and 
programmes; and (vi) being able to demonstrate the reasonableness of policies 
followed (or not followed). Also included under accountability was the keeping of 
proper financial records and presenting proper and accurate periodic reports to 
relevant stakeholders such as regulatory authorities, Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA) and shareholders. Proper stewardship of resources included being accountable 
for the impact of a company's activities and policies on the environment and the 
community in which the company operated. The concept of accountability to all those 
who affected or were affected by a company's activities and policies kept being 
repeated during the interviews. This concept was extended to accountability to all 
society by some interviewees, arguing that the world was becoming a global village 
where what was done in one part of the world affected other parts of the world (such 
as global warming). 
These descriptions are broadly consistent with the (mainly US and UK) based 
definitions of accountability outlined in Chapter 5 and suggest that the notion of 
accountability is not exclusive to (or only applicable in) developed nations. The multi- 
dimensional view of accountability that was expressed by the interviewees was in line 
with Stewart's Ladder of Accountability (Stewart, 1984) that was also presented in 
Chapter 5. The interviewees expressed a wish for companies to act in a manner that 
was appropriate and consistent with the law (probity and legality); they were 
concerned about the value of companies being enhanced through proper management, 
transparency, disclosure and accountability which includes aspects of process, 
performance, programme and policy accountability. Probity, legality and policy 
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accountability, together with transparency and disclosure also have a bearing on the 
companies' relationships with various stakeholders that may affect or be affected by 
the companies' activities. 
In summary, the views of the interviewees indicated that there was a need for greater 
accountability (of many types, including those suggested in Stewart's ladder) in 
Uganda and that concrete action was required to achieve it. 
6.4.2 The State of Accountability in Ugandan Companies 
All the interviewees were of the view that a basic level of accountability should apply 
to all corporations in Uganda. The following statement made by the CEO of the USE 
was typical in this regard: 
Accountability is critical; you cannot have corporate governance without 
accountability. To me it is the foundation of management and boards. 
One of the legislators mentioned that the giving of reports by companies - and the 
assessment of managerial performance this facilitates - was vital to the proper 
running of companies. 
However, as Table 6.5 indicates, virtually all the interviewees stated that the practical 
implementation of accountability in Uganda was very limited, especially in public 
sector corporations. Multinational companies were thought of as having better 
corporate governance than locally owned companies, while listed companies were 
perceived to be more accountable than their unlisted counterparts because of the 
listing requirements enforced by the CMA and the USE. Several interviewees 
mentioned conflicts of interest, political interference, poor record-keeping, 
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unqualified or incompetent staff, forged (managed) accounts, and family ownership of 
companies as some of the key factors affecting accountability in Uganda. The overall 
perception of interviewees that the level of accountability in Ugandan Companies was 
poor points to the need to take corporate governance issues seriously and to find ways 
of improving the confidence that stakeholders have in the governance practices of the 
Ugandan business sector. 
Table 6.5 Views about the Level of Accountability in Ugandan Companies 
Interviewee Private Sector Public Sector 
Legislator I Poor Poor 
Legislator 2 Poor Good" 
Regulator I Poor Very poor 
Regulator 2 
Poor, but some better 
than others 
Regulator 3 
Poor, but some better 
than others Poor 
ICGU 
Poor, but some better 
than others 
High Court Judge I Poor Very poor 
High Court Judge 2 Poor Very poor 
Company Secretary 
Poor, but some better 
than others* Poor 
Senior Civil Servant Poor Very poor 
Solicitor and Senior Partner Poor Poor 
Former Director, Central Bank of Uganda Poor 
Managing Director of a company Poor 
Partner, CPA Firm Poor Poor 
Former Executive Director Poor Very poor 
Chairman, Transparency International Poor Poor 
Note: This Table surnmarises the interviewees' perceptions regarding the level of accountability in the 
private and public sectors in Uganda. 
* According to this Company Secretary, listed companies are slightly better because of listing 
requirements and public scrutiny. 
** Legislator 2 serves on various Goverm-nent committees while legislator I is a junior 
parliamentarian. Legislator 2's involvement could have influenced his views. 
Referring to the reliability of information provided by companies, a Chief Accountant 
in one of the Government Ministries made the following comment: 
Accountability in Uganda is cosmetic in the sense that we reduce 
accountability to paperwork which may not reflect the actual reality of 
what has actually transpired. An example is the report on the construction 
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of valley dams in Uganda. The report indicated that all valley dams had been constructed and completed satisfactorily whereas this was not 
entirely true. 
One of the factors seen by the interviewees as impacting on accountability in Uganda 
was the structure of ownership of the entities. A Senior Official made the following 
observation: 
Most of the companies that we have in Uganda are either family owned or 
sole proprietorships and I do not think that the owners care about 
accountability. 
One of the High Court Judges suggested that people in Uganda were "docile" and 
tended not to demand accountability from Government or those in charge of running 
private corporations, and were afraid of expressing themselves freely; the interviewee 
argued that this encouraged officials to act with impunity. This judge went on to 
suggest that the political history of Uganda might have affected people's attitudes in 
this manner, stating that: 
During the colonial times Ugandans used to exercise their rights through 
boycotts, but with the coming of military regimes people feared for their 
safety. Boycotts and any expression of displeasure were quickly quelled 
through the use of force against the demonstrators. 
6.4.3 Summary of Findings on Accountability 
Considering the interviews as a whole, it appears that the participants view 
accountability from a stakeholder perspective, whereby companies are seen as being 
accountable to a wider range of stakeholders than just shareholders. These 
stakeholders include all those who affect (or are affected by) the company's 
operations; some interviewees extended accountability to society as a whole. The 
views expressed throughout the interviews overwhelmingly indicate that there is a 
195 
need for greater accountability (of many types, including those suggested in Stewart's 
ladder) in Uganda and that concrete action is required to achieve it. 
6.5 Views about the Most Pressing Issues in Corporate 
Governance in Uganda 
Each interviewee was asked to state what he/she thought the most pressing 
governance-related issues in Uganda were. 
The responses, surnmarised in Table 6.5, indicate that top of the list are: a lack of 
accountability, transparency and disclosure; followed by corruption and bribery; 
political interference and sectarianism; and the lack of compliance (or non- 
implementation) of laws and regulations. 
The need for training and sensitising of stakeholders on the principles of corporate 
governance - together with the need for up-to-date laws that are enforceable - was also 
stressed as being urgent. Also mentioned by a majority of interviewees was the need 
for qualified, competent, experienced, and credible management and board members 
whose integrity was not questionable. 
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Table 6.6 Summary of views regarding the most pressing issues of Corporate 
Governance in Uganda 
Issue 
Interviewees 
who 
mentioned 
Total 
number of 
interviewees 
Percentage 
Accountability, Transparency and Disclosure 
16 16 100% 
Corruption and bribery 14 16 88% 
Political interference and sectarianism 14 16 88% 
Implementation and Compliance with laws and 
regulations 14 16 88% 
Training and sensitisation 12 16 75% 
Proper and up-to-date laws that are enforceable 12 16 75% 
Qualifications, competence and credibility of 
management and board members 11 16 69% 
Inadequate infrastructure and resources for 
regulators 7 16 44% 
Lack of ethical values and standards 6 16 38% 
Need for a strong, competent and credible 
parliament that can make good laws and demand for 
accountability from gvt 
5 16 31% 
Lack of awareness of shareholders' rights 3 16 19% 
Need to Protect minority shareholders 3 16 19% 
Lack of political will to enforce CG 2 16 13% 
Fairness to employees and shareholders 2 16 13% 
Gender balance on boards and senior management 
positions 2 16 13% 
Need to strengthen regulatory bodies such as the 
Registrar's office and the ICPAU 2 16 13% 
Conflict of interests 1 16 6% 
Lack of exemplary leadership by politicians 1 16 6% 
Board members overstretched due to membership 
on too many boards 1 16 6% 
Re-introduction of courses like Civics and Religion 
in schools to promote ethical values 1 16 6% 
Salaries too low for a living wage 1 16 6% 
Need for competent people to enforce laws and 
regulations 1 16 6% 
Need for board evaluation 1 16 6% 
Respect for the judiciary by the Government 
executive 1 16 6% 
Keeping of proper records 1 16 6% 
Democracy and good political leadership 1 16 6% 
Appointment of auditors 1 16 6% 
Note: This Table surnmarises the views of the interviewees regarding the most pressing issues of 
corporate governance in Uganda. 
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6.6 Summary 
The semi-structured interviews reported in this chapter revealed a number of salient 
issues regarding the perceptions of stakeholders towards corporate governance in 
Uganda. These perceptions include: (i) the principles of corporate governance are 
known by a limited number of people who are considered to be an elite circle; (ii) 
training carried out by the ICGU has so far concentrated on the managers and board 
members of public sector corporations; 144 (iii) corporate governance in Uganda is 
viewed from a perspective that is broadly consistent with the central tenets of 
conventional stakeholder theory; (iv) detailed laws and regulations governing 
corporate governance exist in Uganda, but some of these are outdated and need 
revision; (v) Western models of corporate governance have been used to draft the 
principles of corporate governance in Uganda, but these should be adapted to fit local 
circumstances; (vi) most interviewees are of the view that all companies, whether 
listed or not, should be governed by the same principles of corporate governance, 
although the extent of disclosure may vary; (vii) corporate governance is seen as 
being important for the economic and social development of Uganda and for 
attracting both local and foreign investment; (viii) accountability, transparency and 
disclosure need to be strengthened; ' (ix)- corruption, bribery and political interference 
should be eliminated; (x) measures to protect all stakeholders (including employees 
and minority shareholders) are needed, especially with the increased presence of 
foreign-owned or multinational companies within Uganda; (xi) regulatory and 
enforcement agencies need to be supported so that they can carry out their duties 
effectively; (xii) the accounting framework needs to be clarified and strengthened so 
144 Some members from the private sector corporations have also attended some corporate governance 
seminars. 
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that all companies use similar accounting standards (and accounting practices can be 
supervised and enforced to a meaningful degree); (xiii) negative cultural, social and 
ethical practices, such as glorifying those who become rich irrespective of the means 
used to acquire their wealth, need to be eliminated so that good practices can be 
promoted; and (xiv) Government should put in place sound fiscal and monetary 
policies that help nurture improvements in governance practices across all sectors. 
What emerged clearly in the interviews was a perception that not all was well with 
respect to corporate governance in Uganda. Although these were the perceptions of 
the interviewees - and the researcher did not set out to verify whether they were true 
or not - it seems that the views of stakeholders may influence the way that they 
respond to certain situations. Investors may be unwilling to risk their money in a 
market which is perceived to be lacking accountability, transparency and integrity. 
Very few of them would think of investing in a market that is plagued with corruption 
and political interference. A sound and effective legal system, where investors' rights 
can be enforced and a regulatory system that is perceived to work satisfactorily, are 
more likely to encourage both local and foreign investment. Perceptions, therefore, 
may influence people's behaviour and have an impact on the management of both 
public and private sector companies in Uganda; this, in turn, may influence the 
economic and social development of Uganda and the willingness of both local and 
foreign stakeholders to invest in Uganda. 
The findings from the interviews indicate that there might be some problems of 
accountability based upon Stewart's Ladder of accountability. The emphasis placed 
on accountability to stakeholders calls to question how true accountability can be 
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achieved in a stakeholder context if Stewart's notion of a bond of accountability is to 
be adhered to. As of March 2006, there are 8 companies listed on the USE, five of 
which are incorporated in Uganda, whilst the other three are registered in Kenya and 
cross-listed on the USE. 145 With the exception of Uganda Clays Limited, Ugandan 
shareholders own minority shareholdings in the companies listed on the Uganda Stock 
Exchange which do not entitle them to have actual control of those firms by virtue of 
their voting power. These companies are instead controlled by their multinational 
parent companies who own dominant shareholdings of up to 90% of total ownership. 
Policies are therefore dictated by parent companies to the extent that the Ugandan 
minority shareholders cannot hold management and boards accountable since there is 
no mechanism for enforcing the views of these minority shareholders. Since there is 
no true bond of accountability as specified by Stewart (1984), it could be concluded 
that Ugandan minority shareholders do not have a framework for holding 
management accountable. 
The only remedy that could ensure accountability to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders would require the legal framework to enforce the protection of 
stakeholder rights. Some of the rights, such as those relating to environmental issues 
and labour relations, are currently protected by law and could thus be enforced in 
courts of law. In theory, therefore, stakeholders could hold companies accountable 
using the force of law. However, interviewees expressed concern that there was poor 
enforcement of laws and regulations and that some of the laws were inadequate or 
145 The 5 Ugandan companies currently listed on the USE are: (1) Uganda Clays Limited; (2) British 
American Tobacco; (3) Bank of Baroda; (4) Development Finance Company of Uganda; and (5) New 
Vision Printing and Publishing Company Ltd. The Kenyan companies cross-listed on the USE are: 
(1) 
Kenya Airways; (2) East African Breweries Limited; and (3) Jubilee Holdings Ltd. (See the USE 
website). 
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out-dated and not relevant. These issues need to be addressed in order to have true 
accountability for legality. 
Accountability for probity could be problematic in the case of minority shareholders 
and other stakeholders unless the conduct of company officials violates laws and 
regulations. These minority shareholders cannot sanction management through 
c4voice" as their vote is not large enough to compel company officials to comply with 
their views. Parent companies could even dictate unfavourable practices in order to 
transfer revenue from subsidiary companies by using practices such as transfer 
pricing, major asset revaluation and write-offs, and management contracts to the 
disadvantage of the minority shareholders in the subsidiary companies. Although this 
might not be considered appropriate by the Ugandan minority shareholders, these 
shareholders would have no recourse unless protected by relevant laws. Boards of the 
respective companies might need to look into accounting for probity to ensure the 
protection of Ugandan minority shareholders; management and accounting practices, 
in particular, need scrutinising in order to establish accounting for legality and 
probity. Some of the activities company officials and board members may be involved 
in may reflect the ethical values (or absence of ethical values) of the individuals who 
control companies. These values would impact on issues such as: integrity; honesty; 
political interference; conflicts of interest; corruption and bribery; unfair accounting 
practices; and the level of stewardship by company officials. In addition, these values 
may influence the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, adequacy and reliability of 
infonnation provided to shareholders and other stakeholders; stakeholders use that 
information to assess the performance of companies and form a judgement as to 
whether management has been accountable for probity and legality. 
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The views of interviewees, therefore, seem to reflect a wish for true and proper 
accountability by companies but do not appear to be supported by actual practices in 
listed Ugandan companies whether these companies are in the private or the public 
sector (state-owned). Accountability may vary for unlisted companies depending on 
the type of ownership as noted by Berle and Means (1932). Interviewees noted that 
most Ugandan companies are owned by either sole proprietors or families and that 
these owners may not appreciate the need for accountability since there is no real 
separation between ownership and management. Also, cultural practices in Uganda do 
not encourage members of the family questioning the "head" of the family. These 
situations may not support Stewart's notion of a bond of accountability. However, it is 
conceivable that in situations of unlisted companies with share ownership of not more 
than 50 members, there could be shareholders with sufficient ownership - whether 
individual or combined with other shareholders - to exert control over management 
by the weight of their voting power and thereby establish a bond of accountability 
which can force management to be accountable. For accountability to other 
stakeholders who are not shareholders, there would be a need for enforceable laws 
and regulations that protect their interests. Alternatively, stakeholders could lobby 
both individual and institutional shareholders who have significant shareholdings and 
are sympathetic to the issues affecting stakeholders to advance the causes of the 
concerned stakeholders. The bond of accountability would then be exercised 
indirectly either by force of law or with the support of shareholders who have 
sufficient shareholdings to exert control over management. 
202 
The interviews documented in this study suggest that much more sensitisation is 
needed to develop awareness of the importance of good governance and 
accountability among directors and managers, as well as among a wide range of 
groups of stakeholders in Ugandan corporations. Several organisations, including the 
ICGU, are attempting to improve the situation, but the Government itself is seen as 
perhaps needing to exhibit a greater will to tackle corruption - and encourage 
accountability and good governance - not just in words, but in practical actions. 
Political cronyism, vested interests and interference, as well as a lack of sufficient 
backing for regulatory agencies appear to be serious obstacles to the emergence of 
improved governance structures in Uganda. A concerted effort is required to ensure 
that management and boards develop better corporate governance practices and 
enhance their accountability framework so that they become (and are seen to become) 
good corporate citizens. 
In summary, there is clearly a need for the Ugandan authorities to address the issues 
identified in this study, and work towards a system of governance that will enhance 
confidence (both domestic and international) in the inherent accountability of the 
Ugandan corporate system. While the present study has limitations, most notably in 
the fact that only those willing to be interviewed took part, the results strongly point 
to a common view along the lines stated above and a need for action that is 
increasingly urgent. 
Chapter 7 will present the results of the questionnaire survey that was conducted in 
Uganda. The questionnaire survey covered some of the important issues that were 
raised in the literature review (Chapter 2) and in the interviews (Chapter 
6). 
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Chapter 7 
Questionnaire Survey - Uganda 
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Chapter 7 
Questionnaire Survey - Uganda 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presented the results of the interviews conducted in Uganda as part of the 
research for this thesis. The present chapter outlines and discusses the results of the 
questionnaire survey carried out in the same country during the months of April, May 
and June 2005. 
The questionnaire survey was administered to a cross-section of legislators, 
regulators, company employees, civil servants, academics, accountants, company 
executives, owner-managers of companies, individual investors, institutional 
investors, non-executive directors, executive directors and individuals working in the 
legal profession. In all, 3 82 questionnaires were distributed, out of which I S? were 
returned during that period; the response rate of 41.4% is high in comparison with 
other recent surveys that examine the views of a range of stakeholders (Burton et al., 
2003; Helliar et al., 2001). 
The questionnaire survey comprised 21 questions, most of which were divided into 
sub-questions. 146 The first question asked respondents to select the primary category 
to which they belonged; these categories are indicated in Table 7.1. 
146 Appendix 7.2 contains a copy of the questionnaire and Appendix 7.1 provides a copy of the 
accompanying letter. 
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Questions 2 to 14 employed a Likert Scale in which respondents were asked to note 
the extent of their agreement with each statement on a scale of I to 5 by ticking the 
appropriate box, where aI indicated strong disagreement and a5 strong agreement. 
147 
Table 7.1 Categories of Respondents for the Questionnaire 
Category Name No. 
% 
Resp. 
Category 
Name No. 
% 
Resp. 
I Legislators 7 23.3 8 Owner-managers 3 60.0 
2 Regulators 6 100.0 9 Individual Investors 9 22.5 
3 Company Employees 36 72.0 10 Institutional Investors 0 0.0 
4 Civil Servants 16 32.0 11 Non-Executive Directors 4 57.1 
5 Academics 21 60. 12 Executive Directors 7 14.0 
6 Accountants 16 80.0 13 Judiciary or Legal 4 40.0 
7 1 Company Executives 25 39.1 14 1 Other 14 40.0 
Note: This table shows the number of respondents and percentage response from each group of 
stakeholders. 
The effect of ownership structure on the practice of corporate governance in Uganda 
was examined in Q15 where respondents were asked to select either "Yes", "No", or 
"I do not know". Question 19 asked respondents who worked in companies to indicate 
the accounting standards their firms employed and whether their companies had 
annual audits. This information was summarised and interpreted as part of the analysis 
of the questionnaire survey. 
Respondents were asked in Q20 to list any other factors that could affect the practice 
of corporate governance in Uganda. Out of a total of 158 respondents, 103 (or 65.2%) 
suggested some other factors which they felt to be important, while 70 respondents 
(44.3 %) gave additional comments in Q21 which asked for any other views about 
148 
Ugandan corporate governance prac ices. 
147 The respondents were asked not to tick any box if they did not know the answer to a specific 
question. 
148 The factors and comments that were presented by the respondents have been incorporated 
in the 
analysis for questions I to 14. 
206 
For the purposes of analysis, the categories of respondents were divided into the 
following five groups: 149 (i) 'TRP, consisting of the legislators, regulators and 
members of the judiciary (17 responses); (ii) "CIO", made up of civil servants. 
individual investors, and others (29); (iii) "CEA", comprising company employees 150 
and accountants (52); (iv) "EDO", composed of company executives, executi%, e 
directors, non-executive directors and owner-managers (39); and (v) ACAD, which 
represents academics (21). The purpose of the groupings was to facilitate analysis 
between different classes of respondents by having fewer groups. Legislators, 
regulators and the judiciary were assumed to have similar characteristics; civil 
servants were also assumed to share similar characteristics with individual investors 
and others because most of these investors were employees not employed by 
commercial entities. Company employees were grouped together with accountants 
because the accountants who participated in the questionnaire survey were mainly 
internal and could therefore logically be considered to be company employees; only 
one of the accountants was an external auditor. 151 Company executives, executive 
directors and non-executive directors were thought to be similar because they are all 
involved in managing and/or controlling companies. The academics were perceived to 
be unique and were left in their own group. 
149Respondents with similar professions or positions were identified as belonging to the same category. 
Categories that were perceived to be similar or expected to have similar views were combined together 
into what is referred to as groups in the thesis. The assumption was that these groups were composed of 
people in similar positions and, therefore, similar views. 
150 The employees in this category were mid-level management; senior level employees were classified 
as company executives. 
15 1 Attempts were made to contact external accountants (including PriceWaterhouseCoopers) but none 
of the major accounting firms responded to the questionnaire. Only one of the smaller accounting firms 
responded to the questionnaire survey. 
207 
The Anderson-Darling Test was used to establish whether the data obtained from the 
questionnaire survey was normally distributed before deciding on the analytical 
methods to be employed in examining the views of stakeholders in Uganda. The null 
hypothesis assumed by the test was that the data being tested was normally 
distributed. The p-values obtained from the test indicated that the probability of the 
associated A-Squared values were all zero to three decimal Places. The test therefore 
established that, for each question in the survey, normality could be rejected at the 5% 
level (Appendix 7.4). It was, therefore, decided to use non-parametric methods of 
analysis consisting of. (i) the Chi-squared test; (ii) Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test; and (iii) 
the Mann-Whitney (MW) test. The chapter also employs parametric analysis where 
appropriate however; for example, mean responses to each question were thought to 
be more informative than medians in the context of a5 point Likert scale, and so the 
former are reported and their significance examined in a one-sample Mest. However, 
analysis of the medians yielded very similar findings in terms of the pattern of 
significance. The chi-squared test was conducted to examine differences in relative 
numbers of respondents agreeing or disagreeing (irrespective of the strength of their 
views) with each question; responses of "4" and "5" were classed as agreeing, while 
responses of "I" or "2" were classed as disagreeing. 152 The KW test was used to 
establish whether there were differences in average response across the five different 
groups in their answers to each question. This test does not reveal where the 
differences lie; to establish this, the MW test was used to verify which pairs of group 
averages were significantly different. 
152 The questions asked in each section of the questionnaire, together with the results of the One 
Sample T-Test, Chi-square test, group averages, KW and MW tests have been presented in each table 
within the Chapter. The results of all the other statistical tests have been included in the Appendices, as 
follows: (i) frequencies (shown in Appendix 7.3); (ii) Anderson- darling normality test results 
(Appendix 7.4); and (iii) means for each of the 14 different categories of stakeholders shown in Table 
7.1 (Appendix 7-5). An asterix (*) after a number in the tables indicates that the p-value is statistically 
significant at the 5% level of confidence. 
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The actual write-up of the survey findings does not follow the numerical order of the 
questions. Instead, questions were grouped together according to themes so as to 
present a more coherent view of the perceptions of the respondents. 
7.2 Views Regarding the Concept of Corporate Governance 
Question 2 of the survey sought to establish general perceptions regarding the concept 
of "corporate governance". The alternatives given in the question described corporate 
governance in terms of either the principal/agent model (which limits corporate 
governance to management's relationship with the owners of the company), or the 
stakeholder view (which extends the concept to management's relationship with a 
wider range of parties). Panel A of Table 7.2 shows the overall means, t-test and chi- 
squared test for each of the statements in questions 2(a) to 20), while Panel B of the 
same Table presents the group means and MW test results. 
7.2.1 Principal/Agent vs. Stakeholder View 
Questions 2(a) to 2(c) examined the extent to which respondents viewed corporate 
governance from a principal/agent and stakeholder standpoint. In Q2(a), the mean and 
the actual numbers of respondents showed that there was more disagreement with the 
principal/agent view since the overall mean was 2.72 and 58 out of 101 disagreed with 
the statement. A t-test (Panel A of Table 7.2) indicated that the mean was significantly 
different from the neutral response of 3 (p-value: 0.014), but the Chi-square test 
suggested that the relative numbers agreeing and disagreeing were not significantly 
different (p-value = 0.135). This seems to suggest that although the t-test rejected the 
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principal/agent model, the chi-square test indicated that there is still room for 
discussion as to which model to follow. 
The statement which received most support was that which described corporate 
governance in terms of an organisation's relationship with all those stakeholders who 
are affected by, or who affect, the organisation's decisions and activities (Q 2b). This 
statement received an overall mean response of 4.29 and was supported by more than 
93% of the respondents. As the relevant P-values of the t-test and chi-square test in 
Panel A of Table 7.2 illustrate, both the mean and proportion of responses were 
significantly different from their neutral values, demonstrating the respondents' clear 
support for the stakeholder view of corporate governance. 
The statement in Q2(c), which suggested that corporate governance could be extended 
to all society irrespective of whether the individuals concerned affected or were 
affected by the operations of the organisation, was supported with an overall mean of 
3.43. Although the support for this view was not as strong as the one in Q2(b) - which 
limited corporate governance to an organisation's relationship with stakeholders who 
were affected by, or who affected the organisation's decisions and activities - the 
level of support was greater than for limiting corporate governance to the 
principal/agency model. The number of responses supporting the statement in 
question 2(c) was 76, while 43 disagreed. As with Q2(b), the mean and response 
proportions suggested significant support for the statement. 
The MW test (Panel B of Table 7.2) indicates that there were some differences 
between groups in tenns of responses to Q2(a) and Q2(c). In particular, the MW test 
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results for Q2(a) indicate that the LRJ group provided significantly stronger support 
for the principal/agent theory of corporate governance than did the CIO group, with a 
p-value of 0.05 resulting. This evidence might reflect the possibility that legislators 
and regulators are more concerned about legal defmitions while civil servants, 
individual investors and others are focussed more on practical relationships with a 
wider range of stakeholders. 153 
In question 2(c), the average response for the LRJ group was significantly lower than 
all the other groups, since it was the only group that expressed disagreement. 154 This 
evidence is consistent with a desire to only hold companies accountable for policies 
and activities that affect other parties or that are in violation of a specific law or 
regulation. In practical terms it might be difficult for regulators, legislators and the 
judiciary to take action against a company when there is no demonstrable evidence of 
the effect of a company's policies or actions on all society. The individuals who affect 
or are affected by a company would therefore be the only ones with grounds to hold a 
company answerable for their activities. 
153 Inspection of Appendix 7.5 indicates that, although the mean for the LRJ group was 3.19, the mean 
for the judiciary (category 13) was 2.75; notwithstanding the small numbers involved, the analysis on 
the stakeholder groups suggests that the judiciary view corporate governance as extending beyond the 
relationship between a company and its owners. Responses to Q2(b) indicate that the judiciary prefer 
companies to extend their relationship to all those stakeholders who are affected by, or who affect, the 
organisation's decisions and activities (mean: 4.75). It is interesting to note that the judiciary reject the 
notion of corporate governance referring to an organisation's relationship with all members of society, 
irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the operations of the organization as suggested in 
Q2(c) (mean: 2.50). These views seem to be consistent with the judiciary's role as protecting the rights 
of individuals in their interaction with each other and not holding one responsible for actions for which 
one is not responsible. The judiciary, therefore, seem to be more analytical when looking at the 
substance of the interactions between companies and other parties. 
154 However, the means of individual categories indicated that the sub-group of regulators in the LRJ 
group was non-committal with a mean of 3.00 while categories 8 (owner-managers) and II (non- 
executive directors) in the EDO group had means of less than 3. It is not surprising that owner- 
managers did not want to be tied down to a relationship with all members of society; however, it is 
interesting to note that the non-executive directors had similar views to the legislators and the judiciarý 
- possibly they were relatively cautious and 
did not want companies to be bound by relationships with 
the whole of society. 
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An evaluation of the answers to the three questions relating to the concept of 
corporate governance indicates that the strongest support was for the perception of the 
term referring to an organisation's relationship with all those who are affected by, or 
who affect, an organisation's decisions and activities. This lends support to a 
stakeholder view of corporate governance and suggests that organisations need to 
identify their stakeholders and take them into account as part of their practice of 
corporate govemance. 
7.2.2 Relevance of Corporate Governance 
Questions 2(d), 2(e), 2(g), 2(h) and 2(i) examined the relevance of corporate 
governance in Uganda. Panel A of Table 7.2 details the specific statements to which 
respondents were asked to state the extent of their agreement; the Panel also indicates 
the means, and t-test and chi-square test results relating to accountability, corruption, 
foreign investment, local investment and the economy. 
The p-values for the t-test (shown in Panel A of Table 7.2) indicate strong 
concurrence with each statement, with the means all proving to be significantly 
different from 3. The overall means for each question also suggest that corporate 
governance is seen as relevant in Uganda in terms of improving the accountability of 
Ugandan firms, helping to reduce the level of corruption, and attracting both local and 
foreign investment. 155 
"' Out of the respondents who answered the question, 128 supported the statement that corporate 
governance was important for the Ugandan economy and only 3 opposed it; the mean was 
4.55. 
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Although these responses seem to indicate general support for the statements, there 
were some noticeable differences among the groups as indicated by the means of the 
different groups (Panel B of Table 7-2) and confirmed by the KW test (Appendix 7-5). 
Inspection of the MW test p-values reveals that there were significant differences 
between groups in questions 2(e) dealing with corruption, and 2(h) regarding the 
attraction of local investment to Uganda; in particular, the CIO group was the least 
optimistic in agreeing with the statements that corporate governance would help to 
reduce the level of corruption in Uganda (mean = 3.46) and in attracting local 
investment in the country (3.17). This finding is consistent with the notion that 
corruption is endemic in the Ugandan public sector where the civil servants work, and 
that a need exists to address this issue and improve governance in public sector 
corporations. The EDO group (mean = 4.68) lent the highest support for the statement 
in question 2(g) which suggested that good corporate governance was important in 
attracting foreign investment in Uganda; such investors might logically be interested 
in the strategic planning, profitability and growth potential of the company, which 
would be among the main governance issues handled by the Board. The differences in 
the responses of the EDO group (mean = 4.36) and both the CIO (4.05) and CEA 
(3.98) groups were statistically significant. This finding might indicate that the EDO 
group appreciate the problems of raising investment for companies since they are the 
ones more likely to be involved in raising capital for the company than, for instance, 
company employees in the CEA goup. 
7.2.3 The Applicability of Corporate Governance Principles 
Question 2(f) asked respondents to state the extent of their agreement with the view 
that all companies, whether listed or otherwise, should be governed by the same 
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principles of good governance. Most of the respondents - 83% - who answered the 
question agreed; this is arguably surprising because countries such as the UK make 
special provisions for small- and medium-sized companies, and these are often 
exempted from certain requirements of the codes of corporate governance. It is 
possible that the respondents were unaware of all the requirements of the principles of 
corporate governance as expressed in various codes. The argument given by some 
individuals who were interviewed in October 2004 was that certain principles of 
governance were universal in nature and should be applied to all companies, 
irrespective of size (see Chapter 6). However, some respondents were of the view that 
the extent of disclosure requirements would differ according to the size and ownership 
structure of the company. 156 
Respondents were asked in Question 20) to state whether corporate social 
responsibility was an integral aspect of good corporate governance and 86% of those 
who answered the question agreed that it was. 157 All the groups seemed to be in 
agreement as neither the KW nor the MW tests identified any differences in answers 
between goups. 
156 It is worth noting that all the regulators (category 2) and owner-managers (category 
8) supported 
this statement with an average of 5.00 for each category (Appendix 7.5). 
157 An examination of the means of the different categories revealed that the 
highest support for the 
statement came from legislators and non-executive directors with an average of 
5.00 each, followed by 
the accountants (mean of 4.73), and owner-managers and others who each 
had a mean of 4.67. 
Surprisingly, it was the judiciary and the executive directors who gave the least support, albeit with an 
average of 4.00. 
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7.2.4 The State and Importance of Corporate Governance in 
Uganda 
A frequent comment in response to the open questions (20 and 21) was that board 
members, company directors, employees and other stakeholders had little knowledge 
I'll aDOUt the main concepts underlying the notion of corporate governance. The ICGU 
has been carrying out sensitisation seminars lasting for three days, but these seminars 
have been aimed at senior officers and board members working in public sector 
corporations; these three-day seminars are arguably unlikely to make board members 
knowledgeable in all aspects of corporate governance; moreover, they involve only a 
small fraction of all the board members in Ugandan firms. The need to have induction 
sessions on appointment and continued training programmes for board members was 
expressed by many of the respondents as a way of disseminating the principles and 
improving on the practice of corporate governance; it appears clear that this 
suggestion needs urgent attention by Ugandan companies. 
Some of the respondents suggested that regulatory authorities and each company 
should draw up clear rules that would form a code of conduct for employees, 
management and board members, and that these rules might enhance good corporate 
governance as part of the culture of the organisation. This evidence suggests that 
managers and boards of Ugandan businesses need further convincing about the need 
to encourage good corporate governance practices (and the disadvantages of bad 
governance) for individual companies, stakeholders and society as a whole. ' 58 
Some of the respondents mentioned members of various professions, such as accountants and 
lawyers, as having an important role in business operations. These professionals, together with 
regulators and the Government itself, were called upon to be committed and play an important part in 
disseminating and encouraging the practice of good governance in companies. 
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As reported in Chapter 6, the interviewees argued that corporate governance was 
important for the economic and social development of Uganda, and for creating 
wealth for shareholders. These individuals further suggested that such aims could be 
achieved if boards managed resources in a more transparent manner, promoting 
accountability, managing risk, attracting both local and foreign investment and 
protecting the interests of all shareholders. One of the stakeholder interviewees 
supported the above view by making the following comment in Q21 of the 
questionnaire: 
If Uganda is to attract quality international investments, then it has to 
embrace good corporate governance and ensure that we have a transparent 
business environment in which to operate. Corporate governance is, 
therefore, important for our growth and development. 
7.3 International Corporate Governance Guidelines 
Question 3 dealt with issues relating to international corporate governance guidelines. 
Q3(a) asked respondents to express their views about the relevance of guidelines 
developed by the Western World to Uganda, while Q3(b) asked whether such 
international norms could be adopted by developing countries, such as Uganda, 
without the need to adapt them to individual home-country circumstances. The results 
in each case are shown in Table 7.3 below. 
There was significant support for the notion that international guidelines have 
relevance in a Ugandan context (mean = 3.38). The LRJ group had the highest mean 
of 3.82 for Q3(a); the academics were the only group whose mean was below 3.159 
159 An inspection of responses across the 14 stakeholder categories (Appendix 7.5) revealed that the 
judiciary had the highest mean in support of this statement (4.25). This might be due to the fact that the 
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The MW test (shown in Panel B of Table 7.3) revealed that there were significant 
differences in responses between the LRJ group and the CIO, although both groups 
expressed significantly higher support than did the ACAD group. The academics 
disagreed (mean = 2.7) with the relevance of the international corporate governance 
guidelines; this result is surprising since academics generally acknowledge the 
opinions of other thinkers in their pursuit of knowledge, irrespective of the country of 
origin of those other thinkers. It is possible that the academics resented the idea of 
having guidelines being imposed on Ugandans from outside. 
Similarly, for Q3(b) the group means ranged between 2.15 (ACAD) and 3.14 (EDO). 
However, although the number of respondents who disagreed with the statement that 
international guidelines could be adopted by developing countries (including Uganda) 
without the need to adapt them to the individual circumstances of those countries was 
more than those who agreed and the overall mean for all respondents was 2.84, the 
chi-squared test results in Panel A of Table 7.3 indicated that the difference between 
those who disagreed and those who agreed was not statistically significant (P-value of 
0.348). There was, therefore, no conclusive evidence to suggest that the respondents 
either agreed or disagreed with the statement in question 3(b). The OECD Principles 
(2004) suggested that their guidelines should be adapted to the circumstances of 
individual countries. 160 The MW test indicated a significantly lower average response 
judiciary sometimes use judgements rendered in similar cases (irrespective of the country in which the 
judgement was given) as precedents. The regulators were next in support of the statement (mean = 
4.17), followed by non-executive directors. These two categories of stakeholders would, presumably, 
be quite familiar with what is involved in running companies and would appreciate the guidance given 
by international guidelines. Academics (2.70) and others (2.50), who expressed the least agreement 
with the relevance of international guidelines, are not directly involved in the management or 
regulation of companies and might therefore be responding from a theoretical point of view. 
160 The OECD Principles (2004) suggested that their guidelines should be adapted to the circumstances 
of individual countries. Those who disagreed most with the adoption of international guidelines without 
the need to adapt them to the circumstances of individual countries were the judiciary, the non- 
executive directors and the academics with means of 1.75,2.00 and 2.15 respectively (Appendix 7.5); 
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from the ACAD group than the EDO, CIO, and CEA groups. It is arguably surprising 
that the EDO group would agree with the adoption of international guidelines without 
the need to adapt them to individual country circumstances. 
Several comments were made by respondents to Q20 and Q21 in which the current 
trend towards globalisation and its impact on the practice of corporate governance all 
over the world was acknowledged. For example, one respondent commented that: 
The world is becoming a global village and multinational investors 
influence the practice of corporate governance in developing countries, 
including Uganda. Globalisation can help to improve corporate 
governance in Uganda as Uganda needs to rise up to global expectations if 
it is to remain a player in the global economic market. 
While some respondents commented that the concepts of corporate governance were 
new in African countries, others argued that these concepts were already part of the 
African culture. One respondent commented as follows: 
Although corporate governance is often seen as a Western concept, it is an 
old phenomenon in Africa. Traditionally, Africans cared about one 
another, had a sense of responsibility, understanding and vision; there was 
also a sense of shame if someone acted in a manner that was not consistent 
with the accepted norms of society. Whatever an African did was 
considered to have an impact on the community and appropriate sanctions 
would be taken against those whose behaviour was believed not to be in 
the interests of the community. 161 
this might be because these groups looked at the principles and the local situation more critically than 
the others. 
161 It is possible that the community-based values referred to by the respondent have been eroded as 
Ugandan culture has interacted with (and been affected by) interactions with other traditions and with 
the rise of a new breed of leaders and executives who do not owe allegiance to cultural values. In 
addition, the whole structure of society has changed and members of society are not subject to 
sanctions imposed by cultural structures and values based on the good of the community. 
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7.4 Disclosure and Transparency 
Several authors, such as Berglof and Pajuste (2005), Solomon and Solomon (2005), 
Brenkert (2004), Monks and Minow (200 1) and Abayo et al. (1993) have stressed the 
importance of disclosure and transparency in the proper governance of firms. 162 In 
question 4, respondents were asked to state the extent of their agreement with a range 
of views relating to disclosure and transparency; the results are shown in Table 7.4. 
The results of the t-test (Panel B of Table 7.4) indicate that respondents agreed that 
the following disclosures should be made to stakeholders: (a) the financial and 
operating results of the company (mean = 4.68); (b) the company's objectives (4.72); 
(c) major share ownership and voting rights (4.40); (d) the remuneration policy for the 
members of the board and key executives (4.20); (e) information about board 
members (4.43); (f) related party transactions (4.0 1); (g) foreseeable risk factors 
(4.12); (h) governance structures and policies (4.46); (i) material interest in any 
transaction or matter directly affecting the Corporation (4.16); and 0) the impact of 
the organisation's activities on society and the envirom-nent (4.37). 163 These views are 
consistent with the UK's revised Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003) 
and other Western models of corporate governance; internal accountability and 
corporate relations with other stakeholders would both be enhanced if these disclosure 
and transparency measures were observed. 
16' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 dedicated a whole Section (Title IV) to financial disclosure, while 
the Combined Code devoted Schedule C to disclosure of corporate governance arrangements. The UK 
Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 require quoted companies to prepare and allow a 
vote on a directors' remuneration report containing specific information as outlined by the regulations. 
163 Unexpectedly, it was category 3 (composed of company employees) that offered the least support 
for disclosure of related party transactions with a mean of 3.56 while the highest support came from 
individual investors (category 9) and non-executive directors who each had a mean of 5.00 (Appendix 
7.6). This would suggest that employees could have had an interest in related party transactions and 
wanted to protect their position. 
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The answers to Q4(i), which dealt with disclosure of material interest in any 
transaction or matter directly affecting the Corporation, were consistent with the 
answers in Q4(f) which covered disclosure of related party transactions; the lowest 
means were from academics (3.90) while the highest support came from the LRJ 
group (4.53). This evidence is not surprising since legislators, regulators and the 
judiciary would be interested in firms disclosing certain information that is required 
for their continued registration as companies and listing on stock markets. Academics 
might not appreciate the requirements for such disclosure if they are less aware of 
regulatory requirements and the likely effect of directors having a material interest in 
company transactions (or of a company having related party transactions). 
It was, however, noted by a number of respondents in Q20 and Q21 that some 
companies were not run in a transparent manner and that such companies had poor 
disclosure practices. ' 64 It was also claimed that some Ugandan companies, including 
public sector corporations, did not disclose financial information to their employees 
and that access to this information was limited to a select few executives. Some 
respondents even argued that the Government itself had not adhered to high standards 
of transparency in the process of privatising former state owned corporations. In the 
light of these comments, it appears that levels of disclosure and transparency 
in 
Uganda need to be urgently looked into with a view to their enhancement. 
164 They cited examples of some foreign owned companies which kept two sets of 
books: one set would 
be in English and would be used for official purposes; the other set would be in a 
foreign language 
which the Ugandan executives and company employees 
did not understand - this set of books which 
was kept by the foreign nationals themselves would 
be the set of accounts reflecting the actual 
transactions as opposed to the "cooked" financial statements in the official accounts. 
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7.5 The Board of Directors 
7.5.1 Composition of the Board 
Various issues dealing with the composition of the Board were covered in Q8. Panel 
A of Table 7.5 presents the specific questions used and a summary of the responses 
received. It can be seen from the panel that an overwhelming majority of respondents 
agreed with all three related statements. The perception of the respondents was that: 
(a) the majority of the members of the board should be independent non-executive 
directors; (b) the Chain-nan of the Board should be an independent non-executive 
director; and (c) the Chief Executive should not at the same time be the Chairman of 
the Board. These views are consistent with the revised Combined Code (2003) in the 
UK. 
There were no significant differences in means between the five groups of 
respondents for Q8(a). However, the MW test indicated that for Q8(b), there were 
significant differences in the answers given by the EDO (with the strongest level of 
support) and both the ACAD and the CEA groups. The EDO and LRJ groups 
provided the strongest level of support for the view that the Chainnan of the board 
should be an independent non-executive director, while the ACAD and CEA groups 
expressed the least agreement. Similarly, for Q8(c) the EDO (mean = 4.82) and LRJ 
(4.82) groups agreed most with the suggestion that the Chief Executive should not 
simultaneously be the Chairman of the board, while the CIO (4.26) and CEA (4.46) 
agreed with it least. The responses to Q8(b) and 8(c) may well reflect the fact that the 
EDO group is the one faced with the challenges of dealing with the Chairman and the 
CEO of companies, and are therefore aware of the possible problems that can arise as 
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a result of combining the two roles. The LRJ appeared to be more sensitive to the 
consequences of having a Chairman who is not independent and of combining the 
roles of Chairman and Chief Executive. In contrast, the ACAD, CIO and CEA groups 
do not, generally, deal with board matters. 
Several factors were mentioned in responses to the open questions, Q20 and Q21, 
relating to desired board composition characteristics; among these was the scarcity of 
candidates who were sufficiently knowledgeable in matters of corporate governance 
to be appointed as directors. The perception of respondents was that some board 
members lacked the skills, knowledge and technical competence required of them in 
controlling management, setting the direction of the company, and being accountable 
and responsible to the relevant stakeholders. It was, therefore, questioned whether - 
under existing circumstances - Ugandan firms could get sufficient numbers of 
appropriately qualified and competent individuals to act as independent non-executive 
directors. 165 Some respondents were of the view that the selection process of board 
members was not transparent and lacked the participation of shareholders. 
166 In 
addition, respondents felt that merit, rather than political or other sectarian 
considerations, should be used as a basis for appointing directors and senior company 
executives. 
165 Other respondents, however, felt that the selection of board members was currently made 
from a 
few individuals who were on several boards at the same time; it was thought that a wider selection of 
possible candidates could be found with a proper nationwide search (Le not just in 
Kampala, the 
Capital City of Uganda). 
166 The Manual on Corporate Governance in Uganda (200 1) states that the nomination committee is one 
of the most relevant committees of the board (par. 2.7). 
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There appears to be a need for Ugandan authorities to examine the processes and 
criteria used for selecting board members, to ensure that technical competence, 
experience, qualifications, personal skills, and stakeholder interests are taken into 
account; it would also be useful if, once appointed, members are given a formal 
induction programme to familiarise them with the workings of the company and 
provide them the necessary background information to make decisions for, and about, 
the company. Subsequent training of new board members should also be seen as a 
priority to enable them to continue improving their knowledge of the principles of 
corporate governance and the various aspects of their role in governing the company. 
Currently there seems to be very little training (if any) of private sector board 
members. 
7.5.2 The Responsibilities of the Board 
Respondents were asked to express the extent of their agreement with statements 
presented in Q9 relating to the responsibilities of Boards (Panel A of Table 7.5). As 
can be seen, the respondents agreed that Boards had all twelve of the responsibilities 
mentioned. These perceptions of stakeholders in Uganda are consistent with the 
recommendations contained in the revised Combined Code (2003) of the UK and of 
the Revised OECD Principles (2004) of corporate governance. It is therefore evident 
that the principles regarding the responsibilities of the board in Uganda are similar to 
those contained in international principles of corporate governance. The problem 
seems to be in the implementation of those principles. 
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The MW test revealed significant differences in the averages of various pairs of 
groups for questions 9(g), 9(h), 9(i), 90), 9(k) and 9(l). For 9(g). The CEA group 
expressed the lowest agreement amongst the respondents for the statement that all 
boards should always treat all shareholders fairly, particularly when board decisions 
may affect different shareholder groups differently. However, the extent of agreement 
was very high for all groups. Similarly for 9(h), the MW test identified significantly 
lower support from the CEA than the EDO group. Once again, the high level of 
agreement with the statement that all boards should take into account the interests of 
other stakeholders when making decisions came from the EDO group, while the CEA 
group had the lowest mean. As with Q9(g), all the group means were high and the 
KW test did not identify overall inter-group variation in average responses. The KW 
test indicated that there were, however, significant differences in responses to Q9(i). 
The MW test identified significantly lower support from the CEA and both the EDO 
and ACAD groups. The mean of the CEA group was the lowest while the ACAD and 
EDO groups displayed the highest extent of agreement with the statement which 
suggested that all boards should monitor the effectiveness of their company's 
governance practices and make changes as needed. For Q90), significant differences 
in means were identified between the CEA (mean = 4.35) and both the EDO (4.76) 
and ACAD (4.67) groups. The EDO group agreed most with the statement in question 
(that all boards should align key executive and board remuneration with the longer- 
term interests of the company and its shareholders). Consistent with the earlier 
responses, the EDO group (mean = 4.79) expressed the highest extent of agreement 
with the statement in Q9(k) which suggested that all boards should be responsible 
for 
selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing 
key executives 
and overseeing succession planning; the CEA group (4.21) had the 
lowest mean for 
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this question. Similarly, significant differences were also identified in Q9(l) between 
the CEA and the EDO groups and between the CIO and both the EDO and ACAD 
groups. The EDO group expressed the highest extent of agreement with several of the 
statements in Q9 relating to responsibilities. This evidence suggests that the 
respondents who were company executives, executive directors, non-executive 
directors or owner-managers viewed the responsibilities of the board in wide terms, 
probably reflecting their senior positions in the company. The company employees, 
who were the majority in the CEA group, seemed to be less familiar with the 
responsibilities of the board, possibly because they were not closely involved with the 
workings of boards. However, all groups exhibited an underlying knowledge of the 
responsibilities of boards since all group means for each part of Q9 were higher than 
4.00. 
The respondents also made various comments in Q20 and Q21 regarding the 
responsibilities of the board. Most of the issues raised related to certain shortfalls 
which were perceived as needing attention to enable board members to improve their 
responsibilities. Training (in-service and external) and refresher courses for both 
management and board members were stressed as being crucial for board members to 
know, understand and put into practice the principles of proper corporate governance. 
The attitude of both management and board members towards issues of corporate 
governance was also thought to need attention. 
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Table 7.6 The Responsibilities of the Board 
Panel A: One Sample T-Test and Chi-square Test 
One ample T-Test Chi-square Test 
Statement p- Chi- 
Mean T Stat value Disagree Agee Square P-Value 
Q9(a) All Board members in Uganda should 
be provided with sufficient information about 
the company to enable them make informed 4.88 58.74 0.000* 0 149 149.00 0.000* 
decisions. 
Q9(b) All Board members should be 
provided with equal, accurate, timely and 
cost efficient access to relevant information 4.75 36.16 0.000* 2 147 141.11 00000* 
about the company. 
Q9(c) All Board members should act in good 
faith, with due diligence and care, and in the 
best interests of the company and its 4.81 49.19 0.000* 0 149 149.00 0-000* 
shareholders. 
Q9(d) All Board members should play an 
important role in ensuring the integrity of the 
corporation's accounting and financial 4.68 33.26 0.000* 1 144 141.03 0.000* 
reporting systems. 
Q9(e) Non-executive board members should 
play an important role in ensuring that the 
board exercises objective independent 4.47 21.25 0.000* 6 133 116.04 0.000* 
Judgement on corporate affairs. 
Q9(f) The nomination and election process of 
board members should be formal and 4.70 33.18 0.000* 1 140 137.03 0.000* 
transparent. 
Q9(g) All Boards should always treat all 
shareholders fairly, particularly when board 
decisions may affect different shareholder 4.71 37.44 0.000* 2 147 141.11 0.000* 
groups differently. 
Q9(h) All Boards should take into account 
the interests of other stakeholders when 4.56 21.98 0.000* 6 134 117.03 0.000* 
making decisions. 
Q9(i) All Boards should monitor the 
effectiveness of their company's Governance 4.52 21.79 0.000* 5 131 116.74 0-000* 
practices and make changes as needed. 
Q90) All Boards should align key executive 
and board remuneration (incentives) with the 
longer-term interests of the company and its 4.50 23.02 0.000* 4 133 121.47 0.000* 
shareholders. 
Q9(k) All Boards should be responsible for 
selecting, compensating, monitoring and, 
when necessary, replacing key executives 4.43 19.03 0.000* 6 
130 113.06 0.000* 
and overseeing succession planning. 
Q9(l) All Boards should monitor and manage 
potential conflicts of interest of management, 
board members and shareholders, including 
the misuse of corporate assets and abuse in 4.52 21.73 0.000* 
7 138 118.35 0-000* 
related I)arty transactions. - 
I 
- 
I I 
NOTE: Panel A of Table 7.6 shows the questions, together with the statistical results for the 
One 
Sample T-Test and Chi-square test for questions 9(a) to 9(l). 
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Some board members were perceived by respondents as putting personal interests 
a 'k 
. nuove the interests of the companies on whose boards they served. One of the 
respondents observed that: 
Many directors still think that being appointed to the board is just a reward 
for something that he or she has done outside the company. So they come 
with the mentality of receiving and not of adding value. 167 
Some respondents argued that the level of remuneration was poor and did not provide 
commensurate reward for the efforts of directors in the performance of their duties 
and that this could also be an obstacle to good governance. Respondents also 
suggested that boards should come up with mechanisms and policies that provide 
proper incentives for management to commit to standards of good governance and 
increase the value of the corporations on behalf of the stakeholders. Some respondents 
emphasised that the procedures for appointing Chief Executives should be clear, fair 
and transparent, just as there should be a clear definition of roles within corporations 
so as to avoid role conflicts and undue interference. The personal traits of 
management - and the CEO in particular - were seen as being a major factor in the 
governance of corporations; it was thought that these traits should be taken into 
account when considering candidates for appointment to those positions. Interference 
by owners or non-executive board members in the day-to-day management of 
corporations was seen as a possible setback for good corporate governance; the 
respondents suggested that the roles of management, the board and the owners should 
be clearly laid out and ownership should be separated from management. 
167 This comment was made in view of appointments that are made based upon political considerations; 
there are Government appointees on the boards of most of the privatised corporations in Uganda. 
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7.5.3 Board Committees 
QIO sought stakeholder perceptions on what committees the boards should have. 
Inspection of Panels A and B of Table 7.7 reveals that there was strong agreement 
among respondents that companies should have: an Audit Committee, a Remuneration 
Committee, a Nomination Committee, a Governance Committee and a Risk 
Committee. 1 68 However, a number of respondents pointed out that some of these 
committees could be combined instead of having each committee as a separate 
entity. ' 
69 
The MW test results revealed some differences in responses to QI O(d) and QI O(e). 
For example, in QI O(d) the academics agreed most with the statement suggesting that 
boards should have Governance Committees to scrutinise all matters relating to 
corporate govemance, , -N-hile the LRJ group provided the least support. It seems that 
the LRJ group took the view that govemance issues were a matter for the board as a 
whole, academics might be used to having review committees to deal , N-ith different 
issues, and this could have influenced their view that boards should establish 
govemance conunittees to scrutinise corporate govemance issues. While all the 
groups supported the setting up of risk committees, as suggested by Q1 O(e), the extent 
of agreement was significantly different between the CEA and both the EDO and 
ACAD groups. 
168 The Ugandan Manual on Corporate Governance (2001) recommends the nomination committee. 
remuneration committee, audit committee and governance committee as being among the most relevant 
committees that boards should have (par. 2.7). 
169 One of the respondents suggested that the Audit Committee could be combined with the Risk 
Committee. 
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The academics expressed the highest agreement with the statement suggesting that 
every company should have a Risk Committee to assess and monitor the risks that a 
company is faced with, especially financial risks (mean = 4.57) while the company 
employees and accountants supported it to a lesser extent with a group mean of 
170 3.98 . It is possible that company employees had a relatively low appreciation of the 
risks faced by a company and did not see the need for a special committee to assess 
and monitor such uncertainty; they may have been of the view that monitoring and 
assessing risks was a matter for the board as a whole, or that risk management could 
be delegated to a board committee with other duties, such as the audit committee. 171 
The major issue highlighted by the responses appears to be the difficulty of finding 
candidates who are qualified, experienced and competent enough to serve on these 
committees and to enlist the cooperation of all those concerned so that the work of the 
committee members can be facilitated. 
In Q20 and Q21, the respondents recommended Audit committees for all companies 
as a means of improving accountability. The strengthening of both internal and 
external audits for effectiveness, and making corporate governance report a 
mandatory part of a company's annual financial statements were also suggested. The 
integrity of the accounting profession was seen as a pre-requisite for audited 
170 However, the means of the sub-categories (shown in Appendix 7.5) indicate that owner-managers 
(category 8), followed by executive directors (category 12), with means of 5.00 and 4.71 respectively, 
agreed most strongly with the statement in QIO(e) while the least support came from legislators 
(category 1), others (category 14) and, perhaps surprisingly, accountants, with means of 3.57,3.75 and 
3.88 respectively. It must be noted, however, that all the categories supported the setting up of risk 
committees to assess and monitor the risks that companies face (especially financial risks). It 
is 
possible that the accountants were of the view that the risk committee could be combined with the audit 
committee. 
17 1 The King Report 11 (2002) recommended that: "A board committee, either a dedicated committee or 
one with other responsibilities, should be appointed to assist the board in reviewing the risk 
management process and the significant risks facing the company" (par. 3.1.6). 
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statements that could provide assurance to users of financial statements. Respondents 
expressed the view that boards should set up mechanisms for ensuring that the 
required reports were filed and that their integrity was monitored. 
7.5.4 Composition of Board Committees 
Q11 developed the line of enquiry begun in QIO by seeking respondents' views 
regarding the composition of board committees; the three statements are also shown 
in Table 7.7. The majority of respondents (105 out of 134) agreed with the view that 
Audit Committees should be composed of only non-executive directors who were 
independent of the company, with a mean of 3.91. There was also agreement with a 
statement which suggested that Remuneration Committees should only be composed 
of non-executive directors who were independent of the company (mean = 3.61). The 
respondents also felt that the majority of members on the Nomination Committee 
should be independent non-executive directors (3.87). The chi-squared test suggested 
that the difference between those who agreed and those who disagreed with the 
statements was statistically significant for each of the statements in QII (Panel A of 
Table 7.7). 
While there were no statistically significant differences in averages between different 
groups for questions II (a) and II (b), the MW test (Panel B of Table 7.7) indicated 
that there was a statistically significant difference between the answers given by the 
LRJ group and EDO group for QII (c). The fonner group (legislators, regulators and 
judiciary) expressed the least agreement with the view that the majority of the 
members on the Nomination Committee should be independent, non-executive 
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directors (mean = 3.35) while the company executives, directors and owner-managers 
offered the most support. The reverse might logically have been expected given the 
powers vested in the LRJ group. A closer inspection of the means of the individual 
categories (Appendix 7.5), however, revealed that the judiciary (sub-category 13) 
strongly affected the overall mean of this group since this category had a mean of 2.00 
while the regulators (sub-category 2) had a mean of 4.50 and the legislators a mean of 
3.14. It is possible that the judiciary were influenced by the fact that judges in Uganda 
are nominated by the members of the Judicial Service Commission; the latter are 
members of the legal profession and not necessarily independent. 
7.6 Factors Affecting Corporate Governance Practice 
This section of the questionnaire sought to establish stakeholders' views as to which 
factors most affected the practice of corporate governance in Uganda. The responses, 
summarised in Panel A of Table 7.8, indicated agreement with statements to the effect 
that corruption and bribery, conflicts of interest, sectarianism, non-compliance with 
laws and regulations, inadequate infrastructure (and resources) for regulatory and 
enforcement agencies, as well as insignificant fines that fail to encourage compliance 
with laws and regulations, affect both private sector and public sector corporations. 
Panel A of Table 7.8 indicates that the respondents to Q7(f) felt that incompetent 
personnel are more prevalent in public sector corporations (mean = 4.02) than in 
private ones (mean = 2.97). Fear and respect for the authority of elders was not 
perceived as affecting private sector corporations (mean = 2.69), and there was only 
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lukewarm support for it affecting public sector corporations (mean = 3.08). 173 Instead, 
it is the fear and respect for those in authority that seems to affect the governance of 
companies, as indicated by answers to question 7(l). This view suggests that 
employees in corporations, whether public or private, respect those in authority (even 
if these are younger than they are). This respect, however, is often coupled with a fear 
for those in authority. Other factors that affect the public sector include: political 
interference; lack of political will to combat corruption; lack of political will to 
enforce compliance; incompetent personnel; and fear and respect for those in 
authority. The results indicate that the public sector is affected far more by these 
factors than the private sector; this is clear in particular from the higher means and 
numbers of those agreeing with each of the statements in Panel A of Table 7.8. 
While the KW test only identified differences in responses for Q(k)(ii), the MW test 
results (shown in Panel B (i) and B (ii) of Table 7.8 for private and public sector 
corporations respectively) indicated that there were statistically significant differences 
in answers between the groups for questions 7(a)(i), 7(b)(i), 7(b)(ii), 7(d)(i), 7(h)(i), 
7(i)(i), 7(k)(i)ý 7(k)(ii) and 7(l)(i). These results indicate that academics expressed the 
highest agreement with the statement in Q7(a)(i) that corruption and bribery affected 
private sector corporations, while company employees and accountants (i. e. the CEA 
group) agreed with it to a lesser extent. It was arguably surprising that company 
employees expressed less agreement with this statement than the EDO group; this 
could be because employees are believed to be deeply steeped in corruption and 
bribery and did not want to point an accusing finger at themselves. However, all 
173 This result seems to contradict the views of the interviewees in Chapter 6 who felt that fear and 
respect for the authority of elders affects the governance of all corporations. 
241 
groups agreed that corruption and bribery affected both private and public sector 
corporations. 
The LRJ group displayed significantly greater support than the CIO, CEA and EDO 
groups for question 7(b)(i), which asked whether conflicts of interest affected the 
practice of corporate governance in private sector companies. While all the groups 
agreed that conflicts of interest had an impact in private sector corporations, the extent 
of agreement for the LRJ group was significantly higher than for other groups. This 
might be because legislators, regulators and the judiciary have to deal with cases 
involving conflicts of interests, and therefore are more aware of the effect of such 
conflicts of interests on the governance of corporations. There was also a significant 
difference between the EDO and the academics in their responses as to whether 
conflicts of interest affected public sector corporations, with the former group 
agreeing most strongly. 
174 
The EDO group (with a mean of 2.76) was the only group that did not agree with the 
view expressed in Q7(d)(i) stating that lack of political will to combat corruption 
affected private sector corporations. 175 The MW test identified significant differences 
in answers between the academics and both the EDO and CEA groups with the latter 
two groups supplying less support. On the whole, respondents who worke in private 
sector companies and the judiciary (who handled the cases of corruption in private 
174 Interestingly, the CIO and EDO groups who are actively involved in business expressed their 
agreement with the statement with mean responses of 4.65 and 4.77 respectively; within the 
former 
group, owner-managers (category 8) agreed with the statement with a mean of 5 
(see Appendix 7.5). 
17' An inspection of the means of individual categories (shown in Appendix 7.5) indicates that the 
judiciary (category 13) did not support the statement (mean = 2.25) while individual investors 
(category 9) remained neutral (mean of 3.00). With the exception of owner-managers 
(category 8) who 
had a mean of 4, all the other categories in the EDO group had means that were 
below 3. The judiciary 
(sub-category 13) in the LRJ group also disagreed with the statement (mean = 2.25). It is possible that 
while other groups pointed accusing fingers at Government (and politicians), the 
EDO group felt that 
they themselves were the ones primarily responsible for corruption in private sector companies. 
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sector companies) expressed less agreement with the statement than other 
respondents. 176 It should, however, be pointed out that the Chi-square test (shown in 
Panel A of Table 7.8) indicates that the difference in numbers agreeing and 
disagreeing with the statement is not significant (p-value of 0.190), although those 
who agreed were more numerous than those who disagreed (64 and 50 respectively). 
The one sample t-test also indicates that the mean for this question is not significantly 
different from the test value of 3 (p-value: 0.148). It cannot, therefore, be conclusively 
argued that the respondents agreed with the view that lack of political will to combat 
corruption affects private sector corporations. 
As Panel B of Table 7.8 shows, only the EDO group failed to agree with the statement 
in Q7(e)(i) that a lack of political will to enforce compliance affected private sector 
corporations. This result was surprising because it might have been expected that the 
legislators and regulators would have a more favourable impression of their role than 
the company executives and directors with respect to the political will needed to 
enforce compliance. 177 It appears reasonable to argue that the company executives and 
directors might rather blame themselves than the politicians for any lack of 
compliance with corporate governance guidelines, since the executives and directors 
are the ones who bear the responsibility for non-compliance in private companies. 
176 However, all the other categories, except the judiciary (i. e. legislators, regulators, company 
employees, civil servants, academics, accountants, owner-managers, individual investors and others) 
agreed with the view that lack of political will to combat corruption affected private sector corporations 
(see Appendix 7.5). 
177 The legislators (category 1) and regulators (category 2) agreed with the statement (with means of 
3.88 and 4.50 respectively) suggesting that a lack of political will to enforce compliance affected 
corporate governance in private sector corporations while company executives and directors disagreed 
with the statement, generating means of 2.46 and 2.67 respectively (see Appendix 7.5). 
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The group means shown in Panel B of Table 7.8 indicate that all the groups expressed 
strong agreement with the view that a lack of political will to enforce compliance 
affected public sector corporations (all means were above 4 for this statement). The 
MW test identified significantly stronger support from the EDO group and both the 
CIO and CEA groups. This evidence might reflect the EDO group being more 
conversant with governance issues in both private and public sector companies and, 
therefore, finding themselves in a better position to make an informed judgement. 
However, all the groups strongly agreed that the lack of political will to enforce 
compliance affected the practice of corporate governance in public sector 
corporations. 
There were also differences in means between groups in responses to Q7(h)(i) which 
suggested that non-compliance with laws and regulations affected the practice of 
corporate governance in private sector corporations. The ACAD (mean = 3.89) and 
EDO (3.89) groups expressed the strongest agreement with the statement, while the 
CEA group (3.35) agreed with it least. Once again, it appears reasonable to surmise 
that the EDO group's responses reflected a more informed position relative to the 
CEA group, members of which are not directly involved in enforcing compliance in 
178 
companies. 
Differences were also identified in responses to Q7(i)(ii) which stated that inadequate 
infrastructure and resources for regulatory and enforcement agencies affected the 
practice of corporate governance in public sector corporations. The MW test indicated 
significantly stronger support from the EDO group and both the CEA and LRJ groups. 
178 The ACAD group might be speculating on possible causes for the state of corporate governance in 
Uganda. 
247 
The EDO group had the highest mean while the CEA and LRJ had the lowest. In one 
respect this result is surprising because it might logically have been expected that the 
LRJ group would have the highest mean since its members are the ones most directly 
involved with regulation and enforcement. 179 The LRJ group (mean = 4.00) agreed 
most strongly with the statement in Q7(i)(i) which suggested that a lack of adequate 
infrastructure and resources for regulatory and enforcement agencies affected 
corporate governance in private sector corporations, while the CEA group agreed least 
(3.23). The responses to Q7(i) suggest that members of the LRJ group are of the view 
that inadequate infrastructure and resources for enforcement agencies affects the 
practice of corporate governance in private sector companies more than public sector 
ones. This evidence might reflect the fact that the regulators who responded to the 
questionnaires were most involved in regulating private sector corporations. It is also 
possible that the LRJ group took the view that corporate governance in public sector 
corporations was really a concern for the line ministries under which those enterprises 
fell, and not the regulators directly; the respondents might not have included those 
line ministries among regulators and enforcement agencies. Alternatively, the LRJ 
group may simply not have believed that those Government ministries lacked the 
infrastructure and resources to monitor the companies under their charge. 
Only the EDO group (mean = 3.11) agreed with the statement in Q7(k)(i) that fear and 
respect for the authority of elders affected corporate govemance in private sector 
179 An examination of the means of the individual categories (Appendix 7.5) reveals that the regulators 
themselves had a mean of 4.00 which makes sense since they would be aware of the factors limiting 
their enforcement of regulations governing corporate governance. However, the categories that ag reed 
with the statement most strongly were: owner-managers (5.00); executive 
directors (4.67); civil 
servants (4.33); and company executives (4.13). 
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companies. 180 Question 7(k)(ii) asked respondents to* express their views as to whether 
fear and respect for the authority of elders affected the practice of corporate 
governance in Ugandan public sector corporations. Inspection of Panel B of Table 7.8 
reveals that the CEA and EDO groups agreed with the statement (with means of 3.26 
and 3.56 respectively) while all the other groups had a mean of less than 3; the overall 
mean was 3.08. There was, however, a significantly higher average response from the 
EDO group than the LRJ, CIO and ACAD groups. 18 1 The answers to question 7(k)(ii) 
indicate that those who work in companies support this view with respect to public 
sector corporations, (albeit with a mean of 3.08) but not for private sector ones (mean 
= 2.69). 
Q7(l)(i) and 7(l)(ii) asked whether fear and respect for those in authority affected 
private and public sector corporations. As in all questions in this section, there was 
more agreement with the view that fear and respect for those in authority affected 
public sector corporations (mean = 3.76) more than private ones (mean of 3.34). 
There were no significant differences in the means of the groups in their responses to 
question 7(l)(ii) which concerned itself with public sector corporations. However, the 
MW test revealed differences in Q7(l)(i) where the answers for the CEA group were 
significantly different from those of the LRJ (p-value: 0.03) and ACAD groups (p- 
180 An inspection of the means of the individual categories (Appendix 7.5) shows that it was only the 
regulators (category 2) who agreed with the statement (mean: 4); all the other categories did not agree. 
This perception seems to have been based upon the traditional practices in African cultures, as 
expressed in the interviews (Chapter 6 of this thesis). 
18, A closer examination of the means of the individual categories (in Appendix 7.5) indicates that the 
individuals who work in companies, such as owner-managers (mean = 4.00), company executives 
(3.75), company employees (3.57) and executive directors (3.17) perceive fear and respect for the 
authority of elders as affecting the practice of corporate governance in public sector corporations; these 
company people were supported by regulators (4.00) and others (3.33). This evidence is consistent with 
the findings of the interviews in Chapter 6 where interviewees mentioned fear and respect for the 
authority of elders as being among the factors that affect corporate governance in both private and 
public sectors, but more strongly in the latter. It is possible that this fear is perceived to exist in public 
sector corporations because of respect for seniority in the public sector (where promotions are also 
influenced by the length of service), whereas in the private sector the priority might be on delivering 
expected results. 
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value: 0.03). While the LRJ and ACAD goups ageed with the statement with means 
of 3.87 and 3.79 respectively, the CEA had a mean of 2.98 . 
182 On the -whole, these 
views were in consonance with those expressed by interviewees in Chapter 6. One 
would have expected the CEA group to agree with the statement more than the other 
groups but, it seems, this group is not as sensitive to corporate governance issues as 
the other groups, such as the LRJ. 
7.7 Stakeholders 
Question 12 asked respondents to identify who they thought the term "stakeholders" 
referred to. Given the importance of the issue of corruption in Ugandan corporations 
that emerged during the interviews, respondents were also asked whether each of the 
potential stakeholder groups were affected by it. 
7.7.1 Stakeholder Groups 
Respondents were asked to express the extent of their agreement with the statements 
in Panel A of Table 7.9 with a view to establishing which groups are perceived to be 
stakeholders in Uganda. The mean values of the responses indicated that all the 
groups mentioned were perceived as stakeholders with each mean being above 3 and 
significant. 
183 
182 Inspection of the means of the individual categories within the CEA group (see Appendix 7.5) 
indicates that company employees agreed with the statement (mean: 3.14) and the accountants 
disagreed (2.60). All the different categories of those who actually work in companies agreed with the 
statement (albeit, to different degrees). The category that gave the highest support to the statement was 
that of the regulators (category 20 with a mean of 4.50. 
183 The non-parametric Chi-square test (Panel A of Table 7.0) verified that the 
difference between those 
who agreed and those who disagreed with the statements was statistically significant 
in all cases. 
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The ranking of stakeholders (based upon the respective means) was as follo,, N-s: (i) 
shareholders (4.71); (ii) customers (4.55); (iii) suppliers (4.53); (iv) all persons who 
affect or are affected by the company's activities (4.53); (v) financial institutions 
(4-40); (vi) the Government (4.34); (vii) regulatory and enforcement agencies (4.22); 
(viii) environmental groups (4.16); (ix) society as a whole (4.03); (x) Members of 
Parliament (3.44); and (xi) the judiciary (3.29). 
The MW test (the results of which are shown in Panel B of Table 7.8) revealed that 
there were differences in certain pairs of group averages for QI 2(g)(i) and Q1 2(h)(i). 
In 12(g)(i), the academics expressed the strongest support of any group for Members 
of Parliament being considered to be among a company's stakeholders, while the 
CEA group provided the lowest level of agreement. The response of the academics is 
consistent with their view expressed in Q70)(i) that all persons who affect or are 
affected by a company's activities are stakeholders (which had a mean of 3.86); 
Members of Parliament affect companies through the legislation and policies that they 
pass in Parliament. Company employees, on the other hand, may conceivably not 
want to be involved too closely with politicians as they might want to avoid political 
interference. 
The CIO group (civil servants, individual investors and others) agreed that the 
judiciary were stakeholders (with a mean of 3.82), the LRJ and CEA groups had 
means of 3.00 and 3.02 respectively; in both cases the average was significantly 
different from the CIO figure according to the MW test result. It is interesting to note 
254 
that the LRJ group (which is composed of legislators, regulators and the judiciarý-), 
seemed equivocal as to whether the judiciary can be classed as stakeholders or not. 184 
Although the overall mean indicated support for notion of Members of Parliament 
included among stakeholders (mean = 3.44), some of the members of the group 
disagreed. 185 The CEA group might have preferred to keep Members of Parliament 
out of their business because of alleged political interference by some of those 
members. 
7.7.2 Stakeholders and Corruption 
As well as defining stakeholder groups, respondents were also asked, in question 
12(ii), to state the extent of their agreement as to whether those identified as 
stakeholders were affected by corruption in corporations in Uganda (Panel A of Table 
7.9). The overall means for the respective stakeholders ranged between 3.63 and 4.66, 
indicating a pervasive view that these stakeholders are affected by corruption in 
Ugandan firms; Panel B(ii) of Table 7.9 confirms that this view was common to all 
five groups of respondents. Such a widely-held perception suggests that action is 
needed at all levels (including Government, regulators, enforcement agencies, 
184 However, the means of the individual categories (shown in Appendix 7.5) within this group revealed 
that legislators (subcategory 1) supported the view that the judiciary were stakeholders (mean = 4.00); 
it was the regulators, and especially the judiciary themselves, who did not think that the judiciary 
should be viewed as stakeholders in companies (2.67 and 1.75 respectively). This evidence suggests 
that the judiciary prefer to be independent and not considered as stakeholders in corporations. The other 
categories that strongly disagreed with the suggestion that the judiciary were among stakeholders 
included: owner-managers (1.33); and accountants (2.94). Evidently these categories preferred to 
maintain the independence of the judiciary. 
185 As inspection of Appendix 7.5 indicates, those who disagreed included: the judiciary (mean = 1.75); 
owner-managers (2.83) and regulators (2.83). This is arguably surprising as it might have been 
expected that the judiciary and regulators would be of the view that legislators are stakeholders by 
monitoring private and public sector corporations so as to promote transparency and accountability at 
all levels as representatives of the electorate. 
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legislators, judiciary, management and boards) to change the views of stakeholders; 
confidence in the investment climate is unlikely to develop if corruption is perceived 
to be endemic in the business sector in Uganda. The laws and regulations that are 
relevant to the good governance of companies in Uganda may need to be reviewed for 
relevance and effectiveness, so as to change the perceptions of stakeholders towards 
corruption. 1 
86 
The MW test indicated significant differences in average responses for various pairs 
of groups for questions 12(a)(ii), 12(b)(ii), 12(d)(ii), 12(h)(ii), and 120)(ii). The EDO 
group provided the most support for the statement in Q12(a)(ii) which suggested that 
shareholders are affected by corruption in Ugandan corporations, while the academics 
agreed with it the least (4.38). Similarly, in Q12(b)(ii) the strongest agreement for the 
view that suppliers are affected by corruption came from the EDO group (mean = 
4.79) while the ACAD, CEA and CIO groups agreed least, with means of 4.33,4.54 
and 4.58 respectively. The same trend continued in Q12(d)(ii) where the EDO group 
(mean = 4.46) agreed most that financial institutions are affected by corruption, with 
the LRJ group agreeing least strongly with a mean of 3.71. Similarly, in Q12(h)(ii), 
the EDO group (mean = 3.92) agreed most that the judiciary are affected by 
corruption in Ugandan corporations, while the CEA group agreed least (3.33). It 
would be interesting to find out whether the strong agreement expressed by the group 
of executive directors, company executives, non-executive directors, and owner- 
managers (as compared to all the other groups) was based upon direct experience with 
the judiciary. Allegations have been made that elements of corruption exist within the 
186 When split into the 14 categories (see Appendix 7.5), it is interesting to note that the judiciary did 
not agree with the statements suggesting that environmental groups, MPs and the judiciary were 
affected by corruption in Ugandan companies. The regulators did not agree with the view that financial 
institutions are affected by corruption in Ugandan firms, although they accepted that corruption in 
Ugandan companies affected regulatory and enforcement agencies (mean = 3.67). 
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Ugandan judiciary, but these are still to be proved (in courts presided over by 
members of the judiciary). 187 
The above responses demonstrate that the EDO group (i. e. company executi\, es, 
executive directors, non-executive directors and owner-managers) were very 
conscious about the effect of corruption on a company's stakeholders. It appears 
reasonable to argue that this awareness should be followed up by concrete actions that 
can eliminate the corruption in Ugandan companies which has a negative impact on 
stakeholders. The EDO group, more than the other groups in the survey, is likely to 
the one that knows the day-to-day reality of what transpires in companies and should 
therefore be proactive in the attempt to route out corruption. 
7.7.3 Rights of Stakeholders 
A further section of the questionnaire focused on the rights of stakeholders. Panel A 
of Table 7.10 indicates that respondents were of the view that the rights of 
stakeholders established by Ugandan law are not respected (with a significant mean of 
2.77); equally worryingly, there was strong disagreement with the view that 
employees can freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices 
to the board without fear of adverse consequences to themselves for doing so (2.14), 
while it was also thought that companies do not generally act in a responsible manner 
or respect the rights of the community, whether these rights are enshrined in the law 
or not (significant mean of 2.52). There was weak support for the statement asserting 
that rights of stakeholders established through mutual agreements are respected by 
187 It was only for Q 120)(ii) that the EDO group did not have the highest mean with respect to 
corruption affecting the respective stakeholders that were identified; in this case it was the ACAD 
group that agreed most strongly that corruption impacts all persons who affect or are affected by 
companies' activities; the CEA group (mean = 4.18) agreed least. 
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companies (3.13), and for a statement claiming that where stakeholder interests are 
protected by the law, stakeholders have the opportunity to obtain effective redress 
through the courts of law for violation of their rights (3.44). The mean response to 
Q14(e), which covered the adequacy of legal protection for stakeholders, was 2.91 
and not conclusive either way. All in all, this section of the questionnaire points to a 
range of issues that should be of concern to Ugandan authorities, with urgent attention 
arguably being required to rectify the perceptions of stakeholders' rights being weak 
in practice. An environment where stakeholders have little confidence in their rights 
being respected is unlikely to be conducive to economic and social development and 
may fail to encourage both local and foreign investment. 
The MW test results (Panel B of Table 7.10) indicate that there were differences in the 
responses made by various pairs of the five groups to questions 14(a), 14(b), 14(e) 
and 14(f). For Q14(a), there was a significant difference between the CIO group and 
the academics. It was only the CIO group that agreed with the statement that rights of 
stakeholders which are established by the law are respected by companies (mean of 
3.13); the ACAD group disagreed with this statement most strongly with a resultant 
mean of 2.42. The reasons why the CIO group (made up of civil servants, individual 
investors and others) supported this statement (while all other groups did not) are not 
immediately obvious and may need further investigation. It is surprising to note that 
all groups, except the academics, agreed with the statement in question 14(b) which 
claimed that the rights of stakeholders that are established through mutual agreements 
are respected by Ugandan companies, since the same respondents thought that the 
rights established by law are not respected by these companies. The MW test 
identified statistically significant differences in the mean responses of the CIO and 
258 
ACAD groups with the CIO group agreeing with the statement most strongly (mean = 
3.43) and the academics disagreeing with it (mean: 2.68). 188 The one sample T-Test 
indicated, however, that the mean was not significantly different from the neutral 
value of 3 and the chi-square test was insignificant. 
It was only the EDO (mean = 3.16) and ACAD (3.21) groups that agreed with the 
statement in Q14(e) suggesting that there is adequate legal protection of stakeholders 
such as creditors, in the event of a company becoming insolvent or bankrupt. The 
MW test picked up significant differences in average responses between the CEA and 
EDO groups, but not between the former and the ACAD group which had the highest 
group mean. It is not surprising that the EDO group thought there to be adequate 
protection for stakeholders, since this group includes those responsible for 
implementing any such rights. All the groups disagreed with the statement in Q14(f) 
which suggested that companies act in a responsible manner and respect the rights of 
the community, even if these rights are not enshrined in the law. The strongest 
disagreement came from the LRJ group (with a mean of 2.06), while the weakest 
came from the EDO group (2.74). It is striking that the EDO group also appear to 
believe that companies do not act in a responsible manner or respect the rights of the 
community; it is evident from the responses given in Q14 as a whole that the rights of 
stakeholders need attention so as to build confidence in the Ugandan corporate sector. 
118 A scrutiny of the means for the 15 different categories (shown in Appendix 7.5) indicates that along 
with the academics, executive directors (mean = 2.43), regulators (2.67) and non-executive directors 
disagreed with the view that the rights of stakeholders established through mutual agreement are 
respected by companies; the company employees (3.00) were non-committal in their view on the 
matter. Apart from the company executives (3.52), it was the judiciary (3.75) and the civil servants 
(3.53) who agreed with the statement most strongly. It is quite revealing that company officials such as 
the executive directors, non-executive directors and company employees do not support the vie,. N, in 
question since they are presumably active participants in dealing with stakeholders. 
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The respondents expressed concern via Q20 and Q21 that some boards just use 
shareholders as "rubber stamps", without having proper discussion on significant 
issues when Annual General Meetings are called. Shareholders appear to be perceived 
as lacking avenues for meaningful communication with management and boards, and 
as not being treated equally and fairly. Neither shareholders nor consumers have been 
made aware of their rights and there are no programmes or groups to advocate for 
their interests. Respondents suggested that there should be a programme to sensitise 
stakeholders (including shareholders) on their rights. Several respondents mentioned 
respect for shareholders' views by boards as being one of the issues that needs most 
attention by Ugandan regulatory authorities; it was felt that the ICGU should receive 
more support from Government so that it can carry out this sensitisation of 
shareholders in particular and stakeholders in general. 
7.7.4 The Board and Accountability to Stakeholders 
In Q 13 respondents were asked to express the extent of their agreement with 
statements as to whom boards were accountable or responsible. The answers given 
by 
the respondents are summarised and analysed in Table 7.11. 
The perceptions of the respondents were that boards were accountable to all the 
stakeholders mentioned in question 13; the only exception related to suppliers 
in 
Q13(b)(i) where the mean response was 3.0, as Panel A of Table 
7.11 shows. 
However, respondents were of the view that boards should be responsible to suppliers, 
with both the mean of 3.7 and the proportion agreeing 
(89 of 119 respondents) 
proving to be significant. An analysis of the answers 
indicates respondents' belief that 
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companies should be accountable to a wider group of stakeholders than just the 
shareholders. Overall, therefore, these responses support the opinion of the 
respondents discussed earlier that corporate governance should be perceived from a 
stakeholder point of view which includes all those who affect or are affected bý' the 
activities of the company and may even extend to the whole of society. 
The MW test results (Panel B of Table 7.11) identified differences in average 
responses between various pairs of groups in questions 13(a)(i), 13(a)(ii), 13(b)(ii), 
13(f)(ii), 13(h)(i), 13(i)(i), 130)(i), and 
13(k)(i). With respect to the board being accountable to the respective types of 
stakeholder, the group providing the strongest agreement in most cases was the 
ACAD group. 189 Academics, therefore, appear to think that boards should be 
accountable to a broader spectrum of stakeholders, which is interesting given that 
academics are potentially subject to extensive scrutiny by a wide cross-section of 
stakeholders when they publish articles or books. Academics may also be more aware 
of CSR literature. This fact could, possibly, have influenced the academic respondents 
to take the view that boards should also be subject to wide scrutiny and accountability. 
In Q13(a)(i), the CIO group (mean = 4.95) provided the strongest agreement for the 
notion of board accountability to shareholders; they were followed by the LRJ group 
(4.88) in the extent of agreement. Surprisingly, given their role in the governance of 
corporations, the EDO group expressed the least extent of agreement (4.5 1), and the 
MW test picked up a significant difference in means between the CIO and EDO 
groups. The LRJ and CIO groups (each with a mean of 5.00) agreed most that boards 
should be responsible for maintaining relations with shareholders while the CEA 
"' Questions 13(d)(i), 13(f)(i), 13(h)(i), 13(i)(i), 130)(i), and 13(k)(i). 
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(4.59) and EDO (4.77) agreed least; all the means did reveal strong agreement with 
the statement. The level of support for the notion of boards being responsible to 
suppliers, stated in Q13(b)(ii), were higher than those agreeing with the notion of 
accountability to suppliers, as suggested in Q13(b)(i). The ACAD group (mean = 
4.52), followed by the CIO group (4.19), provided the strongest agreement with the 
view that boards are responsible to suppliers; the CEA group agreed least (3.14). For 
13 (f)(i), there was a significant difference between the CIO group and the academics 
in terms of the extent of their agreement as to whether boards are accountable to 
regulatory and enforcement agencies. While the academics strongly agreed with the 
statement (with a mean of 4.58), the civil servants, individual investors and others 
gave it less support, with a mean of 3.91. In Q13(h)(i), the academics expressed the 
strongest agreement with the statement that the board are accountable to the judiciary 
(mean = 4.18) and the CEA expressed the least support with a mean of 3.16.190 
As shown in Panel B(i) of Table 7.11, the difference in responses between the ACAD 
and each of the LRJ, CIO, and EDO groups was statistically significant for Q13(i)(i) 
in relation to boards being accountable to Government. For questions 130)(i) and 
13(k)(i), as with all other questions in this section, the academics expressed a higher 
level of agreement than any other group with the view that boards are accountable to 
all persons who affect or are affected by the company's activities and to society as a 
whole. The academics' interest in boards being accountable to this stakeholder group 
190 The level of agreement from the CEA group was consistently lower than from the other groups with 
respect to boards being accountable to or responsible to the stakeholder groups mentioned 
in Q 13. This 
was the case in Q13(a)(ii), 13(b)(i), 13(b)(ii), 13(c)(i), 13(c)(ii), 13(e)(ii), 13(f)(ii), 13(h)(i), and 
13(h)(ii); they also had the second lowest means in 13(d)(ii), 13(e)(i), 13(g)(i), 13(g)(ii), 130)(i), and 
130)(ii). It is possible that this group was the least familiar with the way boards operate and did not 
have the same level of appreciation of the requirements for accountability and responsibility that other 
groups had. 
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might be for the same reasons mentioned earlier, namely the need to be held 
answerable to a wider cross-section of stakeholders as part of their CSR. 
A comparison of the answers given in question 12(i) and 13(i) reveals that, on the 
whole, respondents were consistent in their view that boards should be accountable to 
the groups identified in Q12 (see section 7.7.1 above). The only inconsistencies 
seemed to occur when considering suppliers and the judiciary (see Panel C of Table 
7.11). Whereas in question 12(b)(i) the respondents had expressed strong agreement 
with the view that suppliers could be classed as stakeholders (with a mean of 4.53), 
they appeared to be undecided in question 13(b)(i) when asked whether boards should 
be accountable to suppliers (mean = 3). A possible explanation could be that the 
respondents did not feel that accountability to suppliers was the role of boards per se 
but of individual company executives and employees. Also, whereas in Q12(h)(i) 
respondents agreed with the judiciary being considered as stakeholders (with a mean 
of only 3.29), in Q13(h)(i) there was strong agreement that boards should be 
accountable to the judiciary (mean = 3.5). This result is somewhat puzzling; one 
possibility is that the respondents viewed accountability as a one-way, rather than a 
two-way, relationship. 
There was strong agreement with the statement that boards should be responsible for 
maintaining relations with all the groups (including suppliers) that were mentioned in 
question 13 with means ranging between 3.6 and 4.8 (Table 7.11, Panel A). Each 
mean was significantly different from 3, while the Chi-squared test results suggested 
that the proportions agreeing and disagreeing all differed significantly. 
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Panel C: Stakeholders, Corruption, Accountability and Responsibility 
The following are Boards are Boards are 
Categories Stakeholders affected by accountable to the responsible to the 
include Corruption: following: following: 
Shareholders 4.71 4.66 4.70 4.77 
Customers 4.55 4.40 3.62 3.95 
Suppliers 4.53 4.59 3.03 3.73 
Financial 
Institutions 4.53 4.17 3.90 4.10 
All persons who 
affect or are 
affected 4.53 4.36 3.78 3.96 
Government 4.34 4.49 4.14 4.35 
Regulatory & 
Enforcement 
Agencies 4.22 4.25 4.17 4.09 
Environmental 
groups 4.16 3.91 3.62 3.65 
Society as a 
whole 4.03 4.47 3.79 3.92 
Members of 
Parliament 3.44 3.71 3.98 4.10 
The Judiciary 3.29 3.63 3.45 3.57 
NOTE: Panel C presents a comparison between the means for the different categories of stakeholders 
and whether these stakeholders are affected by corruption, as well as whether boards should be 
accountable or responsible to those stakeholders. 
The MW test identified significant differences between various pairs of groups in 
their responses to questions 13(a)(ii), 13(b)(ii), 13(c)(ii), 13(d)(ii), 13(e)(ii) and 
13(f)(ii). With respect to Q13(a)(ii), there was significantly less agreement from the 
CEA group than from both the LRJ and CIO groups for the notion that boards are 
responsible for maintaining relations with shareholders. 191 However, this statement 
received the highest extent of overall agreement (with a mean of 4.8); all groups 
strongly agreed with the view that boards should be responsible for maintaining 
relationships with shareholders. 
With respect to boards' responsibility for maintaining relationships with suppliers 
(Ql3b ii), Panel B(ii) of Table 7.11 shows that the academics' views differed 
'91 There were also significant differences in responses between the EDO group and both the LRJ and 
CIO groups. 
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significantly from those of the CEA and EDO groups; academics strongly agreed with 
the statement (mean = 4.5), while the others had means of 3.1 and 3.8 respectively. 192 
It is possible that these results reflect the company employees' and executive 
directors' feeling that, in practice, it is their responsibility, and not that of boards, to 
maintain relationships with suppliers, whereas the academics are more concerned with 
the board's formal duties. 
As Panel B(ii) of Table 7.11 shows, there were also some statistically significant 
differences between the academics and the LRJ, CEA and EDO groups regarding 
boards' responsibility for maintaining relationships with environmental groups, as 
suggested in Q13(e)(ii). The academics agreed with the statement most strongly, with 
the LRJ, CEA and EDO groups displaying significantly lower levels of agreement. 193 
There were also statistically significant differences between the responses given by 
the academics and the CEA group to Q13(f)(ii) in the extent of their agreement with 
the view that boards are responsible for maintaining relationships with regulatory and 
enforcement agencies. In this case, the academics provided the strongest agreement 
with the statement (with a mean of 4.5), while the CEA provided the lowest mean of 
3.8.194 
192 Similarly, while the owner-managers, non-executive directors and academics strongly agreed that 
boards should be responsible for maintaining relationships with customers (means of 5.00,4.75 and 
4.65 respectively), the regulators, accountants, company employees and executive directors expressed 
less agreement with that view (means of 3.50,2.44,3.47 and 3.57 respectively) while the individual 
investors neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement (mean = 3.00); see Appendix 7.5. 
193 The judiciary (category 13) were the only category that actually disagreed with the statement (mean 
= 2.50; see Appendix 7.5). This is surprising and it was not clear whether they preferred management, 
rather than boards, to maintain relationships with environmental groups. 
194 However, when broken down into categories (Appendix 7.5), the owner-managers agreed 
completely with the statement (mean: 5.00), followed by the regulators (4.67); the categories that 
expressed the least extent of agreement were: executive directors (3.17); individual investors (3.25); 
company employees (3.79) and accountants (3.94). Possibly the executive directors, company 
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Overall, it was the academics who gave the strongest support for the statements 
dealing with the board's responsibility to maintain relationships with the various 
groups mentioned in Q13, while company employees and accountants, whilst still in 
broad agreement, gave the least support. It might, therefore, be interesting to 
investigate whether the employees and accountants believe that employees and 
management - rather than board members - should be responsible for maintaining 
these relationships. It is possible that these groups of respondents consider the 
maintenance of relationships with these groups to be part of the day-to-day 
management of companies and would see board's active participation as interference 
in their roles. 
7.8 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
Question 15 of the survey asked respondents whether they thought that ownership 
structure affected the practice of corporate governance in Ugandan companies. Of the 
150 people who answered this question, 87% were of the opinion that ownership 
structure affects the governance of companies. The questionnaire did not go into the 
details of how the structure affected governance; further study is needed on this 
matter. As mentioned in Section 1.2 most Ugandan companies are either family- 
owned or are run by sole proprietors; these owner-managers might not value 
improved corporate governance in the conventional sense since there is no separation 
between ownership and management. 
employees and accountants felt that it was their duty to deal with regulatory and enforcement agencies 
and not that of boards. 
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Several respondents made specific comments, via Q20 and Q2 1, that support the 
notion of ownership structure affecting the governance of companies. 195 At the time of 
writing this thesis (March 2006), there are only eight companies listed on the USE, 
only five of which are incorporated in Uganda (the other three are incorporated in 
Kenya and cross-listed in Uganda). The fact that the stock market is relatively small 
and illiquid may affect the choices that are open to potential and actual investors and 
the voice that they have in those companies. It was argued by some respondents that a 
vibrant stock market with more companies listed on it would help to improve 
corporate governance in Uganda since there would be more competition for capital. 
Improved governance practices would also enable companies to get listed and have 
access to more capital. Ugandan investors cannot use the "voice" option and engage 
the management of those companies to comply with their suggestions since Ugandan 
shareholders are, on the whole, a small minority. The "exit" option is not very 
practical either because there are simply too few investment options and the liquidity 
of the shares is limited; as a result, shareholders just buy and hold. The major 
shareholders of the companies listed on the USE are multinational companies that 
dictate policies favourable to them (including accounting, management contracts and 
transfer pricing policies) even though some of these policies may not be beneficial to 
the Ugandan minority owners. 
Since most of the companies in Uganda are either family owned or sole 
proprietorship s, there is often very little practical distinction, if any, between 
ownership and management; this raises the probability of interference by owners in 
the management of those companies, with potential compromising of good 
195 There was specific concern that the ultimate ownership of some foreign companies in Uganda was 
not clear, and that it was not known who to hold accountable for certain practices in those companies. 
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governance. The USE does not have the powers to intervene in unlisted companies 
and so cannot force such companies to comply with the guidelines of good corporate 
governance. The Registrar General's Office, which has the appropriate regulatory and 
monitoring powers, including ensuring compliance with the Ugandan Companies Act 
(1964), does not have the resources required to implement enforcement. 196 The 
Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) itself was incorporated on 1" 
December 1998 as a company limited by guarantee (and not share capital); the 
guarantors are its enrolled members. 197 The ICGU is, therefore, not a statutory body 
and has no powers to enforce compliance with the corporate governance guidelines 
that it issues. The ICGU has, however, been involved in training (mostly public 
sector) directors by offering them three-day courses in corporate governance. Some of 
the respondents to the questionnaire called for the Government to give more backing 
to the ICGU in its efforts to promote good governance in Ugandan companies. 
It appears reasonable to conclude that the ownership structure of Ugandan companies 
is seen as a major factor in the implementation of proper corporate governance 
practices. It also seems evident that the various types of owners may need to be 
convinced that improvements in governance would add value to their companies. 
196 This point was highlighted by the Registrar General during the interviews (see Chapter 6). 
197 Although the ICGU was incorporated in 1998, it was officially launched on 12th October 2000 (see 
Manual on Corporate Governance - Incorporating Recommended Guidelines for Uganda). 
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7.9 Compliance with Corporate Governance Guidelines 
7.9.1 Compliance by Private and Public Sector Companies 
Questions 5(a) to 5(c) of the questionnaire examined respondents' views about which 
types of companies should comply with the principles of corporate governance that 
were issued by the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda. The responses to 
these questions are surnmarised in Panels A and B of Table 7.12. 
The respondents strongly agreed with a statement suggesting that companies that are 
listed and publicly traded on the USE should comply with the principles of corporate 
governance issued by the ICGU, with a mean response of 4.8 resulting; the same 
average level of support was expressed in the case of all state-owned companies. 
These means are clearly high and indicate a widely held view that all public sector 
and listed private sector companies should comply with the ICGU principles. 
Respondents also agreed that all private sector companies, irrespective of whether 
they are listed or not, should comply with the principles of corporate governance 
issued by the ICGU. However, the extent of agreement with this statement (mean = 
3.9) was less than that for listed and state-owned corporations. The CEA group 
provided the least support for this statement, with the CIO group proving to be 
significantly more enthusiastic. 
198 
198 Appendix 7.5 indicates that the accountants (category 6) had the lowest mean (3.53) followed by 
executive directors (3.57), company employees (3.63) and owner-managers (3.88). These categories are 
closely associated with the operation of companies and are likely to be concerned about the 
implications of implementing the guidelines; such concerns would be likely to include cost 
considerations. 
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As observed earlier, the CEA group are often out of line with the other groups in the 
extent of their agreement with a number of the questions. One possible reason for this 
tendency could be concern in Uganda that companies are not behaving in a 
responsible and accountable manner. The behaviour and attitudes of company 
employees could be partly responsible for this negative view of corporate govemance 
and accountability in Ugandan companies, and this viewpoint may be reflected in the 
CEA group's responses to various parts of the survey. 
The MW test results indicated that responses were fairly consistent among all the 
groups. The only significant differences picked up were between the CIO and CEA 
goups in Q5(b) and between the CEA and ACAD goups in Q5(c). The CIO goup 
expressed the highest extent of agreement (mean = 4.43) with the view expressed in 
Q5(b) that requires all private companies, irrespective of whether they are listed or 
not, to comply with the principles of corporate governance issued by the ICGU , while 
the CEA group had the lowest mean of 3.60. For Q5(c), the academics gave the 
lowest support for the view that all state-owned corporations should comply with 
those principles (mean = 4.45), while the LRJ agreed most (4.94). However, the MW 
test highlighted significant differences in average response between the EDO and 
ACAD groups in their answers to Q5(c) (but, surprisingly, not between the LRJ and 
ACAD groups). In the case of Q5(c), the LRJ (4.94), CIO (4.87), EDO (4.82), CEA 
(4.82) and ACAD (4.45) groups all strongly agreed that state-owned enterprises 
should comply with principles of good governance, suggesting wide-spread support 
for the notion. 
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The responses to Q5 as a whole indicate support, for all companies, to comply ývith 
the ICGU principles. 199 Compliance remains an issue, however; while it is relatively 
easy to enforce compliance in listed companies (this could be made a condition for 
their remaining listed and traded on the USE), it is likely to be much more difficult to 
police non-listed companies, as the Registrar General's office which is responsible for 
regulating these companies does not seem to have sufficient resources to enforce 
compliance (as earlier pointed out by the Registrar General during the interviews). 
The aspiration for all companies to comply therefore needs to be examined critically 
to determine how it can be implemented. Each company could be required to declare 
compliance with corporate governance guidelines in their annual reports, but, short of 
full and reliable external audits taking place, there would still be no way of 
guaranteeing that companies had actually complied with those guidelines. 
7.9.2 General Compliance with Corporate Governance Guidelines 
Questions 60) to 6(l) (shown in Panel A of Table 7.13) asked stakeholders to indicate 
their perceptions about corporate governance practices and potential penalties for 
failure to comply across different types of Ugandan firms. The results in Panels A and 
B of the table indicate that respondents disagreed with statements suggesting that the 
practice of corporate governance was satisfactory in listed (mean = 2.88) and un-listed 
companies (2.40). It seems clear, therefore, that stakeholders do not have much 
'99 An analysis of the responses given by the different categories (Appendix 7.5) indicates that 
individual investors (category 9), non-executive directors (category 11) and others (category 14) 
expressed full agreement with the requirement for all companies to comply with the guidelines, as each 
of those categories had a mean of 5.00 for all the statements in Q5. The regulators (category 2) and 
owner-managers (category 8) gave full support for listed companies and public sector companies 
having to comply with the guidelines (mean = 5.00 for each statement), while the judiciary (category 
13) fully supported compliance by listed companies (5.00) and strongly agreed with the requirement for 
all state-owned enterprises to comply. As illustrated by their answers in this question, these groups 
consistently demonstrate greater awareness of the importance of corporate governance issues. 
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confidence in the governance systems in Ugandan companies in general. Respondents 
were of the view, expressed in Q6(l), that foreign owned companies had better 
corporate governance practices than Ugandan-owned companies. However, some 
individuals that are closely associated with foreign-owned companies have doubts 
au about the validity of this perception. 
200 
The responses to Q6(s) indicate strong agreement with the view that listed companies 
which fail to comply with corporate governance guidelines should explain and justify 
themselves (mean = 4.39). The respondents were also of the view that listed 
companies which do not explain and justify their non-compliance with corporate 
governance guidelines should be cle-listed (mean = 3.66) as suggested in Q6(t). 
Respondents also agreed with the statement put forward in Q6(u) which suggested 
that voluntary corporate governance guidelines should be replaced with regulations 
that are legally binding and enforceable (mean = 3.79). 
The MW test identified statistically significant differences in answers to questions 
60), 6(s) and 6(u). For Q60), the EDO group (mean = 3.13) was the only one that 
agreed that the practice of corporate governance in listed companies in Uganda was 
satisfactory. It is arguably not surprising that the EDO group would take this position 
since they were the ones responsible for corporate governance practices in companies, 
200 One of the foreign-owned companies that are listed in Uganda was temporarily suspended from 
trading on the USE following the company's suspension of operations in a major sector of its business 
without informing the USE. At the time of writing this thesis (November, 2005), this is the only listed 
company in Uganda whose share price has fallen below its IPO price, and is the only listed company to 
have been suspended from trading on the USE. The company was allowed to resume trading on the 
USE when it re-opened the sector concerned. Some of the interviewees (in Chapter 6) mentioned 
dubious accounting practices used by some of these companies to under-declare their taxable revenue 
in Uganda and also referred to the practice of some foreign companies of keeping different set of books 
in their attempt to hide their actual revenue from Ugandan authorities. Some companies utilise 
classification of transactions, writing off or revaluation of assets, transfer pricing and management 
contracts with parent companies to siphon revenue from Uganda to the disadvantage of Ugandan 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders, such as Government. 
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and might not have wanted to judge themselves negatively. The EDO group (with a 
mean of 4.61) also provided the most support for the suggestion in Q6(s) that listed 
companies ich fail to comply with corporate governance guidelines should explain 
and justify their non-compliance; this is in line with the stipulation of the UK 
Combined Code which requires companies to adopt the "comply or explain" 
approac . 
201 
Responses to Q6(u) were notable in that respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the 
view that voluntary corporate governance guidelines should be replaced with 
regulations that are legally binding and enforceable. Many of the countries in the 
Western world (with some exceptions including the USA) have opted for voluntary 
corporate governance guidelines rather than legally binding rules and regulations. 
This view received the most support from the EDO group (mean = 4.21) and the least 
support from the academics (3.30); the MW test indicated that the difference in 
average response between these groups was significant. This result is somewhat 
counter-intuitive; it might have been expected that company executives and directors 
would argue for self-regulation rather than external regulation of their companies. It is 
possible that members of the EDO group realise that the market mechanisms are not 
sufficient to pressure companies to abide by corporate governance guidelines, as can 
be evidenced by the current low level of compliance by Ugandan companies, and that 
the force of law is required if implementation of those guidelines is to be achieved, 
especially in view of protecting the rights of minority shareholders. 
20 1 The MW test results indicate that there was a statistically significant difference between the EDO 
and the CIO groups in their answers to Q6(s). Inspection of Appendix 7.5 reveals that it was the civil 
servants (category 4) in the CIO group that affected the group mean since theirs was the only one that 
was below 4 (3.81); however, the averages of the other categories in that group (individual 
investors 
and others) were also relatively lower than the averages for the other categories (except for legislators 
who also had a mean of 4.00). 
279 
CL, 
'Z 
zm 
u 
ow Gn 
OD 
L£) CD (D CD CD CD 
> -7 
C) 
CD 
CD 
CD 
CD 
CD 
C: ) 
CD 
CD 
C: ) 
CD c; c5 ä 
Z 
m 
C: ) 
0) m N 
CD 
CD (D CD r-.: N 
$.. 
týO 
T- m C, 4 
CO 
r, - 
C, 4 T- r-- 
< 
öz M LO LO CY) 00 (X) OD cli ce) clq 
CD CD C) C: ) CD C: ) 
ce CD 5 c) CD C: ) 
> CD CD CD C: ) C: ) 
C) ä ä c; ä ä 
92 
Cli Co u-) 
0) 
CD C: ) 
C%i . 00 L6 
Co 
c92 OD CD (3) (0 C» OD le (0 CI() (0 F-- 
rý cý rý cli clý 
bj) 
0 t2 . - cu 9) 
.E 
-0 M 
-0 ý: E -0 
> 
Z0 C , E E, C) >< U (V ý . >c 
00 
(4-4 > > 
Co lý 
0 
4ý ýC, 0 1-1 
4- 
0 
,' 
cu 
ci 2 0 
lz; 0 
0 CD. 
C) -0 > 'ýý 
a 
. -2 -zi ' -ri 0- 
e- Gn r. 0 M -*- Z 22 0 rn 
c 
0 
4- C) C . - a) - "0 - -0 * 4ý Co 
0 "0 
4-4 
0 ýD -0 Ln 
. (V r. CJ E 
u ='u L, 5: m 
U CZ 
ýD 
Q 
ce 
m 
$.. 
00 
Q> 0 
ce 
ý- -- c2. n. (Z Q- öz -U 
-0 0 
U OJ) .!: i 
"0 0 Ln u z3 - -0 
r. 
Gn 
0 
. C., 
jý 
(V E (V 
ý.. cl ce 
43 U 
m Q) - 
CJ 4ý c) En 
r 
00 CC 
> rz 1--, m CL 
u 
1-1 2 "a 
u 
'-, 
E ý-, ; -- e 0 
C, . S-ý 
'-, r- - U 
oß 
--, 0= i- U = " "- - Q) > . - u2 4,3-. % : 0 +ý v0 ýc ý, 0 0 \Z cn 0 0 (V 3 r_ 0 _c 
03 
C 
,a 
CIO) 
-a u 
-0 
rA 
E 
m 
0 
Z. 
-0 = 
r '0 
C) = 
ce 
ÖJ) 
ýD 
ZI 
CD. 
i>I 
-0 tu c02 
's M 
< 
CZ 
E 
C) > 0 Zu 
C) 
Oo 
C14 
l= 
rw 
Im 
Z rw 
1-1 
C) C: ) U. ) (. C) C: ) Ln CN C14 Lf) CO ;T CD u ci o C: ) 
t co r-- r, - (c) q- q- N , 
UU C: ) 0 ci C) 0 0 
C) ca C-4 00 C') 0-) o 00 .w 
c ýD 5 N CD OC) (0 0 r-- 
C: ) C) o c o 
GO C, 4 (3) , r-- r-- r-- cy) r- . 4- U-1 U 
0 0 0 ci ci 
Lo - C") (Y) 
r- 00 
d It CIJ C: ) - 
C) 
ci o C) c; C: ) C) 
C: 
: t: ý 
-C., d, < 00 Lo o -I- OC) 00 -W , lq- " 0 0 
LO 
u 
-u 
ci C) C) C) o o 
Cý ;; r 
LO r-- C-4 00 U-) 00 U-) (d cv. ) 
C) a 0 ci C) ci 
C) C: ) r-- (D (3) C14 r-- 
(D - CY) (D I; zt 
C: ) C) 0 C: ) c) c: > 
-4' in oo c) ' -, T o ' C) (o . r-4 w 0 (D 
0 ) CY) 0 ) ce) 00 
-ý ,U ci c) 6 C) ci ci 
I- C) I (D CY) 
0 
N-- 
CN 
LO 
- 
* 
Y) c LO (C) c) 
C) C: ) c) C) 
iýý = r CN 
; 1 CN 
CY) 
ý4 
0ý 
>1" 
C4 
6 
T 
6 
(D 
C5 
C 4 
ci C: 5 (: ý 
C) . Zl- " m C', m CD 
(-- c) 4 - m c) U 
0 
* 
cn rn 4 C-; 4 r- 
"t p m N "t 
0ý C'4 r- V) 00 r- 
0 
U 
0 r- 00 ON 
0-4 
tn zT m 00 - kn 
u clý Cý M CI; en clý 
CD 00 110 tl- 00 C14 
00 
C'n C, 4 en 
-, Cý cn l (0 (0 (0 (0 (0 
v c y CY CY a CY CY 
cz 
u cz 
cz 
E 
0 
0j) 
0 
ý, o rlý 
\ýo 
-a CA V) 
r- e- 
(40 -4 
C', 
11 4- 
03 
4, .0 
as -I-- (1) +ý 
E >, 
70 Cl. (1) 
0 Q) 
.. zC Wp0 
o 
00 
N 
7.10 The Framework of Corporate Governance 
The revised Principles of the OECD (2004) place strong emphasis upon the 
framework of corporate governance, which includes: (i) the Legal Framework; (ii) the 
Regulatory Framework; (iii) the Accounting Framework; (iv) the Political 
Framework; (v) the state of the economy; and (vi) cultural, social and ethical factors; 
this framework is intended to facilitate the implementation of the principles of 
corporate governance. Question 6 sought the perceptions of stakeholders towards the 
framework of corporate governance in Uganda; the responses are summarised in 
Table 7.14. 
7.10.1 The Legal Framework 
Questions addressing the Legal Framework in Uganda were presented in questions 
6(a) to 6(d). Respondents were asked for their views regarding the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the Ugandan laws that relate to promoting corporate governance and 
accountability, and whether these laws could help to reduce levels of corruption. The 
answers given by the respondents (Panels A of Table 7.14) indicate that the majority 
(74 out of 105) disagreed with the notion that there are adequate and effective laws 
that promote corporate governance in Uganda202 . This perception 
is clearly worrying 
and suggests that attention from the relevant authorities is needed so that stakeholders 
can have confidence that a legal system exists which promotes high standards of 
de- 
facto corporate governance in Uganda. 
202 The p-values for both the T-Test and Chi-square tests were highly significant. 
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There was general agreement with the statement in Q6(b) that the legal system could 
help to improve corporate governance in Uganda (mean = 4.09). The groups that 
agreed most strongly were the EDO group (4.34), the CEA group (4.18) and the LRJ 
group (4.18), while the least support for the statement came from the academics (3.60) 
and the CIO group (3.83). 
The MW test results in Panel B of Table 7.14 identify significant differences in 
answers to Q2(b) between the group of academics and both the EDO and CEA 
groups, as well as between the CIO group and the EDO gToup . 
203 
Question 6(c) sought respondents' views as to whether the legal system could help to 
improve accountability in Uganda. The mean for the answers to this question was 4.0 
and there was a statistically significant difference between the number agreeing (117) 
and disagreeing (17) with the statement. There was therefore clear support for the 
statement. The results of the MW test indicated significantly lower support from the 
academics than both the CEA and EDO groups, plus significantly stronger support 
from the CEA than the CIO group (Panel B of Table 7.14). 204 The EDO and CEA 
groups agreed most with the statement; these two groups are closely involved in the 
running of companies and this experience might have made them realise the role of 
203 The differences in the CIO group partly reflect the view of civil servants and the others who each 
had a mean of 3.75; the means of all the other categories in this group were higher than 4. The 
academics expressed the least support for the statement (mean = 3.60), while those working in 
companies indicated more support for the legal system helping to improve the practice of corporate 
governance. The civil servants and individual investors also expressed less confidence in the legal 
system (mean: 3.83) than the company executives, executive directors, non-executive directors and 
owner-managers. The legislators themselves (mean: 3.86) expressed the least extent of agreement 
within the LRJ group. This point would be worth following up in later research. 
204 When the 14 categories of respondents are analysed separately (see Appendix 7.5) the academics 
(with a mean response of 3.40) had the lowest mean, followed by civil servants, individual investors 
and others, who each had a mean of 3.5. In Q6(b), the legislators expressed the lowest extent of 
agreement (within the LRJ group) regarding the ability of the legal system to help in improving 
accountability in Ugandan companies. This could be due to a perception by legislators that, despite the 
laws and regulations that are in place, accountability has remained a problem in Uganda. 
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the legal system in the proper running of companies. In contrast, the CIO and 
academics are less actively involved with the management of companies, and their 
awareness of companies' day-to-day activities is lower than that of the EDO and CEA 
groups. 
In question 6(d) respondents were asked to state the extent of their agreement with the 
view that the legal system could help to reduce corruption in Ugandan companies. 
The mean for all responses to this question was 3.89, with the LRJ (mean = 4.35) 
agreeing most, followed by the CEA (4.12) and EDO (3.95) groups; the academics 
(3.40) and the civil servants (3.42) expressed the least agreement with the statement. 
This evidence is notable because the perception among stakeholders is that corruption 
is prevalent in the public sector entities where the civil servants would be employed. 
However, a significant majority of the respondents (106 out of 124) agreed with the 
statement that the legal system could help to reduce corruption in Ugandan 
companies. 205 The MW test indicated that the average level of support given by the 
LRJ group was significantly higher than that given by both the CIO and ACAD 
groups, while the support given by the CEA group differed from those of the CIO and 
ACAD groups (see Panel B of Table 7.14). The LRJ, CEA and EDO groups should be 
relatively familiar with what goes on in companies by virtue of their positions, and 
should be aware of the pandemic of corruption alluded to in the interviews and the 
need to route it out through the legal system to both improve accountability and 
responsibility to stakeholders, and actions which may affect the wealth of the 
providers of capital. 
205 However, the extent of agreement expressed by the following categories of respondents was notably 
lower than for the others: others (2.75); individual investors (3.50); and civil servants (3.56). 
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Table 7.14 The Framework of Corporate Governance 
Panel A: Questions, One Sample T-Test and Chi-square Test 
One Sample -Test Chi-s uare Test 
Dis- Chi- 
Statement Mean T P-Value agree Agree Square P-Value 
Legal Framework _ 
Q6(a) There are adequate and effective 
laws that promote the practice of good 2.55 -4.43 0.000* 74 31 17.61 0.000* 
corporate governance in Uganda. 
Q6(b) The legal system could help to 
improve corporate governance in Uganda. 4.09 14.96 0.000* 6 118 101.16 0.000* 
Q6(c) The legal system could help to 
improve accountability in Uganda. 4.00 12.37 0.000* 11 117 87.78 0.000* 
Q6(d) The legal system could help to 
reduce corruption in Ugandan companies. 3.89 9.37 0.000* 23 106 53.40 0.000* 
Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
Q6(e) The enforcement agencies have the 
power and authority to enforce compliance 3.00 0.00 1.000 49 52 0.09 0.764 
with laws and regulations in Uganda. 
Q6(f) Ugandan regulatory and enforcement 
authorities are effective in enforcing 2.20 -9.42 0.000* 102 16 62.68 0.000* 
compliance with laws and regulations. 
1 Q6(g) Corruption in Uganda affects the 
ability of regulatory authorities to enforce 
compliance with corporate governance 3.99 9.41 0.000* 24 110 55.19 0.000* 
principles and accountability. 
Accounting Framework 
Q6(h) The Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants of Uganda is effective in 
enforcing good accounting and financial 2.81 -2.18 0.031* 51 34 3.40 0.065 
reporting practices. 
Privatisation 
Q6(i) The privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises has improved the practice of 2.92 -0.85 0.396 52 53 0.01 0.920 
corporate governance in those companies. 
Political Framework 
Q6(m) The political climate in Uganda is 
conducive to the practice of good corporate 2.67 -3.49 0.001* 63 36 7.36 0.007* 
governance in private sector companies. 
Q6(n) The political climate in Uganda is 
conducive to the practice of good corporate 2.37 -6.30 0.000* 84 29 26.77 0.000* 
governance in public sector companies. 
Economic, Social, Cultural and Ethical 
Factors 
Q6(o) The state of the economy in Uganda 
affects the practice of corporate 3.79 8.97 0.000* 16 95 56.23 0-000* 
governance. 
Q6(p) Social factors affect the practice of 
corporate governance in Uganda. 3.57 6.24 0.000* 23 83 33.96 0-000* 
Q6(q) Cultural factors affect the practice of 
corporate governance in Uganda. 3.40 3.85 0.000* 34 82 19.86 0-000* 
Q6(r) Ethical factors affect the practice of 
corporate governance in Uganda. 3.95 10.40 0. 000* 18 105 61.54 0-000* 
NOTE: Panel A of Table 7.14 shows the questions regarding the Framework of Corporate Governance, 
together with the results of the One Sample T-Test and Chi-square Test. 
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As a whole, the answers to questions 6(a) to 6(d) suggest that there are questions about 
the effectiveness of the legal system, despite overall support, emerging for its role in 
corporate govemance. It appears that there are still serious concerns about the current 
legal system and that governance and accountability are affected by the inability of the 
extant system to reduce corruption. 
An analysis of comments made in Q20 and Q21 indicates that while some respondents 
feel that Uganda should emphasise persuasion - and a change of mindsets of stakeholders 
- rather than external regulation and enforcement, others favour the introduction of stiffer 
penalties for non-compliance with laws and regulations; the current penalties were not 
seen as being adequate to promote compliance. 206 
Respondents noted that whistleblowers who disclosed malpractices in companies were in 
a vulnerable situation since there is no evident law in Uganda to protect them against 
dismissal and other reprisals. Respondents felt that it was necessary to introduce such a 
law and suggested that this law would contribute to the improvement of Ugandan 
corporate govemance practices. 
7.10.2 The Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
The OECD Principles (2004) highlight the importance of the regulatory, supervisory and 
enforcement authorities and state the following: 
206 Some respondents even suggested that the Government should establish a body that would be 
responsible for the enforcement of the principles of corporate governance, thereby making corporate 
governance a legal requirement in companies. 
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Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the 
authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and 
objective manner (Section 1, D). 
Several questions were therefore asked to ascertain the perceptions of stakeholders about 
Ugandan regulatory and enforcement agencies; the results are summarised and analysed 
in Table 7.14. Panel A of the table indicates that respondents disagreed with the statement 
in Q6(f), i. e that Ugandan regulatory and enforcement authorities are effective in 
enforcing compliance with laws and regulations (the mean response was 2.20). 207 
However, the respondents were neutral about the issue of whether enforcement agencies 
have the power and authority to enforce compliance with laws and regulations in Uganda, 
as suggested by Q6(e) (the T-Test and Chi-square test were both insignificant). 208 Only 
the LRJ group (mean = 3.76) agreed with the statement, while company people were 
amongst those that failed to show support. 
As Panel B of Table 7.14 shows, none of the five groups agreed with the statement in 
Q6(0 which suggested that Ugandan regulatory and enforcement agencies are effective in 
regulating and enforcing compliance with corporate governance practices in Ugandan 
companies. 209 Panel A of the table indicates that the overall mean for this question was 
only 2.20. These results are entirely consistent with the interviewees' views (outlined in 
207 The chi-square test generated a p-value of 0.000, suggesting that a significantly higher number of 
respondents disagreed than agreed with the statement. 
20' The means of individual categories (Appendix 7.5) indicate that the regulators themselves (category 2) 
and the judiciary (category 13) agreed with the statement, with means of 4.33 and 4.00 respectively, while 
the company executives (category 7), executive directors (category 12), non-executive directors (category 
11) and individual investors (category 9) disagreed with the statement, with means of 2.67,2.71,2.75 and 
2.75 respectively. 
209 Neither the KW nor the MW tests detected any differences in the average response of the different 
groups. 
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the previous chapter) that there was poor enforcement of laws and regulations relating to 
corporate governance in Uganda. 210 
All five groups agreed with the view put forward in Q6(g) whereby corruption is one of 
the factors affecting the ability of regulatory authorities to enforce compliance with the 
principles of corporate governance and accountability (the overall mean was 3.99), but 
there were no statistically significant differences in goup averages detected by either the 
KW or MW test. 
211 
In Q20 and Q21, respondents expressed the view that the supervision of public sector 
corporations by parent ministries was not adequate and recommended that the respective 
Ministries must play a role in monitoring and fostering compliance with corporate 
governance principles in the public sector corporations under their charge. 
Some respondents were of the view that regulatory agencies in Uganda needed 
strengthening with greater resources provided to help them enforce compliance with laws 
and regulations. It appears reasonable to argue that the USE itself should make 
compliance with generally accepted principles of corporate governance a condition for 
listing on the stock market. 
"0 It is worth noting that none of the 14 categories of respondents agreed with the statement that Ugandan 
regulatory and enforcement authorities were effective in enforcing compliance with laws and regulations 
(except, of course, the regulators who had a mean of 3.50); see Appendix 7.5. 
21 1 The regulators (category 2) themselves agreed with the statement with a mean of 4.33 (see Appendix 
7.5), while the owner-managers and the judiciary each generated a mean of 5.00. 
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7.10.3 Accounting Framework 
The Accounting Standards used in recording and presenting the transactions of a 
company are instrumental in conveying financial information and other annual reports to 
the users of the statements issued by companies. The use of similar and consistent 
accounting principles by different firms will enable users to evaluate the performance of 
companies using similar yardsticks. This, in turn, enables users to assess the performance 
of management in terms of their governance of companies and their accountability to 
stakeholders. 
Question 19(a) tried to ascertain which accounting standards were being used by 
Ugandan companies. 212 Out of the 80 respondents who answered this question, 67.5% 
stated that their companies used International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
while others said that they employed UK Accounting Standards (8.8%) or Ugandan 
Accounting Standards (12.5%) and others (11.2%) said that they did not know which 
standards their companies were using. 213 
The answers given by respondents indicated that not every company in Uganda uses 
IFRS and that, in several cases, there appears to be uncertainty about which standards are 
being used. Based upon the personal experience of the researcher, who is a member of 
the faculty of a Business School in Uganda, it appears that some Business Schools use 
212 This question was only put to those respondents who worked in companies. 
213 It was, however, clarified by some respondents that the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of 
Uganda (ICPAU) had issued one accounting standard to govern accounting for Value Added Tax (VAT) 
and that all companies in Uganda had to use this accounting standard. Because of this, some respondents 
marked the boxes for both Ugandan Accounting Standards and MRS. 
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whatever textbooks they can get hold, irrespective of the accounting standards used in 
those books. There is, therefore, an obvious need to standardise the principles used in 
these schools to prepare accounting students so that de-facto uniform standards of 
accounting in Uganda develop over time. 
The OECD Principles (2004) stress the importance of annual audits in the following 
words: 
An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and 
qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to 
the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects 
(Section V, C). 
In question 19(b), respondents were asked to state whether their companies had an annual 
audit conducted by independent, competent and qualified auditors. Out of the 81 
respondents who answered this question, 80 (i. e. 98.8%) indicated that their companies 
had annual audits; the Companies Act of Uganda (1964) requires all companies to have 
annual audits by independent, qualified auditors and any company not having annual 
audits would be contravening the law. However, as noted earlier, compliance with other 
elements of Ugandan corporate law appear to be patchy and so such a widespread 
perception of compliance is noteworthy. Nonetheless, given the propensity for corruption 
documented in this and the previous chapter, pertinent questions remain regarding the 
quality and extent of the audits that these companies receive and, since shareholders and 
other stakeholders such as regulators and Government rely on their opinions in judging 
and evaluating the performance of those companies, whether the auditors are truly 
independent and objective. 
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The accountability of external auditors to shareholders was also highlighted by the OECD 
Principles (2004): 
External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to 
the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit 
(Section V, D). 
Of the 79 people who responded to Q19(c), which asked whether external auditors were 
accountable to shareholders, 68 (or 86%) responded in the affirmative, 6 (8%) said "no" 
and 5 (6%) said that they did not know. External auditors are, therefore, clearly perceived 
as being accountable to shareholders in Uganda, but further work might usefully examine 
the form which this accountability takes and whether it is true accountability or simply 
communication of information. The Companies Act of Uganda (1964) places the 
responsibility of appointing auditors on shareholders at an Annual General Meeting. In 
the light of findings reported in this thesis regarding the difficulties faced by Ugandan 
shareholders, and the general climate of inconsistent respect for the law, it is worth 
speculating whether the owners of firms have de-facto responsibility for the appointment 
and sanctioning, where necessary, of auditors, as stipulated by the Companies Act, or 
whether management's choice of auditors prevails in most cases. In the case of 
multinational companies, the extent of influence that Ugandan Shareholders have over 
the selection of auditors is questionable, since, as minority shareholders, their voting 
power is not significant enough to influence the decision. 
Another important question relates to the regulation of accounting practices in Uganda. 
Although the majority of respondents disagreed with the statement in Q6(h) suggesting 
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that The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (ICPAU) was effective in 
enforcing good accounting and financial reporting practices, the difference in numbers 
agreeing and disagreeing was not statistically significant despite the fact that the t-test 
indicated that the mean of 2.8 was significantly lower than the test value of 3 (see Table 
7.14, Panel A). Only the LRJ group, with a mean of 3.13,214 agreed with the statement 
that The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda was effective in enforcing 
good accounting and financial reporting practices. However, there were a high number of 
neutral responses and the results do not support a strong conclusion either way. The 
responses suggest, however, that more needs to be done by the ICPAU to convince 
stakeholders that it is effective in regulating, monitoring and enforcing compliance with 
agreed upon standards of accounting and auditing. 
7.10.4 The Political Framework 
Questions 6(m) and 6(n) examined stakeholders' perceptions as to whether the political 
climate in Uganda was conducive to the practice of corporate governance in private and 
public sector companies. The responses are summarised in Panel A of Table 7.14. The 
results indicate that a statistically significant number of respondents thought that the 
political climate in Uganda is not conducive to the practice of corporate governance in 
either private sector (Q6(m)) or the public sector (Q6(n)) companies, with the public 
sector corporations having a poorer perception than the private sector ones; the public 
214 It was the regulators (category 2) in the LRJ group who agreed most strongly with the view that the 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants were effective in enforcing good accounting and financial 
reporting practices (mean = 3.50) whereas all the other categories in the group did not. This result is not 
surprising since regulators might want to believe that other members of their profession were effective in 
doing their work. 
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sector corporations had a mean of 2.37 as opposed to 2.67 for private sector 
corporations. "' These views should be of concern to the business environment in Uganda 
as the prevailing political climate is likely to have an impact on the governance of 
companies and on both local and foreign investment in the country. 
Further concerns were raised in responses to Q20 and Q21 where respondents expressed 
the perception that the political climate did not promote respect for the rights of 
stakeholders (some stakeholders were not aware of their rights and so did not seek to 
enforce them). A view was also expressed that Government's continued ownership of 
shares in "privatised" corporations was a breeding ground for political interference in the 
running of those organisations. High tax rates were also mentioned as an incentive for 
some company executives to use illegal means such as smuggling in goods, under- 
declaring the value of goods, or managing trading accounts in order to evade taxes. These 
responses support the view that Government's fiscal and monetary policies can affect the 
governance of companies in a tangible and substantive manner. 
7.10.5 Economic, Social, Cultural and Ethical Factors 
Respondents agreed that the following factors that were presented in questions 6(o) to 
6(r) affected the practice of corporate governance in Uganda: (i) the state of the economy 
"' An examination of the means of the individual categories (Appendix 7.5) indicates that even the 
legislators were non-committal (mean = 3.00) as to whether the political climate in Uganda was conducive 
to the practice of good governance in public sector companies; other than the non-executive 
directors 
(category 11; mean= 3.25), none of the categories agreed with the statement in Q6(n). It was only the 
legislators and the regulators who, marginally, agreed that the political climate in Uganda 
is conducive to 
the practice of corporate governance in private sector corporations, with means of 
3.14 and 3.33 
respectively. This finding is not surprising since the legislators are responsible for the political climate 
in 
the country. 
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(mean = 3.79); (ii) social factors (3.57); (iii) cultural factors (3.40); and (iv) ethical 
factors (3.95). The difference between the numbers who agreed and those who disagreed 
with the statements in Panel A of Table 7.14 was statistically significant with the 
majority of respondents expressing the view that these factors affected the practice of 
corporate governance in Uganda. 
216 
These results suggest that companies are not isolated from the environment in which they 
operate; economic, social, cultural and ethical factors are all seen as part of this 
environment and therefore influence the practice of corporate governance. 
Respondents made several comments in Q20 and Q21 regarding the ethical and moral 
degradation of Ugandan society and its effect on the practice of corporate governance by 
providing the seedbed for corruption and other malpractices. These respondents argued 
that there should be moral rehabilitation in Uganda through education, starting from the 
early formative years; it was recommended that a course in "civics", which stresses good 
citizenship and the responsibilities of a good citizen, should be introduced in schools 
right from primary level and that business ethics should be made to be a compulsory part 
of the curriculum of all institutions of higher learning. 217 
Respondents also recommended that Government should issue a strong public 
condemnation of unethical behaviour, such as corruption and the failure of politicians to 
216 An analysis of the results using the KW and MW tests (Panel B of Table 7.14) did not 
indicate any 
significant differences in average responses between groups for Q6(r). 
217 Some Universities in Uganda, such as Uganda Martyrs University, have already made the study of 
Business Ethics mandatory for all their students. 
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abide by the leadership code. Respondents argued that punitive measures should be taken 
against all public officials who were involved in such malpractices, without fear or 
favour, and that this should not be done selectively whereby some "untouchables" were 
not penalised for their misconduct. This course of action would, they argued, necessitate 
leadership by example, with greater political will and commitment to good governance 
required at all levels of Government. Measures such as imprisonment and seizure of the 
property of corrupt officials were proposed as a possible deterrent against corruption in 
the effort to promote good governance in Uganda. 218 
Other respondents thought that high unemployment compromised the practice of good 
governance as Ugandan workers were often desperate for jobs, and prepared to work 
under any conditions even if their rights were not respected. 219 Poor remuneration of 
regulators, employees, management and directors was perceived to be a factor that 
affected good governance, as it might encourage officials to be involved in corruption 
and bribery. Other factors affecting good governance were thought to include: greed by 
management and board members; lack of grievance procedures in organisations; 
backwardness; lack of commitment by management and board members; obsolete 
technology; lack of written codes of conduct for employees and management; "get-rich- 
quick" mentality; sectarianism based on tribe, religion or politics; poverty and high 
unemployment; ignorance; job insecurity; rich proprietors who had little formal education 
and did not appreciate the principles of good corporate governance of their companies; 
218 There was also concern among respondents that some employees, management and board members 
lacked a sense of professionalism and recommended that this professionalism should be promoted 
in all 
organisations. 
2 19 Lack of opportunities for career development was also seen as affecting the commitment of company 
employees. 
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and unclear auditing standards. These views are consistent with those expressed by 
interviewees in the previous chapter. 
7.10.6 Privatisation 
Question 6(i) sought to establish stakeholder perceptions as to whether or not corporate 
governance had improved in the privatised entities. The responses, as presented in Panels 
A and B of Table 7.14, indicate that stakeholder responses were split evenly between 
those who thought that there had been improvement (53) and those who did not (52); 
while the mean for all respondents (2.92) seemed to suggest that, on the whole, 
respondents did not take a strong view about the effect that privatisation had had on 
corporate governance in the companies concerned . 
220 The most optimistic group seemed 
to be the EDO group (mean = 3.29) which is composed of company executives, non- 
executive directors, executive directors and owner managers while the most pessimistic 
was the CIO group (2.46). It was not surprising that company executives and owner- 
managers perceived corporate governance in privatised companies in a favourable 
manner since they are the ones responsible for day-to-day running of the companies. 
The 
LRJ group (legislators, regulators and judiciary) seemed undecided (mean: 
3), while the 
CIO, CEA, and ACAD groups all had a mean of less than 3. 
These responses are worrying, in that they question whether the 
Ugandan Government 
has adopted the measures that are necessary to improve corporate governance 
in state 
220 A substantial number of respondents (46) were undecided. 
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owned companies following their privatisation. The hope seems to have been that the 
private ownership of the companies concerned would automatically lead to improvements 
in corporate governance. Interviewees in the previous chapter pointed out that the 
Government also wanted to save itself the money it was using to subsidise those 
corporations, most of which were loss making; the money saved could then be used to 
improve Ugandan public services. However, some respondents expressed concerns about 
Government accountability for the funds raised from the sale of the privatised entities. 
7.10.7 Policy Implications for the Donor Community 
Some respondents suggested in Q20 and Q21 that the international donor community 
should insist on good governance as a pre-requisite before developing countries such as 
Uganda receive aid. While this was seen as having the potential to improve corporate 
governance practices in Uganda, a number of respondents countered that some of the 
donor agencies need to improve governance in their own organisations. An example was 
given of a donor agency that sent its own agents from outside to be in charge of some 
projects in Uganda, but some of these agents ended up acting in a manner that was not 
transparent and accountable to the Ugandan authorities. Money was sent to the personal 
accounts of these individuals and there was no account of how the money was spent. 
Instead, the Ugandan counterparts were being asked by these individuals to sign 
statements verifying proper use of the funds without them handling the funds or verifying 
the accounts. Despite this, the role of the international donor community was seen as 
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being vital in putting pressure on all the relevant parties to ensure development of a more 
robust corporate governance system in Uganda. 
7.11 Summary 
The questionnaire survey that was administered to a cross-section of legislators, 
regulators, company employees, civil servants, academics, accountants, company 
executives, owner-managers of companies, individual investors, institutional investors, 
non-executive directors, executive directors and individuals working in the legal 
profession had the objective of establishing the perceptions of stakeholders towards the 
state of corporate governance and accountability in Uganda. The areas investigated 
included: the concept of corporate governance; the relevance and importance of corporate 
governance; applicability of corporate governance principles to listed companies, non- 
listed companies and state-owned companies; corporate social responsibility; the 
relevance of international corporate governance guidelines developed by the Western 
World; disclosure and transparency; the responsibilities of the board; the composition of 
the board; board committees and their composition; factors that affect corporate 
governance; stakeholder groups; stakeholders' rights and other matters affecting 
stakeholders (including shareholders); ownership structure and corporate governance; the 
extent of compliance with corporate governance guidelines by private and public sector 
corporations (both local and foreign-owned); the framework of corporate governance; 
and whether privatisation has improved corporate governance in privatised companies. 
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The respondents seemed to view corporate governance more from a stakeholder 
perspective than a principal/agent standpoint. The majority of respondents favoured the 
statement describing stakeholders as those individuals who are affected by, or who affect. 
the organisation's decisions and activities (mean of 4.29); this was followed by the 
understanding of stakeholders as all members of society (3.43). Although more 
respondents disagreed with the principal/agent view than those who agreed with it, the 
difference between those who agreed and those who disagreed was not statistically 
significant. The majority of respondents (86%) also agreed that CSR was an integral part 
of corporate governance. As pointed out in Chapter 6, the stakeholder approach presents 
problems in establishing a bond of accountability, as stipulated by Stewart (1984) in his 
Ladder of Accountability. It is difficult to pinpoint who can enforce sanctions against 
management and boards of companies in the event of these not meeting stakeholder 
expectations - unless stakeholder expectations are protected by law and, therefore, 
enforceable in courts of law. It was suggested in Chapter 6 that stakeholders could 
enforce their rights through shareholders who have substantial shareholdings or through 
the force of law (where applicable). 
Corporate governance was perceived as being important for the economic and social 
development of the country, creating wealth for shareholders, ensuring transparent 
management of resources, promoting accountability, reducing the level of corruption, 
managing risk, attracting both local and foreign investment and protecting the interests of 
all shareholders (including minority shareholders). Respondents felt that good corporate 
governance should apply to all private and public sector companies, whether listed or not, 
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although the extent of disclosure could vary according to ownership and size. It was also 
argued that improved governance practices would enable companies to get listed and 
have access to more capital on the Uganda Securities Exchange. 
It was observed, however, that there seemed to be little knowledge of the principles of 
corporate governance by board members, management and employees and that more 
needed to be done in order to train and sensitise various groups of stakeholders on their 
respective responsibilities and rights. The ICGU has been attempting to do this by 
conducting short courses for board members (mainly public sector members of the board 
and senior management), but these efforts need to be strengthened and extended to a 
wider public outside the capital city, Kampala. International corporate governance 
guidelines were seen by the respondents as being important because of the current trend 
towards globalisation; similarly, multinational investors will have an impact on local 
corporate governance practices and their investment decisions are likely to be influenced 
by the current principles and state of corporate governance in a target country. There was 
also concern that certain foreign investors do not respect the rights of the locals who 
work for them, and that some are not transparent, failing to disclose the actual results of 
their oPerations to the Ugandan Government authorities. Given the fact that most 
Ugandan companies are either family-owned or sole proprietorships, there was need for 
these owners to be convinced about the benefits of improved governance of the 
companies they own and manage. 
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Respondents supported the view that there should be adequate, accurate and timely 
disclosure of the following information: financial and operating results; company 
objectives; details about board members, including the selection process, other company 
directorships and whether they were considered to be independent non-executive 
directors; governance structures and policies; major share ownership; impact of 
organisation's activities on society and the environment; remuneration policy; material 
interest in any transaction or matter affecting the company; foreseeable risk factors; and 
related party transactions. Stewart (1984) discussed the Ladder of Accountability in the 
context of information needs for stakeholders to be able to evaluate the activities and 
policies of elected officials to establish whether their performance met the expectations of 
the electorate. The above list of required disclosures would provide information to 
stakeholders to enable them to evaluate and establish the accountability of companies and 
their officials. However, respondents commented, in questions 20 and 21, that there were 
poor disclosure practices and restrictions on access to relevant information. The list of 
disclosures, therefore, appears to be more of a "wish list" than reality. The transparency 
required in providing appropriate information seems to be lacking and there is not much 
that stakeholders can go by in order to assess the performance of management and board 
members. The view of respondents suggested that management and boards just 
communicated information to shareholders in AGMs and published summary statements 
in the public media but were not open to critical evaluation; there was hardly any room 
for the Ugandan minority shareholders imposing sanctions against management, 
especially those of multinational companies. Family-owned companies and sole 
proprietorships were not required to publish their annual reports in the public media. The 
302 
absence of adequate, accurate and timely information seems to be a major hindrance to 
the accountability of firms in Uganda. 
The views of the respondents regarding board composition were similar to those of the 
Combined Code (2003), namely that: the majority should be independent non-executive 
directors; the chairman should be an independent non-executive director; and the chief 
executive should not at the same time be the board chairperson. The criteria for the 
selection of board members and the specification of their composition and responsibilities 
were seen as needing attention so as to improve transparency; board committees and their 
composition was also seen as an important factor in the governance of companies. 
Respondents were of the view that new board members should receive induction into the 
activities of the companies and the way the particular companies operate so that they can 
exercise their roles from an informed position; it was also recommended that there should 
be ongoing training for board members and senior management so that they can keep 
current with developments in the field of corporate governance. Respondents expressed 
the need for clear codes or rules of conduct for employees and management to be drawn 
up so as to guide them in their work and relationships. 
The responsibilities of the board identified by respondents were similar to those 
contained in Westem models of corporate govemance, namely: acting in good faith, with 
due diligence and care, and in the best interests of the company and its shareholders; 
treating all shareholders equally; ensuring the integrity of accounting and financial 
reporting systems; exercising objective, independent judgement on corporate affairs; 
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monitoring the effectiveness of a company's governance practices and making changes as 
needed; aligning key executive and board remuneration with longer-term interests of the 
company and its shareholders; being responsible for selecting, compensating, monitoring 
and,, when necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning; and 
monitoring and managing potential conflicts of management, board members and 
shareholders - including related party transactions. Respondents felt that board members 
should also take into account the interests of other stakeholders. Several comments were 
made in questions 20 and 21 to the effect that both the attitudes of management and board 
members, and the personal traits of management, especially the chief executive, were 
considered to be major factors in corporate governance as they influence the behaviour of 
those officials in the conduct of their duties. The integrity of company officials was seen 
as a pre-requisite for the good governance of companies. Issues of integrity and personal 
traits are likely to affect those officials' accountability for probity. 
The following factors were identified as affecting corporate governance in private sector 
companies in Uganda: corruption and bribery; conflicts of interest; sectarianism; non- 
compliance with laws and regulations; inadequate infrastructure (and resources) for 
regulatory and enforcement agencies; fear and respect for those in authority; and 
insignificant fines that do not encourage compliance with laws. In addition to the factors 
that affected private sector companies, other factors, such as political interference, lack of 
political will to combat corruption, lack of political will to enforce compliance, and 
incompetent personnel were mentioned as affecting public sector corporations in Uganda. 
The above factors affect the implementation of accountability for both legality and 
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probity in Ugandan firms. Fear and respect for the authority of elders was not an issue 
that generated significant support in either private or public sector companies, although 
interviewees in Chapter 6 had thought that such fear and respect affected the governance 
of companies. It was also argued that because most Ugandan companies are either 
family-owned or owned by sole proprietors, the owner-managers might not value the 
need for corporate governance since, by definition, there is no separation between 
ownership and management. 
There seemed to be general agreement that the structures required for a robust framework 
of corporate governance are in place in Uganda. These structures included the legal, the 
regulatory, the political and the economic framework. The legal framework consists of 
laws passed by parliament; these specify the manner in which companies are to be set up 
and managed and the specific returns to be submitted to the various regulatory agencies. 
Failure to comply with legal requirements constitutes criminal offences whose remedies 
are enforceable in courts of law. Accountability for legality can be identified by 
establishing whether companies have conformed to legal and regulatory requirements. 
Some sections of the law, such as the Companies Act of Uganda, stipulate how 
companies are to relate with shareholders and other stakeholders. These sections of the 
law, as well companies' internal codes and rules of conduct could be used to assess 
whether companies have complied with accountability for probity. Practices such as 
corruption and bribery, conflicts of interest and not declaring related party transactions 
are covered by law and could be the subject of accountability for both legality and 
probity. The accounting framework is regulated by the statute which established and 
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specified the role of the Institute of Public Certified Accountants of Uganda; additionally. 
some of the financial and operating reporting requirements are included in the Companies 
Act of Uganda. The accounting framework, therefore, has the backing of the force of law 
in Uganda which can be used to compel financial reports to be prepared and presented in 
a specified manner. Non-compliance with these requirements would violate 
accountability for legality. The financial and other company reports provide information 
which could be used to assess the company's performance, process and programme 
accountability. However, it was felt that some of these frameworks need updating, with 
the resources provided to enable the regulatory and enforcement agencies to perform their 
work adequately. The accounting framework also needs to be clarified so that uniform 
accounting and auditing standards can be followed by all companies to facilitate the 
interpretation and comparison of results between different companies and financial 
periods. In addition, the economic policies of the country (together with cultural, social 
and ethical factors) need to be scrutinised for their contribution to the promotion of good 
corporate governance in Uganda. Overall, it was clear that a lot of improvements are seen 
as being needed if the frameworks in place are to form the basis for enhanced corporate 
governance in both listed and unlisted companies in Uganda, whether locally-owned or 
owned by foreign nationals. 
Summary of Differences in Means Between Different Groups 
Inspection of Table 7.15 reveals that the EDO group had the most idiosyncratic 
responses, with 23 significant differences with the ACAD group, 22 with the CEA group 
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and 20 with the CIO group. In the discussion of results presented in this chapter, it has 
been suggested that the EDO group appears more knowledgeable in corporate 
governance matters than the others, since its members deal with governance and 
accountability issues as part of their duties whereas others might not have had direct 
experience of those issues. Also, the CEA, being company people, presumably had first 
hand experience of company issues and were more knowledgeable in company matters 
than the academics who were answering based upon their theoretical knowledge; this 
may explain the 23 significant differences in average response between the two groups. 
The LRJ group tended to have the lowest number of significant differences from the other 
groups. This might reflect the possibility that the members of this group tended to be 
more analytical in their views, resulting in cautious and balanced answers that were 
shared by other groups. It is notable that the academics had the highest number of 
differences with both the EDO and the CEA groups which were composed of individuals 
who were actively involved in the running and management of companies. This evidence 
might reflect the fact that these academics were viewing issues from a broadly theoretical 
perspective whilst the EDO and CEA were basing their responses on the practical 
experiences that they had acquired in the firms. 
Table 7.15 Summary: The Mann Whitney Test 
Q Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp 
(LRJ, (LRJ, (LRJ, (LRJ, (CIO, (CIO, (CIO, (CEA (CEA, (EDO 
CIO) CEA) EDO) 
___ 
ACAD) CEA) EDO) ACAD) EDO) ACAD) ACAD) 
Number 
of times 8 6 10 10 12 20 9 22 23 23 
NOTE: This table summarises the total number of times that the MW test identified differences in averages 
between the respective groups for questions 2 to 14. (See Appendix 7.6 for details. 
) 
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This chapter has provided detailed evidence about the views of a wide cross-section of 
Ugandan stakeholders regarding corporate governance, accountability and closely-related 
issues such as corruption. The next chapter attempts to draw these findings together with 
those documented in Chapter 6 from the interviews to establish an overall picture of 
perceptions in Uganda regarding the key research questions examined in this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
Synthesis of Findings 
8.1 Introduction 
This study set out to examine the perceptions of stakeholders towards corporate 
governance in Uganda from an accountability perspective. These perceptions were 
studied in the context of the general literature on corporate governance, which is mainly 
based upon Westem models of corporate govemance. To this end, the key concepts 
underlying the notion of corporate governance in the literature (and the various codes of 
corporate governance adopted across the globe) were examined and presented to a cross- 
section of stakeholders in Uganda to elicit views regarding their applicability and 
relevance in Uganda. Perceptions of stakeholders were also sought regarding the state of 
corporate govemance and the factors that influence the practice of corporate govemance 
and accountability in Uganda; the framework within which this governance is practised 
was also examined. The aim of this chapter is to summarise the material in the previous 
seven chapters, drawing together the key findings from the interviews and questionnaire 
survey in the context of the accountability framework set out in Chapter 5, in particular 
Stewart's ladder model. 
The following research questions were identified in Chapter 1: 
1. How is corporate govemance understood in the Ugandan context? 
2. What do stakeholders perceive to be the current state of corporate governance and 
accountability in Uganda? 
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3. What factors influence the practice of corporate governance in Uganda? 
4. Does Uganda have an adequate framework to support the practice of corporate 
governance? 
5. Are there any stakeholder suggestions on how corporate governance practices can 
be improved in Uganda? 
6. To what extent are Western norms applicable to a developing nation such as 
Uganda? 
These questions appear to have been answered to a significant degree in the various 
chapters that make up this thesis. 
8.2 Understanding of The Concept of Corporate Governance 
The first research question concerned the issue of how corporate governance was 
understood in the Ugandan context. The interviews and the questionnaire survey 
addressed this question in Sections 6.2 and 7.2 respectively. 
Each of the interviewees defined the term "corporate governance" in a manner that was 
consistent with conventional stakeholder theory. The aspects that were mentioned most 
often in the context of defining corporate govemance were: mechanisms or systems for 
directing, controlling, managing and regulating organisations; concern for stakeholders 
that extends beyond shareholders; the promotion of probity, transparency and 
accountability in companies; and corporate social responsibility. One of the notable 
aspects of the concept of corporate govemance referred to by the interviewees was the 
311 
importance of a wide range of stakeholders extending beyond the firms' owners. Most 
interviewees appeared to adhere to the broad notion of corporate citizenship. arguing that 
corporations had to integrate into the economic and societal concerns of their community 
if they were to operate on a sustainable basis. 
The responses received from the questionnaire survey supported the views of the 
interviewees in that the statement to which the respondents agreed with most was one 
describing "corporate governance" in terms of an organisation's relationship with all 
those stakeholders who are affected by, or who affect, the organisation's decisions and 
activities. There was also strong agreement with the view that the term "corporate 
governance" refers to an organisation's relationship with all members of society, 
irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the operations of the organisation. 
The concern for a wider cross-section of stakeholders implies that companies are 
accountable for the effect of their policies, not only on the shareholders, but also to 
society as a whole. Examples of this latter type of accountability would relate, for 
example, to the impact of a company's operations on the ecological environment, 
employment and the level of economic development in a particular location and the 
country as a whole. The statement which received least support with respect to the 
definition of "corporate governance" was one describing the ten-n narrowly, in terms of 
an organisation's relationship with its owners. 22 1 This evidence is consistent with the 
African view of each member of society acting in a manner that is consistent with the 
well-being of the tribe, clan or family to which one belongs (although these traditions are 
22 ' Respondents also agreed that corporate social responsibility was an integral aspect of good corporate 
governance. 
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now beginning to fade as society evolves and as interaction with other cultures groxvs). 
The stakeholder notion of corporate governance highlights the need for a form of 
accountability that is consistent with Stewart's ladder of accountability since his ladder is 
aimed at government being accountable to different types of stakeholders. In the 
stakeholder context, businesses are perceived to be accountable not only to shareholders 
but also to others such as employees, customers, suppliers, govemment, regulatory 
authorities and others who affect or are affected by the activities and decisions of firms. 
The problem of applying Stewart's ladder to private companies is the difficulty of 
establishing and enforcing the bond of accountability. Among the proposals made in this 
thesis are the use of shareholders who have substantial shareholdings and the use of 
legislation to provide enforceable protection for the rights of other stakeholders. 
Companies are artificial Persons that come into existence in accordance with specific 
laws in each country; these laws and regulations also govern the manner in which 
companies operate and relate to various stakeholders in society. For example, in Uganda 
all companies are governed by the Companies Act (1964); this Act specifies the 
conditions for a company to be registered and managed, and the various obligations of 
companies with respect to shareholders, employees, as well as the various reports to be 
submitted to the respective regulatory authorities. Non-compliance can lead to 
prosecution in courts of law which assist in enforcing compliance with the various 
requirements of the law. There are also various acts and statutes passed by parliament to 
regulate companies. Some of these laws relate to a company's relationship with other 
stakeholders such as employees and society at large; examples include: labour laws, as 
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well as laws governing minimum wageS222, social security and protection of the 
environment. In this way, companies are perceived as legal persons who have both rights 
and obligations under the law. Conformity with these laws and regulations plaý's a role in 
Stewart's (1984) notion of accountability for legality. Companies are also required to be 
conscious of the effect of their activities on other stakeholders, even if there are no 
specific laws protecting stakeholders in certain instances; companies would, therefore, 
need to examine their policies and activities to determine whether they are proper and 
whether they portray good citizenship in promoting good neighbourliness. Such issues 
concern accountability for policy and probity. The question in such cases is whether 
communities can enforce their rights when these are not protected by law, and whether 
they can hold companies accountable for their policies and activities. Interviewees and 
questionnaire survey respondents asserted that communities could sanction companies by 
either refusing to do business with them or by denying them licence to operate, possibly 
by bringing pressure to bear on the various Government agencies responsible for granting 
the licences. Some of the community concerns might arise from the processes used by 
companies to manufacture their products; society could also hold companies accountable 
for the processes they use, in conformity with Stewart's notion of process accountability. 
8.3 The Current State of Corporate Governance in Uganda 
The second research question set out to examine the current state of corporate governance 
and accountability in Uganda. This question was answered in Sections 
6.2.3,6.2.6,6.4.2, 
222 The Uganda Government has still to establish meaningful laws that govern minimum wages 
for 
employees in the country. 
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7.2.5,7.26 and 7.9. The interviews established that the ICGU had published guidelines to 
govern corporate governance in Uganda in 2001; these guidelines were based on Western 
principles such as the OECD Principles (1999), the King Report 1 (1999) and the 
Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (1999). Both the 
interviewees and the questionnaire respondents observed that the Ugandan guidelines 
need revision to make them more relevant to the present situation in Uganda. Participants 
pointed to shortcomings in enforcement of compliance and argued that general 
compliance with corporate governance guidelines was poor in Ugandan firms, most 
especially in public sector corporations. However, both the interviewees and the 
questionnaire respondents agreed that the good governance of Ugandan corporations was 
important as it would improve accountability in Ugandan firms, reduce the level of 
corruption and help to attract both local and foreign investment. The ICGU has been 
conducting three-day seminars for board members to update them on good corporate 
governance principles; to-date, however, these seminars have largely been aimed at 
public sector board and senior management members in Kampala. Research participants 
highlighted the need for extending the courses in corporate governance to all parts of the 
country, thereby promoting knowledge of the principles and at the same time increasing 
the pool from which board members could be selected. 
8.4 Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in Uganda 
The third research question aimed at establishing the factors that influence the practice of 
corporate governance in Uganda. Interviewees identified the following 
factors as being 
315 
among those that affect the good governance of both private and public sector firms: 
corruption and bribery; conflicts of interest; sectarianism; non-compliance with laws and 
regulations; inadequate infrastructure (and resources) for regulatory and enforcement 
agencies; and insignificant fines that fail to encourage compliance with laws and 
regulations. The questionnaire respondents confirmed these factors but also noted that 
corruption and bribery, conflicts of interest and sectarianism affect public sector 
corporations more than private sector ones. These respondents also noted that public 
sector corporations tend to be less accountable than private sector ones. 
These views may reflect the fact that most private sector companies in Uganda are either 
sole proprietorships or family owned and there is no necessary separation of beneficial 
ownership and management. This would eliminate the need for management's 
accountability to shareholders (unless it is accountability to members of the family - in 
the case of family ownership). What would be left is accountability to other stakeholders 
such as employees, regulatory agencies, relevant Government organs and the community, 
where applicable. Listed companies would still need to account to shareholders and the 
other stakeholders as required. With respect to public sector firms, the ownership is not 
so clearly defined in the sense that there are no specific beneficial owners; Government 
seems to be an amorphous entity with specific individuals not gaining or suffering loss 
from the performance of these firms. Management and board members, therefore, do not 
have the same pressure to be accountable, as in private sector companies, since the funds 
belong to everybody. These firms are supposed to be overseen by the line ministers 
through the designated departments of the relevant ministry, with the line minister 
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appointing board members and senior management, on the advice of technical 
committees. However, interviewees noted that ministers do not necessarily appoint the 
best candidates for the job and may base their selection on political considerations and 
personal allegiances. These factors may affect the extent of accountability of those board 
members and senior management since there are no shareholders to hold them 
accountable. Such appointments may also result in political interference, without board 
members and senior management being able to stand up against it since they depend on 
these politicians for their continued employment. 
The above issues affect the accountability of firms when it comes to accounting for the 
different rungs of the ladder proposed by Stewart. For example, there has been an outcry 
against corruption in Uganda, especially in public sector corporations. Corruption and 
bribery are illegal and are against the laws of the country. Conflicts of interest are 
specifically mentioned in the Companies Act of Uganda; any involvement in such acts 
without proper disclosure at the relevant levels is also in violation of the Companies Act 
which is backed by the force of law. Non-compliance with the various laws and 
regulations is also contrary to the requirement for companies to act within the laws of the 
country in which they operate. These factors, therefore, directly relate to accountability 
for legality and are enforceable through courts of law. The factors identified in the study 
may fall under Stewart's notion of accountability for probity in as far as they reflect the 
conduct of company officials and bring into judgement the appropriateness of their 
conduct in carrying out their duties. 
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8.5 Adequacy of Framework to Support Corporate Governance 
The fourth research question asked whether there was an adequate framework to support 
the practice of corporate governance in Uganda. This question was examined under the 
following headings: legal framework; regulatory and supervisory framework: accounting 
framework; political framework; and cultural, social, ethical and economic factors. The 
process of privatisation in Uganda was also taken into account when seeking answers to 
this question. Interviewees' perceptions were presented in detail in Section 6.3, while 
those of the questionnaire survey respondents are covered in Section 7.10. 
8.5.1 Legal Framework 
One of the interviewees stressed that companies must conduct their affairs in accordance 
with the laws of the country concerned and that the board and senior management of a 
company have to ensure that no laws are violated. The basic law that governs all 
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companies in Uganda is the Companies Act of 1948 (last revised in 1964) . It is worth 
noting that most of the interviewees perceived the laws that govern corporate governance 
in Uganda as either not being adequate or as being outdated and needing revision. Issues 
such as the protection of minority shareholders, minimum wages for employees, 
protection of whistleblowers, the independence of the judiciary and the monetary value of 
fines in cases of non-compliance with regulations were mentioned as needing attention in 
Uganda. Other issues concerned selective enforcement of laws (particularly in the case of 
223 There are also various Acts and Statutes passed by Parliament to regulate the management of 
companies. 
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corrupt officials who had protection from high ranking political figures). and obsolete 
information systems and lack of human, material and financial resources. The 
questionnaire survey respondents had similar perceptions regarding the legal framework 
in Uganda (see Section 7.10.1). These views highlight the need to act in accordance with 
the law and to be held accountable for non-compliance; the need for companies to be held 
accountable for ensuring that they act in accordance with applicable laws is therefore 
evident in the responses. Due to the importance of legal issues, many Ugandan 
companies hire lawyers to act as company secretaries or retain law firms to advise them 
on legal issues. The views of the research participants, however, indicate that there are 
some weaknesses in imPlementing accountability for legality due to inadequate or 
obsolete laws and selective enforcement, in addition to minimal fines that do not 
encourage compliance. It is evident from these findings that the Ugandan legal 
framework needs attention in order to promote good corporate governance. 
8.5.2 Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
The regulatory and supervisory framework was covered in Sections 6.3.2 and 7.10.2. 
Interviewees noted that there are various regulatory and supervisory agencies that are 
entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that companies adhere to Ugandan 
laws and 
regulations. Examples of these agencies were given in Section 6.3.2. While some of these 
agencies, for example the BoU, were thought to be effective, others, such as the 
Registrar 
General's Office were perceived to be ineffective in enforcing governance regulations. 
Some of the problems encountered by these agencies in playing their roles were: 
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inadequate financing, personnel, transport and obsolete information technology. Other 
factors mentioned included companies not keeping proper financial and other required 
records, as well as corruption and insufficient training for regulatory and supervison., 
personnel. Some interviewees also mentioned that various regulations were imposed on 
companies wi out consultation and were not tailored to the Ugandan environment; these 
participants argued that due consultation would improve the quality of regulations and 
also ensure backing by companies. 
The questionnaire survey respondents expressed similar views as those of the 
interviewees. Because of the corruption that was perceived to be prevalent in Uganda, 
neither the interviewees, nor the questionnaire respondents, could categorically affirm 
that regulatory agencies had the power and authority to enforce laws and regulations in 
Uganda. There was, therefore, general agreement among both the interviewees and the 
respondents that there was poor enforcement of laws and regulations relating to the 
nation's system of corporate governance. Respondents also noted that there appeared to 
be poor supervision of public sector corporations by their parent ministries. Poor 
supervision of compliance with laws and regulations brings into question the extent to 
which true accountability for legality and probity exists among Ugandan firms. 
Compliance with laws and regulations would foster such accountability and would be 
considered desirable, but it appears that the regulatory and supervisory authorities have 
limitations which affect their ability to enforce compliance and administer effective 
sanctions against companies that do not comply. The question of inadequate fines also 
emerged from the research and regulation might usefully re-examine this issue. 
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8.5.3 Accounting Framework 
The accounting framework was examined in Sections 6.3.3 and 7.10.3 of the precedinto, 
chapters. Interviewees pointed out that various companies use a range of different 
accounting standards; some employ those of the UK, while others use the US standards 
published by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The interviewees 
suggested that this diversity makes it difficult to undertake meaningful evaluation and 
comparison of performance between different companies. The questionnaire survey 
established that most of the respondents' companies use MRS, with the rest adopting UK 
or Ugandan Accounting standards. This situation points to the need for harmonisation in 
the use of accounting standards in preparing financial statements in Uganda. During the 
interviews, the CEO of the ICPAU admitted that the Institute did not have sufficient 
resources to monitor companies, or to follow up the work of accountants in Uganda to 
enforce compliance with the IFRS. Avenues should, therefore, be sought on how to 
improve the situation so that accounting information can be prepared and disclosed in 
accordance with high quality standards of accounting as well as financial and non- 
financial disclosure. Business Schools could also usefully promote MRS by teaching 
accounting based upon them; the researcher's personal experience indicates that, 
currently, lecturers in Ugandan schools appear to choose textbooks on an ad-hoc basis 
without verifying the standards used in those books. 
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The evidence of a perceived need for a coherent and robust accounting framework 
highlights the need for adequate and reliable information which can be used to evaluate 
the performance, processes and policies used by company officials in achieving company 
goals and objectives. Relevant parties such as shareholders and tax authorities can then 
hold the companies accountable for maximising shareholder value and paying due taxes, 
as well as paying dividends and meeting other company commitments. NVithin Stewart's 
ladder framework, accounting information thereby enables stakeholders to assess the 
company's accountability for performance, processes, programmes and policies. The 
information also enables the regulatory authorities to ascertain ý, vhen companies have 
complied with legal requirements to record transactions in accordance Nvith the 
accounting standards sanctioned by law in a given country, therefore leading to 
accounting for legality. It is evident from the views of the interviewees and the 
questionnaire survey respondents that the mechanisms and systems in place need 
improvement and harmonisation in order to provide the information required for proper 
accountability. Auditing practices were also perceived to be inadequate and subject to 
corruption in some cases. There was, therefore, little confidence in the audit function 
providing independent and reliable assurance that financial statements fairly reflect the 
substance of the transactions of the companies. The disclosures (or lack of disclosure) 
made by companies in their financial and other annual reports can assist in evaluating the 
appropriateness of the judgements behind company transactions and so help in providing 
information for holding the officials accountable for probity. 
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8.5.4 Political Framework 
The political framework was examined in Sections 6.3.4 and 7.10.4. The general 
consensus among the interviewees was that a nation's political environment does affect 
the practice of corporate governance in that country in several identifiable ways. The 
interviewees argued that factors such as Government's fiscal and monetary policies (as 
well as security, stability and political leadership in a nation) could have a strong 
influence on corporate governance. There was concern that political interference with the 
work of regulatory and supervisory bodies, as well as in the management of public sector 
corporations, was adversely affecting corporate governance practices in Ugandan 
companies. On the whole, the interviewees doubted the ability of the current Ugandan 
parliament to enact laws that were appropriate for assisting in the practice of good 
governance. This opinion reflected perceptions of corruption, lack of integrity and vested 
interests among some of the parliamentarians; there was also a feeling that some 
Members of Parliament did not understand the concepts underlying good corporate 
governance. In addition, respondents to the questionnaire survey did not agree with a 
statement suggesting that the political climate in Uganda was conducive to the practice of 
good corporate governance in private or public sector companies. Further concerns were 
expressed via the survey that the prevailing political climate does not promote respect for 
the rights of stakeholders, and that continued ownership of shares in "privatised" firms 
was a breeding ground for political interference in the running of those companies. 
Clearly, there are major concerns about the political climate in Uganda with respect to 
promoting corporate governance in Ugandan firms; this appears to be more pronounced 
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in the case of public sector corporations where political interference is perceived as being 
rampant. The findings reported here indicate that political interference affects public 
sector corporations more than private sector ones, and suggest that lack of political will to 
combat corruption also affects the public sector more than the private sector. 224 Although 
the private sector is also affected by the political climate (including Governmental fiscal 
and monetary policies), the responses seem to point to the fact that poor governance in 
private sector companies cannot be entirely blamed on the political framework. It appears 
that the focus of attention should also be directed to the management and board of private 
sector companies if tangible improvements are to be effected; various stakeholders, such 
as shareholders, might need to take a more active role in ensuring the good governance of 
the companies in which they have a stake. 
Within Stewart's ladder framework, political decisions which affect the operations of 
companies fall under "policy" accountability. Governments are held accountable for the 
fiscal and monetary policies that they formulate to govern the business sector in a 
country; these policies, together with various legislation and infrastructure put in place by 
Government, affect the way companies are managed, as well as the social and economic 
development of a country. Political interference brings into question the appropriateness 
of those actions thereby relating to the notion of accountability for probity within 
Stewart's framework. In this context, the question might relate to the identity of those 
best suited to holding Government and politicians as a whole accountable for their 
policies and inappropriate behaviour. Stewart himself suggested that the electorate should 
224 Lack of political will to enforce compliance was also thought to affect the public sector more than the 
private sector. 
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hold Government and political figures accountable by voting out of office those officials 
who fell short of voters' expectations and standards. This mechanism for discharging 
accountability does not seem to be working in Uganda, as some political figures act in a 
manner that suggests they see themselves as being above the law. Proper accountabil't' 
for policy and probity, therefore, seems to be lacking in Uganda with public sector firms 
affected most strongly. 
8.5.5 Economic, Social, Cultural and Ethical Factors 
The interviewees viewed a range of cultural and social factors as having an impact on the 
practice of corporate governance in Ugandan companies, including: pressure from 
extended families and clan members for financial support; respect for elders (allied to due 
deference to one' superiors and non-confrontation of those in authority); the head of a 
family making decisions for family-owned businesses without expecting to be questioned 
about those decisions; attitudes towards employment; attitudes towards women (and the 
dominance of men); tribalism; and the practice of glorifying those who acquired wealth - 
irrespective of the means used to acquire it. Interviewees also pointed out that a range of 
ethical factors could affect the practice of corporate governance; these included: threats 
of a person being sacked for exposing an official who was doing something wrong; 
sexual harassment against staff; compromising behaviour of management in dealing with 
junior staff; political appointments that failed to take account of qualifications or 
competence regarding assigned duties; recruitment of unqualified and incompetent 
individuals on other grounds; corruption and bribery; insufficient disclosure of 
accounting information; non-adherence to the codes of conduct governing various 
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corporations; lack of integrity, honesty and accountability; and the tendency of some 
politicians to demand favours from the officers of public sector corporations under peril 
of losing jobs if the demands were not satisfied. The interviews also revealed that some 
economic factors (such as the level of remuneration, poverty, inflation and high taxes) 
were thought to have the potential to affect the behaviour of company board members 
and employees, although one interviewee argued that being rich is not a pre-requisite for 
honesty and that not all poor people are thieves or corrupt. Respondents to the 
questionnaire survey generally agreed with the views of the interviewees, however, they 
suggested that fear and respect for those in authority (rather than fear and respect for the 
authority of elders per se) seem to affect the practice of corporate governance in private 
sector corporations; in contrast, public sector corporations seem to be affected by both. 
The findings from both the interviews and questionnaire survey indicate that economic, 
social, cultural and ethical factors have an impact on the level of accountability in 
Ugandan firms. Company officials seem to be under pressure to present financial 
statements with positive and improved results. As a consequence of this, officials may be 
tempted to evade taxes or to manipulate their financial statements so that they appear 
more profitable than in reality. Uganda is not alone in this respect, as examples of cases 
such as Enron and Parmalat demonstrate. Within Stewart's ladder framework, such 
machinations are relevant to the issues of accountability for performance and, arguably, 
legality. Social, cultural and ethical factors may have a bearing on accountability for 
probity if the officials are drawn to use of inappropriate means to satisfy the demands and 
tendencies arising from such factors. It therefore follows that the appropriateness of 
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one5s actions in conducting company affairs is an important aspect of corporate 
governance irrespective of whether the companies concerned are private or public sector- 
based. 
Comments made by both the interviewees and the respondents to the questionnaire 
survey indicate that there is a need for moral rehabilitation at all levels of Ugandan 
society, so as to improve the level of corporate governance in the country. Education in 
moral, ethical and social values based upon a sound cultural background seems to be in 
order and the researcher would support the calls made by the participants in this research 
for this process to start in Ugandan citizens' early formative years, including the teaching 
of civics in primary schools and ethics in higher institutions of leaming. This 
development should take place concurrently with the imposition of stiff punitive 
measures, sufficient to dissuade any individual from contemplating behaviour contrary to 
the notion of good corporate governance in both private sector and public sector 
corporations. The researcher believes that, ultimately, it is up to each individual to 
appreciate the value of good corporate governance and to practise it. 
8.5.6 Privatisation in Uganda 
The Ugandan Government decided to privatise most of the nation's state-owned 
corporations in the 1990s in the hope that de-facto corporate governance would improve 
in those firms, thereby encouraging private investment, and relieving the Government of 
the need for subsidies. In principle, the interviewees expressed support 
for the 
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privatisation programme, arguing that it would help to improve accountability, the quality 
of products and services, and the quality of management. However, the interviewees also 
expressed the view that the privatisation process had not been handled in a transparent 
and accountable manner and that there was some political interference in the selection of 
potential buyers for those companies. Concern was also expressed regarding 
accountability for the proceeds from the sales, and the manner in which that money was 
used. Moreover, participants in the questionnaire survey did not seem to agree with the 
view that the privatisation of state-owned enterprises had improved the practice of 
corporate governance and accountability therein. These respondents felt that the Ugandan 
Government had failed to put in place mechanisms to help improve the governance of the 
companies that were being privatised. This evidence suggests that for future 
privatisations, Government should consider the ability of the potential buyers to improve 
the governance of target companies and, more generally, that there should be a 
mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the good governance of all companies in 
Uganda. 
The issues raised regarding privatisation relate to the implementation of programmes and 
the processes used to achieve them. Research participants also questioned whether the 
objectives of privatisation in improving corporate governance had been achieved. The 
findings of the research indicate that stakeholders were concerned about programme, 
process and policy accountability, as well as performance accountability. Privatisation 
itself was a result of a statute passed by parliament and so had some elements of legality. 
While the policy itself seems to have received support, apart from the fact that some 
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participants would have preferred a greater extent of ownership by Ugandans, the general 
assessment of programme, process and perfon-nance was not very positive. Issues of 
accountability and transparency seem to have marred the success of the programme. 
8.6 Stakeholder Suggestions 
The fifth research question was whether there were any stakeholder suggestions on how 
corporate governance practices could be improved in Uganda. 
Research participants suggested a number of tangible ways in which corporate 
governance in Uganda could be improved, and accountability to stakeholders enhanced. 
First, courses for actual and potential board members should be conducted in all regions 
of Uganda, and not restricted to Kampala. Second, there should be ongoing courses or 
seminars for board members to deepen their understanding of corporate governance 
principles and also to keep them up-to-date with current developments in theory and 
practice. Third, the establishment of an Institute of Directors for Uganda would 
potentially help in terms of providing technical support to directors and helping them 
perform better in their roles. Fourth, the formation of stakeholders' advocacy groups 
would assist stakeholders such as shareholders to make decisions about their companies, 
and might be useful in promoting the rights of groups such as employees, customers and 
suppliers. Fifth, there is a clear need for a forum for major participants in the corporate 
governance framework such as regulators, legislators, accountants, the ICGU, academics, 
investors and other relevant parties to enable them to develop a more robust but workable 
corporate govemance framework in Uganda. Sixth, it would be desirable to companies to 
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spell out how accountability to a diverse group of stakeholders can be discharged at a 
practical level. For example, the reasonable expectations and rights of employees, as key 
contributors to a firm's activities, could be laid out in a formal way. Seventh, clear 
recommendations should be considered regarding the composition of the board and its 
committees, as well as the term of service for board members, on-going re-election of 
board members and the notion of independence. Eighth, The Companies Act of Uganda 
(and other related Acts and Statutes of parliament that govern corporate governance in 
Uganda) need urgent revision to make them relevant to the promotion of corporate 
governance in Uganda. Ninth, enforcement of corporate governance principles in both 
listed and un-listed companies needs to be planned for in conjunction with ICGU, the 
USE, the CMA and the Registrar General's office. In terms of the last two points, careful 
consideration needs to be given to whether a self-regulatory regime (such as in the UK) 
or a legally mandated system (such as in the US) is required. The evidence in this thesis 
suggests that the latter approach is more appropriate in the current Ugandan climate, 
particularly if accountability to stakeholders underlies the nation's corporate governance 
practices. There is also a need to consider how the moral rehabilitation of Ugandans can 
be carried out at all levels of society; the teaching of civics, political education and ethics 
in schools and institutions of higher learning should be considered so as to instil good 
citizenship and social responsibility. In short, the thesis has demonstrated a real and 
urgent need for improvements in Ugandan corporate governance practices, if any 
meaningful level of accountability to interested stakeholders is to develop. 
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8.7 Applicability of Western norms to Developing Nations 
The sixth, and last, research question asked to what extent Western nonns of corporate 
governance were applicable to a developing nation such as Uganda. The findings of this 
study indicate that Western norms of corporate governance are applicable to a deN, eloping 
nation such as Uganda. However, the actual implementation has to take into account the 
country specific factors so as to be practicable. 
It was noted in Section 8.2 that the research participants' concept of corporate 
governance placed importance on a wide range of stakeholders extending beyond the 
firms' owners. This stakeholder approach is similar to the German corporate governance 
principles where, for instance, employees are perceived as stakeholders in companies. 
However, there is increasing worldwide concern about the effect of companies' activities 
on the environment (both human and ecological), as is seen in Greenpeace movements 
and laws relating to environmental protection, in addition to the growing interest in 
ethical funds. Concern for accountability, transparency and integrity also seems to be 
universal in character and applies to all nations, irrespective of the level of economic 
development. 
It was also pointed out that developing nations often base their company law on Westem 
models. The Companies Act of Uganda, which contains various regulations regarding the 
governance of Ugandan companies, was given as an example; the Act is 
based on the 
British Companies Act of 1948. It was, therefore, argued that developing nations have 
already been using Western norms of corporate governance to manage their companies. 
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Questionnaire respondents generally concurred with the principles of corporate 
governance laid out in the UK Combined Code and the OECD Principles. There was 
support for the principles contained in these Western norms of corporate governance 
regarding the composition of the board (Section 7.5.1), the responsibilities of the board 
(7.5.2), board committees (7.5.3), composition of board committees (7.5.4) and the rights 
of stakeholders (including shareholders). There was also support for companies that do 
not conform to the principles having to comply or explain, while other respondents felt 
that companies that do not comply should be de-listed. There was also support for 
companies providing relevant and timely information (including annual reports) to board 
members, regulatory agencies and other concerned stakeholders. It can, therefore, be 
concluded that Western norms of corporate governance are applicable to developing 
nations such as Uganda, but they have to be adapted to local circumstances. 
8.8 Summary 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Stewart's (1984) "ladder" framework appeared to provide a 
useful potential lens for viewing the findings, since the governance of private, state and 
semi-state owned enterprises was being examined. Stewart primarily designed the ladder 
to examine public sector accountability by government but also acknowledged that it 
could be used to examine managerial and commercial accountability in both public and 
private sector enterprises. Stewart's main assumption was that for accountability to hold 
there must be a bond of accountability whereby one party is required to give an account 
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to another party in a specified area and the party receiving the account has enforceable 
powers to hold the account giver accountable. Stewart's ladder consists of probity and 
legality, process, performance, programme and policy accountability; the present studý' 
was therefore analysed in the context of these five bases, but most especially using the 
steps of probity and legality. 
Ugandan companies are incorporated in accordance with specific laws which regulate 
their operation in the country. In addition, companies have to conform to various laws 
that regulate the conduct of their business; these laws are supposed to be enforceable in 
courts of law either by regulatory authorities or by stakeholders who are affected and are 
entitled to legal remedy. However, both the interviewees and questionnaire respondents 
expressed concern about the poor compliance by companies with some of the laws and 
regulations in Uganda. Regulatory agencies which are supposed to enforce these laws and 
regulations are ill-equipped or compromised by corruption in enforcing accountability for 
legality. The evidence from the current research, therefore, suggests that Stewart's 
accountability for legality needs attention in Ugandan companies in order to promote 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
Accountability for probity also seems to be an issue of great concern in Ugandan private 
sector corporations. Both the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents decried the 
prevailing levels of corruption, bribery and fraud in some of the Ugandan firms, 
particularly the public sector ones. These concerns touch on accountability for both 
legality and probity since they are against the law in Uganda. The preparation of financial 
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statements which are presented to shareholders was also questioned since some research 
participants expressed the view that some accounts did not reflect the true state of affairs 
of the companies concerned. Other factors that were believed to influence the governance 
of companies were ethical, cultural, social and economic factors, as Nvell as political 
interference. All these issues may have an impact on the appropriateness of the conduct 
of board members and company executives. In all cases where company officials' 
conduct was thought to be illegal, concerned stakeholders and regulatory agencies have 
the option to seek enforceable legal remedies. The details of participants' views were 
presented in the sections dealing with the framework of corporate governance in Uganda. 
The evidence from the research, therefore, indicates that Ugandan companies are subject 
to accountability for probity; however, research participants were of the view that this 
accountability left a lot to be desired in practice. 
Research participants were concerned about the processes used by firms and the impact 
of those processes on the community where specific industries are located in Uganda. 
Potential harmful processes include disposal of industrial waste and air pollution arising 
from emission of gases from factories. Stakeholders would be affected by these processes 
and would be entitled to legal redress if they could prove that they were negatively 
affected. This could be done either directly by affected stakeholders going to courts of 
law, or indirectly through regulatory agencies such as the National Environment and 
Management Authority. Although interviewees and questionnaire survey respondents did 
not address the question of processes such as efficiency of procedures, as well as time 
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and effort spent, these issues are of interest to stakeholders in as far as they affect the 
wealth and well-being that is supposed to accrue to them. 
Interviewees expressed concern about remuneration policies in Uganda and noted that 
they were not linked to the actual performance of company executives, especially in 
public sector corporations. However some interviewees noted that some private sector 
companies had similar problems and gave examples of some multinational companies 
which siphon off revenue from Uganda by using management contracts where 
remuneration was not necessarily linked to performance. The corollary to this practice is 
that the revenue left for Ugandan shareholders is decreased while that accruing to the 
shareholders of parent companies increases. Performance measurement and 
compensation was, therefore, an issue where interviewees were of the view that there was 
need for greater accountability. The performance of companies is also measured by 
comparing actual and budgeted activities and revenue. This is an area that research 
participants were also of the view that company executives should be held accountable 
for, with performance reflected in their compensation. Another concern was about the 
evaluation of the performance of board members and who should perform those 
evaluations as well as how they should be performed. The participants felt that those 
members whose performance was unsatisfactory should not continue as members of the 
board. This point needs attention and standards against which board members are to be 
evaluated should be specified. In all these cases the need for performance accountability 
was highlighted by research participants. 
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The notion of programme accountability was highlighted, particularly in the interviews 
where participants felt that there was poor accountability for programmes especially in 
the public sector. The privatisation process of formerly state-owned entities in Uganda 
was mentioned as a glaring example of lack of programme accountability. There was a 
feeling that the programme had not been properly planned and that both the 
implementation and accountability for funds raised from the process were poor. Although 
the private sector was not specifically examined under programme accountability, it may 
be noted that companies have various programmes such as staff welfare, setting up a new 
branch, capturing a specified market share or introducing new products and new markets. 
Stewart's notion of programme accountability is applicable in the sense that boards of 
directors can hold company executives answerable for the implementation of planned 
programmes, just as shareholders (where shareholders have the power to do so) can hold 
boards and top management answerable for the achievement of programmes approved in 
shareholder meetings. Shareholders can express their displeasure by not approving board 
and executive remuneration packages which are incentive related in the event of set goals 
and objectives not being attained by companies. Accountability for programmes might be 
more difficult to enforce in the stakeholder context but, presumably, this could be done 
by civic organisations not approving planning permissions or even boycotting doing 
business with companies that do not implement programmes that are beneficial to 
society. Power centres and enforceable sanctions that can be used to hold those 
individuals accountable need to be specified. This may be through courts of 
law where 
legal remedies are specified or through other sanctions against 
individuals whose 
programme accountability is found wanting. 
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Both performance and programme evaluation are aspects of a board's responsibilities as 
board members assess the performance of company executives regarding whether they 
have achieved specified goals and objectives; financial and non-financial incentives such 
as promotions and various perks and remuneration packages may be linked to the 
findings of such an evaluation. A negative evaluation could result in some members of 
management having their services with the company terminated due to poor performance 
or failure to meet specified goals and objectives. In the case of Uganda, there seems to be 
little accountability by companies for performance and programmes. Ugandan 
shareholders do not have effective powers to impose sanctions against board members 
and senior comPany executives because of their minority shareholdings. The stock 
market is not very active and shareholders do not have many alternative investment 
opportunities; market control by exit or voice option may not work just as threats of 
takeovers are not relevant in Uganda. The evidence from the research suggests that, while 
there is a need for both performance and programme accountability, the actual practice in 
Uganda does not reflect that companies are actually being accountable to stakeholders in 
those respects. 
The views gathered from interviewees and questionnaire survey respondents indicate that 
there is poor accountability for policy in both public and private sector entities. 
Participants argue that, although there is need for companies to be held accountable for 
the policies they follow (or do not follow), the actual implementation of policy 
accountability is poor due to ineffective enforcement of laws and regulations. 
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Shareholders and other stakeholders do not have much say in evaluating the policies 
followed, or not followed, by boards and company executives in private sector 
companies. There has been some selective action by government following public 
outcries by stakeholders regarding the activities of certain public sector entities; some 
boards have been suspended and others appointed. This is a step in the right direction but 
more needs to be done. The USE and CMA need to take action to strengthen the rights of 
Ugandan minority shareholders and other stakeholders who affect, or are affected by, the 
activities of private sector firms, especially where these rights are not presently protected 
by law. These bodies also need to follow up companies that do not respect the rights of 
stakeholders that are protected by law. Boards, as the ultimate policy-setting organs for 
both private and public sector entities should bear more responsibility and accountability 
for the activities and policies of companies. 
8.9 Observations on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability 
Stewart's intention was to address public accountability and the information requirements 
for such an accountability to be discharged. To this end, the areas or "bases" of 
accountability which were identified as forming this ladder of accountability were: 
probity and legality; process; performance; programme and policy. Although Stewart 
argues for the bond of accountability between a person or institution giving the account 
and the specific person or group of persons receiving the account (with the understanding 
that this latter person or group has powers to act on the report), he also recognises the 
difficulty of implementing this, particularly when it comes to civil servants who cannot 
be sanctioned directly by the electorate. Stewart reasons that the doctrine of ministerial 
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responsibility for the acts of officials within a department loses much of its meanino- 
when the department employs many thousands of civil servants. There is, therefore. an 
apparent gap identified in public accountability and a similar situation applies to large 
companies with thousands of employees who may operate in different countries, as is the 
case with several multinationals that have Ugandan operations. However, there is a need 
for accountability at all levels of an entity's operation. To the researcher, this need cannot 
be satisfied by the five ladders of accountability advanced by Stewart. 
8.10 Accountability to Stakeholders 
Jensen (1988) argued that market forces would disciPline boards and senior management 
through the existence of a liquid market for managerial talent, and a vigorous takeover 
environment. The evidence from the research carried out in Uganda does not seem to 
indicate that such market forces are effective. Research participants indicated that 
management and board's accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders in Uganda 
is poor; minority shareholders do not have a say in who should serve as a board member 
or a senior executive in companies listed on the Uganda Stock Exchange. Ugandans 
cannot, therefore, hold boards or management accountable by exercising their voting 
rights. The legal remedies specified in the Companies Act of Uganda are also not 
favourable to minority shareholders as they require certain percentages of share 
ownership (and the meeting of legal costs by those shareholders) if their complaints are to 
be acted upon. The legal framework in Uganda may therefore need to be revised in order 
to give any meaningful voice to Ugandan minority shareholders. 
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Section 7.7.3 of the thesis established that Ugandan companies are not seen as being 
respectful of the rights of stakeholders, whether they are established by law or not, and 
that employees could not freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical 
practices to the board without fear of adverse consequences to themselves for doing so; 
there was a general feeling that legal protection for Ugandan stakeholders was not 
adequate. It is very difficult for meaningful accountability of any sort to be exercised in 
such an environment. What passes for accountability seems to be merely a 
communication of information (which Stewart calls a "link of account") rather than a 
form of true accountability, largely because stakeholders cannot take enforceable 
sanctions against board members and senior management of companies. 
Board structure and conduct are an important aspect of corporate governance and there is 
an obvious need to enforce a meaningful level of board accountability. There is therefore 
a need to identity those responsible for ensuring that only individuals who meet the 
requirements of competence and integrity are appointed to boards; the identity of those 
with the de-facto power to apply sanctions in the event that such conditions are not met 
also needs to be specified. The UK Combined code recommended that boards should 
have nomination committees that are responsible for identifying individuals to be 
proposed to shareholders for appointment as board members. However, some 
interviewees noted that in practice individuals can be appointed as board members and 
then submitted to shareholders for ratification. It is rare that shareholders would vote 
against such individuals being board members. The Companies Act (1964) of Uganda 
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devotes Sections 177 to 205 to "Directors and other Officers". The Act specifies that for a 
person to be eligible to be a board member, that individual must be at least 21 and not 
more than 70 years old. However, the age limit can be overridden by a special resolution 
at a General Meeting. 225 Although these provisions exist in the Companies Act, the 
results of this study indicate that Ugandan shareholders have little say on who is a 
director of the listed companies in Uganda since they are minority shareholders and their 
views do not seem to be respected. The question of who controls the appointment of 
Ugandan board members and their activities as board members is therefore pertinent, 
especially given that the nation's market forces do not seem to have much effect on board 
membership and there seems to be little accountability to minority shareholders. Similar 
problems exist with respect to other stakeholders, since multinational companies wield a 
lot of power based on their tax contribution to the national budget; they may, therefore, 
have influence over regulatory and other authorities and can use their muscle to fight off 
unwanted "interference" by concerned stakeholders. The discharge of accountability by 
board members, therefore, appears to need attention in Uganda so that the composition, 
activities and policies of boards can be monitored and effective and enforceable sanctions 
taken against violation of stakeholders' rights or poor management of companies. One 
way of achieving this would be through the establishment of an independent ombudsman, 
possibly attached to (and paid by) the Uganda Securities Exchange or Capital Markets 
Authority. Stakeholder groups could also be set up to mobilise and advise shareholders 
and other stakeholders on pertinent issues relating to the governance structures and 
practices in Ugandan companies and on how to vote on them (or take some other action) 
as required. 
225 Other restrictions include individuals who have undischarged bankruptcy or who are fraudulent. 
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Such effective monitoring and enforcement of sanctions against boards would be 
extended to the board's responsibility to account for legality and probity, process, 
performance, programme and policy. The board's supervisory role in relation to a 
company's management would also be monitored and assessed and the board held 
accountable for the recruitment, performance and conduct of company officials. The 
ombudsman or other monitoring bodies should have the power of law to protect and 
enhance their roles so that their decisions or recommendations are enforceable in the 
event that particular companies do not comply with relevant laws and regulations or fail 
to fulfil their responsibilities to concerned stakeholders (including minorities). 
Stakeholders who have concerns could then direct them to the ombudsman or relevant 
body for investigation without being discouraged by the current legal costs that 
individuals are required to bear if they seek legal redress from Ugandan courts. 
8.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a synthesis of the research findings within the context of 
Stewart's ladder framework, made suggestions regarding the development of a new form 
of accountability to stakeholders in Uganda and examined the applicability of Stewart's 
model to private sector entities. The conclusion chapter of the thesis reviews the thesis as 
a whole, sets out the main limitations of the study and makes some suggestions regarding 
further work in the area. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the thesis as well as to highlight 
some of the study's limitations and make suggestions for further work in the area. The 
chapter concludes with some final thoughts on the research undertaken. 
This study was undertaken following the prominent scandals involving Enron, 
Worldcom, Parmalat and others (in the West) and some Ugandan banks that collapsed as 
a result of inappropriate governance practices in those companies. The research set out to 
establish how corporate governance is understood in the Ugandan context, the perceived 
state of the nation's corporate governance system, and the framework under which both 
private and public sector firms are governed. The research findings were interpreted 
using an accountability perspective. The answers to the research questions were 
synthesised in Sections 8.2 - 8.7. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the general literature on corporate governance and highlighted some 
of the important issues in the field of corporate governance; these included: the concept 
of corporate govemance; the relevance of corporate governance; the board of 
directors 
and its committees; shareholders; disclosure and transparency; and the framework of 
corporate governance. Chapter 3 provided a detailed review of the relevant corporate 
governance literature in both developed countries and those in Africa. 
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Chapter 4 outlined the research methodology and methods to be used for the stud),. As 
the discussion therein highlights, an interpretive paradigm was adopted for the study 
because the main thrust of the research was an attempt to develop an understanding of the 
perceptions of stakeholders from the point of view of the stakeholders themselves. 
However, the study assumed that stakeholders were likely to be influenced by their 
historical and present experiences and the values held by the society in which they live; 
in addition, it was assumed that participants' perceptions could also be influenced by 
their interaction with the researcher. Semi-structured interviews and questionnaire 
surveys were selected as the main methods for collecting research data. Chapter 5 
presented the theoretical framework adopted for interpreting the research data and 
findings; given the state and semi-state nature of many Ugandan firms, Stewart's ladder 
of accountability was adopted for this purpose and was used to analyse the findings from 
the interviews (Chapter 6) and questionnaire survey results (Chapter 7). Although 
Stewart's ladder proved to be largely applicable in interpreting the results, one of the 
problems encountered, in using the ladder in the stakeholder context, was the 
identification of actual and enforceable bonds of accountability between company 
management and boards and specific groups of stakeholders. Berle and Means (1932) 
recognised this problem and noted that actual power over the management and direction 
of companies lay in the hands of those who were in a position to nominate and appoint 
board members and senior management. -pifferent groups of stakeholders are not likely to 
have this power and so do not have direct means of enforcing the required bond of 
accountability. Berle and Means pointed out that under such circumstances, minority 
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shareholder rights could only be protected by government enacting laws that offer such 
protection. McLaren (2004) further proposed that socially responsible investment 
managers could play an active role in representing the interests of stakeholders; 
stakeholders could, therefore, enforce their rights indirectly through institutional and 
other majority shareholders who took an interest in issues affecting a wider cross-section 
of stakeholders as a result of investor-activism. In effect, McLaren (2004) proposed that 
the legal framework and the participation of sympathetic majority shareholders could be 
used as a means of establishing an indirect bond of accountability between companies 
and multiple stakeholders. 
9.2 Research Findings from Interviews 
Chapter 6 outlined the findings from the semi-structured interviews conducted in Uganda 
during 2004. The sample of interviewees included: legislators; regulators; members of the 
judiciary; civil servants; accountants; executive and non-executive directors; senior 
management and others who were actively involved in the promotion of corporate 
governance in Uganda. The individuals concerned were selected based upon their 
knowledge of and/or participation in issues relating to corporate governance in Uganda. 
All the 16 individuals interviewed perceived corporate governance from a stakeholder 
perspective and were of the view that companies should be held answerable to a wider 
cross-section of stakeholders than just the shareholders. However, the interviewees were 
of the view that stakeholders might not be aware of their rights and how to find remedies 
in cases where companies violate those rights. There was a feeling that companies did not 
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respect stakeholders' rights (whether those rights were protected by law or not); this 
appears to be due to a lack of a clear bond of accountability between stakeholders and 
company officials, in addition to stakeholders not being aware of their rights. The 
minority position of Ugandan shareholders also affected their ability to hold companies 
accountable. Some interviewees pointed to the attitudes of board members and company 
executives, which affected their ability to manage companies with integrity and fairness. 
Interviewees also alleged that the various political and social changes that have been 
taking place in Uganda have affected the values of the participants in the governance of 
companies and also of the stakeholders who are evaluating the performance of 
companies. Despite these shortcomings in actual implementation, corporate governance 
was perceived to be important in the social and economic development of the country, as 
well as in promoting transparency and accountability, managing risk, improving the 
performance of companies, protecting stakeholder interests and attracting both local and 
foreign capital. 
The interviewees acknowledged that a country should have an effective and supportive 
framework for a strong corporate governance system to flourish. In this respect, they 
identified the legal, regulatory and supervisory, accounting, political, cultural, social and 
ethical frameworks as being crucial in providing an environment within which the 
governance of companies is practised. In the case of Uganda, the general view among the 
interviewees was that, although the structures were in place, the frameworks were not 
adequate in the promotion of corporate governance. Some of the laws, such as the 
Companies Act of Uganda (1964), were considered to be outdated and in need of 
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revision, while others, such as those governing minimum wages for employees and 
protecting whistleblowers, were lacking. Political appointees in senior management 
positions and on boards, as well as political interference in the management of companies 
(especially public sector ones) was seen as having a negative impact on governance 
practices. Research participants were also of the view that Uganda should have unified 
and enforceable accounting and auditing standards which could be used to add reliability 
to financial and operating reports from companies and facilitate the evaluation of 
information provided by different companies using similar standards. Some cultural 
aspects, such as financial demands to support extended families and to hire relatives 
(even if they were not sufficiently qualified), were perceived to have an impact on the 
ethical behaviour of some of the company officials and, consequently, the governance of 
companies. However, interviewees were of the view that the political and social 
upheavals that have been taking place in Uganda since the time of Idi Amin (in the 
1970s) might have affected the moral values of some Ugandans; there was, therefore, a 
need to strengthen moral values and a sense of social responsibility to a wide cross- 
section of stakeholders (as used to be the case in Ugandan traditional society). It was 
observed by interviewees that the Ugandan Government had undertaken privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises as a way of freeing resources used to subsidise those companies 
and to improve their performance; however, there was scepticism as to whether the 
governance of those companies had actually improved. Interviewees felt that there was 
need for government - and all other concerned parties - to take positive steps to enforce 
measures that would actually improve the governance of Ugandan companies. 
Other 
factors such as poverty and shortage of employment, as well as lack of adequate 
laws to 
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protect workers, were perceived as playing a contributory role to poor governance as 
employers can afford to treat employees as they want without fear of industrial action by 
those affected. 
The top most pressing corporate governance issues identified by the majority of 
interviewees (more than 50%) were: a lack of accountability, transparency and 
disclosure; corruption and bribery; political interference and sectarianism (especially in 
public sector firms); poor implementation and compliance with laws and regulations; the 
need for training of board members and senior executives to improve their understanding 
of the principles of corporate governance; the need for proper and up-to-date laws that are 
enforceable; and the need to select board members with the required qualifications, 
competence and experience. The personal qualities of senior management and board 
members were also perceived as being important in enhancing their credibility and 
enabling them to perform their duties with competence and integrity. 
9.3 Research Findings from Questionnaire Surveys 
The findings of the questionnaire survey that was conducted in Uganda during 2005 were 
reported in Chapter 7. The purpose of the questionnaire was to verify whether the views 
of the interviewees were shared by a wider cross-section of Ugandans; the questionnaires 
were also a convenient way of gathering views from a larger sample at a lower cost and 
in a time efficient manner whilst also providing anonymity to the respondents. The 
sample of respondents included: legislators; regulators; company employees; civil 
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The responses to the questionnaires indicated that the participants supported the 
proposals of the UK Combined Code (2003) relating to the composition of the board, the 
responsibilities of the board and the board committees that each company should have, 
together with their composition. The factors that were perceived as affecting the practice 
of corporate governance in Ugandan private sector companies were: conflicts of interest; 
corruption and bribery; insignificant fines that do not compel compliance with laws and 
regulations; inadequate infrastructure and resources for regulatory and enforcement 
agencies; and fear and respect for those in authority. In addition to the above factors, 
public sector companies were also thought to be affected by political interference; lack of 
political will to combat corruption; lack of political will to enforce compliance; and 
incompetent personnel. There was no significant support among the questionnaire 
respondents for the view expressed by interviewees that fear and respect for the authority 
of elders affected the practice of corporate governance in Ugandan companies. 
Respondents also supported the opinion of the interviewees that the rights of 
stakeholders, whether established by law or not, were not respected by Ugandan 
companies; instead, there was a feeling that companies did not act in a responsible 
manner in dealing with issues that affected the rights of the community. Overall, 
Ugandan laws that relate to the governance of companies were perceived as either being 
archaic or inadequate. Consistent with several of the interviewees' statements, the 
questionnaire respondents noted that employees' rights and those of whistleblowers 
needed to be protected better. Respondents also expressed concern about the fact that 
Ugandans have insignificant minority shareholdings in the companies listed on the 
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Uganda Securities Exchange, which means that they have no real control over 
management. Research participants stated that the views of the Ugandan shareholders 
were not respected and these shareholders did not have adequate remedies as the legal 
requirements do not favour the protection of their rights; instead, the present laws require 
a certain percentage of ownership and the meeting of legal costs which makes it difficult 
for Ugandan minority shareholders to enforce their rights. The ownership structure was, 
therefore, seen as affecting the enforcement of the rights of the Ugandan minority 
shareholders in listed companies, which are mainly multinational companies owned by 
foreign majority shareholders who dictate policies to their subsidiary companies. 
Respondents supported the views of interviewees regarding the need to harmonise the 
accounting and auditing principles used by Ugandan companies and improve on the 
enforcement of those principles so as to have a uniform reporting system. Political, 
economic, social, cultural and ethical factors were also seen as affecting the practice of 
corporate governance for the same reasons given by interviewees in Chapter 6. The 
respondents were, however, equivocal as to whether the privatisation of the former state- 
owned companies had improved the governance of those companies. 
9.4 Stakeholder Suggestions and Policy Implications 
The research participants made a number of suggestions on what needs to be done so as 
to improve corporate governance in Uganda. The main suggestions were as follows: 
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1. The governance of companies depends on the quality of the people who manage 
those companies. Respondents therefore suggested that the processes and criteria 
used to select board members and senior management should be examined to 
ensure that technical competence, experience, qualifications and personal 
characteristics such as integrity and values held by potential candidates are taken 
into account in the appointment of those officials. 
2. Formal induction of newly-appointed board members, as well as ongoing training 
(in-service and external) for continuing members and senior management, were 
perceived to be essential in keeping those officials up-to-date with developments 
in corporate governance and in the promotion of the good governance of the 
companies that they manage. 
3. It was also proposed that there should be a clear definition of roles within 
corporations so as to avoid role conflicts and undue interference between board 
members, management and company owners. 
4. Research participants called for the strengthening of both internal and external 
audits so as to improve their effectiveness. They also suggested that corporate 
governance reports should be made a mandatory component of annual financial 
and operating statements prepared by companies and that mechanisms should be 
set up to monitor compliance with these requirements. 
5. Participants suggested that the laws and regulations relating to the governance of 
Ugandan companies should be reviewed for relevance, adequacy and 
effectiveness; stiffer penalties should be introduced to discourage malpractices 
and non-compliance in companies. Relevant and enforceable laws should be 
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enacted to protect minority shareholders as well as other stakeholders against 
violation of their rights. 
6. It was suggested that adequate resources should be provided to the regulatory and 
enforcement agencies to enable them carry out their duties effectively. 
7. Stakeholders also suggested that government should exhibit stronger and more 
transparent political will in supporting efforts to improve the governance of 
companies and laws should be applied to all individuals without fear or favour. 
8. The creation of advocacy groups, such as the institute of directors and others 
representing shareholders, employees and/or other special interest groups should 
be encouraged in Uganda so as to provide a forum to support the interests of the 
group members. 
9.5 Limitations of the Study 
The ma . or limitation of this study relates to the generalisability of the findings, since a j 
relatively small sample of interviewees and respondents was used. Only 16 individuals 
were interviewed, while 382 questionnaires were administered and 158 returned. In 
addition, as with any project using these methods, those taking part are necessarily a self- 
selecting group of those willing to become involved. However, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the views expressed by the respondents in the questionnaire survey 
were generally consistent with those expressed during the interviews. It 
is therefore 
hoped that the results provide a broadly representative picture of the views of 
stakeholders in Uganda. 
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sector. Researchers such as Caprio et al. (2005), Manibog (2003), Fick (2002) and 
Tangari and Mwenda (2001) have stressed that good corporate governance is essential for 
attracting investment, improving commercial performance and contributing to economic 
development; factors such as bad or unclear corporate governance, corruption, inadequate 
legal and judicial systems and lack of democracy are seen as not being conducive to 
investment. The Africa Competitive Report of 2000/2001 re-iterated the same issues and 
stressed the need for the regulatory framework to be tightened to provide for improved 
corporate governance and mandate prompt corrective measures. 
The current research project has exposed a number of areas that may need to be 
investigated further. Each of the major sections of the research may need to be 
investigated further so as to establish why respondents to the questionnaire held certain 
views and what can be done on a practical basis to improve corporate governance and 
accountability in Uganda. Issues such as board composition, board committees, 
independent board members, as well as transparency and accountability in the 
stakeholder context need to be investigated to establish how they can be made manifest. 
The notions of corporate governance seem to be taking root in Uganda, but their 
implementation needs to take place urgently. How this can be done substantively is a 
topic of significance in Uganda. There may also be a need to widen the stakeholder 
groups whose views were examined, for example to include trade unions and other types 
of pressure groups. It would also be helpful to carry out studies in other developing 
countries to establish whether the findings of this study are unique to Uganda or are 
common to other developing countries in Africa and elsewhere. 
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9.7 Concluding Thoughts 
The research questions set out in Chapter I appear to have been answered to a significant 
degree in the various chapters that make up this thesis. These answers were synthesised 
in Sections 8.2 - 8.7. 
However, as a result of the study, the researcher has come to the view that while 
guidelines (and the various elements that make up and support the framework of 
corporate governance) are important, the most crucial element in the governance of 
companies is the inherent attitude of the individuals who are entrusted with the 
management of companies. Many well-publicised violations of corporate governance 
principles, whether accounting-related or not, appear not to have been committed because 
company officials and board members did not know what to do, but rather because the 
individuals occupying various positions of responsibility manipulated systems to their 
advantage with total disregard for accountability for legality (and probity), process, 
performance, programme and policy. In the light of the findings presented in this thesis, it 
seems to the researcher that the main focus in Uganda should be on putting in place a 
governance system whereby individuals with appropriate personal qualities, including 
integrity and competence, are identified and appointed to positions of trust and 
responsibility. Ultimately, it is such people who are best placed to implement meaningful 
corporate govemance guidelines. Unfortunately, such a development does not feature 
significantly in conventional normative analyses of corporate governance, with the 
358 
emphasis being placed instead on developing guidelines, rulebooks and principles. 
Further study is needed on how the people element can be addressed in the attempt to 
develop robust corporate govemance practices. 
With hindsight, the questionnaire seems to have been longer than in the ideal situation 
and a more concise version might have been preferable. However, the questionnaire 
survey that was used in the research was designed to cover all the important topics in 
corporate governance and a trade-off had to be made between shortening the 
questionnaire in order to get a higher response rate and lengthening it in order to cover 
more topics. In any event, the survey yielded a response rate of more than 41%. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Recommended Guidelines for Corporate Governance in Uganda 
(2001) 
1. Introduction 
The basic mission of the ICGU is to nurture and promote good corporate governance by 
setting, enforcing and practicing the highest standards of commercial probity, efficiency 
and ethical conduct through training and advocacy. 
The ICGU was set up to complement the efforts other institutions in the country are 
making towards improving the manner in which corporate entities, both private and 
public, operate. 
Professional associations, for example The Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers 
and The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda, are one category of 
institutions helping to shape corporate governance. The Regulatory agencies like the 
Electricity Regulatory Authority, Bank of Uganda, The National Bureau of Standards 
(UNBS), Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) and the Media Council, are the 
second category. 
Guidelines for corporate governance have been developed by a number of countries and 
international organisations, for example the Commonwealth. The principles in all cases 
are the same, but each country may modify these to suit the domestic conditions of the 
country. The guidelines, though with an international touch, must be suitable to the local 
setting of each country. The principles of the CAGG, OECD and the Kings Report will 
serve as an important benchmark for Uganda on which to build the national code of 
corporate govemance. 
Below are the guidelines recommended to set out the basic framework within which good 
corporate governance will thrive in Uganda. These are generic in nature and each 
individual firm, organization or association will be expected to develop its own code 
based on this framework to suit its peculiar circumstances. The guidelines are by no 
means exhaustive but diverse enough to provide the necessary building blocks to move 
the process. 
The guidelines are recommended for use by all corporate bodies in Uganda irrespective 
of the form of ownership and size of entity. It is also worth noting from the onset that 
corporate governance may not be implemented effectively on the basis of the guidelines 
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without the support structures, policies and institutions in the public sector. It is, 
therefore, recommended that government formulates and implements similar codes for its diverse structures and stakeholders. 
2. The Board of Directors 
2.1 Primary Objective of the Board 
The Board's primary objective is to ensure that the company is properly 
managed to enhance and protect shareholder value and to ensure that the 
company meets its obligations to all stakeholders, the industry and the law. 
Accordingly the Board shall: 
i. Adopt, approve and review corporate strategy and planning; 
ii. Monitor corporate performance and identify and manage risk; 
Establish performance objectives and hurdles for directors, management 
and employees; 
iv. Ensure that appropriate systems and controls are in place for monitoring 
compliance with accounting, financial, audit, transparence and reporting 
requirements, and with the law; 
V. Establish and maintain the company's communication policy to ensure 
effective communication with all stakeholders; 
vi. Annually review, using established objective criteria, the company's 
performance in order to assess and ensure the company's future solvency, 
and the board's conclusion should be reported in the financial statements. 
2.2 Board composition, appointments and elections 
Directors should be appointed or elected in accordance with the law (by the 
shareholders), and the election or appointment should follow a formal and 
transparent procedure that allows the board to select nominees for election 
or appointment by the shareholders. 
The board should be composed of qualified individuals who reflect a 
diversity of training, experience and backgrounds. 
The board's composition should include a balance of executive and non- 
executive directors such that no individual or group of individuals can 
dominate the board's decision making. 
376 
To ensure director independence in decision-making non-executive directors should not have any benefits from the company other than their fee, which must be determined by the board. Director independence 
signifies being independent of management and any controlling 
shareholder and possessing the ability for independent judgement. 
IV. Non-executive directors should have the necessary skill and experience to bring independent judgement on issues of strategy, performance, 
resources, key appointments and standards. 
2.3 Induction, Orientation and Training of Directors 
Directors should formally be advised of their rights, duties, obligations 
and responsibilities, and the Chair should ensure the non re-election or 
resignation or removal of non-performing directors. 
Orientation and training of board appointee s/candidate s should follow a 
defined procedure and should focus on the company's business, strategic 
plans and objectives, market position, resources, systems and management 
structure. 
Board appointees with no relevant training or previous board experience 
should participate in a training course for directors. 
iv. Directors should receive training from time to time on matters including 
relevant new laws and regulations, changing commercial risks, among 
others. 
2.4 The Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
i. The roles of chairman and chief executive officer should be separate. 
Where the roles must be combined, a strong and independent element 
must exist on the board and the board must enact a system that ensures the 
independence of the board from management, e. g. the appointment of an 
independent non-executive director as deputy chairman. 
2.5 The Board and Other Stakeholders 
The board should identify the company's internal and external stakeholders 
and agree a policy or policies of how the company should relate to them and 
address their interests. 
Directors should recognize that companies do not act independently of the 
societies in which they operate, and that the continued and ultimate 
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success of a company depends on the support and goodv, -ill of different 
resource providers, including investors, employees, creditors, suppliers, 
bankers, etc., whose interests must therefore be specifically addressed. 
Directors and shareholders should further recognize that society now 
expects companies to act responsibly in regard to matters such as the 
environment, health and safety of workers and society at large, employee 
relations, ethical business conduct, standards, etc. 
The Board should therefore outline a policy or policies to regulate the 
company's conduct and relationships with all relevant stakeholders and 
also to promote goodwill and a reciprocal relationship with these 
stakeholders. 
2.6 The Board's sole responsibility for the company's performance 
The Board should ensure the existence of an effective management for 
implementation of the company's strategic and financial objectives and, 
accordingly, the Board should appoint the Chief Executive Officer and 
Senior Management. 
i. The Board should promote a system that recognizes and rewards 
enterprise and innovation, with performance-related rewards that motivate 
management and employees effectively and productively. 
The Board should safeguard the company's inherent assets by ensuring the 
motivation of management and employees and the protection of the 
company's intrinsic intellectual capital. 
The Board should also ensure that there is adequate training for employees 
and management. 
iv. The Board should implement a remuneration policy that will recruit, 
motivate and retain high quality executive directors, management and 
employees. 
2.7 Internal systems and controls 
Directors should ensure that appropriate internal systems and controls are in 
place for monitoring compliance with accounting, financial and audit 
reporting requirements, and with the law. Boards, therefore, should: 
Create and maintain relevant board committees with clear terms of 
reference. The most relevant committees that Boards should have include 
the nomination, remuneration, audit and governance. Board committees 
should be: 
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(a) Given reasonable resources to enable them to discharge their functions 
properly. 
(b) Facilitated to obtain expert/professional advice, whether internal or 
external, necessary for the execution of their duties. 
(c) Given the discretion to invite any director, company officer or outsider 
with relevant experience to attend their meetings where necessary. 
The Board should meet as regularly and frequently as is necessary for the 
directors to execute their duties and responsibilities. 
(a) There must be adequate notice to all directors of the dates and time of 
the meetings and of issues to be discussed at the meeting. 
(b) Directors (or alternates where permissible) should be physically 
present at meetings and should effectively participate through 
preparation before the meeting and in the proceedings of the meeting. 
2.8 The Audit Committee 
The board should establish an audit committee and the majority of its 
members should be independent non-executive directors with adequate 
knowledge of finance, accounts and basic elements of company law and 
should be mentioned in the annual report. The audit committee should 
have clear and written terms of reference. 
The audit committee should serve as a necessary channel of 
communication with external auditors for purposes of audit quality and 
effectiveness and on matters relating to and arising out of the external 
audit. 
The audit committee should enjoy direct communication with 
management, the Finance Director, Chief Finance Officer and internal and 
external auditors. 
iv. The audit committee should have explicit authority to investigate matters 
under its terms of reference and full access to information to enable it to 
do so. 
V. The audit committee should have unrestricted access to and the co- 
operation of management and the internal and external auditors and have 
full discretion to invite any director and executive officer to attend its 
meetings. 
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vi. The audit committee should report to the Board on all issues regarding its 
operating standards of accounting. 
2.9 Compliance with Laws and Regulations 
The Board should ensure compliance by the company and company officers 
with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of best business practice. 
The directors should be conversant with the statutory and regulatory 
requirements affecting the company and ensure the company's compliance 
with them. 
The annual Directors' Report should disclose the Board's confirmation of 
statutory and regulatory compliance. 
2.10 Communication 
The Board should ensure that there is effective communication 
among/between shareholders, directors, management and other 
stakeholders. 
i. The Board should ensure that all communication is timely and accurate 
and is received by all relevant people/entities. 
The Board should communicate long term strategic decisions to the 
shareholders, management, employees, and other stakeholders to get their 
co-operation for the success of the strategy/decisions. 
2.11 Good faith and confidentiality 
The Board as a whole and each director as an individual should ensure that 
they always act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. 
The Board should ensure that at no point in time do the personal interests 
of a director take precedence over those of the company and shareholders. 
Directors must not disclose or make improper use of sensitive confidential 
information acquired by them by virtue of their position as a director. 
In the event of any potential or actual conflict of interest between a 
director and the company, the director should refrain / be refrained from 
debating or voting on the matter. 
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2.12 Assessment of Company, Board and Management Performance 
The Board should constantly monitor and review management's 
implementation of the strategic plans and objectives. 
The Board and management must establish mutually agreed management 
performance criteria and business plans and use them as the basis for 
monitoring and evaluating management's performance. 
The Board (through the appropriate committee) should establish criteria 
and procedures for regularly assessing the effectiveness of the Board as a 
whole and of the committees and the individual directors. 
2.13 Code of Ethics 
The Board should ensure the development/creation of, and implementation 
of, a code of ethics for the enterprise which meets/satisfies the principles 
essential for corporate governance including transparency, disclosure, 
accountability and probity. The code of ethics should: 
Commit the company and its shareholders, directors, managers and all 
other stakeholders to the highest standards of behaviour. 
Be developed in such a way as to involve all stakeholders to infuse its 
culture. 
Receive total commitment from the Board and the Chief Executive Officer 
of the Company. 
3. Shareholders 
3.1 Shareholders' meetings 
Shareholders protect, preserve and actively exercise the supreme authority of 
the company through the Annual General Meetings and the Extra Ordinary 
Meetings. Shareholders therefore have a duty to: 
Elect competent and reliable persons to the Board of Directors, capable of 
fulfilling the objectives of the entity; 
Put in place constraints so that no one single shareholder or group of 
shareholders, even if it is the majority shareholder(s), can solely elect the 
Board; 
Confer authority and power on the elected members of the Board of 
Directors to enable them carry out their duties efficiently; 
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iv. Regularly assess the performance of the Board fairly in light of the 
objectives of the entity; 
V. Exercise their right to vote according to the procedure in the Articles of Association of the company and the law; 
vi. Keep themselves informed of the issues to be voted on and of the 
consequences of their vote. 
3.2 Communication 
Shareholders should regularly communicate with the Board and Vvith 
management on the performance of the company and their other interests. 
All shareholders should have equal access to the information concerning the 
performance of the company regardless of their shareholding. 
3.3 Evaluation of the company's performance 
The shareholders should be familiar with the concepts of good corporate 
governance and they should be able to relate the concepts of good corporate 
practice to the policies and objectives of the company and to evaluate the 
company's performance in the light of these. 
3.4 Shareholders' duties to each other 
Shareholders have a duty to ensure that no shareholder dishonestly manipulates 
the prices of the shares of the company or the interests of the enterprise to the 
prejudice of the other shareholders. Accordingly shareholders, individually or 
collectively, should: 
Desist from using information that comes to their knowledge for their 
personal gains and to the detriment of the other shareholders; 
Be informed of the financial position of the company in case of issuance 
of new shares, liquidation or a takeover of or by the entity; 
Be informed of the possibilities and arrangements that enable certain 
shareholders to obtain a degree of control which is disproportionate to 
their shareholding. 
3.5 Duties to the Employees and the Community 
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In voluntary winding up of the company by the shareholders, they must take 
cognizance of the impact of the closure of business on the employees of the 
company and the community in which the business operates. 
4. 
5. 
The entity should further avoid any negative impacts on the community, for 
example possible environmental hazards from disposal of anly raw materials 
where the entity was involved in manufacturing. 
Audits 
Companies should have effective internal audit systems that have the respect of 
both the board of directors and management. 
Internal auditors should have unrestricted access to the board and audit 
committee. 
The internal auditors should be independent from their personal interests, 
management and the Board's interference. 
The annual audits should be conducted by an independent external auditor 
in order to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in 
which financial statements are prepared and presented. 
Management 
The management of a company, including the Chief Executive Officer, is 
responsible for implementing the board corporate decisions and there should 
be a clear flow of information between management and the board in order 
to facilitate the evaluation and appraisal of the company's performance. 
Management should act honestly and in good faith and should act within 
their powers and in the interest and benefit of the company. 
Managers should carry out their duties with the skill and care expected of 
a person of knowledge and experience and exercise their own judgement. 
Managers should report accurately to the owners on the performance and 
prospects of the company and justify the confidence reposed in them. 
iv. Managers should furnish the auditors with all the information and 
explanations required and should not permit wastage of the assets of the 
company. 
V. Management should not carry on the business of the company negligently 
or recklessly and should not permit wastage of the assets of the company. 
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vi. Managers should not Place themselves in positions where their personal interests could conflict with their duties and in particular they should: 
Not divulge confidential information of the company to its 
competitors; 
Not carry on any business which is forbidden by the company; 
Not accept bribes, commissions or other unconscionable benefits. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Employees 
Employees support and assist management to fulfill its commercial and 
ethical obligations. 
i. Employees should avoid unreasonable disruption of production and 
wastage of company resources including time. 
Employees should act honestly at all times and report any discrepancies at 
the work place. 
Employees should honour their agreed terms and conditions of 
employment. 
iv. Employees should not abuse their bargaining positions or engage in 
unreasonable industrial action. 
V. Employees should have due regard to environmental and public health 
considerations in and around the workplace. 
Government 
The government should provide an environment that is conducive for the 
operations of the entity and should ensure compliance by the statutory 
corporations of the relevant laws, regulations and codes of best practice. 
Government should make laws and policies that encourage investment and 
good corporate practice and investment without unnecessary restrictions, 
for example for environmental preservation at the detriment of 
development and machinery for the maintenance of order and justice. 
Government should provide a conducive environment and physical 
infrastructure for the efficiency and effectiveness of every business entity. 
Regulatory bodies 
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The regulatory bodies should enforce compliance with the laws and regulations to 
ensure the protection of the investors and all stakeholders. 
9. Suppliers of a company 
Suppliers should strive to provide good quality products complying Nvith 
the agreed standards at competitive prices and according to the contract 
terms. 
ii. Suppliers should not engage in restrictive trade practices. 
10. Lenders of the company 
i. Lenders should not withdraw credit without justification. 
ii. Lenders should not charge unjustified interest. 
11. Customers of the company 
Customers should pay for the products/services in accordance with the 
terms concluded with the company and should not make false allegations 
for defects in the product/services provided to them. 
Customers should not engage in restrictive practices and should not claim 
for refund for damage of goods where it occurs when the goods are in their 
possession. 
12. Investors 
Investors should enter into dialogue with the company in order to 
determine mutual objectives. 
Investors should desist from finding out about the company from 
unauthorized means, for example through employees or competitors. 
13. The community 
The environmentalists should advise the business entities on 
environmental matters in accordance with environmental laws. 
The requirement to preserve the environment should always be considered 
in light of the need for development and should therefore not be used to 
deter development and investment where the development would not have 
a negative impact on the environment. 
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Appendix 1.2 
The Capital Markets Corporate Governance Guidelines. 
(Under section 102 of the Capital Markets Authority Statute, 1996; 
Statute No. I of 1996) 
IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred on the Capital Markets Authority ("Authority") 
by sections 6 and 102 of the Capital Markets Authority Statute, 1996 ("Statute"), these th 
Guidelines are made this 25 day of February, 2003. 
PART I- PRELIMINARY. 
1. These Guidelines shall be referred to as the Capital Markets Corporate Governance 
Guidelines. 
2. The Authority has developed these Guidelines as a minimum standard for good 
corporate governance practices by public companies and issuers of corporate debt in 
Uganda, in response to the growing importance of governance issues both in emerging 
and developing economies and for promoting domestic and regional capital markets 
growth. It is also in recognition of the role of good governance in corporate performance, 
capital formation and maximization of shareholders value as well as protection of 
investors' rights. 
3. Corporate governance, for the Purposes of these Guidelines is defined as the process 
and structure used to direct and manage business affairs of the company towards 
enhancing prosperity and corporate accounting with the ultimate objective of protecting 
and promoting shareholders' rights and realizing shareholders' long term value while 
taking into account the interests of stake holders. 
4. These Guidelines have been developed taking into account work which has been 
undertaken extensively in several jurisdictions through many task forces or committees, 
including but not limited to the United Kingdom, Malaysia, South Africa, the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance and the OECD principles of 
Corporate Governance. 
5. The Authority has also supported the development of a code of best practices for 
corporate governance in Uganda issued by the Institute of Corporate Governance of 
Uganda, whose efforts have also been useful in the development of these Guidelines and 
are supplementary thereto. 
6. The objective of these Guidelines is to strengthen corporate governance practices by 
listed companies in Uganda and promote the standards of self-regulation so as to bring 
the level of governance in line with international trends. 
7. The Authority, in developing these Guidelines has adopted both prescriptive and non- 
prescriptive approaches in order to provide for flexibility and innovative dynamism to 
corporate governance practices by public listed companies. 
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8. Good corporate governance practices must be nurtured and encouraged to evolve as a 
matter of best practice but certain aspects of operation in a body corporate must of 
necessity require minimum standards of good governance. In this regard the Authority 
expects the Directors of every listed company to undertake or commit themselves to 
adopt good corporate governance practices as part of their continuing listing obligations. 
9. In these Guidelines, the following words and expressions shall carry the meaning 
attributed to them: 
"Authority" shall mean the Capital Markets Authority as established under section 5 of 
the Capital Markets Authority Statute 1996; 
"Independent director" shall mean a director who: 
(a) has not been employed to the company in an executive capacity within the last five 
years; 
(b) is not affiliated to an adviser or consultant of the company or a member of the 
company's senior management or a significant customer or supplier of the company or 
with a not-for-profit entity that receives significant contributions from the company; or 
within the last five years, has not had any business relationship with the company (other 
than service as a director) for which the company has been required to make disclosure; 
(c) has no personal service contract (s) with the company or a member of the company's 
senior management; 
(d) is not employed by a public company at which an executive officer serves as a 
director; 
(e) is not a member of the immediate family of any person described above; 
(f) has not had any of the relationships described above with any affiliate of the company. 
"Non-executive director" means a director who is not involved in the administrative or 
managerial operations of the company; 
"Substantial shareholder" means a person who holds not less than fifteen percent of the 
voting rights of a listed company and has the ability to exercise a majority voting, for 
instance, in the election of Directors. 
10. The extent of compliance of these Guidelines shall form an essential part of 
disclosure obligations in corporate annual reports. Disclosure of all areas of non- 
compliance or alternative practices shall also form part of these disclosure requirements. 
11. Where a company is not fully compliant with these Guidelines, the Directors shall 
indicate the steps being taken to adhere to full compliance and the reasons for departure. 
PART II - BEST PRACTICES RELATING TO THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
12. Every listed company should be headed by an effective Board to offer strategic 
guidance, lead and control the company and be accountable to its shareholders and 
responsible to its stakeholders. 
13. The Board of Directors should assume a primary responsibility of fostering the long- 
term business of the company consistent with their fiduciary responsibility to the 
shareholders. 
14. Board members should accord sufficient time for their functions and act on a fully- 
informed basis, while treating all shareholders fairly in the discharge of the following 
functions (among others): 
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(a) Defining the company's vision, mission, values, strategy, goals, risk management 
policy, plans and objectives; 
(b) Approving its annual budgets and accounts; 
(c) Overseeing the management and operations of the company, its major capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures and reviewing corporate performance and 
strategies, including management accounts at least on a quarterly basis; 
(d) Identifying corporate business opportunities as well as principal risks in its operating 
environment including the implementation of appropriate measures to manage such risks 
or anticipated changes impacting on the corporate business; 
(e) Developing appropriate staffing and remuneration policies including the appointment 
of a Chief Executive and senior staff, particularly the finance director, operations director 
and the company secretary as may be applicable; 
(f) Reviewing on a regular basis the adequacy and integrity of the company's internal 
control, accounting and financial reporting and management of information systems 
including compliance with applicable laws, regulations, rules and guidelines-, 
(g) Establishing and implementing a system that provides necessary information to the 
shareholders including a shareholder communication policy for the company. 
(h) Monitoring the effectiveness of the corporate governance practices under which it 
operates and proposing revisions as may be required. 
(i) Taking into consideration the interest of the company's stakeholders in its decision- 
making process. 
15. The Board of Directors should reflect a balance between independent, non-executive 
Directors and executive Directors of diverse skills or expertise, in order to ensure that no 
individual or group of individuals dominates the Board decision-making processes. 
16. The independent and non-executive Directors should form at least one-third of the 
membership of the Board. 
17. The composition of the Board should fairly reflect the company's shareholding 
structure and should not be biased towards representation by a substantial shareholder. In 
addition, it should contain an element of representation of the minority shareholders 
without undermining the collective responsibility of the Directors. 
18. In circumstances where there is no majority shareholder but there is still a single 
substantive shareholder, the Board should exercise judgment in determining the Board 
representation of such shareholder and those of the other shareholders, which reflects the 
shareholding structure of the company. 
19. The size of the Board should not be too large to undermine an interactive discussion 
during Board meetings or too small such that the inclusion of a wider expertise and skills 
to improve the effectiveness of the Board is compromised. 
20. The Board should monitor and manage potential conflicts of interest at management, 
Board and shareholder levels. 
2 1. The Board should ensure that it obtains relevant, accurate and timely information to 
enable it discharge its duties. 
22. The Board should maintain an effective communication policy that enables 
both 
management and the Board to communicate effectively with its shareholders, 
stakeholders and the public in general. 
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23. There should be a formal and transparent procedure in the appointment of Directors 
to the Board and all persons offering themselves for appointment as Directors should 
disclose any potential area of conflict that may undermine their position or service as 
Director. 
24. All Directors should be required to submit themselves for re-election at regular 
intervals or at least every three years. 
25. Executive Directors should have a fixed service contract not exceeding five years 
with a provision to renew subject to regular performance appraisal. 
26. Disclosure should be made to the shareholders at the Annual General Meeting and in 
the annual reports of all Directors approaching their seventieth (70th) birthday that 
respective year. 
27. (1) The Board of every listed company should appoint a Nominating Committee 
composed of majority non-executive Directors with the responsibility of proposing new 
nominees for the Board and for assessing the performance and effectiveness of Directors 
to perform their role in the company. 
(2) The Nominating Committee should consider only persons of high caliber and 
credibility and who have the necessary skills and expertise to exercise independent 
judgment on issues that are necessary to promote the company's objectives and 
performance in its area of business. 
(3) The Nominating Committee should also consider candidates for Directorship 
proposed by the Chief Executive and shareholders. 
(4) The Board, through the Nominating Committee, should on an annual basis, review its 
required mix, skills and expertise of which the executive Directors as well as independent 
or non-executive Directors should bring to the Board and make disclosure of the same in 
the annual report. 
(5) The Nominating Committee should recommend to the Board candidates for 
Directorship to be filled by the shareholders as the responsibility of nominating rests on 
the full Board, after considering the recommendations of the nominating committee. 
28. The Board, through the Nominating Committee, should also implement the process of 
assessing the effectiveness of the Board as a whole, Committees of the Board, as well as 
individual Directors. 
29. Newly appointed Directors should be provided with necessary orientation in the area 
of the company's business in order to enhance their effectiveness on the Board. 
30. The process of appointment of Directors should be sensitive to gender representation. 
3 1. No person should hold more than five Directorships in any listed company at any one 
time, in order to ensure effective participation on the Board. 
32. (1) The Board of Directors of every listed company should appoint a Remuneration 
Committee or assign a mandate to the Nominating Committee consisting mainly of 
independent and non-executive Directors to recommend to the Board the remuneration of 
the executive Directors and the structure of their compensation package. 
(2) The determination of the remuneration for non-executive Directors should be a matter 
for the whole Board. 
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(3) The remuneration of executive Directors should include an element that is linked to 
corporate performance including a share option scheme so as to ensure the maximization 
of shareholder value. 
33. Every Board should disclose in its annual report, its policies for remuneration including incentives for the Board and senior management, particularly the following: (a) Quantum and component of remuneration for Directors including non-executive Directors on a consolidated basis in the following categories: 
(i) Executive Directors fees; 
(ii) Executive Directors emoluments; 
(iii) Non-executive Directors' fees; 
(iv) Non-executive Directors' emoluments. 
(b) Share options and other forms of executive compensation that have to be made or have been made during the course of the financial year; and, 
(c) Directors' loans. 
PART III - BEST PRACTICES RELATING TO THE POSITION OF 
CHAIRPERSON AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
34. There should be a separation of the role and responsibilities of the Chairperson and 
Chief Executive, which will ensure a balance of power of authority and provide for 
checks and balances such that no individual has unfettered powers of decision-making. 
35. Where such roles are combined, a rationale for the same should be disclosed to the 
shareholders in the annual report of the company; and the position should be: 
a) For a limited period; 
b) Approved by the shareholders; 
c) Include measures that have been implemented to ensure that no individual has 
unfettered powers of decision-making in the company; and, 
d) Include a plan for the separation of the roles where such combined role is deemed 
necessary during a restructuring or change process. 
36. The Chairpersonship of a public listed company should be held by an independent or 
non-executive Director. 
37. Every listed company should have a clear succession plan for its Chairperson and 
Chief Executive in order to avoid unplanned and sudden departures, which could 
undermine the company and shareholder interest. 
38. No person shall be Chairperson of more than two public listed companies at any one 
time. 
39. (1) The Chief Executive should be responsible for implementing Board corporate 
decisions and there should be a clear flow of information between management and the 
Board in order to facilitate both quantitative and qualitative evaluation and appraisal of 
the company's performance. 
(2) The Chief Executive should undertake a primary responsibility of organizing 
information necessary for the Board to deal with and for providing necessary information 
to the Directors on a timely basis. 
(3) The Chief Executive is obliged to provide such necessary quality information to the 
Board in the discharge of the Board's business. 
PART IV - BEST PRACTICES RELATING TO THE RIGHTS OF 
SHAREHOLDERS 
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40. The Board of every public listed company should ensure equitable treatment of 
shareholders including the minority and foreign shareholders. 
41. All shareholders should receive relevant information on the company's performance through distribution of regular annual reports and accounts, half yearly results and 
quarterly results as a matter of best practice. 
42. There should be shareholder's participation in all major decisions of the company. The Board should therefore provide the shareholders with information on matters that include but are not limited to major disposal of company assets, restructuring, takeovers, 
mergers, acquisitions or reorganizations. 
43. The shareholders should receive a secure method of transfer and registration of 
ownership as well as a certificate or statement evidencing such ownership in the case of a 
central depository environment. 
44. Every shareholder shall have the right to participate and vote at the general 
shareholders meeting including the election of Directors. 
45. Every shareholder shall be entitled to ask questions or seek clarification on the 
company's performance as reflected in the annual reports and accounts or in any matter 
that may be relevant to the company's performance or promotion of shareholder's interest 
and to receive explanation by the Directors and /or management. 
46. Every shareholder shall be entitled to distributed profit in form of dividend and other 
rights for bonus shares, scrip dividends or rights issues as applicable and in the 
proportion of its shareholding in the company's share capital. 
47. The annual report and accounts to shareholders must include highlights of the 
operations of the company, financial performance and a list of the ten major shareholders 
of the company and their shareholding. 
48. (1) Listed companies are encouraged to organize regular investor briefings when the 
half-yearly and annual results are declared or as may be necessary to explain their 
performance and promote shareholder interaction. 
(2) Listed companies should endeavor to establish a company website and encourage its 
use by shareholders to ease communication and interaction between shareholders and the 
company. 
49. Every listed company should encourage and facilitate the establishment of a 
Shareholder's Association to promote dialogue between the company and the 
shareholders. The Association should play an important role in promoting good 
governance and actively encourage all shareholders to participate in the annual general 
meeting of the company or assign necessary voting proxy. 
PART V- BEST PRACTICES RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF 
GENERAL MEETINGS 
50. The Board of a listed company should provide to all its shareholders sufficient and 
timely information concerning the date, location and agenda of the general meeting as 
well as full and timely information regarding issues to be decided during the general 
meetings. 
5 1. The Board should make shareholder's expenses and convenience primary criteria 
when selecting venue and location of annual general meetings. 
52. The Board of a listed company should ensure that the shareholder's rights of full 
participation at general meetings are protected by: 
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(a) Giving shareholders information in a simplified and generally understandable manner: (b) Giving shareholders sufficient information on voting rules and procedures; (c) Giving shareholders the opportunity to quiz management, for this purpose, the Directors should provide sufficient time for shareholders questions on matters pertaining to the company's performance and seek to explain to their shareholders their concerns; 
(d) Giving shareholders the opportunity to place items on the agenda at general meetings; (e) Giving shareholders the opportunity to vote in absentia; 
(f) Giving shareholders the opportunity to consider the costs and benefits of their votes. 53. All shareholders should be encouraged to participate in the annual general meetings 
and to exercise their votes. 
54. Institutional investors are particularly encouraged to make direct contact with the 
company's senior management and Board members to discuss performance and corporate 
governance mattes in addition to exercising their vote during annual general meetings. 
55. Shareholders while exercising their right of participation and voting during annual 
general meetings of their company should not act in a disrespectful manner as such 
conduct may undermine company interest. 
PART VI - BEST PRACTICES RELATING TO ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
THE ROLE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES 
56. The Board should present an objective and understandable assessment of the 
company's operating position and prospects. 
57. The Board should ensure that financial statements are presented in line with 
International Financial Reporting Standards. To this end, any departure from these 
standards and the impact thereof, should be explained in the annual report. 
58. The Board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard the 
shareholders investments and assets. 
59. The Board should establish a formal and transparent arrangement for shareholders to 
effect the appointment of independent auditors at each annual general meeting. 
60. The Board should establish a formal and transparent arrangement for maintaining a 
professional interaction with the company's auditors. 
61. The Board shall establish an audit committee with a majority of independent and non- 
executive Directors, who shall report to the Board, with formal terms of reference 
addressing its authority and duties. 
62. The Chairperson of the audit committee should be an independent or non-executive 
Director, and the Board should disclose in the annual report, whether it has an audit 
committee and the mandate of that committee. 
63. Important attributes of the audit committee members should include: 
(a) Broad business knowledge relevant to the company's business; 
(b) Keen awareness of the interests of the investing public; 
(c) Familiarity with basic accounting principles; and, 
(d) Objectivity in carrying out their mandate with no conflict of interest. 
64. The Audit Committee should have adequate resources and authority to discharge their 
responsibilities, and it shall: 
(a) Be informed, vigilant and effective overseers of the financial reporting process and 
the internal controls of the company; 
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(b) Review and make recommendations on management programs established to monitor 
compliance with the code of conduct; 
(c) Consider the appointment of the external auditor, the audit fee and any questions of 
resignation or dismissal of the external auditor; 
d) Discuss with the external auditor before the audit commences, the nature and scope of 
the audit and ensure co-ordination where more that one audit firm is involved; 
e) Review management's evaluation of factors related to the independence of the 
company's external auditor. Both the audit committee and management should assist the 
external auditor in preserving its independence; 
f) Review the quarterly, half-yearly and year-end financial statements of the company, 
focusing primarily on: 
- Any changes in accounting policies and practices; 
- Significant adjustments arising from the audit; 
- The going concern assumption; and 
- Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards and other legal and 
regulatory requirements. 
(g) Discuss problems and reservations arising from the interim and final audits, and any 
matter that the external auditor may wish to discuss (in the absence of management where 
necessary); 
(h) Review the external auditor's letter(s) to the management and management's 
response; 
(i) Consider any related party transactions that may arise within the company group; 
0) Consider the major findings of the internal investigations and management's response; 
(k) Have explicit authority to investigate any matter within its terms of reference, the 
resources that its needs to do so and full access to information; 
(1) Obtain external professional advice and to invite outsiders with relevant experience to 
attend, if necessary; and, 
in) Consider other topics as defined by the Board including 
regular review of the capacity of the internal audit function. 
65. The Board should establish an internal audit function. 
66. In relation to the internal audit function, the audit committee's functions should 
include: 
(a) Review the adequacy, scope, functions and resources of the internal audit function 
and ensure that it has the necessary authority to carry out its work; 
b) Review the internal audit program and results of the internal audit process and where 
necessary ensure that appropriate action is taken on the recommendations of the internal 
audit function; 
(c) Review any appraisal or assessment of the performance of the members of the internal 
audit function; 
(d) Approve any appointment or termination of senior staff members of the internal audit 
function; 
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(e) Ensure that the internal audit function is independent of the activities of the company 
and is performed with impartiality, proficiency and due professional care; 
(f) Determine the effectiveness of the internal audit function; 
(g) Be informed of resignations of internal audit staff members and provide the resigning 
staff members an opportunity to submit reasons for resigning. 
67. The finance director, head of internal audit (where such function exists), a 
representative of the external auditors or any Board members may attend the meetings of 
the Audit Committee upon invitation by the audit committee. 
68. The Audit Committee shall meet with the external auditors at least once a year, in the 
absence of executive Board members. 
69. The Audit Committee should meet regularly with due notice of issues to be discussed 
and should record its conclusions in discharging its duties and responsibilities. 
70. The Board should disclose in an informative way, details of the activities of the Audit 
Committee, the number of audit committee meetings held in the year and details of 
attendance of each Director in respect of such meetings. 
St Issued this I day of October, 2003. 
LEO KIBIRANGO 
Chairman Capital Markets Authority (Uganda) 
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Appendix 4.1 
Strands of the Interpretive Paradigm 
Solipsism 
Solipsists are extreme idealistic subjectivists who believe that the world is the creation 
of the mind and does not have any distinct independent existence. Solipsism is 
associated with Bishop Berkeley (1685 - 1753) although Berkeley himself did not 
follow that extreme standpoint himself Burrell and Morgan (1979) explained that the 
solipsist position resulted in complete relativism and scepticism and did not give any 
significance to the notions of regulation and radical change. They, however, argue that 
solipsism is consistent with both the interpretive and radical humanist paradigms but 
point out that solipsism is of little importance within the context of contemporary 
sociology. 
Hermeneutics 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) were of the view that: 
Hermeneutics is concerned with interpreting and understanding the 
products of the human mind which characterise the social and cultural 
world. ... Human 
beings in the course of life externalise the internal 
processes of their minds through the creation of cultural artefacts which 
attain an objective character. Institutions, works of art, literature, 
languages, religions and the like are examples of this process of 
objectification. Such objectifications of the human mind are the subject of 
study in hermeneutics (p. 236). 
Dilthey (1976) argued that hermeneutics was tied to re-creating and re-living what 
transpired in the past and developing historical consciousness and that this would 
help 
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in interpreting the written records of human existence such as in exegesis. Dilthey 
further argued that social phenomena should be analysed in detail, and interpreted as 
texts, to reveal their essential meaning and significance. The tradition of hermeneutIcs 
was developed by Gadamer (1988) who argued that in order to understand social or 
cultural phenomena, the observer must enter into dialogue with the subject of stud), 
whereby there is an interchange of the frames of reference of the observer and the 
observed; language is used as the medium of intersubjectivity and as the concrete 
expression of "forms of life". As Giddens (1976) explained, hermeneutics consists in 
understanding literary art through grasping the form of life which gives it meaning 
and not just trying to place oneself "inside" the subjective experience of a text's 
author. 
Phenomenology 
The phenomenological methodology originated from German idealism (most notably, 
the work of Husserl) and developed different strands as a result of interaction with 
sociological positivism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
As a result intermediate points of view have emerged, each with its own 
distinctive configuration of assumptions about the nature of social science. 
They have all spawned theories, ideas and approaches characteristic of 
their intermediate position (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 8) 
Burrell and Morgan argued that: 
The task of epistemology is to explore and reveal the essential types and 
structures of experience. Phenomenology studies essences and clarifies the 
relationships between them; mt seeks to delve into experiences and clarify 
the very grounds of knowledge. In this endeavour the methods of "direct 
intuition" and "insight into essential structures" are offered as the principal 
means of penetrating the depths of consciousness and transcending the 
world of everyday affairs in search of subjectivity in its pure form (p. 233). 
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) divided phenomenology into (i) transcendental (or pure) 
phenomenology, and (ii) existential phenomenology. 
Transcendental phenomenology is represented by Edmund Husserl (1859 - 
1938)228 
who is widely regarded as the founder and leading exponent of the phenomenological 
movement in philosophy. Husserl characterised himself as a transcendental idealist 
and insisted that he was not a realist (Sawicki, 2005); Husserl argued that 
phenomenology studied essences and clarified the very grounds of knowledge using 
the methods of direct intuition and insight into essential structures. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) argued that: 
Husserlian phenomenology is based upon a fundamental questioning of 
the common-sense, "taken for granted" attitudes which characterise 
everyday life and the realms of natural science (p. 233). 
This is done in order to render the natural attitude of daily life an object for 
philosophical scrutiny and in order to describe and account for its essential structure 
(Natanson, 1966) . 
229Husserl himself adopted an extremely subjectivist position in 
relation to the subjective - objective dimension of Burrell and Morgan's paradigms. 
Husserl also argued that transcendental-phenomenological idealism did not deny the 
actual existence of the real world, but sought instead to clarify the sense of this world 
(which everyone accepts) as actually existing (Sawicki, 2005). However, although 
phenomenological analysis had to penetrate way beyond a superficial description of 
appearance or intuition, there were no external means of verifying reality's existence 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Husserl argued that some perceptions arose directly from 
228 Husserl's formulations of his pure phenomenology are presented in "Ideen zu einer renen 
Phenomenologie undphanomenologischen Philosophie (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy). The first volume of Ideen appeared in the first volume of 
Husserl's Jahrbuchfur Philosophie undphanomenologische Forschung in 193 L" (Sawicki M. in The 
Internet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, http: /www. iep. utm. edu/h/Husserl. htm, 5/10/2005). 
229 Quoted by Burrell and Morgan (1979: 23 3). 
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things, while others arose as objectifications of what was inherent in the very act of 
knowing (Sawicki, 2005). 
This specific research will not adopt pure phenomenology since it will assume that the 
perceptions of stakeholders, although subjective, will be based on a middle ground 
between idealism and realism. Husserl did not want his pure phenomenology to be 
identified with realism. 
The existential wing of the phenomenological movement is most often associated with 
the work of Heidegger (1889-1976)230, Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), Sartre (1905- 
1980) and Schutz (1899-1959). Heidegger was influenced by Husserl's 
phenomenology which concerned itself with the science of consciousness and its 
objects but extended it to "being" or "existence" and thus gave rise to existentialism 
(Korab-Karpowicz, 2005). Sartre was instrumental in developing a philosophy of 
existence known as "Existentialism" (Onof, C. J., 2004). Sartre himself claimed that 
the focus of existentialism was the individual as belonging to a certain social 
situation, but not totally determined by it (Sartre, 1964). 231 
Merleau-Ponty was of the view that both empiricism and intellectualism (idealism) 
were eminently flawed positions. However, Merleau-Ponty does not deny the 
possibility of cognitive relations between subject and object and accepts the fact that 
many scientific endeavours fruitfully rely upon the methodological ideal of a detached 
230 Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher, developed existential phenomenology and is regarded as 
the most original 20'h century philosopher. He was a student of Edmund Husserl at the 
University of 
Freiburg. Heidegger was also influenced by pre-Socrates, Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche 
(litlp: //www. connect. net/ron/heid. html. ) 
231 Quoted by Onon, C. J (2005) in "Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980): Existentialism", 
http: //www. iep. utni. edu/s/sartre-ex. htm (4/10/2005). 
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consciousness observing brute facts about the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the seer and 
the seen condition one another and the capacity for seeing depends on the capacity for 
the object being seen (Reynolds, 2005). Merleau-Ponty held that perception was a 
44creative receptivity" and expressed the view that: 
Perception 
... involves the perceiving subject in a situation, rather than 
positioning them as a spectator who has somehow abstracted themselves 
from the situation. There is hence an interconnection of action and 
perception ... " (Reynolds, 2005 ). 
232 
For Merleau-Ponty, perception was, therefore, was not grounded in either an objective 
or subjective component but by a reciprocal openness which resides between the 
object and the subject. Merleau-Ponty also argued that perception was learnt primarily 
through imitation, in an embodied and communal environment (Reynolds, 2005). 
Schutz searches the phenomenological analysis of meaning in the "stream of 
consciousness" and argues that consciousness is fundamentally an unbroken stream of 
lived experiences which have no meaning in themselves. Meaning is dependent upon 
reflexivity (the process of turning on oneself and looking at what has been going on 
and, thus, attaching meaning retrospectively to what has already been experienced). 
Schutz also argues that this process of attributing meaning reflexively is dependent 
upon the actors' identifying the purpose or goals which they are supposedly seeking. 
This introduces the notion of being able to attribute meaning, in advance, to future 
experiences. The concept of meaningful action thus contains elements of both the past 
and anticipated future (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). However, as Schutz proceeded to 
the study of the social world, he abandoned the strictly phenomenological method. He 
accepted the existence of the social world as presented in the natural attitude and 
232 This quotation is taken from Reynold's (2005) article: "Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-196 
1)" in 
The Internet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, hllp: //www. iep. utm. edu/m/merleau. htm 5/10/2005. 
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focused upon the problem of intersubjective understanding. Immanuel Kant (1724 - 
1803) argued that there must be inherent, in-born organising principles within man's 
consciousness by which any and all sense data is structured, arranged and thus 
understood. Kant saw a priori knowledge as independent of any external reality and 
the sense data which it "emits"; he saw a priori knowledge as the product of "mind" 
and the interpretive processes which were within the mind. Shutz postulated that 
actors applied constructs derived from the experience of everyday life and the stock of 
knowledge or common-sense understandings which comprised the natural attitude and 
that it was through the use of typifications that we classify and organise our everyday 
reality. The typifications are learned through our biogaphical situation. They are 
handed to us according to our social context; knowledge of everyday life is thus 
socially ordered. The stock of knowledge which we use to typify the actions of others 
and understand the world around us, therefore, varies from context to context. 
Phenomenological Sociology 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) examine phenomenological sociology under the headings 
of (i) ethnomethodology, and (ii) phenomenological symbolic interactionism. 
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1067; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Douglas, 1970b; and 
Wittgenstein, 1973) seeks to understand interactions between people from within 
taking into account the experiences of those people and the assumptions that they take 
for granted in accounting for their activities. Ethnomethodology also assumes Shutz's 
notions of reflexivity and indexicality. Shutz's notions of reflexivity and indexicality 
(the process of organising and ordering experiences using expressions and activities 
which are shared even though they are not explicitly stated; this is 
based on 
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reflexivity) help the participants to fonnulate typifications to classify and organise 
their lived experiences and also to anticipate the future play an important part in 
ethnomethodology. These typifications are assumed to vary according to the social 
context of the participants since, according to Shutz, typifications are learned through 
the biographical situation of the actors (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). These 
typifications draw upon various assumptions, conventions, practices and other types 
of resources available within the situation of the participants and help to shape the 
encounters of those participants (Garfinkel, 1967). 
Douglas (1970b) explains that ethnomethodology is not concerned with providing 
causal explanations of observably regular, patterned, repetitive actions by some kind 
of analysis of the actor's point of view but with how members of society go about the 
task of seeing, describing, and explaining order in the world in which they live" 
(Douglas, 1970, pp. 287 - 9). 
The ethnomethodologists are interested in the way in which actors make 
evident and persuade each other that the events and activities in which 
they are involved are coherent and consistent. They are interested in 
understanding the methods which characterise this accounting process. 
From the ethnomethodological point of view, "order" in human affairs 
does not exist independently of the accounting practices employed in its 
discovery. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 250). 
Whereas the ethnomethodolo gist usually focuses upon the way in which individual 
actors account for and make sense of their world, the phenomenological symbolic 
interactionist focuses upon social contexts in which interacting individuals employ a 
variety of practices to create and sustain particular defmitions of the world. Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) explain that phenomenological symbolic interactionism: 
... is typified 
by its emphasis upon the emergent properties of interaction, 
through which individuals create their social world rather than merely 
reacting to it. Meaning is attributed to the environment, not derived from 
and imposed upon individual actors ... (p. 25 1) 
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Appendix 6.1 
Guiding Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews 
On the Framework of Corporate Governance in Uganda 
(September 2004) 
Introduction 
The OECD Principles (1999, revised 2004) cover the following areas: 
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
li. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
Ill. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
VI. The Responsibilities of the Board. 
Objective of Research 
This research project will examine the extent to which stakeholders in Uganda 
perceive the country's present corporate governance framework as being effective in 
providing confidence about the corporate sector. The corporate governance 
framework is treated as encompassing cultural, political, economic, legal, ethical and 
technological dimensions. The analysis is conducted in the context of the division of 
responsibilities between supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities existing 
in Uganda. 
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Outline of topics to be covered: 
1- Concept of Corporate Governance 
a) What do you understand by corporate governance and what areas do you think are 
important in corporate governance? Do you think that corporate govemance is 
important in Uganda? Why should we be concerned about corporate governance? 
b) What is your assessment of the present corporate guidelines that were developed by 
the Institute of Corporate Governance in Uganda in 1999? 
c) Are you aware of the OECD guidelines? If so, are they relevant to Uganda? In your 
view, are the "Western" models of corporate governance such as the UK and the US 
codes relevant to Uganda? 
d) Do you think that the corporate governance guidelines should apply to all 
companies, whether listed or not? 
2. Accountability 
a) Which stakeholder groups have an interest in good corporate governance? Why? 
b) What is your definition of accountability? Does accountability apply to corporate 
governance in Uganda, and do you think that it should apply? 
c) Do you think that management and boards should be accountable, and, if so, to 
whom should they be accountable, and how? 
420 
I Legal, Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks 
a) Do you think that the laws we have in Uganda are adequate in ensuring an effective 
corporate governance framework? What laws, if any, need to be revised or added? 
b) Do we have an effective system of enforcing the laws that are relevant to corporate 
governance? What factors affect the enforceability of these laws? 
c) Which bodies regulate and supervise corporate governance in Uganda, and what are 
their roles? 
d) Is there a clear division of responsibilities between the different supervisory, 
regulatory/legislative, and enforcement authorities? 
e) Do these regulatory and supervisory bodies have the powers and resources 
necessary to enforce the regulations? 
4. Political Framework 
a) Which political factors affect the practice of corporate governance in Uganda and 
what, in your view, should be done to ensure a political climate that supports an 
effective corporate govemance framework? 
b) What is the role of parliamentarians in ensuring an effective corporate governance 
framework in Uganda? 
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5. Cultural Factors 
a) What cultural aspects affect the practice of corporate governance in Uganda? 
b) What position should be taken regarding these cultural factors? 
6. Ethical Factors 
Are there any ethical factors that affect the practice of corporate govemance in 
Uganda? How can these be handled? What ethical factors should be taken into 
account that might have an impact on the relationship with stakeholders and what is 
the role of stakeholders as far as ethical factors are concemed? 
7. Economic Factors 
Do economic factors influence the practice of corporate governance and, if so, (i) 
which of these affect the practice of corporate governance in Uganda and (ii) how do 
they do so? 
8. Privatisation in Uganda 
Do you think that the privatisation process in Uganda has taken into account the 
corporate governance implications for the privatised companies? Explain. 
422 
9. General 
a) What other aspects of the corporate governance framework in Uganda should be 
considered and why? 
b) What other remarks would you like to make regarding the practice of corporate 
governance and the effectiveness of the corporate governance framework in Uganda? 
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Appendix 7.1 
Letter of Introduction 
Accountancy & Business Finance 
Head of Department 
Robert A. Lyon MA CA CMA 
To Whom It May Concern 
Dear Sir / Madam, 
On behalf of the Department of Accountancy and Business Finance at the University 
of Dundee, Scotland, UK, we could be most grateful if you could take the time to 
complete the attached questionnaire survey. The survey forms a key part of Simeon 
Wanyama's doctoral research project, which is aimed at investigating corporate 
governance practices and attitudes in Uganda. It would be greatly appreciated if you 
could take the time to answer the questions. We are happy to guarantee anonymity 
regarding the questionnaire; your identity will not be revealed in the dissertation or in 
any related presentations or publications. 
If you require any further information please feel free to contact us. 
Thanking you again for your time, 
Yours faithfully, 
Professor Christine Helliar 
e-mail: c. v. helliar(cNundee. ac. uk 
Dr. Bruce Burton 
b. m. burton@dundee. ac. uk 
UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE Dundee DDI 4HN Scotland, UK +44(0)1382 344193 +44 (0) 1382 348421 
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Appendix 7.2 
UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE 
Questionnaire Survey 
On 
Governance and Accountability in Uganda. 
Contact: 
Simeon Wanyama 
Department of Accountacy & Business Finance 
University of Dundee 
DUNDEEDD14HN 
UNITED KINGDOM - SCOTLAND. 
E-mail: s. wanyama@dundee. ac. uk. 
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Q 1. Please indicate the primary category that you belong to by ticking the 
appropriate box (please tick only one box). 
Legislator Regulator 171 
Company Employee Civil Servant Fý 
Academic Accountant Fý 
Company Executive Owner-managers F-1 
Individual Investor Institutional Investor Fý 
Non-Executive Director Executive Director 
Judiciary or Legal 
Other (please specify) 
In the remainder of the questionnaire, please note the extent of your agreement 
with the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5 by ticking the appropriate box, 
where aI indicates strong disagreement and a5 strong agreement; please do not 
tick any box if you do not know the answer to the question. 
2 Concept of Corporate Governance 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
(a) The term "corporate governance" refers to an organisation's 
relationship with its owners. 
(b) The term "corporate governance" refers to an organisation's 
relationship with all those stakeholders who are affected by, or who 
affect, the organisation's decisions and activities. 
(c) The term "corporate governance" refers to an organisation's 
relationship with all members of society, irrespective of whether 
they affect or are affected by the operations of the organisation. 
(d) Improvements in corporate governance will improve the 
accountability of Ugandan firms. 
(e) Improvements in corporate governance will help to reduce the level 
of corruption in Uganda. 
(f) All companies, whether listed or not, should be governed by the same 
principles of good governance. 
(g) Good corporate governance is important in attracting foreign 
investment in Uganda. 
(h) Good corporate governance is important in attracting local 
investment in Uganda. 
(i) Good corporate governance is important for the Ugandan economy. 
Corporate social responsibility is an integral aspect of good 
corporate governance. 
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3 International Corporate Governance Guidelines 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 2 3 
(a) International guidelines of corporate governance that have been 
developed by the Western World are relevant to Uganda. 
(b) International guidelines can be adopted by developing countries 
(including Uganda) without the need to adapt them to the individual 
circumstances of these countries. 
4 Disclosure and Transparency 
Companies in Uganda should make a timely and accurate disclosure to relevant stakeholders on all 
material matters regarding the corporation in the following aspects: 
I= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 3 
(a) the financial and operating results of the company 
(b) the company objectives 
(c) major share ownership and voting rights 
(d) remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives 
(e) information about board members, including their qualifications, the 
selection process, other company directorships and whether they are 
regarded as independent by the board. 
(f) related party transactions 
(g) foreseeable risk factors 
(h) governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any 
corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is 
implemented. 
(i) material interest in any transaction or matter directly affecting the 
Corporation. 
0) the impact of the organisation's activities on society and the 
environment. 
5 Compliance with Corporate Governance Guidelines 
The following companies should comply with the principles of corporate governance issued by the 
Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda: 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 2 3 
(a) companies that are listed and publicly traded on the Uganda 
Securities Exchange. 
(b) all private sector companies irrespective of whether they are listed or 
not. 
c all state-owned corporations. 
427 
6 The Framework of Corporate Governance 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 2 45 (a) There are adequate and effective laws that promote the practice of 
good corporate governance in Uganda. 
(b) The legal system could help to improve corporate governance in 
Uganda. 
(c) The legal system could help to improve accountability in Uganda. 
(d) The legal system could help to reduce corruption in Ugandan 
companies. 
(e) The enforcement agencies have the power and authority to enforce 
compliance with laws and regulations in Uganda. 
(f) Ugandan regulatory and enforcement authorities are effective in 
enforcing compliance with laws and regulations. 
(g) Corruption in Uganda affects the ability of regulatory authorities to 
enforce compliance with corporate governance principles and 
accountability. 
(h) The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda is effective 
in enforcing good accounting and financial reporting practices. 
(i) The privatisation of state-owned enterprises has improved the practice 
of corporate governance in those companies. 
The practice of corporate governance in listed companies in Uganda is 
satisfactory. 
(k) The practice of corporate governance in un-listed companies in 
Uganda is satisfactory. 
(1) Foreign owned companies have better corporate governance practices 
than Ugandan-owned companies. 
(in) The political climate in Uganda is conducive to the practice of good 
corporate governance in private sector companies. 
(n) The political climate in Uganda is conducive to the practice of good 
corporate gove ance in public sector companies. 
(o) The state of the economy in Uganda affects the practice of corporate 
governance. 
(p) Social factors affect the practice of corporate governance in Uganda. 
(q) Cultural factors affect the practice of corporate governance in 
Uganda. 
(r) Ethical factors affect the practice of corporate governance in Uganda 
(s) Listed companies that do not comply with corporate governance 
guidelines should explain and justify their non-compliance. 
(t) Listed companies that do not explain and justify their non-compliance 
with corporate governance guidelines and should be de-listed. 
(u) Voluntary corporate governance guidelines should be replaced with 
regulations which are legally binding and enforceable. 
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7 Factors that affect corporate governance: 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement as to whether the following factors affect the practice of corporate governance in private sector and public sector (Government- 
owned) corporations. 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
(i) Private Sector 
Corporations 
(ii) Public Sector 
Corporations 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(a) Corruption and bribery 
(b) Conflicts of interest 
(c) Political interference 
(d) Lack of political will to combat 
corruption 
(e) Lack of political will to enforce 
compliance 
(f) Incompetent personnel 
(g) Sectarianism 
(h) Non-compliance with laws and 
regulations 
(i) Inadequate infrastructure and 
resources for regulatory and 
enforcemejt agencies 
Insignificant fines which do not 
encourage compliance with laws 
(k) fear and respect for the authority 
of elders 
(1) fear and respect for those in 
authority. 
The Composition of the Board 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 
(a) The majority of the members of the board should be independent 
non-executive directors. 
(b) The Chairman of the board should be an independent non-executive 
director. 
(c) The Chief Executive should not at the same time be the Chairman of 
the board. 
9 The Responsibilities of the Board 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
(a) All Board members in Uganda should be provided with sufficient 
information about the company to enable them make informed 
decisions. 
(b) All Board members should be provided with equal, accurate, timely 
and cost efficient access to relevant information about the company. 
(c) All Board members should act in good faith, with due diligence and 
care, and in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. 
(d) All Board members should play an important role in ensuring the 
integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting 
systems. 
(e) Non-executive board members should play an important role in 
ensuring that the board exercises objective independent judgement on 
corporate affairs. 
(f) The nomination and election process of board members should be 
formal and transparent. 
(g) All Boards should always treat all shareholders fairly, particularly 
when board decisions may affect different shareholder groups 
differently. 
(h) All Boards should take into account the interests of other 
stakeholders when making decisions. 
(i) All Boards should monitor the effectiveness of their company's 
Governance practices and make changes as needed. 
All Boards should align key executive and board remuneration 
(incentives) with the longer-term interests of the company and its 
shareholders. 
(k) All Boards should be responsible for selecting, compensating, 
monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and 
overseeing succession planning. 
(1) All Boards should monitor and manage potential conflicts of interest 
of management, board members and shareholders, including the misuse 
of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions. 
10 Board Committees 
Companies should have the following committees of the board: 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 2 3 4 5 
(a) Audit Committee - to oversee the accounting and financial reporting 
policies and processes and to liaise with internal and external auditors. 
(b) Remuneration Committee - to assist in determining the company's 
policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages 
for each of the Executive Directors. 
(c) Nomination Committee - to lead the process for board 
appointments, make recommendations to the board and be involved with 
succession planning in the company. 
(d) Governance Committee - to scrutinize all matters relating to 
corporate governance in the company. 
(e) Risk Committee - to assess and monitor the risks that the company 
is facing, especially financial risks. 
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Composition of Board Committees 
I= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 2 3 
i 
(a) Audit Committees should be composed of ONLY non-executive 
directors who are independent of the company. 
(b) Remuneration Committees should be composed of ONLY 
non-executive directors who are independent of the company. 
(c) Nomination Committee - the majority of members of the nomination 
committee should be independent non-executive directors. 
12 Stakeholders and corruption. 
Please note your agreement with the following statements: 
= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
(i) The term "stakeholder" 
includes the following: 
(ii) The following are 
affected by corruption in 
Ugandan corp rations: 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(a) Shareholders 
(b) Suppliers 
(c) Customers 
(d) Financial Institutions 
(e) Environmental groups 
(f) Regulatory and enforcement 
agencies 
(g) Members of Parliament 
(h) The Judiciary 
(i) The Government 
All persons who affect or are 
affected by the company's 
activities 
(k) Society as a whole. 
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13 The Board and accountability to stakeholders 
I= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
(i) The Boards are 
accountable to the following: 
(ii) The Boards are 
responsible for maintaining 
relations with the following: 
1 2 3_ 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(a) Shareholders 
(b) Suppliers 
(c) Customers 
(d) Financial Institutions 
(e) Environmental groups 
(f) Regulatory and enforcement 
agencies 
(g) Policy makers (including the 
Members of Parliament) 
(h) The Judiciary 
(i) The Government 
All persons who affect or are 
affected by the company's 
activities 
(k) Society as a whole. 
14 Rights of Stakeholders 
1= Strongly Disagree 5= Strongly Agree 
Statement 1 2 3 
(a) In Uganda, the rights of stakeholders that are established by the law 
are respected by companies. 
(b) The rights of stakeholders that are established through mutual 
agreements are respected by companies. 
(c) Where stakeholder interests are protected by the law, stakeholders 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress through the courts of law 
for violation of their rights. 
(d) Employees can freely communicate their concerns about illegal or 
unethical practices to the board without fear of adverse consequences 
to themselves for doing so. 
(e) There is adequate legal protection of stakeholders such as creditors, in 
the event of a company becoming insolvent or bankrupt. 
(f) Companies generally act in a responsible manner and respect the 
rights of the community, even though some of these rights are not 
enshrined in the law. 
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15 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
Does the ownership structure of companies affect the practice of corporate governance in Ugandan 
companies? 
Yes F-I 
No 
I do not know 
The following Section should be completed by respondents who work in 
companies. Non-company respondents, please go to Q. 20. 
16 Biographic Data 
Your Position in the Organisation ............................................................. 
Number of Years in the Organisation ........................................................ 
Name of Organisation (Optional) ............................................................. 
17 Ownership 
Please indicate the approximate percentage of your company that is owned by the following: 
Category Percentage 
Owner-managers 
Family 
Individual investors 
Institutions 
Government 
Other (specify) .......................................... 
18 Please indicate the total sales (turnover) of your company in Ugandan Shillings: 
Shs ....................................................................................................... 
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19 Accounting Standards 
(a) Please indicate which accounting standards your company uses by ticking the appropriate box 
W US Accounting Standards 
(ii) UK Accounting Standards 
(iii) International Accounting Standards 
(iv) Ugandan Accounting Standards 
(v) I do not know 
(vi) Other (please specify) 
....................................... ........................... ................ 
(b) Does your company have an annual audit conducted by an independent, competent and 
qualified, auditor? 
Yes F-I 
No F-I 
I do not know F-I 
(c) Are the external auditors accountable to the shareholders? 
Yes F-I 
No Iý 
I do not know 171 
Please go to Q. 20. 
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20 Please list any other factors that you feel may affect the practice of corporate governance in Uganda. 
. ....................................................................................... 
. .......................................................................................... 
. .......................................................................................... 
. .......................................................................................... 
. .......................................................................................... 
f........................................................................................... 
9........................................................................................... 
h............................................................................................ 
21 Other Comments 
Please make any other comments that you think are relevant to the practice of corporate 
governance in Uganda. 
Thank you for taking time to respond to this questionnaire. 
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Appendix 7.3 
Frequencies 
Variable Choices Total Missing Grand 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Q2(a) 40 18 44 28 15 145 8 158 
Q2(b) 4 5 18 38 82 147 6 158 
Q2(c) 21 22 25 26 50 144 9 158 
Q2(d) 4 3 18 34 87 146 7 158 
Q2(e) 6 9 26 31 77 149 4 158 
Q2(f) 7 5 13 27 97 149 4 158 
Q2(g) 5 4 18 31 87 145 8 158 
Q2(h) 12 11 26 38 60 147 6 158 
Q2(i) 1 2 15 26 102 146 7 158 
Q20) 2 3 16 39 86 146 7 158 
Q3(a) 18 16 34 50 29 147 6 158 
Q3(b) 32 30 32 33 19 146 7 158 
Q4(a) 0 0 10 28 114 152 1 158 
Q4(b) 0 1 9 21 121 152 1 158 
Q4(c) 1 6 14 40 88 149 4 158 
Q4(d) 6 9 17 33 83 148 5 158 
Q4(e) 2 4 13 40 91 150 3 158 
Q4(ý 7 8 26 43 65 149 4 158 
Q4(g) 3 7 28 39 69 146 7 158 
Q4(h) 1 3 17 34 95 150 3 158 
Q4(i) 4 7 30 29 80 150 3 158 
Q40) 2 7 13 40 89 151 2 158 
Q5(a) 2 0 5 16 123 146 7 158 
Q5(b) 9 11 26 38 
- 
64 148 5 158 
Q5(c) 2 0 5 13 130 150 3 158 
Q6(a) 34 40 41 19 12 146 7 158 
Q6(b) 3 3 26 64 54 150 3 158 
Q6(c) 6 5 22 67 50 150 3 158 
Q6(d) 7 16 22 47 59 151 2 158 
Q6(e) 18 31 49 37 15 150 3 158 
Q6(q 37 65 28 10 6 146 7 158 
Q6(g) 12 12 16 36 74 150 3 158 
Q6(h) 17 34 60 27 7 145 8 158 
Q6(i) 22 30 46 44 9 151 2 158 
Q60) 11 - 44 - 50 33 8 146 7 158 
Q6(k) 32 51 41 9 10 143 10 
158 
Q6(1) 8 10 50 46 36 150 3 _1 
58 
CO 
Q6(m) 28 35 48 29 7 147 6 
150 
Q6(n) 46 38 35 21 8 148 
5 158 
Q6(o) 6 10 38 51 44 149 4 _1 
58 
Q6( ) 9 14 44 48 35 150 
3 158 
p - -- - Q6( ) 18 16 33 53 29 149 
4 158 
q 
Q6(r) 5 13 24 48 57 147 
6 158 
_ 
Q6(s) 3 5 13 37 90 148 
5 158 
Q6 t 18 15 24 33 58 148 
5 158 
( ) 
- -- Q6(u) 15 12 24 35 62 148 
5 158 
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Variable Choices Total Missing Grand 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Q7(a)(i) 10 28 22 23 65 148 5 158 
Q7(a)(ii) 1 2 4 17 125 149 4 158 
Q7(b)(i) 9 13 29 40 52 143 9 158 
Q7(b)(ii) 3 3 9 36 98 149 4 158 
Q7(c)(i) 22 27 33 27 36 145 8 158 
Q7(c)(H) 1 2 4 15 125 147 6 158 
Q7(d)(i) 25 25 28 28 36 142 11 158 
Q7(d)(H) 5 4 10 22 104 145 8 158 
Q7(e)(i) 24 20 33 36 28 141 12 158 
Q7(e)(H) 3 6 15 32 87 143 10 158 
Q7(ý(i) 25 33 32 30 24 144 9 158 
Q7(ý(ii) 6 13 20 41 67 147 6 158 
Q7(g)(i) 15 26 29 35 36 141 12 158 
Q7(g)(H) 2 3 22 40 77 144 9 158 
Q7(h)(i) 11 22 25 35 48 141 12 158 
Q7(h)(ii) 2 14 26 43 58 143 10 158 
Q7(i)(i) 13 24 31 29 47 144 9 158 
Q7(i)(H) 12 14 22 41 59 148 5 158 
Q70)(i) 13 15 28 35 49 140 13 158 
Q70)(ii) 8 13 19 41 64 145 8 158 
Q7(k)(i) 34 35 32 23 18 
_142 
11 158 
Q7(k)(ii) 30 26 27 27 35 145 8 158 
Q7(1)(i) 18 22 36 28 39 143 10 158 
Q7(1)(ii) 15 13 22 40 58 148 5 158 
Q8(a) 5 6 22 42 77 152 1 158 
Q8(b) 9 10 13 20 101 158 0 158 
Q8(c) 5 2 10 14 121 152 1 158 
Q9(a) 0 0 4 10 139 158 0 158 
Q9(b) 1 1 4 23 124 158 0 158 
Q9(c) 0 0 4 21 128 158 0 158 
Q9(d) 1 0 7 30 114 152 1 158 
Q9(e) 2 4 11 37 96 150 3 158 
Q9(0 
Q9(g) 
0 
0 
1 
2 
11 
2 
21 
34 
119 
113 
152 
151 
1 
2 
158 
158 
Q9(h) 3 3 12 22 112 152 1 158 
Qg(i) 2 3 15 26 105 151 2 158 
Q90) 1 3 14 35 98_ 151 2 158 
Q9(k) 4 2 16 33 97 152 1 158 
Q90) 3 4 8 33 105 158 0 158 
QIO(a) 
QIO(b) 
2 
3 
2 
6 
8 
22 
14 
35 
126 
85 
152 
151 
1 
2 
158 
158 
Q10(c) 6 10 21 33 82 152 1 158 
Q10(d) 4 6 14 35 93 152 1 158 
Q10(e) 6 9 20 26 91 152 1 158 
Q11(a) 14 15 19 28 77 158 0 158 
Q 11 (b) 14 20 31 34 53 152 1 158 
QJJ(C) 11 8 30 42 60 151 2 158 
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Variable Choices Total Miýý* Grand 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Q12(a)(i) 4 2 6 9 1 29 150 3 158 
Q12(a)(ii) 3 5 4 17 _ 122 151 2 158 
Q12(b)(i) 4 5 9 22 110 150 3 158 
Q12(b)(ii) 5 3 8 17 120 158 0 158 
Q12(c)(i) 4 6 8 17 114 149 4 158 
Q12(c)(ii) 7 3 8 19 115 152 1 158 
Q12(d)(i) 4 6 10 35 93 148 5 158 
Q12(d)(ii) 8 9 22 23 89 151 2 158 
Q12(e)(i) 5 10 22 29 80 146 7 158 
Q12(e)(ii) 7 18 28 24 72 149 4 158 
Q12(f)(i) 6 10 18 25 89 148 5 158 
Q12(%i) 3 10 19 30 85 147 6 158 
Q12(g)(i) 21 23 25 26 52 147 6 158 
Q12(g)(ii) 16 16 27 25 64 148 5 158 
Q12(h)(i) 24 23 28 28 43 146 7 158 
Q12(h)(ii) 17 17 31 21 61 147 6 158 
Q12(i)(i) 8 8 9 23 99 147 6 158 
Q12(i)(ii) 3 6 12 22 106 149 4 158 
Q120)(i) 5 3 12 16 ill 147 6 158 
Q120)(ii) 4 5 20 25 95 149 4 158 
Q12(k)(i) 11 16 16 17 86 146 7 158 
Q12(k)(ii) 8 3 8 22 109 150 3 158 
Q13(a)(i) 4 4 2 13 126 149 4 158 
Q13(a)(ii) 1 2 5 14 123 145 8 158 
Q13(b)(i) 30 24 36 27 31 148 5 158 
Q13(b)(ii) 18 12 24 25 64 143 10 158 
Q13(c)(i) 18 16 24 35 54 147 6 158 
Q13(c)(ii) 13 10 21 26 73 143 10 158 
Q13(d)(i) 10 9 27 42 60 148 5 158 
Q13(d)(ii) 6 8 26 28 75 143 10 158 
Q13(e)(i) 9 19 35 36 45 144 9 158 
Q13(e)(ii) 7 25 33 20 55 140 13 158 
Q13(%) 4 5 25 39 72 145 8 158 
Q13(%i) 5 11 23 30 73 142 11 158 
Q13(g)(i) 7 12 26 33 68 146 7 158 
Q13(g)(ii) 5 13 19 33 74 144 9 158 
Q13(h)(i) 13 26 27 37 40 143 10 158 
Q13(h)(ii) 13 23 27 23 52 138 15 158 
Q13(i)(i) 8 8 16 36 77 145 8 158 
Q13(i)(ii) 1 8 17 29 85 140 13 158 
Q130)(i) 10 18 24 33 58 143 10 158 
Q130)(ii) 7 16 23 23 70 139 14 158 
Q13(k)(i) 14 15 24 28 65 146 7 158 
Q13(k)(ii) 9 18 19 23 71 140 13 158 
Q14(a) 25 31 57 25 11 149 4 158 
Q14(b) 12 22 63 39 13 149 4 158 
Q1 4(c) 9 23 41 42 32 147 6 158 
Q14(d) 55 48 20 19 6 148 5 158 
Q14(e) 18 33 53 30 13 147 6 158 
Q14(ý 33 45 38 1 24 8 148 5 1 158 _j 
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Appendix 7.4 
Andersen-Darling Normality Test 
Average StdDev A-Squared P-Val 
Q2(a) 2.72 1.33 5.896 0.00 
Q2(b) 4.29 0.99 15.456 0.000 
Q2(c) 3.43 1.46 7.433 0.000 
Q2(d) 4.35 0.97 17.256 0.000 
Q2(e) 4.10 1.14 13.435 0.000 
Q2(ý 4.36 1.08 21.864 0.000 
Q2(g) 4.32 1.03 17.484 0.000 
Q2(h) 3.84 1.27 9.490 0.000 
Q2(i) 4.55 0.79 24.292 0.000 
Q20) 4.40 0.87 16.950 0.000 
Q3(a) 3.38 1.26 6.102 0.000 
Q3(b) 2.84 1.35 4.976 0.000 
Q4(a) 4.68 0.59 30.811 0.000 
Q4(b) 4.72 0.60 34.565 0.000 
Q4(c) 4.40 0.87 17.625 0.000 
Q4(d) 4.20 1.12 16.031 0.000 
Q4(e) 4.43 0.86 18.503 0.000 
Q4(ý 4.01 1.12 10.503 0.000 
Q4(g) 4.12 1.02 11.421 0.000 
Q4(h) 4.46 0.82 20.257 0.000 
Q4(i) 4.16 1.07 14.379 0.000 
Q40) 4.37 0.92 16.950 0.000 
Q5(a) 4.77 0.64 36.476 0.000 
Q5(b) 3.93 1.21 10.165 0.000 
Q5(c) 4.79 0.63 40.351 0.000 
Q6(a) 2.55 1.22 5.187 0.000 
Q6(b) 4.09 0.89 10.081 0.000 
Q6(c) 4.00 0.99 10.340 0.000 
Q6(d) 3.89 1.17 9.597 0.000 
Q6(e) 3.00 1.16 4.792 0.000 
Q6(ý 2.20 1.03 8.354 0.000 
Q6(g) 3.99 1.28 13.770 0.000 
Q6(h) 2.81 1.03 5.943 0.000 
Q6(i) 2.92 1.15 5.719 0.000 
Q60) 2.88 1.02 5.859 0.000 
Q6(k) 2.40 1.11 6.367 0.000 
Q6(l) 3.61 1.09 6.467 0.000 
Q6(m) 2.67 1.14 5.229 0.000 
Q6(n) 2.37 1.21 6.434 0.000 
Q6(o) 3.79 1.07 7.085 0.000 
Q6(p) 3.57 1.13 5.985 0.000 
Q6(q) 3.40 1.26 6.498 0.000 
Q6(r) 3.95 1.10 9.140 0.000 
Q6(s) 4.39 0.93 18.422 0.000 
Q6(t) 3.66 1.40 9.187 0.000 
Q6(u) 3.79 1.34 10.095_ _ 
0.000 
Q7(a)(i) 3.71 1.37 10.784 0.000 
Q7(a)(ii) 4.77 0.63 37.040 0.000 
Q7(b)(i) 3.79 1.21 7.704 0.000 
Q7(b)(ii) 4.50 0.86 21.611 0.000 
Q7(c)(i) 3.19 1.40 5.208 0.000 
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Q7 ii 
Average StdDev A-Squared P-Value (c)( ) 
Q7 d i 
4.78 0.6 
-- 
37.851 0.000 ( )( ) 
Q7 d ii 
3.18 1.4ý 5.492 0.000 ( )( ) 
Q7 i 
4.49 0.99 25.843 0.000- (e)( ) 3.17 
- 
1.36 4.952 0 000 Q7 i . 1 (e)( g 4. Y6 0.97 17.769 0 000-7 Q7 . (%) 
Q7(ý(ii) 
Q7(g)(i) 
Q7(g)(ii) 
2.97 
4.02 
3.36 
4.30 
1.35 
1.15 
1.33 
0.90 
4.616 
11.301 
5.260 
14.075 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000---ý 
0.000 
Q7(h)(i) 3.62 1.31 6.998 0.000 
Q7(h)(ii) 3.99 1.05 9.201 0.000 
Q7(i)(i) 3.51 1.34 6.478 0.000 
Q7(i)(ii) 3.82 1.28 9.599 0.000 
Q70)(i) 3.66 1.31 7.133 0.000- 
Q70)(ii) 3.97 1.20 10.847 0.000 
Q7(k)(i) an 2.69 1.34 5.027 0.000 
Q7(k)(ii) 3.08 1.47 5.803 0.000 
Q7(l)(i) 3.34 1.36 5.339 0.000 
Q7(1)(ii) 3.76 1.33 9.590 0.000 
Q8(a) 4.18 1.04 13.513 0.000 
Q8(b) 4.27 1.21 23.585 0.000 
Q8(c) 4.61 0.92 34.243 0.000 
Q9(a) 4.88 0.40 48.229 0.000 
Q9(b) 4.75 0.60 34.886 0.000 
Q9(c) 4.81 0.46 40.124 0.000 
Q9(d) 4.68 0.62 29.343 0.000 
Q9(e) 4.47 0.85 20.539 0.000 
Q9(D 4.70 0.63 33.457 0.000 
Q9(g) 4.71 0.56 29.898 0.000 
Q9(h) 4.56 0.87 28.225 0.000 
Qg(i) 4.52 0.86 24.629 0.000 
Q90) 4.50 0.80 21.336 0.000 
Q9(k) 4.43 0.93 20.577 0.000 
Qg(l) 4.52 0.87 24.354 0.000 
Q10(a) 4.71 0.74 37.187 0.000 
Ql O(b) 4.28 0.99 16.002 0.000 
Ql O(C) 4.15 1.13 15.087 0.000 
Q1 O(d) 4.36 0.99 19.254 0.000 
Q10(e) 4.23 1.13 18.430 0.000 
Q 11 (a) 3.91 1.36 14.027 0.000 
Ql 1 (b) 3.61 1.33 7.482 0.000 
Ql 1 (C) 3.87 1.21 9.435 0.000 
Q12(a)(i) 4.71 0.83 40.706 0.000 
Q12(a)(ii) 4.66 0.85 35.291 0.000 
Q12(b)(i) 4.53 0.95 28.018 0.000 
Q12(b)(ii) 4.59 0.93 33.376 0.000 
Q12(c)(i) 4.55 0.96 30.952 0.000 
Q12(c)(ii) 4.53 1.02 31.067 0.000 
Q12(d)(i) 4.40 0.97 20.061 0.000 
Q12(d)(ii) 4.17 1.20 17.788 0.000 
Q12(e)(i) 4.16 1.12 14.787 0.000 
Q12(e)(ii) 3.91 1.26 12.021 0.000 
Q12(D(i) 4.22 1.15 18.245 0.000 
Q12(D(ii) 4.25 1.05 16.626 0.000 
Q12(g)(i) 3.44 1.46 7.771 0.000 
Q12(g)(ii) 3.71 1.40 10.069 0.000 
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Q12(h)(i) 
Average 
3.29 
StdDev 
1.45 
A-Squared 
6.323 
P-Value 
0.000 
Q12(h)(ii) 3.63 1.42 9.263 0.000 
Q12(i)(i) 4.34 1.16 23.875 0.000 
Q12(i)(ii) 4.49 0.95 25.921 0.000 
Q120)(i) 4.53 0.97 29.325 0.000 
Q120)(ii) 4.36 1.01 20.290 0.000 
Q12(k)(i) 4.03 1.35 17.874 0.000 
Q12(k)(ii) 4.47 1.06 28.354 0.000 
Q13(a)(i) 4.70 0.85 39.143 0.000 
Q13(a)(ii) 4.77 0.65 37.277 0.000 
Q13(b)(i) 3.03 1.42 5.182 0.000 
Q13(b)(ii) 3.73 1.42 10.680 0.000 
Q13(c)(i) 3.62 1.39 8.431 0.000 
Q13(c)(ii) 3.95 1.33 13.240 0.000 
Q13(d)(i) 3.90 1.20 9.534 0.000 
Q13(d)(ii) 4.10 1.14 13.224 0.000 
Ql 3(e)(i) 3.62 1.23 6.220 0.000 
Q13(e)(ii) 3.65 1.30 8.417 0.000 
Q13(%) 4.17 1.02 12.295 0.000 
Q13(ý(ii) 4.09 1.14 12.760 0.000 
Q13(g)(i) 3.98 1.19 11.029 0.000 
Q13(g)(ii) 4.10 1.15 13.250 0.000 
Q13(h)(i) 3.45 1.31 5.875 0.000 
Q13(h)(ii) 3.57 1.38 7.563 0.000 
Q13(i)(i) 4.14 1.16 14.629 0.000 
Q13(i)(ii) 4.35 0.95 17.495 0.000 
Q130)(i) 3.78 1.29 8.869 0.000 
Ql 30)(ii) 3.96 1.26 12.136 0.000 
Q13(k)(i) 3.79 1.36 10.525 0.000 
Q13(k)(ii) 3.92 1.32 12.694 0.000 
Q1 4(a) 2.77 1.14 5.397 0.000 
Q14(b) 3.13 1.04 6.353 0.000 
Q1 4(c) 3.44 1.17 5.159 0.000 
Q14(d) 2.14 1.17 9.172 0.000 
Q14(e) 2.91 1.13 4.885 0.000 
Q14(o 2.52 1.16 5.423 0.000 
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APPENDIX 7.6 
Summary of the Mann Whitney Test 
Q 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
CIO) 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
CEA) 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
EDO) 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
ACAD) 
Gp 
(CIO, 
__gEA) 
Gp 
(CIO, 
EDO) 
Gp 
(CIO, 
_ACAD) 
Gp 
(CEA 
EDO) 
Gp 
(CEA, 
ACAD) 
Gp 
(EDO 
ACAD) 
Q2(a) 0.05* 
Q2(c) 0.01 0.05* 0.02* 0.03* 
Q2(d) 0.01* 0.05* 
Q2(e) 0.01* 0.02* 0.00* 
Q2(g) 0.02* 0.02* 
Q2(h) 0.00* 0.05* 0.00* 
Q2(i) 0.05* 
Q3(a) 0.01* 0.03* 
Q3(b) 0.02* 0.04* 0.01* 
Q4(a) 0.05* 0.01 
Q4(b) 0.04* 
Q4(d) 0.05* 
Q4(ý 0.02* 0.02* 
Q4(g) 0.04 0.04* 0.04* _ 
Q40) 0.01 * 0.04* 
Q5(b) 0.01 * 
Q6(b) 0.02* 0.05* 0.01* 
Q6(c) 0.01 * 0.00* 0.02* 0.01* 
Q6(d) 0.02* 0.04* 0.02* 0.04* 0.15 
Q6(e) 0.00* 0.00* 0.05* 
Q6(i) 0.01 
Q60) 0.05* 
Q6(o) 0.04* 
Q6(r) 0.01*- 
Q6(s) 0.03* 
Q6(t) 0.03* 
Q6(u) 0.01*- 
Q7(a)(i) 0.05* 
Q7(b)(i) 
Q7(b)(ii) 
0-05* 0.05* 0.03* 
0.02*_ 
Q7(d)(i) 
Q7(e)(ii) 
Q7(h)(i) 
0.03* 0.05* 
0.05* 
0.05* 0.03* 
Q7(i)(i) 
Q7(i)(ii) 
0.05* 
0.03* 0.03* 
Q7(k)(i) 
Q7(k)(ii) 
Q7(1)(i) 
Q8(b) 
- 
ZO. 
0 
0.05* 0.01* 
0.04* 
0.04* 
0.03__ 
0.02* 
- 0.04* 
Q8(c) 
Q9(g) - ---- 
0.02* 0.05* 
0.04* 0.05 
Q9(h) 
Qg(i) 
0.01* 
0.01 * 0.02* 
* * Q90) 0.01 0.05 
* Q9(k) 
Qg(l) 
0.01 
0.00* 0.02* 
0.01 
0.01 
QI 0(d) 
Q10(e) 
Q 11 (b) 
Ql 1 (c) 0.05* 
0.05* 
0.04* 0.04* 0.66 
In nA* 
Q 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
CIO) 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
CEA) 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
_JýDO) 
Gp 
(LRJ, 
_ACAD) 
Gp 
(CIO, 
CEA) 
Gp 
(CIO, 
EDO) 
Gp 
(CIO, 
ACAD) 
Gp Gp Gp 
(CEA (c E A. (EDO 
EDO) IACAD) ACAD) Q12(a)(ii) 
0 05* 
. Q12(b)(ii) 0.03* 0.83 0 04* 0 65 _ 0 03* 
Q12(d)(ii) . . . 
Q12(g)(i) 0.05* 
Q12(g)(ii) 0.67 0.97 
Q12(h)(i) 0.05* 0.03* 
Q12( )(ii) 0.04* 
Q120)(ii) 0.05* 
Q13(a)(i) 0.05* 
Q13(a)(ii) 0.04* 0.04* 0.02* 0.02* 
Q13(b)(ii) 0.01* 0.05* 0.00* 0.03* 
Q13(c)(ii) 0.04* 0.00* 
Q13(d)(i) 0.05* 
Q13(d)(ii) 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Q13(e)(ii) 0.04* 0.00* 0.02* 
Q13(ý(i) 0.04* 
Q13(%i) 0.02 
Q13(h)(i) 0.04* 0.00* 0.05 
Q13(i)(i) 0.01* 0.04* _ 0.05* 
Q130)(i) 0.02* 0.01 * 
Q13(k)(i) 0.02* 0.03* 
Q14(a) 0.04* 
Q14(b) 0.04* 
Q14(e) 0.01* 
Q14(o 0.04* 
Total # 8 6 10 10 12 20 9 22 23 23 
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